Rickettsia parkeri Rickettsiosis in Kidney Transplant Recipient, North Carolina, USA, 2023.

Spotted fever rickettsiosis is rarely observed in solid organ transplant recipients, and all previously reported cases have been associated with tick bite months to years after transplantation. We describe a kidney transplant recipient in North Carolina, USA, who had a moderately severe Rickettsia parkeri infection develop during the immediate posttransplant period.

Incomplete tissue product tracing during an investigation of a tissue-derived tuberculosis outbreak.

In the United States, there is currently no system to track donated human tissue products to individual recipients. This posed a challenge during an investigation of a nationwide tuberculosis outbreak that occurred when bone allograft contaminated with Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Lot A) was implanted into 113 patients in 18 US states, including 2 patients at 1 health care facility in Colorado. A third patient at the same facility developed spinal tuberculosis with an isolate genetically identical to the Lot A outbreak strain. However, health care records indicated this patient had received bone allograft from a different donor (Lot B). We investigated the source of this newly identified infection, including the possibilities of Lot B donor infection, product switch or contamination during manufacturing, product switch at the health care facility, person-to-person transmission, and laboratory error. The findings included gaps in tissue traceability at the health care facility, creating the possibility for a product switch at the point of care despite detailed tissue-tracking policies. Nationally, 6 (3.9%) of 155 Lot B units could not be traced to final disposition. This investigation highlights the critical need to improve tissue-tracking systems to ensure unbroken traceability, facilitating investigations of recipient adverse events and enabling timely public health responses to prevent morbidity and mortality.

Second Nationwide Tuberculosis Outbreak Caused by Bone Allografts Containing Live Cells - United States, 2023.

During July 7-11, 2023, CDC received reports of two patients in different states with a tuberculosis (TB) diagnosis following spinal surgical procedures that used bone allografts containing live cells from the same deceased donor. An outbreak associated with a similar product manufactured by the same tissue establishment (i.e., manufacturer) occurred in 2021. Because of concern that these cases represented a second outbreak, CDC and the Food and Drug Administration worked with the tissue establishment to determine that this product was obtained from a donor different from the one implicated in the 2021 outbreak and learned that the bone allograft product was distributed to 13 health care facilities in seven states. Notifications to all seven states occurred on July 12. As of December 20, 2023, five of 36 surgical bone allograft recipients received laboratory-confirmed TB disease diagnoses; two patients died of TB. Whole-genome sequencing demonstrated close genetic relatedness between positive Mycobacterium tuberculosis cultures from surgical recipients and unused product. Although the bone product had tested negative by nucleic acid amplification testing before distribution, M. tuberculosis culture of unused product was not performed until after the outbreak was recognized. The public health response prevented up to 53 additional surgical procedures using allografts from that donor; additional measures to protect patients from tissue-transmitted M. tuberculosis are urgently needed.

Transfusion-Transmitted Cache Valley Virus Infection in a Kidney Transplant Recipient With Meningoencephalitis.

BACKGROUND: Cache Valley virus (CVV) is a mosquito-borne virus that is a rare cause of disease in humans. In the fall of 2020, a patient developed encephalitis 6 weeks following kidney transplantation and receipt of multiple blood transfusions. METHODS: After ruling out more common etiologies, metagenomic next-generation sequencing (mNGS) of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) was performed. We reviewed the medical histories of the index kidney recipient, organ donor, and recipients of other organs from the same donor and conducted a blood traceback investigation to evaluate blood transfusion as a possible source of infection in the kidney recipient. We tested patient specimens using reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), the plaque reduction neutralization test, cell culture, and whole-genome sequencing. RESULTS: CVV was detected in CSF from the index patient by mNGS, and this result was confirmed by RT-PCR, viral culture, and additional whole-genome sequencing. The organ donor and other organ recipients had no evidence of infection with CVV by molecular or serologic testing. Neutralizing antibodies against CVV were detected in serum from a donor of red blood cells received by the index patient immediately prior to transplant. CVV neutralizing antibodies were also detected in serum from a patient who received the co-component plasma from the same blood donation. CONCLUSIONS: Our investigation demonstrates probable CVV transmission through blood transfusion. Clinicians should consider arboviral infections in unexplained meningoencephalitis after blood transfusion or organ transplantation. The use of mNGS might facilitate detection of rare, unexpected infections, particularly in immunocompromised patients.

