A conditional judgment procedure for probing evaluative conditioning effects in the absence of feelings of remembering.

Attitude research has capitalized on evaluative conditioning procedures to gain insight into how evaluations are formed and may be changed. In evaluative conditioning, a conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., an unfamiliar soda brand) is paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US) of affective value (e.g., a pleasant picture). Following this pairing, a change in CS liking may be observed (e.g., the soda brand is liked better). A question with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications is whether the change in CS liking is found when participants feel they do not remember the CS-US pairings at the time an evaluation is produced about the CS. Here, we introduce a new conditional judgment procedure-the two-button-sets (TBS) task-for probing evaluative conditioning effects without feelings of remembering about the valence of the US paired with the CS. In three experiments, the TBS is (1) is successfully validated; it is also used to (2) provide preliminary information on the feeling of remembering question, and (3) to examine an affect-consistent bias in memory judgments for CS-US pairings. Results do not support evaluative effects in the absence of feelings of remembering, and they oppose the view that affect-consistent bias is limited to memory uncertainty. We discuss these findings in light of previous evidence and of dual-learning models of attitudes. We also discuss limitations and research avenues related to the new procedure.

Sixty Years After Orne's American Psychologist Article: A Conceptual Framework for Subjective Experiences Elicited by Demand Characteristics.

Study participants form beliefs based on cues present in a testing situation (demand characteristics). These beliefs can alter study outcomes (demand effects). Neglecting demand effects can threaten the internal and external validity of studies (including their replication). While demand characteristics garnered much attention following Orne's introduction of this notion, consideration of their effects has become sparse in experimental reports. Moreover, the concept remains confusing. Here, we introduce a conceptual framework for subjective experiences elicited by demand characteristics. The model distinguishes between participants' awareness of the hypothesis, their motivation to comply with it, and the strategy they use to meet situational requirements. We stress that demand characteristics can give rise to genuine experiences. To illustrate, we apply the model to Evaluative Conditioning and the Rubber Hand Illusion. In the General Discussion, we discuss risks and opportunities associated with demand characteristics, and we explain that they remain highly relevant to current research.

Incidental Attitude Formation via the Surveillance Task: A Preregistered Replication of the Olson and Fazio (2001) Study.

Evaluative conditioning is one of the most widely studied procedures for establishing and changing attitudes. The surveillance task is a highly cited evaluative-conditioning paradigm and one that is claimed to generate attitudes without awareness. The potential for evaluative-conditioning effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and most are characterized by small samples and small effect sizes. We conducted a high-powered (N = 1,478 adult participants), preregistered close replication of the original surveillance-task study (Olson & Fazio, 2001). We obtained evidence for a small evaluative-conditioning effect when "aware" participants were excluded using the original criterion-therefore replicating the original effect. However, no such effect emerged when three other awareness criteria were used. We suggest that there is a need for caution when using evidence from the surveillance-task effect to make theoretical and practical claims about "unaware" evaluative-conditioning effects.

Implicit? What Do You Mean? A Comprehensive Review of the Delusive Implicitness Construct in Attitude Research.

This article provides a comprehensive review of divergent conceptualizations of the "implicit" construct that have emerged in attitude research over the past two decades. In doing so, our goal is to raise awareness of the harmful consequences of conceptual ambiguities associated with this terminology. We identify three main conceptualizations of the "implicitness" construct: the procedural conceptualization (implicit-as-indirect), the functional conceptualization (implicit-as-automatic), and the mental theory conceptualization (implicit-as-associative), as well as two hybrid conceptualizations (implicit-as-indirect-and-automatic, implicit-as-driven-by-affective-gut-reactions). We discuss critical limitations associated with each conceptualization and explain that confusion also arises from their coexistence. We recommend discontinuing the usage of the "implicit" terminology in attitude research and research inspired by it. We offer terminological alternatives aimed at increasing both the precision of theorization and the practical value of future research.

Associative Attitude Learning: A Closer Look at Evidence and How It Relates to Attitude Models.

Associative attitude learning is typically viewed as a low-level process that automatically registers mere co-occurrences between stimuli, independent of their validity and relational meaning. This view invites to critically examine how attitude formation conforms to four operating conditions (i.e., unawareness, efficiency, goal independence, and uncontrollability) and two operating principles (i.e., unqualified registration of mere co-occurrences between stimuli and formation of direct stimulus-response links), which is the main purpose of the present contribution. The general discussion examines how contemporary attitude models endorse these conditions and principles. Overall, this contribution calls for (a) a nuanced understanding of the nature and scope of associative attitude learning, (b) a fine-grained understanding of how contemporary attitude models endorse conditions and principles reviewed here and find them relevant to their theorization of attitude formation, (c) a clarification of how direct and indirect evaluative measures relate to these conditions and principles, and (d) enhanced efforts in specifying contemporary attitude formation models.

