Anti-establishment sentiments: realistic and symbolic threat appraisals predict populist attitudes and conspiracy mentality.

Previous research has found that populist attitudes and conspiracy mentality - here summarised as anti-establishment attitudes - increase when people feel threatened. Two types of intergroup threat have been distinguished, namely realistic threats (pertaining to socio-economic resources, climate, or health), and symbolic threats (pertaining to cultural values). However, there is no agreement on which types of threat and corresponding appraisals would be most important in predicting anti-establishment attitudes. We hypothesise that it is the threat itself, irrespective of its cause, that predicts anti-establishment attitudes. In the current paper, we conducted new (multilevel) regression analyses on previously collected data from four high-powered studies with multiple time points (Study 1) or collected in multiple nations (Studies 2-4). All studies included a populist attitudes scale, a conspiracy mentality scale, and different types of threat and emotion measures, reflecting both realistic and symbolic threats. Across studies, both realistic and symbolic threats positively predicted anti-establishment attitudes. The results support an emotional appraisal approach to anti-establishment attitudes, which highlights the importance of anxiety and feeling threatened regardless of what type of event elicits the threat.

Stop crying! The impact of situational demands on interpersonal emotion regulation.

Crying is a common response to emotional distress that elicits support from the environment. People may regulate another's crying in several ways, such as by providing socio-affective support (e.g. comforting) or cognitive support (e.g. reappraisal), or by trying to emotionally disengage the other by suppression or distraction. We examined whether people adapt their interpersonal emotion regulation strategies to the situational context, by manipulating the regulatory demand of the situation in which someone is crying. Participants watched a video of a crying man and provided support by recording a video message. We hypothesised that when immediate down-regulation was required (i.e. high regulatory demand), participants would provide lower levels of socio-affective and cognitive support, and instead distract the crying person or encourage them to suppress their emotions, compared to when there is no such urgency (i.e. low regulatory demand). As predicted, both self-reported and behavioural responses indicated that high (as compared to low) regulatory demand led to a reduction in socio-affective support provision, and a strong increase in suppression and distraction. Cognitive support provision, however, was unaffected by regulatory demand. When the context required more immediate down-regulation, participants thus employed more regulation strategies aimed at disengaging from the emotional experience. This study provides a first step in showing that people take the context into account when attempting to regulate others' emotions.

I hear you (not): sharers' expressions and listeners' inferences of the need for support in response to negative emotions.

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for support. Paradoxically, even when people perceive social support to be beneficial, it often does not result in emotional recovery. This paradox may be explained by the fact that the sharing process disproportionately centres on support that is not helpful in the long run. A distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support alleviates momentary emotional distress, cognitive support fosters long-term recovery. But can listeners tell what support the sharer needs? The present study examines the hypothesis that sharers communicate their support goals by sharing in such a way that it allows listeners to infer the sharer's needs. In Experiment 1, we manipulated participants' support goals, and showed that socio-affective support goals led participants to express more emotions, whereas cognitive support goals resulted in greater use of appraisals. In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested whether these differential expressions would affect the support goals that listeners inferred. We found no evidence for such an effect: Listeners consistently perceived the sharer to predominantly want socio-affective support. These findings help explain why many social sharing instances revolve around socio-affective support, leading to subjectively experienced benefits, but not to genuine recovery.

Can perceivers recognise emotions from spontaneous expressions?

Posed stimuli dominate the study of nonverbal communication of emotion, but concerns have been raised that the use of posed stimuli may inflate recognition accuracy relative to spontaneous expressions. Here, we compare recognition of emotions from spontaneous expressions with that of matched posed stimuli. Participants made forced-choice judgments about the expressed emotion and whether the expression was spontaneous, and rated expressions on intensity (Experiments 1 and 2) and prototypicality (Experiment 2). Listeners were able to accurately infer emotions from both posed and spontaneous expressions, from auditory, visual, and audiovisual cues. Furthermore, perceived intensity and prototypicality were found to play a role in the accurate recognition of emotion, particularly from spontaneous expressions. Our findings demonstrate that perceivers can reliably recognise emotions from spontaneous expressions, and that depending on the comparison set, recognition levels can even be equivalent to that of posed stimulus sets.

