Foundations of Arrogance: A Broad Survey and Framework for Research.

We consider the topic of arrogance from a cross-disciplinary viewpoint. To stimulate further research, we suggest three types of arrogance (individual, comparative, and antagonistic) and six components contributing to them, each logically related to the next. The components progress from imperfect knowledge and abilities to an unrealistic assessment of them, an unwarranted attitude of superiority over other people, and related derisive behavior. Although each component presumably is present to some degree when the next one operates, causality might flow between components in either direction. The classification of components of arrogance should reduce miscommunication among researchers, as the relevant concepts and mechanisms span cognitive, motivational, social, and clinical domains and literatures. Arrogance is an important concept warranting further study for both theoretical and practical reasons, in both psychopathology and normal social interaction. Everyone seems to have qualities of arrogance to some degree, and we consider the importance of arrogance on a spectrum. We contend that humankind can benefit from a better understanding of the cognitive limitations and motivational biases that, operating together, appear to contribute to arrogance. We bring together information and questions that might lead to an invigorating increase in the rate and quality of cross-disciplinary research on arrogance.

Conscious contents as reflexive processes: Evidence from the habituation of high-level cognitions.

Reflexes are often insuppressible, predictable, and susceptible to external control. In contrast, conscious thoughts have been regarded as whimsical, 'offline,' and shielded from external control. Recent advances suggest that conscious thoughts are more reflex-like and susceptible to external control than previously thought. In one paradigm, high-level conscious thoughts (subvocalizations) are triggered by external control, as a function of external stimuli and experimenter-induced action sets. It has been hypothesized that these conscious contents are activated involuntarily and in a reflex-like manner. If such is the case, then these activations should possess a well-known property of the reflex: habituation. Accordingly, we found that involuntary high-level cognitions (subvocalizations) habituated (i.e., were less likely to arise) after repeated stimulation. As in the case of the habituation of a reflex, this novel effect was stimulus-specific. We discuss the implications of this finding for theories about consciousness and about psychopathological phenomena involving undesired, involuntary cognitions.

Learning to deal with delayed outcomes: EEG oscillatory and slow potentials during the prefeedback interval.

It is well established that the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN) decreases in amplitude as a task is mastered, a phenomenon generally attributed to the reduction in anticipatory attention as feedback becomes less needed. Typically, the experiments supporting this assumption have used relatively short delays (<3 s). However, we found in a previous study that this decline in amplitude, although present during the 2.5-s prefeedback delay of a patterned key-pressing task, was absent with an 8-s delay. We reexamined this finding using a 6-s delay and found that the SPN diminished at frontal sites as participants learned a sequence of four keypress durations, but that this modulation was limited to the early half of the delay (maximum at 2 s). Decline of lateralized sensorimotor theta activity across trials was also limited to early portions of the delay. These findings suggest that processes other than anticipatory attention to feedback may be more relevant for explaining SPN diminution. Such processes could include adjustment and maintenance of action-outcome expectancies (e.g., forward models) during the prefeedback interval.

EEG Correlates of Involuntary Cognitions in the Reflexive Imagery Task.

The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) reveals that the activation of sets can result in involuntary cognitions that are triggered by external stimuli. In the basic RIT, subjects are presented with an image of an object (e.g., CAT) and instructed to not think of the name of the object. Involuntary subvocalizations of the name (the RIT effect) arise on roughly 80% of the trials. We conducted an electroencephalography (EEG) study to explore the neural correlates of the RIT effect. Subjects were presented with one object at a time in one condition and two objects simultaneously in another condition. Five regions were defined by electrode sites: frontal (F3-F4), parietal (P3-P4), temporal (T3-T4), right hemisphere (F4-P4), and left hemisphere (F3-P3). We focused on the alpha (8-13 Hz), beta (13-30 Hz), delta (0.01-4 Hz), and theta (4-8 Hz) frequencies.

Involuntary Entry Into Consciousness From the Activation of Sets: Object Counting and Color Naming.

High-level cognitions can enter consciousness through the activation of certain action sets and the presentation of external stimuli ("set-based entry," for short). Set-based entry arises in a manner that is involuntary and systematic. In the Reflexive Imagery Task, for example, subjects are presented with visual objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on roughly 80% of the trials. We examined whether or not set-based entry can also occur in the case of involuntary counting. Subjects in Experiment 1A were instructed to not count the number of objects presented in an array. Involuntary counting arose on a high proportion of the trials (a mean proportion of ∼0.90) for stimulus arrays having 2-5 objects, and such counting arose less frequently across trials when the array consisted of 6-10 objects (a mean proportion of ∼0.21). The data from Experiment 1B revealed that, when people choose to perform Set X, they also experience thoughts about an unselected Set (Set Y). Subjects were trained on one set (e.g., to "color name") and then, when presented with stimuli, were given the choice to perform the trained set or a novel set. Consistent with theories proposing that the conscious contents represent several potential action plans, subjects were equally likely to experience set-related imagery or set-unrelated imagery. Our findings regarding set-based entry are relevant to many subfields of psychology and neuroscience (e.g., the study of high-level mental processes, attention, imagery, and action control).

Metacognition of Working Memory Performance: Trial-by-Trial Subjective Effects from a New Paradigm.

Investigators have begun to examine the fleeting urges and inclinations that subjects experience when performing tasks involving response interference and working memory. Building on this research, we developed a paradigm in which subjects, after learning to press certain buttons when presented with certain letters, are presented with two action-related letters (the memoranda) but must withhold responding (4 s) until cued to emit the response associated with only one of the two letters. In the Congruent condition, the action corresponds to the cue (e.g., memoranda = AB, cue = B, response = B); in the Incongruent condition, the action corresponds to the other item of the memoranda (e.g., memoranda = AB, cue = B, response = A). After each trial, subjects inputted a rating regarding their subjectively experienced "urge to err" on that trial. These introspection-based data revealed that, as found in previous research, urges to err were strongest for incongruent trials. Our findings reveal, first, that subjects can successfully perform this new task, even though it is more complex than that of previous studies, and second, that, in this new paradigm, reliable subjective, metacognitive data can be obtained on a trial-by-trial basis. We hope that our novel paradigm will serve as a foundation for future experimental projects on the relationship between working memory performance and consciousness-an under-explored nexus whose investigation is likely to reveal insights about working memory, cognitive control, and metacognition.

Ironic effects as reflexive responses: Evidence from word frequency effects on involuntary subvocalizations.

In ironic processing, one is more likely to think about something (e.g., white bears) when instructed to not think about that thing. To further investigate this phenomenon involving cognitive control, in the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT), participants are instructed to not subvocalize the names of visual objects. On the majority of the trials, participants fail to suppress such subvocalizations. This finding supports theorizing that conscious thoughts can be triggered by external stimuli in a manner that is nontrivial, involuntary, and, importantly, reflex-like. These conclusions challenge intuitions that consciousness is unpredictable, whimsical, and somewhat insulated from external control. Perhaps these thoughts arise, not in a reflex-like manner, but from experimental demand or other high-level, strategic processes. This prevalent criticism would be inconsistent with the observation that the RIT effect is influenced by a stimulus parameter such as word frequency. Regarding demand characteristics, such an artifact would require participants to have a theory regarding how word frequency should influence responses. We introduce evidence that stimuli associated with high frequency names are more likely to yield involuntary subvocalizations than stimuli associated with low frequency names. These theoretically-relevant data suggest that ironic effects in paradigms such as the RIT resemble reflex-like processes.