A systematic review of psychosocial explanations for the relationship between socioeconomic status and body mass index.

A negative association between socioeconomic status (SES) and levels of overweight/obesity is consistently found in high- and middle-income countries. Yet, there is little conclusive evidence about the mechanisms driving this association. In this systematic review, we discuss and compare the results of 22 studies that examine the role of psychosocial mediators in the association between SES and BMI in diverse population samples. These include factors related to resources and constraints in one's external neighborhood, social resources, and psychological factors such as stress. The findings support theoretical models indicating that SES is related to BMI partially through environmental and psychological factors. Importantly, SES often remains a significant predictor of weight status, indicating the importance of also addressing structural antecedents in order to improve health among lower SES populations. We thoroughly discuss the quality and limitations of current study designs and mediation testing and provide recommendations for future research.

Response production during extinction training is not sufficient for extinction of evaluative conditioning.

Two high-powered experiments examined the role of evaluative response production in the extinction of evaluative conditioning (EC) by positioning EC in the procedural and conceptual framework of classical conditioning (CC). According to Rescorla's response inhibition hypothesis, more frequent responding during extinction training results in larger extinction during testing. Experiment 1 used three extinction conditions following response acquisition in an EC procedure: evaluative responses were measured only after extinction; after acquisition and after extinction; or were continuously measured after acquisition, during extinction and after extinction. Based on Rescorla's response inhibition hypothesis, we predicted that extinction of EC would be the highest in the third condition. Experiment 2 was aimed at further facilitating extinction of EC by encouraging participants to experience that their evaluation may change over the course of the experiment. To this end, half of the participants completed pre- and post-acquisition ratings prior to practicing continuous response expression in the extinction phase. Contrary to our predictions, no extinction of EC was observed in either of these experiments. We conclude that Rescorla's inhibition response hypothesis may not apply to EC and discuss the theoretical implications of this finding.

Does attitude acquisition in evaluative conditioning without explicit CS-US memory reflect implicit misattribution of affect?

Research that dissociates different types of processes within a given task using a processing tree approach suggests that attitudes may be acquired through evaluative conditioning in the absence of explicit encoding of CS-US pairings in memory. This research distinguishes explicit memory for the CS-US pairings from CS-liking acquired without encoding of CS-US pairs in explicit memory. It has been suggested that the latter effect may be due to an implicit misattribution process that is assumed to operate when US evocativeness is low. In the present research, the latter assumption was supported neither by two high-powered experiments nor by complementary meta-analytic evidence, whereas evocativeness exerted an influence on explicit memory. This pattern of findings is inconsistent with the view that CS-liking acquired without encoding of CS-US pairs in explicit memory reflects an implicit misattribution process at learning. Hence, the underlying learning process is awaiting further empirical scrutiny.

Does it help to feel your body? Evidence is inconclusive that interoceptive accuracy and sensibility help cope with negative experiences.

In four studies (total N = 534), we examined the moderating impact of Interoceptive Accuracy (i.e. IAcc, as measured with the heartbeat counting task) and Interoceptive Sensibility (IS, assessed via questionnaire) on negative affect, following social exclusion or after receiving negative feedback. Results from an integrative data analysis combining the four studies confirmed that the manipulations were successful at inducing negative affect. However, no significant interaction between mood induction (control versus negative affect induction) and interoception on mood measures was observed, and this was true both for objective (i.e. IAcc) and subjective (i.e. IS) measures of interoception. Hence, previous conclusions on the moderating impact of interoception in the relationship between mood induction and self-reported mood were neither replicated nor generalised to this larger sample. We discuss these findings in light of theories of emotion regulation as well as recent concerns raised about the validity of the heartbeat counting task.

Religiosity and the Motivation for Social Affiliation.

Although universal, the motivation to affiliate can vary as a function of individual differences and of the characteristics of the target. Three studies explored the extent to which religious beliefs and identity are related to social affiliation motivation. Because most religions advocate affiliation and provide opportunities for frequent experiences of affiliation, we reasoned that religious people might show greater affiliation motivation in everyday attitudes and behaviors. We found that religiosity was positively related to implicit and behavioral measures of general social affiliation (Studies 1 and 2). However, manipulating the identity of the affiliation target revealed that when affiliating might not lead to positive outcomes, the relation between religiosity and social affiliation disappeared (but did not reverse). In Studies 2 and 3, when the target of the affiliation was explicitly identified as a member of a threatening out-group (atheist), religiosity did not predict affiliation behaviors. We discuss the mechanisms by which religiosity motivates and constrains social affiliation and the potential implications for social influence and intergroup processes.

The role of awareness in attitude formation through evaluative conditioning.