Recognition of facial expressions is moderated by Islamic cues.

Recognising emotions from faces that are partly covered is more difficult than from fully visible faces. The focus of the present study is on the role of an Islamic versus non-Islamic context, i.e. Islamic versus non-Islamic headdress in perceiving emotions. We report an experiment that investigates whether briefly presented (40 ms) facial expressions of anger, fear, happiness and sadness are perceived differently when covered by a niqab or turban, compared to a cap and shawl. In addition, we examined whether oxytocin, a neuropeptide regulating affection, bonding and cooperation between ingroup members and fostering outgroup vigilance and derogation, would differentially impact on emotion recognition from wearers of Islamic versus non-Islamic headdresses. The results first of all show that the recognition of happiness was more accurate when the face was covered by a Western compared to Islamic headdress. Second, participants more often incorrectly assigned sadness to a face covered by an Islamic headdress compared to a cap and shawl. Third, when correctly recognising sadness, they did so faster when the face was covered by an Islamic compared to Western headdress. Fourth, oxytocin did not modulate any of these effects. Implications for theorising about the role of group membership on emotion perception are discussed.

Sense or sensibility? Social sharers' evaluations of socio-affective vs. cognitive support in response to negative emotions.

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for social support. A general distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support temporarily alleviates emotional distress, cognitive support may contribute to better long-term recovery. In the current studies, we examine what type of support individuals seek. We first confirmed in a pilot study that these two types of support can be reliably distinguished. Then, in Study 1, we experimentally tested participants' support evaluations in response to different emotional situations using a vignette methodology. Findings showed that individuals perceived any type of reaction that included socio-affective support as preferable. The evaluation of cognitive support, however, was dependent on the specific emotion: Unlike worry and regret, anger and sadness were characterised by a strong dislike for purely cognitive support. Using different materials, Study 2 replicated these findings. Taken together, the findings suggest that individuals evaluate different types of support in a way that is unlikely to benefit emotional recovery in the long run.

Contempt, like any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment.

Gervais & Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude) but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, like many other emotions, can be both an emotion and a sentiment.

Emotional collectives: How groups shape emotions and emotions shape groups.

Group settings are epicentres of emotional activity. Yet, the role of emotions in groups is poorly understood. How do group-level phenomena shape group members' emotional experience and expression? How are emotional expressions recognised, interpreted and shared in group settings? And how do such expressions influence the emotions, cognitions and behaviours of fellow group members and outside observers? To answer these and other questions, we draw on relevant theoretical perspectives (e.g., intergroup emotions theory, social appraisal theory and emotions as social information theory) and recent empirical findings regarding the role of emotions in groups. We organise our review according to two overarching themes: how groups shape emotions and how emotions shape groups. We show how novel empirical approaches break important new ground in uncovering the role of emotions in groups. Research on emotional collectives is thriving and constitutes a key to understanding the social nature of emotions.

Withdraw or affiliate? The role of humiliation during initiation rituals.

Initiation rituals can take different forms and empirical evidence is inconsistent as to whether these rituals promote affiliation among novices. We argue that experienced humiliation during initiations leads to less affiliation among novices, in particular when one is initiated as sole group member rather than as part of the group. We examined this hypothesis in three studies, using different paradigms. In Study 1 (N = 123), perceived severity of an initiation in the past was associated with lower affiliation with other novices; this relationship was mediated by experienced humiliation. Study 2 (N = 64) showed that public derogation in the lab led to more humiliation when participants were the only victim than when they were derogated as a group. Study 3 (N = 248), a vignette study, showed that a similar effect of social context was mediated by expected support from other novices. We conclude that severe initiations may, due to experienced humiliation, result in less rather than more affiliation with fellow novices.

Social anxiety is associated with personal distress and disrupted recognition of negative emotions.

