Cognitive empathy boosts honesty in children and young adolescents.

Children and young adolescents often tend to behave dishonestly in order to serve their self-interests. This study focused on how empathic abilities affect children's tendency to deceive others. Deception is the act of causing others to form a false belief to get them to act in a way that serves the deceiver's interests. As such, it requires the ability to predict how others might use the provided information. In two experiments, 274 participants (aged 10-16 years) played a game in which they could send a deceptive message to another participant to boost their own payoff at the other player's expense. We measured participants' cognitive and emotional empathy using different measures. We found that a measure of cognitive empathy, namely the fantasy scale, was associated with less deception of another player when that other player was not identified and was presented only as "Player B." However, when Player B was identified by name, empathy did not predict deception. In such cases, the only factors affecting deception rates were the gain for the participant (higher possible gains lead to more deception) and loss to the other player (higher possible losses lead to less deception). Overall, the findings suggest that even by 11 years of age, children can understand the impact of their unethical behavior on another child and adjust their actions accordingly. However, when the other child is not identified, children need to possess high levels of cognitive empathy toward imagined individuals to resist the temptation to deceive the other child.

The recursive nature of ownership intuitions.

The proposed model overlooks the self-referential and self-perpetuating nature of ownership intuitions. Human knowledge is primarily formed through social interaction within power dynamics. Accordingly, we suggest that legitimate ownership of one object can influence perceptions of legitimate ownership of another object. Ultimately, we argue that ownership intuitions are not independent but embedded in a self-referential system that perpetuates inequality.

Family still matters: Human social motivation across 42 countries during a global pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic caused drastic social changes for many people, including separation from friends and coworkers, enforced close contact with family, and reductions in mobility. Here we assess the extent to which people's evolutionarily-relevant basic motivations and goals-fundamental social motives such as Affiliation and Kin Care-might have been affected. To address this question, we gathered data on fundamental social motives in 42 countries (N = 15,915) across two waves, including 19 countries (N = 10,907) for which data were gathered both before and during the pandemic (pre-pandemic wave: 32 countries, N = 8998; 3302 male, 5585 female; M age  = 24.43, SD = 7.91; mid-pandemic wave: 29 countries, N = 6917; 2249 male, 4218 female; M age  = 28.59, SD = 11.31). Samples include data collected online (e.g., Prolific, MTurk), at universities, and via community sampling. We found that Disease Avoidance motivation was substantially higher during the pandemic, and that most of the other fundamental social motives showed small, yet significant, differences across waves. Most sensibly, concern with caring for one's children was higher during the pandemic, and concerns with Mate Seeking and Status were lower. Earlier findings showing the prioritization of family motives over mating motives (and even over Disease Avoidance motives) were replicated during the pandemic. Finally, well-being remained positively associated with family-related motives and negatively associated with mating motives during the pandemic, as in the pre-pandemic samples. Our results provide further evidence for the robust primacy of family-related motivations even during this unique disruption of social life.

Who's more generous than me? Children's self-evaluation of their prosociality in normative social comparisons.

We examined the development of children's self-evaluation of their prosociality in normative social comparisons (with an average peer). Results suggest that when comparing themselves with an average other in the abstract (i.e., without reference to actual behavior), elementary school children (aged 6-12 years) demonstrated the better than average (BTA) effect of perceiving themselves as more prosocial than their average peer (Study 1). However, when they evaluated other children's prosociality (sharing), after experiencing an actual opportunity to share their endowment with others (Studies 2 and 3), the younger children (at first-grade level) exhibited the worse than average (WTA) effect in that they assumed that their peers would act more generously than themselves. Task difficulty predicted relative self-evaluations across all examined ages, such that greater difficulty was related to a lower BTA effect (or a greater WTA effect). However, whereas the older children used abstract difficulty perceptions to evaluate themselves relative to others, the younger children's evaluations were affected only by the difficulty that they themselves experienced. In all age groups, the BTA effect was driven mostly by participants who were above the mean in the extent of their sharing, whereas the WTA effect was driven by those who shared below the mean of their age group.

Achieving More With Less: Intuitive Correction in Selection.