Fatal Invasive Mold Infections after Transplantation of Organs Recovered from Drowned Donors, United States, 2011-2021.

Drowned organ donors can be exposed to environmental molds through the aspiration of water; transplantation of exposed organs can cause invasive mold infections in recipients. We describe 4 rapidly fatal cases of potentially donor-derived invasive mold infections in the United States, highlighting the importance of maintaining clinical suspicion for these infections in transplant recipients.

Posttransfusion Sepsis Attributable to Bacterial Contamination in Platelet Collection Set Manufacturing Facility, United States.

During May 2018‒December 2022, we reviewed transfusion-transmitted sepsis cases in the United States attributable to polymicrobial contaminated apheresis platelet components, including Acinetobacter calcoaceticus‒baumannii complex or Staphylococcus saprophyticus isolated from patients and components. Transfused platelet components underwent bacterial risk control strategies (primary culture, pathogen reduction or primary culture, and secondary rapid test) before transfusion. Environmental samples were collected from a platelet collection set manufacturing facility. Seven sepsis cases from 6 platelet donations from 6 different donors were identified in patients from 6 states; 3 patients died. Cultures identified Acinetobacter calcoaceticus‒baumannii complex in 6 patients and 6 transfused platelets, S. saprophyticus in 4 patients and 4 transfused platelets. Whole-genome sequencing showed environmental isolates from the manufacturer were closely related genetically to patient and platelet isolates, indicating the manufacturer was the most probable source of recurrent polymicrobial contamination. Clinicians should maintain awareness of possible transfusion-transmitted sepsis even when using bacterial risk control strategies.

Investigation of donor-derived Strongyloides stercoralis infection in multiple solid organ transplant recipients-California, Michigan, Ohio, 2022.

BACKGROUND: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention led an investigation to determine if Strongyloides infection in a right kidney recipient was an existing chronic infection, or if the infection was transmitted from an infected organ donor. METHODS: Evidence regarding the organ donor and organ recipients Strongyloides testing, treatment, and risk factors were gathered and evaluated. The case classification algorithm created by the Disease Transmission Advisory Committee was utilized. RESULTS: The organ donor had risk factors for Strongyloides infection; the banked donor specimen, submitted for serology testing 112 days post-donor death, was positive. The right kidney recipient was negative for Strongyloides infection pretransplant. Strongyloides infection was diagnosed via small bowel and stomach biopsies. The left kidney recipient had risk factors for Strongyloides infection. Two posttransplant Strongyloides antibody tests were negative at 59 and 116 days posttransplant; repeat antibody tests returned positive at 158 and 190 days posttransplant. Examination of bronchial alveolar lavage fluid collected 110 days posttransplant from the heart recipient showed a parasite morphologically consistent with Strongyloides species. She subsequently developed complications from Strongyloides infection, including hyperinfection syndrome and disseminated strongyloidiasis. Based on the evidence from our investigation, donor-derived strongyloidiasis was suspected in one recipient and proven in two recipients. CONCLUSION: The results of this investigation support the importance of preventing donor-derived Strongyloides infections by laboratory-based serology testing of solid organ donors. Donor positive testing results would direct the monitoring and treatment of recipients to avoid severe complications.

West Nile Virus Transmission by Solid Organ Transplantation and Considerations for Organ Donor Screening Practices, United States.

West Nile virus (WNV) is the most common domestic arbovirus in the United States. During 2018, WNV was transmitted through solid organ transplantation to 2 recipients who had neuroinvasive disease develop. Because of increased illness and death in transplant recipients, organ procurement organizations should consider screening during region-specific WNV transmission months.

Donor-derived tuberculosis among solid organ transplant recipients in the United States-2008 to 2018.