Past research investigating the relation between social anxiety (SA), empathy and emotion recognition is marked by conceptual and methodological issues. In the present study, we aim to overcome these limitations by examining whether individuals with high (n = 40) vs. low (n = 43) social anxiety differed across these two facets of empathy and whether this could be related to their recognition of emotions. We employed a naturalistic emotion recognition paradigm in which participants watched short videos of individuals (targets) sharing authentic emotional experiences. After each video, we measured self-reported empathic concern and distress, as well as their ability to recognize the emotions expressed by the targets in the videos. Our results show that individuals with high social anxiety recognized the targets' emotions less accurately. Furthermore, high socially anxious individuals reported more personal distress than low socially anxious individuals, whereas no significant difference was found for empathic concern. The findings suggest that reduced recognition of emotions among SA individuals can be better explained by the negative effects of social stress than by a general deficit in empathy.

The dynamics of interpersonal emotion regulation: How sharers elicit desired (but not necessarily helpful) support.

When in distress, people often seek help in regulating their emotions by sharing them with others. Paradoxically, although people perceive such social sharing as beneficial, it often fails to promote emotional recovery. This may be explained by people seeking-and eliciting-emotional support, which offers only momentary relief. We hypothesized that (1) the type of support sharers seek shapes corresponding support provided by listeners, (2) the intensity of sharers' emotions increases their desire for emotional support and decreases their desire for cognitive support, and (3) listeners' empathic accuracy promotes support provision that matches sharers' desires. In 8-min interactions, participants (N = 208; data collected in 2016-2017) were randomly assigned to the role of sharer (asked to discuss an upsetting situation) or listener (instructed to respond naturally). Next, participants watched their video-recorded interaction in 20-s fragments. Sharers rated their emotional intensity and support desires, and listeners rated the sharer's emotional intensity and their own support provision. First, we found that the desire for support predicted corresponding support provision. Second, the intensity of sharers' emotions was associated with an increased desire for emotional and cognitive support. Third, the more accurately listeners judged sharers' emotional intensity, the more they fulfilled sharers' emotional (but not cognitive) support desire. These findings suggest that people have partial control over the success of their social sharing in bringing about effective interpersonal emotion regulation. People elicit the support they desire at that moment, explaining why they perceive sharing as beneficial even though it may not engender emotional recovery. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Treatment Approaches for Altered Facial Expression: A Systematic Review in Facioscapulohumeral Muscular Dystrophy and Other Neurological Diseases.

Background: Facial weakness is a key feature of facioscapulohumeral muscular dystrophy (FSHD) and may lead to altered facial expression and subsequent psychosocial impairment. There is no cure and supportive treatments focus on optimizing physical fitness and compensation of functional disabilities. Objective: We hypothesize that symptomatic treatment options and psychosocial interventions for other neurological diseases with altered facial expression could be applicable to FSHD. Therefore, the aim of this review is to collect symptomatic treatment approaches that target facial muscle function and psychosocial interventions in various neurological diseases with altered facial expression in order to discuss the applicability to FSHD. Methods: A systematic search was performed. Selected studies had to include FSHD, Bell's palsy, Moebius syndrome, myotonic dystrophy type 1, or Parkinson's disease and treatment options which target altered facial expression. Data was extracted for study and patients' characteristics, outcome assessment tools, treatment, outcome of facial expression and or psychosocial functioning. Results: Forty studies met the inclusion criteria, of which only three studies included FSHD patients exclusively. Most, twenty-one, studies were performed in patients with Bell's palsy. Studies included twelve different therapy categories and results were assessed with different outcomes measures. Conclusions: Five therapy categories were considered applicable to FSHD: training of (non-verbal) communication compensation strategies, speech training, physical therapy, conference attendance, and smile restoration surgery. Further research is needed to establish the effect of these therapies in FSHD. We recommend to include outcome measures in these studies that cover at least cosmetic, functional, communication, and quality of life domains.

Social identity salience shapes group-based emotions through group-based appraisals.

Group-based emotions have been conceptualised as being rooted in perceivers' social identity. Consistent with this idea, previous research has shown that social identity salience affects group-based emotions, but no research to date has directly examined the role of group-based appraisals in comparison with individual appraisals. In the present studies, we measured group-based appraisals through a thought-listing procedure. In Experiment 1, we explicitly reminded people of their group identity, which led to the predicted change in group-based anger. This effect was mediated by group-based appraisals. In Experiment 2, participants either discussed a group-relevant scenario in small groups or a related topic irrelevant to the group. The group-relevant condition not only led to stronger indignation but the perceived presence of group-based appraisals was also related to participants' reports of indignation. These results provide further evidence for the importance of group-based appraisals as components of group-based emotions.

