It will (never) stop hurting: Do repeated or chronic experiences of exclusion lead to hyper- or hyposensitive psychological responses?

Unlike one-time lab manipulations of exclusion, in real life, many people experience exclusion, from others and from groups, over extended periods, raising the question of whether individuals could, over time, develop hypo- or hypersensitive responses to chronic exclusion. In Study 1, we subjected participants to repeated experiences of inclusion or exclusion (three Cyberball games, time lag of three days, N = 194; 659 observations). We find that repeatedly excluded individuals become hypersensitive to inclusion, but not to exclusion. Study 2 (N = 183) tested whether individuals with chronic experiences of real-world exclusion show hypo- or hypersensitive responses to a novel episode of exclusion. In line with Study 1, exclusion hurt to the same extent regardless of baseline levels of chronic exclusion in daily life. However, chronically excluded individuals show more psychological distress in general. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for dealing with chronically excluded individuals and groups.

This feels like the right choice: how decision aids may facilitate affect-based valuation.

When individuals cannot make up their mind, they sometimes use a random decision-making aid such as a coin to make a decision. This aid may also elicit affective reactions: A person flipping a coin may (dis)like the outcome, and thus decide according to this feeling. We refer to this process as catalysing decisions and to the aid as catalyst. We investigate whether using a catalyst may not only elicit affect but also result in more affect-based decision making. We used different online studies that examine affect-driven decisions by investigating scope insensitivity (indirect behavioural measure) and self-reported weight given to feelings versus reasons in hypothetical donation decisions. Study 1a showed that a catalyst (a lottery wheel) lead to more scope insensitive (i.e. affect-driven) donations. Study 1b included several changes and did not replicate these results. Study 2 (preregistered) examined scope insensitivity but did not replicate previous results; Study 3 (preregistered) looked at the weight given to feelings versus reason. Although catalyst (compared to control) participants descriptively reported relying more on feelings, this difference did not reach significance. In contrast to lay beliefs, results do not indicate support for the hypothesis that using a catalyst results in more affect-based hypothetical donation decisions.

Ostracism in everyday life: A framework of threat and behavioral responses in real life.

Ostracism-being ignored and excluded-is part of many individuals' daily lives. Yet, ostracism is often studied in laboratory settings and rarely in natural settings. Here, we report one of the first investigations into ostracism in everyday life by documenting how often and where ostracism occurs; who the sources of ostracism are; and how ostracism affects targets' feelings and behaviors. Two experience sampling studies using event-contingent (N = 323, k = 1,107 ostracism experiences in 14 days) and time-signaling sampling approaches (N = 272, k = 7,943 assessments including 767 ostracism experiences in 7 days) show that ostracism is an aversive experience that takes place in a range of contexts and relationships, as often as two to three times per week on average. Reconciling previously mixed findings regarding ostracism's effects on behavior and extending existing theory, we propose a novel framework of behavioral reactions based on need-threat levels: When psychological needs are severely threatened, individuals react to everyday ostracism with avoidance (i.e., withdrawal) and antisocial inclinations (i.e., they exhibit significantly stronger antisocial intentions, although they do not engage in antisocial behavior more frequently). Conversely, when psychological needs are threatened to a lesser extent, individuals are more likely to adopt approach behaviors (i.e., prosocial behavior, talking to others, or connecting with them on social media). Our findings considerably extend present theorizing in ostracism research as they allow to understand when and how individuals experience everyday ostracism and how behavioral reactions after ostracism form in real life. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Effects of an open-label placebo intervention on reactions to social exclusion in healthy adults: a randomized controlled trial.

Social exclusion, that is being left out by others, can have adverse consequences for individuals' psychological well-being. Even short-term experiences of social exclusion strongly threaten basic psychological needs and cause so-called social pain. Prior research suggests an overlap between the experience of social and physical pain that, amongst others, is reflected by the effectiveness of physical pain treatments in alleviating social pain. Drawing upon these prior findings, we here explore whether open-label placebos, which have previously been found to be effective in reducing physical pain, can alleviate social pain following social exclusion. Seventy-four healthy participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 × 2 between-subjects design: First, they either received an open-label placebo intervention or no treatment. Second, they either experienced inclusion or exclusion by their co-players in the interactive ball-tossing game Cyberball. We find that excluded participants in the open-label placebo condition experienced significantly less hurt feelings compared to those in the control condition (Cohen's d = 0.77). There was no effect of treatment for need threat. The findings suggest new possibilities to alleviate social pain, which is of particular interest in the context of preventing destructive and maladaptive behaviors in situations where functional coping strategies are unavailable.