Mycobacterium tuberculosis can be transmitted via organ donation and result in severe outcomes. To better understand donor-derived tuberculosis (DDTB), all potential transmissions reported to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) Ad Hoc Disease Transmission Advisory Committee between 2008 and 2018 were analyzed. Among 51 total reports, nine (17%) (9 donors/35 recipients) had ≥ 1 recipient with proven/probable disease transmission. Of these, eight were reported due to recipient disease, and one was reported due to a positive donor result. Proven/probable DDTB transmissions were reported in six lung and five nonlung recipients. The median time to diagnosis was 104 days posttransplant (range 0-165 days). Pulmonary TB, extrapulmonary TB, pulmonary plus extrapulmonary TB, and asymptomatic TB infection with positive interferon-gamma release assay were present in five, three, one, and two recipients, respectively. All recipients received treatment and survived except for one whose death was not attributed to TB. All donors associated with proven/probable DDTB had ≥ 1 TB risk factor. Six were born in a TB-endemic country, five had traveled to a TB-endemic country, three had been incarcerated, and three had latent TB infection. These cases highlight the importance of evaluating donors for TB based on risk factors. Early posttransplant TB in organ recipients of donors with TB risk factors requires prompt reporting to OPTN to identify other potential affected recipients and implement timely treatment interventions.

Powassan Virus Infection Likely Acquired Through Blood Transfusion Presenting as Encephalitis in a Kidney Transplant Recipient.

A kidney transplant patient without known tick exposure developed encephalitis 3 weeks after transplantation. During the transplant hospitalization, the patient had received a blood transfusion from an asymptomatic donor later discovered to have been infected with Powassan virus. Here, we describe a probable instance of transfusion-transmitted Powassan virus infection.

Donor-derived human herpesvirus 8 and development of Kaposi sarcoma among 6 recipients of organs from donors with high-risk sexual and substance use behavior.

Kaposi sarcoma (KS) can develop following organ transplantation through reactivation of recipient human herpesvirus 8 (HHV-8) infection or through donor-derived HHV-8 transmission. We describe 6 cases of donor-derived HHV-8 infection and KS investigated from July 2018 to January 2020. Organs from 6 donors, retrospectively identified as HHV-8-positive, with a history of drug use disorder, were transplanted into 22 recipients. Four of 6 donors had risk factors for HHV-8 infection reported in donor history questionnaires. Fourteen of 22 organ recipients (64%) had evidence of posttransplant HHV-8 infection. Lung recipients were particularly susceptible to KS. Four of the 6 recipients who developed KS died from KS or associated complications. The US opioid crisis has resulted in an increasing number and proportion of organ donors with substance use disorder, and particularly injection drug use history, which may increase the risk of HHV-8 transmission to recipients. Better awareness of the risk of posttransplant KS for recipients of organs from donors with HHV-8 infection risk could be useful for recipient management. Testing donors and recipients for HHV-8 is currently challenging with no validated commercial serology kits available. Limited HHV-8 antibody testing is available through some US reference laboratories and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Unexpected Hepatitis B Virus Infection After Liver Transplantation - United States, 2014-2019.

Unexpected donor-derived hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection is defined as a new HBV infection in a recipient of a transplanted organ from a donor who tested negative for total antihepatitis B core antibody (total anti-HBc), hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg), and HBV DNA* before organ procurement. Such infections are rare and are associated with injection drug use among deceased donors (1). During 2014-2019, CDC received 20 reports of HBV infection among recipients of livers from donors who had no evidence of past or current HBV infection. Investigation included review of laboratory data and medical records. Fourteen of these new HBV infections were detected during 2019 alone; infections were detected a median of 38 (range = 5-116) weeks after transplantation. Of the 14 donors, 13 were hepatitis C virus (HCV)-seropositive† and had a history of injection drug use within the year preceding death, a positive toxicology result, or both. Because injection drug use is the most commonly reported risk factor for hepatitis C,§ providers caring for recipients of organs from donors who are HCV-seropositive or recently injected drugs should maintain awareness of infectious complications of injection drug use and monitor recipients accordingly (2). In addition to testing for HBV DNA at 4-6 weeks after transplantation, clinicians caring for liver transplant recipients should consider testing for HBV DNA 1 year after transplantation or at any time if signs and symptoms of viral hepatitis develop, even if previous tests were negative (2).