Mental states inside out: switching costs for emotional and nonemotional sentences that differ in internal and external focus.

Mental states-such as thinking, remembering, or feeling angry, happy, or dizzy-have a clear internal component. We feel a certain way when we are in these states. These internal experiences may be simulated when people understand conceptual references to mental states. However, mental states can also be described from an "external" perspective, for example when referring to "smiling." In those cases, simulation of visible outside features may be more relevant for understanding. In a switching costs paradigm, we presented semantically unrelated sentences describing emotional and nonemotional mental states while manipulating their internal or external focus. The results show that switching costs occur when participants shift between sentences with an internal and an external focus. This suggests that different forms of simulation underlie understanding these sentences. In addition, these effects occurred for emotional and nonemotional mental states, suggesting that they are grounded in a similar way-through the process of simulation.

"You're just envious": Inferring benign and malicious envy from facial expressions and contextual information.

Envy shapes social hierarchies. To protect their rank, envied persons react to the threat posed by enviers. Doing so requires that envied persons initially perceive who envies them. However, a common perspective is that envy lacks a unique expression and that enviers disguise their experience, preventing the social perception of envy. In contrast to this perspective, recent evidence indicates that observers perceive benign and malicious forms of envy accurately when they can integrate information about targets. These findings suggest that observers infer envy based on multiple, contextual cues. We hypothesized that observers infer envy from facial and bodily expressions in comparison situations. Specifically, observers should infer benign envy when a target, who encounters an advantaged person, turns with disappointment toward the advantage. Conversely, observers should infer malicious envy when the target turns with anger toward the advantaged person. Three preregistered studies tested these hypotheses (total N = 693). In Studies 1 and 2, targets turned with an emotional or neutral expression either toward a person silhouette or a valuable object, and participants rated targets' envy. In Study 3, participants performed the same task with more realistic stimuli. Across studies, emotional display and head turning had independent effects on inferences of benign and malicious envy. Furthermore, observers inferred envy more when the target expressed an emotion instead of remaining neutral. We discuss how the results inform research on the social perception of envy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotion Recognition from Realistic Dynamic Emotional Expressions Cohere with Established Emotion Recognition Tests: A Proof-of-Concept Validation of the Emotional Accuracy Test.

Individual differences in understanding other people's emotions have typically been studied with recognition tests using prototypical emotional expressions. These tests have been criticized for the use of posed, prototypical displays, raising the question of whether such tests tell us anything about the ability to understand spontaneous, non-prototypical emotional expressions. Here, we employ the Emotional Accuracy Test (EAT), which uses natural emotional expressions and defines the recognition as the match between the emotion ratings of a target and a perceiver. In two preregistered studies (Ntotal = 231), we compared the performance on the EAT with two well-established tests of emotion recognition ability: the Geneva Emotion Recognition Test (GERT) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). We found significant overlap (r > 0.20) between individuals' performance in recognizing spontaneous emotions in naturalistic settings (EAT) and posed (or enacted) non-verbal measures of emotion recognition (GERT, RMET), even when controlling for individual differences in verbal IQ. On average, however, participants reported enjoying the EAT more than the other tasks. Thus, the current research provides a proof-of-concept validation of the EAT as a useful measure for testing the understanding of others' emotions, a crucial feature of emotional intelligence. Further, our findings indicate that emotion recognition tests using prototypical expressions are valid proxies for measuring the understanding of others' emotions in more realistic everyday contexts.

Interpreting Emotions From Women With Covered Faces: A Comparison Between a Middle Eastern and Western-European Sample.

While new regulations obligate or recommend people to wear medical masks at public places to prevent further spread of the Covid-19 virus, there are still open questions as to what face coverage does to social emotional communication. Previous research on the effects of wearing veils or face-covering niqabs showed that covering of the mouth led to the attribution of negative emotions and to the perception of less intense positive emotions. The current study compares a sample from the Netherlands with a sample from the United Arab Emirates on their perception of emotions from faces covered by a niqab, censoring black bars, or uncovered faces. The results show that covering the mouth area leads to greater anxiety in participants in both countries. Furthermore, although participants did not report greater decoding difficulties for faces that were covered as compared to fully visible, results show that face coverage did influence emotion perception. Specifically, happiness and anger were perceived as being less intense. Further, face coverage by a niqab, as compared to black bars, yielded lower emotional intensity ratings. We conclude that face coverage in particular can modulate the perception of emotions, but that affective contextual cues may play a role as well.

