Global evidence on the selfish rich inequality hypothesis.

We report on a study of whether people believe that the rich are richer than the poor because they have been more selfish in life, using data from more than 26,000 individuals in 60 countries. The findings show a strong belief in the selfish rich inequality hypothesis at the global level; in the majority of countries, the mode is to strongly agree with it. However, we also identify important between- and within-country variation. We find that the belief in selfish rich inequality is much stronger in countries with extensive corruption and weak institutions and less strong among people who are higher in the income distribution in their society. Finally, we show that the belief in selfish rich inequality is predictive of people's policy views on inequality and redistribution: It is significantly positively associated with agreeing that inequality in their country is unfair, and it is significantly positively associated with agreeing that the government should aim to reduce inequality. These relationships are highly significant both across and within countries and robust to including country-level or individual-level controls and using Lasso-selected regressors. Thus, the data provide compelling evidence of people believing that the rich are richer because they have been more selfish in life and perceiving selfish behavior as creating unfair inequality and justifying equalizing policies.

Solidarity and fairness in times of crisis.

In a large-scale pre-registered survey experiment with a representative sample of more than 8000 Americans, we examine how a reminder of the COVID-19 pandemic causally affects people's views on solidarity and fairness. We randomly manipulate whether respondents are asked general questions about the crisis before answering moral questions. By making the pandemic particularly salient for treated respondents, we provide causal evidence on how the crisis may change moral views. We find that a reminder about the crisis makes respondents more willing to prioritize society's problems over their own problems, but also more tolerant of inequalities due to luck. We show that people's moral views are strongly associated with their policy preferences for redistribution. The findings show that the pandemic may alter moral views and political attitudes in the United States and, consequently, the support for redistribution and welfare policies.

The development of social comparisons and sharing behavior across 12 countries.

Humans are social beings, and acts of prosocial behavior may be influenced by social comparisons. To study the development of prosociality and the impact of social comparisons on sharing, we conducted experiments with nearly 2500 children aged 3-12 years across 12 countries across five continents. Children participated in a dictator game where they had the opportunity to share up to 10 of their stickers with another anonymous child. Then, children were randomized to one of two treatments. In the "shared a little" treatment children were told that another child from their school had shared 1 sticker, whereas in the "shared a lot" treatment children were told that another child from their school had shared 6 stickers in the same game. There was a strong increase in baseline sharing with age in all countries and in both treatments. The "shared a lot" treatment had a positive treatment effect in increasing sharing overall, which varied across countries. However, cross-cultural comparisons did not yield expected significant differences between collectivist and individualist countries. Our results provide interesting evidence for the development of sharing behavior by age across the world and show that social information about the sharing of peers is important for children's decision making.

Equity theory and fair inequality: a neuroeconomic study.

The present paper reports results from, to our knowledge, the first study designed to examine the neuronal responses to income inequality in situations in which individuals have made different contributions in terms of work effort. We conducted an experiment that included a prescanning phase in which the participants earned money by working, and a neuronal scanning phase in which we examined how the brain responded when the participants evaluated different distributions of their earnings. We provide causal evidence for the relative contribution of work effort being crucial for understanding the hemodynamic response in the brain to inequality. We found a significant hemodynamic response in the striatum to deviations from the distribution of income that was proportional to work effort, but found no effect of deviations from the equal distribution of income. We also observed a striking correlation between the hemodynamic response in the striatum and the self-reported evaluation of the income distributions. Our results provide, to our knowledge, the first set of neuronal evidence for equity theory and suggest that people distinguish between fair and unfair inequalities.

Heterogeneity in fairness views: a challenge to the mutualistic approach?

This commentary argues that the observed heterogeneity in fairness views, documented in many economic experiments, poses a challenge to the partner choice theory developed by Baumard et al. It also discusses the extent to which their theory can explain how people consider inequalities due to pure luck.

Responsibility, fairness and rationing in health care.

OBJECTIVE: People make different choices about how to live their life and these choices have a significant effect on their health, the risks they face and their need for treatment in the future. The objective of this article is, drawing on normative political theory, to sketch an argument that assigns a limited but significant role to individual responsibility in the design of the health-care system. METHOD: In developing our argument, we proceed in five steps. First, we review the literature on criteria for priority setting. Second, we explore the most prominent contemporary tradition in normative theory, liberal egalitarian ethics, with the aim to clarify the role of responsibility for choice. In particular, we discuss where liberal egalitarian theories would draw the 'cut' between the responsibility of the state (which is extensive) and the responsibility of the individuals (which is limited but significant). In the third step, we identify a priority setting dilemma where the commonly advocated criteria would assign equal priority. Finally, we develop a simple model in order to examine the implications of introducing a well-defined notion of responsibility for choice in a priority-setting dilemma of this kind. RESULTS: Liberal egalitarianism holds individuals responsible for choices that affect their health, given that (i) the illness is completely or partly a result of individual behaviour and choice; (ii) the illness is not life-threatening; (iii) the illness does not limit the use of political rights or the exercise of fundamental capabilities; and (iv) the cost of treatment is low relative to the income of the patients. The paper shows how this type of considerations can be used to determine an optimal level of co-payments for diseases even when individual choices cannot be observed directly. CONCLUSIONS: It is possible to assign a limited but significant role to individual responsibility in the rationing of health-care resources. The liberal egalitarian argument captures a concern that is not captured by traditional criteria for priorities in health care. It can thus help policy makers in situations where the cost-effectiveness of different alternatives and the severity of the illnesses are approximately the same, or if the society wants to assign some weight to responsibility for choice. It can easily be linked to a system of graduated co-payments, but need not be.

Fairness and the development of inequality acceptance.

Fairness considerations fundamentally affect human behavior, but our understanding of the nature and development of people's fairness preferences is limited. The dictator game has been the standard experimental design for studying fairness preferences, but it only captures a situation where there is broad agreement that fairness requires equality. In real life, people often disagree on what is fair because they disagree on whether individual achievements, luck, and efficiency considerations of what maximizes total benefits can justify inequalities. We modified the dictator game to capture these features and studied how inequality acceptance develops in adolescence. We found that as children enter adolescence, they increasingly view inequalities reflecting differences in individual achievements, but not luck, as fair, whereas efficiency considerations mainly play a role in late adolescence.