Choosing between candidates for a position can be tricky, especially when the selection test is affected by irrelevant characteristics (e.g., reading speed). One can correct for this irrelevant attribute by penalizing individuals who have unjustifiably benefited from it. Statistical models do so by including the irrelevant attribute as a suppressor variable, but can people do the same without the help of a model? In three experiments (total N = 357), participants had to choose between two candidates, one of whom had higher levels of an irrelevant attribute and thus enjoyed an unfair advantage. Participants showed a substantial preference for the candidate with high levels of the irrelevant attribute, thus choosing the less suitable candidate. This bias was attenuated when the irrelevant attribute was a situational factor, probably by making the correction process more intuitive. Understanding the intuitive judgment of suppressor variables can help candidates from underprivileged groups boost their chances to succeed.

Cross-cultural regularities in the cognitive architecture of pride.

Pride occurs in every known culture, appears early in development, is reliably triggered by achievements and formidability, and causes a characteristic display that is recognized everywhere. Here, we evaluate the theory that pride evolved to guide decisions relevant to pursuing actions that enhance valuation and respect for a person in the minds of others. By hypothesis, pride is a neurocomputational program tailored by selection to orchestrate cognition and behavior in the service of: (i) motivating the cost-effective pursuit of courses of action that would increase others' valuations and respect of the individual, (ii) motivating the advertisement of acts or characteristics whose recognition by others would lead them to enhance their evaluations of the individual, and (iii) mobilizing the individual to take advantage of the resulting enhanced social landscape. To modulate how much to invest in actions that might lead to enhanced evaluations by others, the pride system must forecast the magnitude of the evaluations the action would evoke in the audience and calibrate its activation proportionally. We tested this prediction in 16 countries across 4 continents (n = 2,085), for 25 acts and traits. As predicted, the pride intensity for a given act or trait closely tracks the valuations of audiences, local (mean r = +0.82) and foreign (mean r = +0.75). This relationship is specific to pride and does not generalize to other positive emotions that coactivate with pride but lack its audience-recalibrating function.

Exploring relations between task conflict and informational conflict in the Stroop task.

In this study, we tested the proposal that the Stroop task involves two conflicts--task conflict and informational conflict. Task conflict was defined as the latency difference between color words and non-letter neutrals, and manipulated by varying the proportion of color words versus non-letter neutrals. Informational conflict was defined as the latency difference between incongruent and congruent trials and manipulated by varying the congruent-to-incongruent trial ratio. We replicated previous findings showing that increasing the ratio of incongruent-to-congruent trials reduces the latency difference between the incongruent and congruent condition (i.e., informational conflict), as does increasing the proportion of color words (i.e., task conflict). A significant under-additive interaction between the two proportion manipulations (congruent vs. incongruent and color words vs. neutrals) indicated that the effects of task conflict and informational conflict were not additive. By assessing task conflict as the contrast between color words and neutrals, we found that task conflict existed in all of our experimental conditions. Under specific conditions, when task conflict dominated behavior by explaining most of the variability between congruency conditions, we also found negative facilitation, thus demonstrating that this effect is a special case of task conflict.

Honesty requires time (and lack of justifications).

Recent research suggests that refraining from cheating in tempting situations requires self-control, which indicates that serving self-interest is an automatic tendency. However, evidence also suggests that people cheat to the extent that they can justify their unethical behavior to themselves. To merge these different lines of research, we adopted a dual-system approach that distinguished between the intuitive and deliberative cognitive systems. We suggest that for people to restrict their dishonest behavior, they need to have enough time and no justifications for self-serving unethical behavior. We employed an anonymous die-under-cup task in which participants privately rolled a die and reported the outcome to determine their pay. We manipulated the time available for participants to report their outcome (short vs. ample). The results of two experiments support our prediction, revealing that the dark side of people's automatic self-serving tendency may be overcome when time to decide is ample and private justifications for dishonesty are not available.

Reciprocity and uncertainty.

Guala points to a discrepancy between strong negative reciprocity observed in the lab and the way cooperation is sustained "in the wild." This commentary suggests that in lab experiments, strong negative reciprocity is limited when uncertainty exists regarding the players' actions and the intentions. Thus, costly punishment is indeed a limited mechanism for sustaining cooperation in an uncertain environment.

To deliberate or not? The role of intuition and deliberation when controlling for irrelevant information in selection decisions.

In selection decisions, decision makers often struggle to ignore irrelevant information, such as candidates' age, gender and attractiveness, which can lead to suboptimal decisions. One way to correct the effects of these irrelevant attributes is to consider them as suppressor variables, and penalize individuals who unjustifiably benefit from them. Previous research demonstrated that people have difficulties doing so. In five experiments (N = 1325), we examined the mechanism at the core of people's ability to do so. We found that triggering System 2 did not improve participants' ability to correct for this bias. The majority of those who were successful did so even when denied the opportunity to deliberate. We suggest that logic intuition-not deliberation-is the basis for successfully considering irrelevant information as suppressors. Our results are in line with a revised dual-process approach, in which solving reasoning problems can occur directly through System 1 and does not require an override by a System 2's-based process.

