New supramolecular interactions for electrochemical sensors development: different cucurbit[8]uril sensing platform designs.

Three different strategies for cucurbit[8]uril immobilization on a glassy carbon electrode have been assayed. The electrochemical properties of the resulting modified electrodes in solutions containing neutral, positively and negatively charged potential cucurbit[8]uril guests were investigated by cyclic voltammetry and electrochemical impedance spectroscopy. The comparison of the electrochemical behaviour exhibited by the unmodified electrodes against various probes, with respect to that of each modified electrode, resulted in an appropriate method to choose among different strategies for the development of electrochemical sensors. These sensors are based on the incorporation of the cucurbit[8]uril molecular selection properties that depend on the chemical characteristics of the potential analytes. Furthermore, atomic force microscopy was employed for the characterization of the different surfaces developed.

Globalization and human cooperation.

Globalization magnifies the problems that affect all people and that require large-scale human cooperation, for example, the overharvesting of natural resources and human-induced global warming. However, what does globalization imply for the cooperation needed to address such global social dilemmas? Two competing hypotheses are offered. One hypothesis is that globalization prompts reactionary movements that reinforce parochial distinctions among people. Large-scale cooperation then focuses on favoring one's own ethnic, racial, or language group. The alternative hypothesis suggests that globalization strengthens cosmopolitan attitudes by weakening the relevance of ethnicity, locality, or nationhood as sources of identification. In essence, globalization, the increasing interconnectedness of people worldwide, broadens the group boundaries within which individuals perceive they belong. We test these hypotheses by measuring globalization at both the country and individual levels and analyzing the relationship between globalization and individual cooperation with distal others in multilevel sequential cooperation experiments in which players can contribute to individual, local, and/or global accounts. Our samples were drawn from the general populations of the United States, Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa, and Iran. We find that as country and individual levels of globalization increase, so too does individual cooperation at the global level vis-à-vis the local level. In essence, "globalized" individuals draw broader group boundaries than others, eschewing parochial motivations in favor of cosmopolitan ones. Globalization may thus be fundamental in shaping contemporary large-scale cooperation and may be a positive force toward the provision of global public goods.

Global social identity and global cooperation.

This research examined the question of whether the psychology of social identity can motivate cooperation in the context of a global collective. Our data came from a multinational study of choice behavior in a multilevel public-goods dilemma conducted among samples drawn from the general populations of the United States, Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa, and Iran. Results demonstrate that an inclusive social identification with the world community is a meaningful psychological construct that plays a role in motivating cooperation that transcends parochial interests. Self-reported identification with the world as a whole predicts behavioral contributions to a global public good beyond what is predicted from expectations about what other people are likely to contribute. Furthermore, global social identification is conceptually distinct from general attitudes about global issues, and has unique effects on cooperative behavior.

In science we (should) trust: Expectations and compliance across nine countries during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The magnitude and nature of the COVID-19 pandemic prevents public health policies from relying on coercive enforcement. Practicing social distancing, wearing masks and staying at home becomes voluntary and conditional on the behavior of others. We present the results of a large-scale survey experiment in nine countries with representative samples of the population. We find that both empirical expectations (what others do) and normative expectations (what others approve of) play a significant role in compliance, beyond the effect of any other individual or group characteristic. In our vignette experiment, respondents evaluate the likelihood of compliance with social distancing and staying at home of someone similar to them in a hypothetical scenario. When empirical and normative expectations of individuals are high, respondents' evaluation of the vignette's character's compliance likelihood goes up by 55% (relative to the low expectations condition). Similar results are obtained when looking at self-reported compliance among those with high expectations. Our results are moderated by individuals' trust in government and trust in science. Holding expectations high, the effect of trusting science is substantial and significant in our vignette experiment (22% increase in compliance likelihood), and even larger in self-reported compliance (76% and 127% increase before and after the lockdown). By contrast, trusting the government only generates modest effects. At the aggregate level, the country-level trust in science, and not in government, becomes a strong predictor of compliance.

Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game.

When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful, lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinction produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group comparison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation.

Antisocial punishment in two social dilemmas.

The effect of sanctions on cooperation depends on social and cultural norms. While free riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment carried out by free riders pushes back cooperation in others. In this paper we analyze sanctions in both a standard public goods game with a linear production function and an otherwise identical social dilemma in which the minimum contribution determines the group outcome. Experiments were run in a culture with traditionally high antisocial punishment (Southern Europe). We replicate the detrimental effect of antisocial sanctions on cooperation in the linear case. However, we find that punishment is still widely effective when actions are complementary: the provision of the public good significantly and substantially increases with sanctions, participants punish significantly less and sanctions radically transform conditional cooperation patterns to generate significant welfare gains.