Your browser doesn't support javascript.

Portal Regional da BVS

Informação e Conhecimento para a Saúde

Home > Pesquisa > ()
Imprimir Exportar

Formato de exportação:

Exportar

Email
Adicionar mais destinatários
| |

How Not to Argue for Selective Reproductive Procedures.

Kennedy Inst Ethics J; 27(2): 185-215, 2017.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28736419
Many bioethicists try to secure a moral requirement to select against disability, while wishing to avoid denigrating disabled people. Dan Brock's arguments are representative of this attempt. Brock argues that the harm of giving birth to a disabled child when an able child could be had in its stead is a "nonperson-affecting harm." The harm is creating a world with less opportunity and more diminishment of opportunity. I argue that the presumptions that a life with disability is ceteris paribus a worse life, and that there is an inherent badness in living with a disability are contestable and fail to provide an argument that avoids the objections that disability scholars have voiced to reproductive selection against disability.