Towards a better understanding of the legibility bias in performance assessments: the case of gender-based inferences.

BACKGROUND: Handwriting legibility systematically biases evaluations in that highly legible handwriting results in more positive evaluations than less legible handwriting. Because performance assessments in educational contexts are not only based on computerized or multiple choice tests but often include the evaluation of handwritten work samples, understanding the causes of this bias is critical. AIMS: This research was designed to replicate and extend the legibility bias in two tightly controlled experiments and to explore whether gender-based inferences contribute to its occurrence. SAMPLE(S): A total of 132 students from a German university participated in one pre-test and two independent experiments. METHOD: Participants were asked to read and evaluate several handwritten essays varying in content quality. Each essay was presented to some participants in highly legible handwriting and to other participants in less legible handwriting. In addition, the assignment of legibility to participant group was reversed from essay to essay, resulting in a mixed-factor design. RESULTS: The legibility bias was replicated in both experiments. Results suggest that gender-based inferences do not account for its occurrence. Rather it appears that fluency from legibility exerts a biasing impact on evaluations of content and author abilities. CONCLUSIONS: The legibility bias was shown to be genuine and strong. By refuting a series of alternative explanations, this research contributes to a better understanding of what underlies the legibility bias. The present research may inform those who grade on what to focus and thus help to better allocate cognitive resources when trying to reduce this important source of error.

Deciding advantageously after flipping a coin.

Folk wisdom, advice columns, and pop culture suggest that when undecided, individuals may flip a coin - not to simply follow the suggestion, but to inspect their reaction to the outcome and then use the reaction to decide. While being intuitively appealing, it remains an open question whether this strategy results in advantageous decisions. Here we used an adapted version of the Iowa Gambling Task to test whether flipping a coin before making a decision may result in advantageous choices. Participants from the general public (N = 542) participated in the adapted Iowa Gambling Task. Results suggest that, under certain conditions, using a coin flip results in a higher likelihood to choose the objectively better option after 40 trials and a steeper learning curve throughout the game. Furthermore, after 40 trials, coin- compared to control-participants described themselves as more certain and the task as easier. This study is the first to show that flipping a coin may prove beneficial, objectively by leading to better decisions, and subjectively by resulting in reduced difficulty and higher certainty.

Social pain by non-social agents: Exclusion hurts and provokes punishment even if the excluding source is a computer.

Prior research has shown that being excluded by computer-agents in experimental exclusion paradigms threatens individuals' basic needs to a similar extent as being excluded by humans. It is less clear, however, why this similarity between computer and human exclusion occurs, and whether it applies only to reactions immediately after the exclusion event (reflexive stage), or also to reactions that occur further downstream (e.g., reflective stage). Four studies (N = 1048) with three different exclusion paradigms provide several key insights: First, the similarity between computer and human exclusion is robust and pervasive, as Bayesian analyses provide consistent support that the source of exclusion (human vs. computer) does not affect reflexive need satisfaction. Second, this similarity also extends to reflective reactions and punishing behavior. Finally, the present studies extend our knowledge about the processes underlying this similarity by uncovering the role of anthropomorphism. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

When do people rely on affective and cognitive feelings in judgment? A review.

Although people have been shown to rely on feelings to make judgments, the conditions that moderate this reliance have not been systematically reviewed and conceptually integrated. This article addresses this gap by jointly reviewing moderators of the reliance on both subtle affective feelings and cognitive feelings of ease-of-retrieval. The review revealed that moderators of the reliance on affective and cognitive feelings are remarkably similar and can be grouped into five major categories: (a) the salience of the feelings, (b) the representativeness of the feelings for the target, (c) the relevance of the feelings to the judgment, (d) the evaluative malleability of the judgment, and (e) the level of processing intensity. Based on the reviewed evidence, it is concluded that the use of feelings as information is a frequent event and a generally sensible judgmental strategy rather than a constant source of error. Avenues for future research are discussed.

