Rich false memories of autobiographical events can be reversed.

False memories of autobiographical events can create enormous problems in forensic settings (e.g., false accusations). While multiple studies succeeded in inducing false memories in interview settings, we present research trying to reverse this effect (and thereby reduce the potential damage) by means of two ecologically valid strategies. We first successfully implanted false memories for two plausible autobiographical events (suggested by the students' parents, alongside two true events). Over three repeated interviews, participants developed false memories (measured by state-of-the-art coding) of the suggested events under minimally suggestive conditions (27%) and even more so using massive suggestion (56%). We then used two techniques to reduce false memory endorsement, source sensitization (alerting interviewees to possible external sources of the memories, e.g., family narratives) and false memory sensitization (raising the possibility of false memories being inadvertently created in memory interviews, delivered by a new interviewer). This reversed the false memory build-up over the first three interviews, returning false memory rates in both suggestion conditions to the baseline levels of the first interview (i.e., to ∼15% and ∼25%, respectively). By comparison, true event memories were endorsed at a higher level overall and less affected by either the repeated interviews or the sensitization techniques. In a 1-y follow-up (after the original interviews and debriefing), false memory rates further dropped to 5%, and participants overwhelmingly rejected the false events. One strong practical implication is that false memories can be substantially reduced by easy-to-implement techniques without causing collateral damage to true memories.

Auditory hindsight bias in school-age children.

We report two experiments investigating hindsight bias in children, focusing on a rarely studied age range of 8-13 years. In Experiment 1, we asked children to complete both an auditory hindsight task and a visual hindsight task. Children exhibited hindsight bias in both tasks, and the bias decreased with age. In Experiment 2, we further explored children 's auditory hindsight bias by contrasting performance in hypothetical and memory designs (which previous research with adults had found to involve different mechanisms-fluency vs. memory reconstruction). Children exhibited auditory hindsight bias in both tasks, but only in the hypothetical design was the bias magnitude modulated by a priming manipulation designed to increase fluency, replicating and extending the pattern found in adults to children.

The serial reproduction of an urban myth: revisiting Bartlett's schema theory.

Frederic Bartlett's schema theory is still widely misunderstood as claiming that remembering is inevitably unreliable. However, according to the logic of his schema theory, remembering should, in relation to certain kinds of material, be relatively reliable. In this study we examined whether a "well-worn" urban myth (the Vanishing Hitchhiker) could be exempt from the fate of other material used in Bartlett's own research on serial reproduction. Supporting Bartlett's ideas, we found that recall of the Hitchhiker story was better (if not perfect) over a series of five reproductions than recall of the classic War of the Ghosts. Recall was also better for a strict (as opposed to a lenient) audience, in line with another prediction from Bartlett's social theory of remembering. Notwithstanding this, we conclude with some critical remarks on the serial reproduction method as an approach to cultural memory.

False remembering in real life: James Ost's contributions to memory psychology.

This special issue honours James Ost's (1973-2019) contributions to our understanding of false and distorted remembering. In our editorial, we introduce some of James' distinctive research themes including the experiences of people who retract "recovered" memories, social (e.g., co-witness and interviewer influence) and personality influences on false remembering, the nature of false remembering itself (e.g., different types of false memories; false memories vs. false beliefs), public understanding of (false) memory, and a historical link to the work of Frederic Bartlett. We illustrate these themes through a number of key publications. The unifying thread behind James' work is his core interest in false/distorted remembering in real-life (typically high-stake) situations, in line with his engagement with the British False Memory Society and his role as an expert witness in court trials. The articles included in this special issue elaborate on the research themes to which James devoted his career and his curiosity.

Structured word-lists as a model of basic schemata: deviations from content and order in a repeated event paradigm.

Repeated events are common in everyday life, but relatively neglected as a topic within memory psychology. In two samples of adults, we investigated memory for repeated, schema-establishing simple events (operationalised as structured word-lists), and the effects of deviations within those events. We focused on the effects of deviations from two core dimensions of schema: content and order. Across three successive word-list events, we established and reinforced a basic list schema by always presenting three content categories in the same order. These expectations were violated in a fourth and final word-list. We measured the effects on memory of both the violating and the schema-establishing lists in multiple recall attempts over a period of one month. We measured correct recall, misattribution errors, metacognitive awareness of list-organisation and deviations, and recall organisation. Across all delays and across all word-lists (not only the final one), content changes increased recall, whereas order changes decreased recall. Participants were also more aware of content changes than order changes. These disparate effects suggest that the two types of schema-deviations may have qualitatively different effects on memory for specific instances of a repeated generic event. Cognitive processes underlying memory for typical and exceptional instances of repeated events are discussed.