Fundamental social motives measured across forty-two cultures in two waves.

How does psychology vary across human societies? The fundamental social motives framework adopts an evolutionary approach to capture the broad range of human social goals within a taxonomy of ancestrally recurring threats and opportunities. These motives-self-protection, disease avoidance, affiliation, status, mate acquisition, mate retention, and kin care-are high in fitness relevance and everyday salience, yet understudied cross-culturally. Here, we gathered data on these motives in 42 countries (N = 15,915) in two cross-sectional waves, including 19 countries (N = 10,907) for which data were gathered in both waves. Wave 1 was collected from mid-2016 through late 2019 (32 countries, N = 8,998; 3,302 male, 5,585 female; Mage = 24.43, SD = 7.91). Wave 2 was collected from April through November 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic (29 countries, N = 6,917; 2,249 male, 4,218 female; Mage = 28.59, SD = 11.31). These data can be used to assess differences and similarities in people's fundamental social motives both across and within cultures, at different time points, and in relation to other commonly studied cultural indicators and outcomes.

Honesty Speaks a Second Language.

Theories of dishonest behavior implicitly assume language independence. Here, we investigated this assumption by comparing lying by people using a foreign language versus their native tongue. Participants rolled a die and were paid according to the outcome they reported. Because the outcome was private, they could lie to inflate their profit without risk of repercussions. Participants performed the task either in their native language or in a foreign language. With native speakers of Hebrew, Korean, Spanish, and English, we discovered that, on average, people inflate their earnings less when they use a foreign language. The outcome is explained by a dual system account that suggests that self-serving dishonesty is an automatic tendency, which is supported by a fast and intuitive system. Because using a foreign language is less intuitive and automatic, it might engage more deliberation and reduce the temptation to lie. These findings challenge theories of ethical behavior to account for the role of the language in shaping ethical behavior.

Intuitive Honesty Versus Dishonesty: Meta-Analytic Evidence.

Is self-serving lying intuitive? Or does honesty come naturally? Many experiments have manipulated reliance on intuition in behavioral-dishonesty tasks, with mixed results. We present two meta-analyses (with evidential value) testing whether an intuitive mind-set affects the proportion of liars (k = 73; n = 12,711) and the magnitude of lying (k = 50; n = 6,473). The results indicate that when dishonesty harms abstract others, promoting intuition causes more people to lie, log odds ratio = 0.38, p = .0004, and people to lie more, Hedges's g = 0.26, p < .0001. However, when dishonesty inflicts harm on concrete others, promoting intuition has no significant effect on dishonesty (p > .63). We propose one potential explanation: The intuitive appeal of prosociality may cancel out the intuitive selfish appeal of dishonesty, suggesting that the social consequences of lying could be a promising key to the riddle of intuition's role in honesty. We discuss limitations such as the relatively unbalanced distribution of studies using concrete versus abstract victims and the overall large interstudy heterogeneity.

Perceptions of Active Versus Passive Risks, and the Effect of Personal Responsibility.

Not getting vaccinated or not backing up computer files are examples of passive risk taking: risk brought on or magnified by inaction. We suggest the difficulty in paying attention to absences, together with the reduced agency and responsibility that is associated with passive choices, leads to the perception of passive risks as being less risky than equivalent active risks. Using scenarios in which risk was taken either actively or passively, we demonstrate that passive risks are judged as less risky than equivalent active risks. We find the perception of personal responsibility mediates the differences between the perception of passive and active risks. The current research offers an additional explanation for omission or default biases: The passive nature of these choices causes them to appear less risky than they really are.

Not taking responsibility: Equity trumps efficiency in allocation decisions.

When allocating resources, equity and efficiency may conflict. When resources are scarce and cannot be distributed equally, one may choose to destroy resources and reduce societal welfare to maintain equity among its members. We examined whether people are averse to inequitable outcomes per se or to being responsible for deciding how inequity should be implemented. Three scenario-based experiments and one incentivized experiment revealed that participants are inequity responsibility averse: when asked to decide which of the 2 equally deserving individuals should receive a reward, they rather discarded the reward than choosing who will get it. This tendency diminished significantly when participants had the possibility to use a random device to allocate the reward. The finding suggests that it is more difficult to be responsible for the way inequity is implemented than to create inequity per se. (PsycINFO Database Record

Careful Cheating: People Cheat Groups Rather than Individuals.