This article provides a review of past and contemporary debates regarding the role of awareness in attitude formation through evaluative conditioning (EC), that is, by repeatedly pairing a stimulus with other stimuli of positive or negative valence. Because EC is considered the most prototypical method to form and change the network of evaluative associations in memory, the role of awareness in this effect is critical to the question of whether attitudes may be formed and changed through dual processes. We analyze the reasons why there has been so much discussion and disagreement regarding the role of awareness, review past and contemporary methodologies and their limitations, discuss the role of mental processes and conditioning procedures, and identify promising directions for future research in this area.

Do uncontrolled processes contribute to evaluative learning? Insights from a new two-US process dissociation procedure and ambivalence measures.

The contribution of uncontrolled processes to evaluative learning has been examined in evaluative conditioning procedures by comparing evaluations of conditioned stimuli between tasks or within tasks but between learning instruction conditions. In the present research, we introduced a new procedure that keeps both tasks and instructions constant. In addition, we introduced ambivalence measures to address this uncontrollability question. The new procedure involves forming an impression of conditioned stimuli based on their pairing with one unconditioned stimulus while attending but discarding the influence of another unconditioned stimulus holding the same (congruent trials) versus a different (incongruent trials) valence. When the to-be-used and to-be-discarded unconditioned stimuli share the same (vs. a different) valence, controlled and uncontrolled processes should support the same (vs. opposite) responses. We used this approach in two preregistered experiments (Ntotal = 467) using dichotomous evaluative classifications (Experiments 1 and 2), evaluative ratings, and two measures of attitudinal ambivalence: mouse trajectories and felt ambivalence (Experiment 2). While we failed to find evidence for uncontrolled processes in evaluative classification frequencies separately in Experiments 1 and 2, analyses of aggregated classification frequencies across Experiments 1 and 2 suggested a small contribution of uncontrolled processes. In addition, we found larger felt ambivalence for incongruent than congruent trials. Overall, the present findings are mixed but support the possibility of a contribution of uncontrolled processes to evaluative learning, even when control is applied to a focal stimulus and additional influences come from a to-be-disregarded stimulus.

People underestimate the influence of repetition on truth judgments (and more so for themselves than for others).

People judge repeated statements as more truthful than new statements: a truth effect. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 463), we examined whether people expect repetition to influence truth judgments more for others than for themselves: a bias blind spot in the truth effect. In Experiments 1 and 2, using moderately plausible and implausible statements, respectively, the test for the bias blind spot did not pass the significance threshold set for a two-step sequential analysis. Experiment 3 considered moderately plausible statements but with a larger sample of participants. Additionally, it compared actual performance after a two-day delay with participants' predictions for themselves and others. This time, we found clear evidence for a bias blind spot in the truth effect. Experiment 3 also showed that participants underestimated the magnitude of the truth effect, especially so for themselves, and that predictions and actual truth effect scores were not significantly related. Finally, an integrative analysis focusing on a more conservative between-participant approach found clear frequentist and Bayesian evidence for a bias blind spot. Overall, the results indicate that people (1) hold beliefs about the effect of repetition on truth judgments, (2) believe that this effect is larger for others than for themselves, (3) and underestimate the effect's magnitude, and (4) particularly so for themselves.

Verifying properties of concepts spontaneously requires sharing resources with same-modality percept.

In the present experiments, participants had to verify properties of concepts but, depending on the trial condition, concept-property pairs were presented via headphones or on the screen. The results showed that participants took longer and were less accurate at verifying conceptual properties when the channel used to present the CONCEPT-property pair and the type of property matched in sensory modality (e.g., LEMON-yellow on screen; BLENDER-loud in headphones) compared to when properties and channel did not match (e.g., LEMON-yellow in headphones; BLENDER-loud on screen). Such interference is consistent with theories of embodied cognition holding that knowledge is grounded in modality-specific systems (Barsalou in Behav Brain Sci 22:577-660, 1999). When the resources of one modality are burdened during the task, processing costs are incurred in a conceptual task (Vermeulen et al. in Cognition 109:287-294, 2008).

Does co-occurrence information influence evaluations beyond relational meaning? An investigation using self-reported and mouse-tracking measures of attitudinal ambivalence.