Episodic memory must be grounded in reality in order to be useful in communication.

The primary function of episodic memory is to provide reliable information about reality that is essential for surviving and navigating in an environment. The communicative function of episodic memory "sits on top of" this basic function but does not, in itself, explain it in its totality (but may explain particular aspects such as its sensitivity to source credibility).

Recollection, belief and metacognition: a reality check.

Non-believed autobiographical memories [e.g. Mazzoni, G., Scoboria, A., & Harvey, L. (2010). Nonbelieved memories. Psychological Science, 21, 1334-1340] are striking examples of divergences between recollective experiences and beliefs in their correspondence to real events. After reviewing a broader range of similar phenomena, I argue that recollection-belief divergences can arise from normal, "healthy" metacognitive monitoring and control processes that balance memory recollections and reality constraints. Such validating "reality checks" draw on general world knowledge and external/social information. Importantly, changes in (perceived) reality constraints can lead to changes in memory beliefs. More generally, both recollection and (external) reality are keys to the past. In many cases, more or less automatic (System 1-type) reliance on recollection is sufficient (or memory would be useless as a system), but sometimes more elaborate (System 2-type) reality checks are needed. I conclude with some ideas about memory-driven and reality-driven recollection-belief divergences.

Knowledge updating in real-world estimation: Connecting hindsight bias and seeding effects.

When people estimate the quantities of objects (e.g., country populations), are then presented with the objects' actual quantities, and subsequently asked to remember their initial estimates, responses are often distorted towards the actual quantities. This hindsight bias-traditionally considered to reflect a cognitive error-has more recently been proposed to result from adaptive knowledge updating. But how to conceptualize such knowledge-updating processes and their potentially beneficial consequences? Here, we provide a framework that conceptualizes knowledge updating in the context of hindsight bias in real-world estimation by connecting it with research on seeding effects-improvements in people's estimation accuracy after exposure to numerical facts. This integrative perspective highlights a previously neglected facet of knowledge updating, namely, recalibration of metric domain knowledge, which can be expected to lead to transfer learning and thus improve estimation for objects from a domain more generally. We develop an experimental paradigm to investigate the association of hindsight bias with improved estimation accuracy. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that the classical approach to induce hindsight bias indeed produces transfer learning. In Experiment 2, we provide evidence for the novel prediction that hindsight bias can be triggered via transfer learning; this establishes a direct link from knowledge updating to hindsight bias. Our work integrates two prominent but previously unconnected research programs on the effects of knowledge updating in real-world estimation and supports the notion that hindsight bias is driven by adaptive learning processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Schema and deviation effects in remembering repeated unfamiliar stories.

In today's globalized world, we frequently encounter unfamiliar events that we may have difficulty comprehending - and in turn remembering - due to a lack of appropriate schemata. This research investigated schema effects in a situation where participants established a complex new schema for an unfamiliar type of story through exposure to four variations. We found that immediate recall increased across subsequent stories and that distortions occurred less frequently - participants built on the emerging schema and gradually established representations of parts of the story that were initially transformed. In recall with delays increasing up to 1 month, quantitative measures indicated forgetting while distortions increased. The second focus of this research was on content and order deviation effects on recall. The content deviation, in contrast with previous repeated-event research, was not remembered well and was associated with lower recall; the order deviation had a similar (but expected) effect. We discuss discrepancies between results of this study and previous literature, which had focused on schemata for familiar events, in relation to stages of schema development: it seems that in unfamiliar repeated events, a complex new schema is in the early stages of formation, where the lack of attentional resources limits active processing of deviations.

Controllability and hindsight components: Understanding opposite hindsight biases for self-relevant negative event outcomes.

There is an anomaly in the hindsight bias literature with respect to hindsight effects obtained after self-relevant negative event outcomes: Whereas some studies have reported reduced hindsight bias, others have shown increases. This article contrasts two explanations for the anomaly. The first points to an influence of perceived control over the event outcome: In hindsight, people decrease foreseeability (and hence, responsibility and blame) for controllable events, but they increase the perceived inevitability of uncontrollable events for coping reasons. The second explanation, derived from a reconception of hindsight bias in terms of separate components (Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008), traces the anomaly to differences in the observed hindsight components: Hindsight decreases are to be expected for foreseeability, whereas increases are restricted to the inevitability component. Our experiment (N = 210) manipulated controllability and the hindsight component orthogonally and showed strong support for the component explanation, but also some influence of perceived control.

