Armed actor interventions in humanitarian and public health crises: examining perspectives of crisis-affected community members.

BACKGROUND: Despite frequently providing non-military services in times of crisis, little systematic research has examined the perspectives of crisis-affected community members on the role of armed actors responding to humanitarian crises and public health emergencies. METHODS: To address this research gap, 175 interviews were conducted (2020-2021) amongst humanitarian and public health practitioners; armed actors; and crisis-affected community members across three country and four crisis contexts. Specifically, this effort included an Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; a refugee crisis on the Jordanian-Syrian border; and a volcanic eruption and COVID-19 outbreak in the Philippines. Data was analysed using grounded theory principles. RESULTS: Crisis-affected community members held diverse views. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and government armed actors were characterised as antagonists by some but supportive by others; gender issues were central to perceptions of armed actors, in ways that were both prejudicing and favourable. Overall perception was most closely linked to armed actor roles rather than the relative amount of conflict in a given area. CONCLUSIONS: Findings nuance the relevant literature characterizing NSAGs as disruptive agents, and also the relevant literature that does not fully consider the nuances of gender and armed actor roles as deeply relevant to crisis-affected community perspectives on armed actors. These findings have important implications for both policy and academic discourse on militarization and localization.

Damage to medical complexes in the Israel-Hamas war: a geospatial analysis.

INTRODUCTION: Medical facilities are civilian objects specially protected during armed conflict by international humanitarian law (IHL). These protections are customarily applied regardless of the conflict, parties or contexts involved. Attacks on medical care have characterised the bombardment campaign of the Gaza Strip beginning 7 October 2023. This study presents evidence regarding patterns of damage to medical complexes relative to all other buildings in the first month of this conflict. METHODS: This is an observational pre/post-study of damage to buildings during the first month of the Israel Defence Force bombardment of Gaza from 7 October to 7 November 2023. Open-source polygons for the Gaza Strip were spatially joined with building damage assessments from satellite imagery analysis. Medical facilities were included in the analysis if they were cross-referenced by a minimum of two datasets. Welch's t-test was used to test for statistically significant differences in the proportions of damaged medical complexes and other buildings. RESULTS: A total of 167 292 unique buildings were identified, including 106 cross-referenced medical complexes. Approximately 9% of non-medical buildings and medical complexes alike sustained damage during the first month of the bombardment (p>0.7292). CONCLUSION: During the first month of the bombing campaign, evidence suggests medical complexes have not received special protection as required by IHL. This finding raises concerns about combatants' application of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, suggesting the importance of further investigation.

Continuity planning for public health crises: Designing workplace redundancies for organizational resilience.

Continuity planning prepares organizations to maintain essential functions despite disruptions to critical infrastructure that occur during crises. Continuity planning is especially important for Public-Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), which must prepare to answer 911 calls and dispatch first responders in all-hazard environments, including public health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. However, continuity planning typically focuses on disruptions to cyber-physical infrastructure rather than social infrastructure disruptions that occur when outbreaks of communicable disease limit the ability of essential personnel to perform an organization's essential functions. Reporting findings from interviews with US officials, this study examines how PSAPs decentralized essential personnel by designing redundant workplaces during the COVID-19 pandemic. Realizing existing continuity plans prepared PSAPs to relocate and recentralize essential personnel in a single, shared workplace, officials developed new plans to protect and decentralize telecommunicators across multiple, separate workplaces. To do so, PSAPs achieved passive, standby, and active workplace redundancies that recommend continuity planning objectives and requirements for organizations preparing for future public health crises.