Teachers' multicultural attitudes and perspective taking abilities as factors in culturally responsive teaching.

BACKGROUND: Culturally responsive teaching (CRT) has been associated with increased student engagement and achievement. Its practice in classrooms, however, has been shown to be less than optimal. Nonetheless, certain teacher qualities have been suggested to facilitate its practice. AIMS: The current study sought quantitative evidence in support of two of these teacher qualities, namely teachers' multicultural attitudes, and their perspective taking abilities. By identifying the strength of the suggested relationships, we aimed to examine the generalizability of previous findings in the literature and inform teachers' professional development and interventions. SAMPLE: A total of 143 primary school teachers from different parts of the Netherlands responded to our online survey. METHODS: We conducted a multivariate multiple regression analysis to investigate the relationship between these qualities and teachers' engagement in two separate but related components of CRT (i.e., socially sensitive and culturally sensitive teaching). RESULTS: Results of our analysis yielded significant relationships between the two teacher qualities and the frequency with which teachers engage in socially and culturally sensitive teaching. Perspective taking was a stronger predictor for both aspects of CRT. CONCLUSION: These findings signal the significance of incorporating especially perspective taking experiences and exercises into teacher education and professional development programmes, which could benefit all students regardless of their backgrounds. Our results are promising as these qualities are malleable and thus can be improved.

Different faces of empathy: Feelings of similarity disrupt recognition of negative emotions.

Empathizing with others is widely presumed to increase our understanding of their emotions. Little is known, however, about which empathic process actually help people recognize others' feelings more accurately. Here, we probed the relationship between emotion recognition and two empathic processes: spontaneously felt similarity (having had a similar experience) and deliberate perspective taking (focus on the other vs. oneself). We report four studies in which participants (total N = 803) watched videos of targets sharing genuine negative emotional experiences. Participants' multi-scalar ratings of the targets' emotions were compared with the targets' own emotion ratings. In Study 1 we found that having had a similar experience to what the target was sharing was associated with lower recognition of the target's emotions. Study 2 replicated the same pattern and in addition showed that making participants' own imagined reaction to the described event salient resulted in further reduced accuracy. Studies 3 and 4 were preregistered replications and extensions of Studies 1 and 2, in which we observed the same outcome using a different stimulus set, indicating the robustness of the finding. Moreover, Study 4 directly investigated the underlying mechanism of the observed effect. Findings showed that perceivers who have had a negative life experience similar to the emotional event described in the video felt greater personal distress after watching the video, which in part explained their reduced accuracy. These results provide the first demonstration that spontaneous empathy, evoked by similarity in negative experiences, may inhibit rather than increase our understanding of others' emotions.

Good vibrations: A review of vocal expressions of positive emotions.

Researchers examining nonverbal communication of emotions are becoming increasingly interested in differentiations between different positive emotional states like interest, relief, and pride. But despite the importance of the voice in communicating emotion in general and positive emotion in particular, there is to date no systematic review of what characterizes vocal expressions of different positive emotions. Furthermore, integration and synthesis of current findings are lacking. In this review, we comprehensively review studies (N = 108) investigating acoustic features relating to specific positive emotions in speech prosody and nonverbal vocalizations. We find that happy voices are generally loud with considerable variability in loudness, have high and variable pitch, and are high in the first two formant frequencies. When specific positive emotions are directly compared with each other, pitch mean, loudness mean, and speech rate differ across positive emotions, with patterns mapping onto clusters of emotions, so-called emotion families. For instance, pitch is higher for epistemological emotions (amusement, interest, relief), moderate for savouring emotions (contentment and pleasure), and lower for a prosocial emotion (admiration). Some, but not all, of the differences in acoustic patterns also map on to differences in arousal levels. We end by pointing to limitations in extant work and making concrete proposals for future research on positive emotions in the voice.