Enlightenment beats prejudice: The reversibility of stereotype-induced memory distortion.

Social stereotypes impact how we remember people, but how stable is this influence? Inspired by the reversibility of the eyewitness misinformation effect through postwarnings about the planting of misinformation ('enlightenment'), we explored if stereotype influence on person memory can be similarly reversed. Participants read person self-descriptions and subsequently answered memory test questions either with or without stereotype labels, establishing sizeable stereotype-induced memory distortion. One week later, the participants answered the same questions again, but half were enlightened about the earlier stereotype manipulation. This eliminated the stereotype effect and restored memory for the original information, whereas memory remained distorted without enlightenment. We discuss implications for memory distortion research and for (undermining) the self-perpetuation of stereotypes in society.

Eliciting Response Bias Within Forced Choice Tests to Detect Random Responders.

The Forced Choice Test (FCT) can be used to detect malingered loss of memory or sensory deficits. In this test, examinees are presented with two stimuli, one correct and one incorrect, in regards to a specific event or a perceptual discrimination task. The task is to select the correct answer alternative, or guess if it is unknown. Genuine impairment is associated with test scores that fall within chance performance. In contrast, malingered impairment is associated with purposeful avoidance of correct information, resulting in below chance performance. However, a substantial proportion of malingerers intentionally randomize their responses, and are missed by the test. Here we examine whether a 'runs test' and a 'within test response 'bias' have diagnostic value to detect this intentional randomization. We instructed 73 examinees to malinger red/green blindness and subjected them to a FCT. For half of the examinees we manipulated the ambiguity between answer alternatives over the test trials in order to elicit a response bias. Compared to a sample of 10,000 cases of computer generated genuine performance, the runs test and response bias both detected malingered performance better than chance.

How many hindsight biases are there?

The answer is three: questioning a conceptual default assumption in hindsight bias research, we argue that the hindsight bias is not a unitary phenomenon but consists of three separable and partially independent subphenomena or components, namely, memory distortions, impressions of foreseeability and impressions of necessity. Following a detailed conceptual analysis including a systematic survey of hindsight characterizations in the published literature, we investigated these hindsight components in the context of political elections. We present evidence from three empirical studies that impressions of foreseeability and memory distortions (1) show hindsight effects that typically differ in magnitude and sometimes even in direction, (2) are essentially uncorrelated, and (3) are differentially influenced by extraneous variables. A fourth study found similar dissociations between memory distortions and impressions of necessity. All four studies thus provide support for a separate components view of the hindsight bias. An important consequence of such a view is that apparent contradictions in research findings as well as in theoretical explanations (e.g., cognitive vs. social-motivational) might be alleviated by taking differences between components into account. We also suggest conditions under which the components diverge or converge.

Hindsight bias doesn't always come easy: causal models, cognitive effort, and creeping determinism.

Creeping determinism, a form of hindsight bias, refers to people's hindsight perceptions of events as being determined or inevitable. This article proposes, on the basis of a causal-model theory of creeping determinism, that the underlying processes are effortful, and hence creeping determinism should disappear when individuals lack the cognitive resources to make sense of an outcome. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to read a scenario while they were under either low or high processing load. Participants who had the cognitive resources to make sense of the outcome perceived it as more probable and necessary than did participants under high processing load or participants who did not receive outcome information. Experiment 3 was designed to separate 2 postulated subprocesses and showed that the attenuating effect of processing load on hindsight bias is not due to a disruption of the retrieval of potential causal antecedents but to a disruption of their evaluation. Together the 3 experiments show that the processes underlying creeping determinism are effortful, and they highlight the crucial role of causal reasoning in the perception of past events.

Effects of postwarning specificity on memory performance and confidence in the eyewitness misinformation paradigm.

The influence of postevent misinformation on memory is typically constrained by postwarnings, but little is known about the effectiveness of particular features of postwarnings, such as their specificity. Experiment 1 compared 2 levels of postwarning specificity: A general postwarning just stated the presence of misinformation, whereas a specific postwarning identified the test items for which misinformation had been presented earlier. The specific postwarning, but not the general postwarning, eliminated both the misinformation effect and its deleterious impact on memory monitoring (using a classic 2-alternative forced-choice recognition procedure). Experiment 2 ruled out an alternative interpretation of these findings and replicated this postwarning specificity pattern using a cued-recall test. We observed, in addition to the moderating influence of task representations on misinformation acceptance, 2 unexpected facilitative effects on event memory caused by misinformation. Misinformation facilitated event memory during narrative encoding if discrepancies between the event and the narrative were detected (Experiment 1) and during retrieval if a specific postwarning was combined with cued recall (Experiment 2). We interpret the facilitative effect of discrepancy detection within a recursive-remindings framework on noticing and recollecting change. (PsycINFO Database Record

Perceiving events as both inevitable and unforeseeable in hindsight: the Leipzig candidacy for the Olympics.