Cheating for material gain is a destructive phenomenon in any society. We examine the extent to which people care about the victims of their unethical behavior-be they a group of people or an individual-and whether they are sensitive to the degree of harm or cost that they cause to these victims. The results of three studies suggest that when a group (rather than a single individual) is the victim of one's behavior, the incidence of cheating increases only if the harm to the group is presented in global terms-such that the cheating might be justified by the relatively minor harm caused to each individual in the group (Studies #1 and #3). However, when the harm or cost to each individual in the group is made explicit, the tendency to cheat the group is no longer apparent and the tendency to cheat increases when the harm caused is minor-regardless of whether the victim is an individual or a group of people (Study #2). Individual differences in rational and intuitive thinking appear to play different roles in the decision to cheat different type of opponents: individual opponents seem to trigger the subject's intuitive thinking which restrains the urge to cheat, whereas groups of opponents seem to trigger the subject's rational mode of thinking which encourage cheating.

Decision making under internal uncertainty: the case of multiple-choice tests with different scoring rules.

This paper assesses framing effects on decision making with internal uncertainty, i.e., partial knowledge, by focusing on examinees' behavior in multiple-choice (MC) tests with different scoring rules. In two experiments participants answered a general-knowledge MC test that consisted of 34 solvable and 6 unsolvable items. Experiment 1 studied two scoring rules involving Positive (only gains) and Negative (only losses) scores. Although answering all items was the dominating strategy for both rules, the results revealed a greater tendency to answer under the Negative scoring rule. These results are in line with the predictions derived from Prospect Theory (PT) [Econometrica 47 (1979) 263]. The second experiment studied two scoring rules, which allowed respondents to exhibit partial knowledge. Under the Inclusion-scoring rule the respondents mark all answers that could be correct, and under the Exclusion-scoring rule they exclude all answers that might be incorrect. As predicted by PT, respondents took more risks under the Inclusion rule than under the Exclusion rule. The results illustrate that the basic process that underlies choice behavior under internal uncertainty and especially the effect of framing is similar to the process of choice under external uncertainty and can be described quite accurately by PT.

Proportion congruency effects: instructions may be enough.

Learning takes time, namely, one needs to be exposed to contingency relations between stimulus dimensions in order to learn, whereas intentional control can be recruited through task demands. Therefore showing that control can be recruited as a function of experimental instructions alone, that is, adapting the processing according to the instructions before the exposure to the task, can be taken as evidence for existence of control recruitment in the absence of learning. This was done by manipulating the information given at the outset of the experiment. In the first experiment, we manipulated list-level congruency proportion. Half of the participants were informed that most of the stimuli would be congruent, whereas the other half were informed that most of the stimuli would be incongruent. This held true for the stimuli in the second part of each experiment. In the first part, however, the proportion of the two stimulus types was equal. A proportion congruent (PC) effect was found in both parts of the experiment, but it was larger in the second part. In our second experiment, we manipulated the proportion of the stimuli within participants by applying an item-specific design. This was done by presenting some color words most often in their congruent color, and other color words in incongruent colors. Participants were informed about the exact word-color pairings in advance. Similar to Experiment 1, this held true only for the second experimental part. In contrast to our first experiment, informing participants in advance did not result in an item-specific proportion effect, which was observed only in the second part. Thus our results support the hypothesis that instructions may be enough to trigger list-level control, yet learning does contribute to the PC effect under such conditions. The item-level proportion effect is apparently caused by learning or at least it is moderated by it.

Between self-interest and reciprocity: the social bright side of self-control failure.

Despite the importance of reciprocity in many areas of social life, little is known about possible factors affecting it and its interplay with the self-interest motive to maximize one's own gains. In this study, we examined the role of cognitive control in reciprocal behavior to determine whether it is a deliberate and controlled act or whether the behavior is evoked automatically. In Experiment 1, depletion of cognitive control resources increased the rate of rejected unfair offers in the ultimatum game despite associated financial loss. In Experiments 2A and 2B, using 2 depletion manipulations, we extended these results and showed that depleted participants returned more money in response to highly trusting investments during the trust game. These results suggest that reciprocity considerations are actively suppressed when attempting to maximize one's own gains. When cognitive control is limited, this suppression becomes difficult, and consequently reciprocity considerations prevail.