RESUMO
STUDY OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the short-term (12 wks) safety and tolerability of a once-daily, fixed-dose abacavir-lamivudine combination versus twice-daily dosing of the separate components, both with background antiretroviral therapy. DESIGN: Phase IIIB, randomized, open-label, parallel-group, multicenter study. SETTING: One hundred forty-six human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) clinics. PATIENTS: Six hundred eighty antiretroviral therapy-naïve patients with HIV type 1 RNA greater than 1000 copies/ml at baseline. INTERVENTION: Patients were randomly assigned in a 2:1 manner to receive either abacavir 600 mg-lamivudine 300 mg once/day or abacavir 300 mg twice/day and lamivudine 150 mg twice/day. Subjects were stratified based on choice of third or fourth antiretroviral drug (nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor [NRTI], NNRTI, or protease inhibitor), assigned before randomization. MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: The primary end point was occurrence of grades 2-4 adverse events and serious adverse events; abacavir hypersensitivity reactions were considered serious adverse events. Baseline characteristics were similar between the once-daily (455 patients) and twice-daily (225 patients) groups. The rates of all grades 2-4 adverse events were similar: once-daily 33% (150 patients), twice-daily 31% (69). A slightly larger proportion of patients in the twice-daily group experienced drug-related grades 2-4 adverse events: once-daily 10% (47), twice-daily 16% (36). Rates of all serious adverse events (once-daily 11% [49], twice-daily 10% [22]) and drug-related serious adverse events (once-daily 5% [21], twice-daily 8% [17]) were similar. The rate of suspected abacavir hypersensitivity reaction was 5.3% (once-daily 4.4% [20], twice-daily 7.1% [16]), with a higher rate for the NNRTI stratum of the twice-daily group (8.6% [10]) than in any other stratum (once-daily, NNRTI 4.3% [10]; twice-daily, protease inhibitor 5.6% [6]; once-daily, protease inhibitor 4.6% [10]). CONCLUSION: In the short-term, the rates of adverse events in the once-daily and twice-daily groups appeared to be similar. The rate of suspected abacavir hypersensitivity reaction in the once-daily group was lower than the rate in the twice-daily group.
Assuntos
Fármacos Anti-HIV/efeitos adversos , Infecções por HIV/tratamento farmacológico , Lamivudina/efeitos adversos , Adulto , Idoso , Fármacos Anti-HIV/uso terapêutico , Contagem de Linfócito CD4 , Didesoxinucleosídeos , Esquema de Medicação , Combinação de Medicamentos , Feminino , Humanos , Lamivudina/uso terapêutico , Masculino , Pessoa de Meia-Idade , Cooperação do Paciente , Satisfação do Paciente , Carga ViralAssuntos
Antraz/história , Surtos de Doenças/história , Exposição Ocupacional/história , Infecções Respiratórias/história , Animais , Antraz/diagnóstico , Antraz/epidemiologia , Bacillus anthracis/isolamento & purificação , Feminino , História do Século XX , Humanos , Masculino , New Hampshire/epidemiologia , Infecções Respiratórias/diagnóstico , Infecções Respiratórias/epidemiologia , Dermatopatias Bacterianas/diagnóstico , Dermatopatias Bacterianas/epidemiologia , Dermatopatias Bacterianas/história , Esporos Bacterianos/isolamento & purificação , Curtume , LãAssuntos
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S./história , Epidemias , Epidemiologia/história , Publicações Periódicas como Assunto/história , Vigilância da População , Coleta de Dados , Epidemias/prevenção & controle , Epidemias/estatística & dados numéricos , Métodos Epidemiológicos , História do Século XX , História do Século XXI , Humanos , Estados UnidosRESUMO
We used unpublished reports, published manuscripts, and communication with investigators to identify and summarize 49 anthrax-related epidemiologic field investigations conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from 1950 to August 2001. Of 41 investigations in which Bacillus anthracis caused human or animal disease, 24 were in agricultural settings, 11 in textile mills, and 6 in other settings. Among the other investigations, two focused on building decontamination, one was a response to bioterrorism threats, and five involved other causes. Knowledge gained in these investigations helped guide the public health response to the October 2001 intentional release of B. anthracis, especially by addressing the management of anthrax threats, prevention of occupational anthrax, use of antibiotic prophylaxis in exposed persons, use of vaccination, spread of B. anthracis spores in aerosols, clinical diagnostic and laboratory confirmation methods, techniques for environmental sampling of exposed surfaces, and methods for decontaminating buildings.