People occasionally encounter information of which the structure bears divergent evaluative implications. For instance, when reading that a sunscreen protects against skin cancer, the relational meaning of the information (i.e., "protects against skin cancer") has positive evaluative implications for the sunscreen, whereas the co-occurrence (of "sunscreen" with "skin cancer") is negative. An important theoretical (and practical) issue is whether the co-occurrence information influences people's evaluations beyond the relational meaning of the information. This question has been recently investigated using task comparison procedures (comparing evaluative outcomes on different tasks) and process dissociation procedures (estimating relational and co-occurrence parameters within a given task). In this article, we report four experiments that examined this question by reducing interpretational ambiguities inherent in the two preceding approaches. This was achieved by using self-reported and mouse-tracking measures of ambivalence. We reasoned that when co-occurrence and relational information have divergent (rather than convergent) evaluative implications, more ambivalence should be found. We tested this prediction in experiential (Experiments 1 to 3) and instructed (Experiment 4) procedures. Higher self-reported ambivalence was found in divergent compared to convergent conditions in all experiments. Ambivalence, as estimated with mouse-tracking measures, was higher in divergent than in convergent conditions in the experiential experiments but not in the instructed experiment. Results are discussed with reference to single-process (propositional and episodic) and dual-process attitude learning models. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Truth by repetition Without repetition: Testing the effect of instructed repetition on truth judgments.

Past research indicates that people judge repeated statements as more true than new ones. An experiential consequence of repetition that may underly this "truth effect" is processing fluency: Processing statements feels easier following their repetition. In three preregistered experiments (N = 684), we examined the effect of merely instructed repetition (i.e., not experienced) on truth judgments. Experiments 1-2 instructed participants that some statements were present (vs. absent) in an exposure phase allegedly undergone by other individuals. We then asked them to rate such statements based on how they thought those individuals would have done. Overall, participants rated repeated statements as more true than new statements. The instruction-based repetition effects were significant but also significantly weaker than those elicited by the experience of repetition (Experiments 1 and 2). Additionally, Experiment 2 clarified that adding a repetition status tag in the experienced repetition condition did not impact truth judgments. Experiment 3 further showed that the instruction-based effect was still detectable when participants provided truth judgments for themselves rather than estimating other people's judgments. We discuss the mechanisms that can explain these effects and their implications for advancing our understanding of the truth effect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Discrepancies in the Definition and Measurement of Human Interoception: A Comprehensive Discussion and Suggested Ways Forward.

Interoception has been the subject of renewed interest over the past 2 decades. The involvement of interoception in a variety of fundamental human abilities (e.g., decision-making and emotional regulation) has led to the hypothesis that interoception is a central transdiagnostic process that causes and maintains mental disorders and physical diseases. However, interoception has been inconsistently defined and conceptualized. In the first part of this article, we argue that the widespread practice of defining interoception as the processing of signals originating from within the body and limiting it to specific physiological pathways (lamina I spinothalamic afferents) is problematic. This is because, in humans, the processing of internal states is underpinned by other physiological pathways generally assigned to the somatosensory system. In the second part, we explain that the consensual dimensions of interoception are empirically detached from existing measures, the latter of which capture loosely related phenomena. This is detrimental to the replicability of findings across measures and the validity of interpretations. In the general discussion, we discuss the main insights of the current analysis and suggest a more refined way to define interoception in humans and conceptualize its underlying dimensions.

The new measures of interoceptive accuracy: A systematic review and assessment.

Conscious interoception, the perception of internal bodily states, is thought to contribute to fundamental human abilities (e.g., decision-making and emotional regulation). One of its most studied dimensions is interoceptive accuracy: the objective capacity to detect internal bodily signals. In the past few years, several labs across the world have started developing new tasks aimed at overcoming limitations inherent in classical measures of interoceptive accuracy. In this systematic review, we identified these tasks (since 2015) for the cardiac, respiratory, and gastrointestinal domains. For each identified task, we discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and make constructive suggestions for further improvement. In the general discussion, we discuss the (potentially elusive) possibility of reaching high validity in the measurement of interoceptive accuracy. We also point out that interoceptive accuracy may not be the most critical dimension for informing current theories, and we encourage researchers to investigate other dimensions of conscious interoception.

Beware 'persuasive communication devices' when writing and reading scientific articles.

Authors rely on a range of devices and techniques to attract and maintain the interest of readers, and to convince them of the merits of the author's point of view. However, when writing a scientific article, authors must use these 'persuasive communication devices' carefully. In particular, they must be explicit about the limitations of their work, avoid obfuscation, and resist the temptation to oversell their results. Here we discuss a list of persuasive communication devices and we encourage authors, as well as reviewers and editors, to think carefully about their use.

Container size influences snack food intake independently of portion size.

While larger containers have been found to increase food intake, it is unclear whether this effect is driven by container size, portion size, or their combination, as these variables are usually confounded. The study was advertised as examining the effects of snack food consumption on information processing and participants were served M&M's for free consumption in individual cubicles while watching a TV show. Participants were served (1) a medium portion of M&M's in a small (n=30) or (2) in a large container (n=29), or (3) a large portion in a large container (n=29). The larger container increased intake by 129% (199 kcal) despite holding portion size constant, while controlling for different confounding variables. This research suggests that larger containers stimulate food intake over and above their impact on portion size.