Donor-derived transmission through lung transplantation of carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii producing the OXA-23 carbapenemase during an ongoing healthcare facility outbreak.

We describe a rare instance of donor-derived OXA-23-producing carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii transmission during lung transplantation and the subsequent public health response. This investigation highlights how transplantation can introduce rare multidrug-resistant organisms into different healthcare facilities and regions.

Transmission of Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus From an Organ Donor to 3 Transplant Recipients.

BACKGROUND: In fall 2017, 3 solid organ transplant (SOT) recipients from a common donor developed encephalitis within 1 week of transplantation, prompting suspicion of transplant-transmitted infection. Eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV) infection was identified during testing of endomyocardial tissue from the heart recipient. METHODS: We reviewed medical records of the organ donor and transplant recipients and tested serum, whole blood, cerebrospinal fluid, and tissue from the donor and recipients for evidence of EEEV infection by multiple assays. We investigated blood transfusion as a possible source of organ donor infection by testing remaining components and serum specimens from blood donors. We reviewed data from the pretransplant organ donor evaluation and local EEEV surveillance. RESULTS: We found laboratory evidence of recent EEEV infection in all organ recipients and the common donor. Serum collected from the organ donor upon hospital admission tested negative, but subsequent samples obtained prior to organ recovery were positive for EEEV RNA. There was no evidence of EEEV infection among donors of the 8 blood products transfused into the organ donor or in products derived from these donations. Veterinary and mosquito surveillance showed recent EEEV activity in counties nearby the organ donor's county of residence. Neuroinvasive EEEV infection directly contributed to the death of 1 organ recipient and likely contributed to death in another. CONCLUSIONS: Our investigation demonstrated EEEV transmission through SOT. Mosquito-borne transmission of EEEV to the organ donor was the likely source of infection. Clinicians should be aware of EEEV as a cause of transplant-associated encephalitis.

Francisella tularensis Transmission by Solid Organ Transplantation, 20171.

In July 2017, fever and sepsis developed in 3 recipients of solid organs (1 heart and 2 kidneys) from a common donor in the United States; 1 of the kidney recipients died. Tularemia was suspected only after blood cultures from the surviving kidney recipient grew Francisella species. The organ donor, a middle-aged man from the southwestern United States, had been hospitalized for acute alcohol withdrawal syndrome, pneumonia, and multiorgan failure. F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (clade A2) was cultured from archived spleen tissue from the donor and blood from both kidney recipients. Whole-genome multilocus sequence typing indicated that the isolated strains were indistinguishable. The heart recipient remained seronegative with negative blood cultures but had been receiving antimicrobial drugs for a medical device infection before transplant. Two lagomorph carcasses collected near the donor's residence were positive by PCR for F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (clade A2). This investigation documents F. tularensis transmission by solid organ transplantation.

Quantifying the risk of undetected HIV, hepatitis B virus, or hepatitis C virus infection in Public Health Service increased risk donors.

To reduce the risk of HIV, hepatitis B virus (HBV), and hepatitis C virus (HCV) transmission through organ transplantation, donors are universally screened for these infections by nucleic acid tests (NAT). Deceased organ donors are classified as "increased risk" if they engaged in specific behaviors during the 12 months before death. We developed a model to estimate the risk of undetected infection for HIV, HBV, and HCV among NAT-negative donors specific to the type and timing of donors' potential risk behavior to guide revisions to the 12-month timeline. Model parameters were estimated, including risk of disease acquisition for increased risk groups, number of virions that multiply to establish infection, virus doubling time, and limit of detection by NAT. Monte Carlo simulation was performed. The risk of undetected infection was <1/1 000 000 for HIV after 14 days, for HBV after 35 days, and for HCV after 7 days from the time of most recent potential exposure to the day of a negative NAT. The period during which reported donor risk behaviors result in an "increased risk" designation can be safely shortened.

Characteristics of Deceased Solid Organ Donors and Screening Results for Hepatitis B, C, and Human Immunodeficiency Viruses - United States, 2010-2017.