We present a new conceptualization of hindsight bias in terms of three separate hindsight components (foreseeability impressions, perceptions of necessity and memory distortions) and report three kinds of supporting evidence from an internet study (N = 101) of the unsuccessful application of the City of Leipzig to host the Olympic Games: (1) strongly diverging hindsight effects, (2) low intercorrelations between the components, and (3) dissociative effects of third variables on them. Specifically, experiencing the failure of the application as personally negative (due to a pro-application attitude and previous commitment), led to perceiving it as inevitable but also as unforeseeable. This surprising result helps to resolve seeming contradictions between previous findings (Louie, 1999; Mark et al., 2003; Tykocinski, 2001) by relating the opposite hindsight effects to differences in the nature and functions (dissonance reduction vs. coping with disappointment) of the foreseeability and necessity components.

Looking back on the London Olympics: Independent outcome and hindsight effects in decision evaluation.

Outcome bias and hindsight bias are related, but how exactly? To remedy theoretical ambiguity and non-existent directly relevant empirical research, we contrast an older idea (Baron & Hershey, 1988, J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., 54, 569) that sees outcome bias as partly mediated through hindsight bias with the idea that the two biases independently affect decision evaluations. In an Internet study of retrospections on the 2012 London Olympics, evaluations of the Games' success and its foreseeability had independent effects on evaluations of the International Olympic Committee's decision to award the Olympics to London; there was no evidence of mediation. Further theoretical discussion emphasizes the need to distinguish between a holistic assessment of decisions and a more specific assessment of the decision-making process in future outcome bias research.

The role of horizontal categorization in retroactive and proactive interference.

Four paired-associate experiments with a total N of 291 participants investigated the effects of horizontal categorization on retroactive and proactive interference. (Exclusively) horizontal categorization means that unique categorical relationships hold across the A-B and A-C stimulus-response pairs of successive word lists (e.g., fruit--pear, river--Thames, in list 1; and fruit--plum, river--Wolga, in list 2). Experiment 1 found no significant amounts of interference with this type of list organization. However, strong interference arose with the same materials when the categorical structure was destroyed in Experiment 2. A third experiment contrasted two alternative explanations for these results, and Experiment 4 replicated the effect of horizontal categorization (vs. no categorical relationship) in a within-participants design. The results of the four experiments largely fit with a response competition explanation proposed by Bower, Thompson-Schill, and Tulving (1994), adapted to the within-participants designs used here. Overall, the present findings add to a body of evidence demonstrating limits to retroactive and proactive interference.

Comparing the influence of directly vs. indirectly encountered post-event misinformation on eyewitness remembering.

Some research has found a stronger influence of directly (face-to-face; co-witness; 'social') vs. indirectly (through written reports, 'non-social') encountered post-event misinformation on eyewitness memory reports, whereas other research finds no (big) difference. We argue and demonstrate that a crucial but so far neglected variable underlying this difference is memory for the misleading information itself. In a study with N=120 participants who encountered misinformation directly or indirectly, we found misinformation retention (as assessed in a separate test) to be positively associated with a broad range of misinformation effects. Influence type (direct vs. indirect), however, did not moderate the misinformation effect in terms of memory for original details, and misinformation endorsement was even weaker in the direct influence condition. In our view, these findings reflect differential conversion of retained misinformation into test performance. Other than this, influence type had essentially no effects on remembering; nor did an additional post-warning manipulation.

False memory ≠ false memory: DRM errors are unrelated to the misinformation effect.

The DRM method has proved to be a popular and powerful, if controversial, way to study 'false memories'. One reason for the controversy is that the extent to which the DRM effect generalises to other kinds of memory error has been neither satisfactorily established nor subject to much empirical attention. In the present paper we contribute data to this ongoing debate. One hundred and twenty participants took part in a standard misinformation effect experiment, in which they watched some CCTV footage, were exposed to misleading post-event information about events depicted in the footage, and then completed free recall and recognition tests. Participants also completed a DRM test as an ostensibly unrelated filler task. Despite obtaining robust misinformation and DRM effects, there were no correlations between a broad range of misinformation and DRM effect measures (mean r  = -.01). This was not due to reliability issues with our measures or a lack of power. Thus DRM 'false memories' and misinformation effect 'false memories' do not appear to be equivalent.