The ongoing U.S. opioid crisis has resulted in an increase in drug overdose deaths and acute hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections, with young persons (who might be eligible organ donors) most affected.*,† In 2013, the Public Health Service released a revised guideline to reduce the risk for unintended organ transplantation-associated hepatitis B virus (HBV), HCV, and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) transmission (1). The guideline describes criteria to categorize donors at increased risk (increased risk donors [IRDs]) for transmitting these viruses to recipients (1). It also recommends universal donor testing for HBV, HCV, and HIV.§ CDC analyzed deceased donor data for the period 2010-2017 reported to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network for IRDs and standard risk donors (SRDs) (i.e., donors who do not meet any of the criteria for increased risk designation). During this period, the proportion of IRDs increased approximately 200%, from 8.9% to 26.3%; the percentage with drug intoxication reported as the mechanism of death also increased approximately 200%, from 4.3% to 13.4%; and the proportion of these donors with reported injection drug use (IDU) increased approximately 500%, from 1.3% to 8.0%. Compared with SRDs, IRDs were significantly more likely to have positive HBV and HCV screening results. These findings demonstrate the continuing need for identifying viral bloodborne pathogen infection risk factors among deceased donors to reduce the risk for transmission, monitor posttransplant infection in recipients, and offer treatment if infection occurs.

Sepsis Attributed to Bacterial Contamination of Platelets Associated with a Potential Common Source - Multiple States, 2018.

During May-October 2018, four patients from three states experienced sepsis after transfusion of apheresis platelets contaminated with Acinetobacter calcoaceticus-baumannii complex (ACBC) and Staphylococcus saprophyticus; one patient died. ACBC isolates from patients' blood, transfused platelet residuals, and two environmental samples were closely related by whole genome sequencing. S. saprophyticus isolates from two patients' blood, three transfused platelet residuals, and one hospital environmental sample formed two whole genome sequencing clusters. This whole genome sequencing analysis indicated a potential common source of bacterial contamination; investigation into the contamination source continues. All platelet donations were collected using apheresis cell separator machines and collection sets from the same manufacturer; two of three collection sets were from the same lot. One implicated platelet unit had been treated with pathogen-inactivation technology, and two had tested negative with a rapid bacterial detection device after negative primary culture. Because platelets are usually stored at room temperature, bacteria in contaminated platelet units can proliferate to clinically relevant levels by the time of transfusion. Clinicians should monitor for sepsis after platelet transfusions even after implementation of bacterial contamination mitigation strategies. Recognizing adverse transfusion reactions and reporting to the platelet supplier and hemovigilance systems is crucial for public health practitioners to detect and prevent sepsis associated with contaminated platelets.

Mycoplasma hominis Infections Transmitted Through Amniotic Tissue Product.

Background: Mycoplasma hominis is a commensal genitourinary tract organism that can cause infections outside the genitourinary tract. We investigated a cluster of M. hominis surgical site infections in patients who underwent spine surgery, all associated with amniotic tissue linked to a common donor. Methods: Laboratory tests of tissue product from the donor, including culture, quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qPCR), and whole-genome sequencing were performed. Use of this amniotic tissue product was reviewed. A multistate investigation to identify additional cases and locate any unused products was conducted. Results: Twenty-seven tissue product vials from a donor were distributed to facilities in 7 states; at least 20 vials from this donor were used in 14 patients. Of these, 4 of 14 (29%) developed surgical site infections, including 2 M. hominis infections. Mycoplasma hominis was detected by culture and qPCR in 2 unused vials from the donor. Sequencing indicated >99% similarity between patient and unopened vial isolates. For 5 of 27 (19%) vials, the final disposition could not be confirmed. Conclusions: Mycoplasma hominis was transmitted through amniotic tissue from a single donor to 2 recipients. Current routine donor screening and product testing does not detect all potential pathogens. Clinicians should be aware that M. hominis can cause surgical site infections, and may not be detected by routine clinical cultures. The lack of a standardized system to track tissue products in healthcare facilities limits the ability of public health agencies to respond to outbreaks and investigate other adverse events associated with these products.