This outcome feels right! subjective evaluations of coin flip outcomes reflect previously stated preferences.

When facing a difficult decision, individuals may rely on a coin flip to help them come to a conclusion. In some cases, however, individuals might not adhere to the coin's outcome, but instead report liking or disliking the coin flip's outcome, and may use this affective reaction to form their decision. In this manuscript we investigate the affective reaction towards the outcome of a coin flip and determine whether this affective reaction provides valid feedback in regards to individuals' underlying preferences (Hypothesis 1). We further test whether flipping a coin results in a higher alignment between previous preferences and subsequent decisions (Hypothesis 2). We conducted three studies in the lab and with online samples. Throughout all studies we found support for the notion that the affective reactions regarding the coin flip's outcome validly reflect previously indicated preferences or attractiveness ratings. Contrary to wide-spread expectations, however, we did not find reliable support for the notion that flipping a coin, compared to a control group, leads to decisions that are more in line with the previously stated preferences.

Depressed and excluded: Do depressive symptoms moderate recovery from ostracism?

BACKGROUND: Prior studies show that depressed individuals react with more immediate reflexive need threat to ostracism than healthy controls. However, it remains unclear whether the observed difference between depressed individuals and healthy controls is caused by ostracism. To find out, the exclusion condition needs to be compared to a baseline condition: inclusion. METHODS: We assessed depressive symptoms in N = 426 participants in an experimental study. Participants were included or excluded in Cyberball and indicated both their immediate reflexive need satisfaction level and their reflective need satisfaction level several minutes later to assess recovery. RESULTS: Being excluded decreased reflexive need satisfaction levels for all participants. At the same time, the strength of depressive symptoms negatively predicted reflexive and reflective need satisfaction and was associated with slower recovery. Importantly, no moderation was observed: individuals with more depressive symptoms reported reduced need satisfaction levels regardless of being included or excluded in Cyberball. LIMITATIONS: The present findings were obtained with one paradigm only, albeit the most commonly used one: Cyberball. Depressive symptoms were assessed as self-report; future studies may wish to replicate the effects using structured clinical interviews. CONCLUSIONS: Depressive symptoms come with lowered need satisfaction levels, irrespective of whether individuals are socially excluded or included. Clinical practitioners should be aware of the relationship between chronic need threat and depression in order to help their patients overcome it.

Truth feels easy: Knowing information is true enhances experienced processing fluency.

Information is more likely believed to be true when it feels easy rather than difficult to process. An ecological learning explanation for this fluency-truth effect implicitly or explicitly presumes that truth and fluency are positively associated. Specifically, true information may be easier to process than false information and individuals may reverse this link in their truth judgments. The current research investigates the important but so far untested precondition of the learning explanation for the fluency-truth effect. In particular, five experiments (total N = 712) test whether participants experience information known to be true as easier to process than information known to be false. Participants in Experiment 1a judged true statements easier to read than false statements. Experiment 1b was a preregistered direct replication with a large sample and again found increased legibility for true statements-importantly, however, this was not the case for statements for which the truth status was unknown. Experiment 1b thereby shows that it is not the actual truth or falsehood of information but the believed truth or falsehood that is associated with processing fluency. In Experiment 2, true calculations were rated as easier to read than false calculations. Participants in Experiment 3 judged it easier to listen to calculations generally known to be true than to calculations generally known to be false. Experiment 4 shows an effect of truth on processing fluency independent of statement familiarity. Discussion centers on the current explanation for the fluency-truth effect and the validity of processing fluency as a cue in truth judgments.

The fate of activated information in impression formation: fluency of concept activation moderates the emergence of assimilation versus contrast.

Prior research has shown that activated concepts may influence subsequent interpretation and judgmental processes via priming. Building on this evidence, we suggest that the fluency associated with concept activation may determine whether activated content elicits assimilation or contrast. In two experiments, concept activation in a typical priming experiment was rendered fluent or non-fluent. Consistent with hypotheses, fluent concept activation led to assimilation, whereas non-fluent concept activation led to contrast.

Negative Is True Here and Now, But Not So Much There and Then.

How do people judge the veracity of a message? The negativity bias in judgments of truth describes the phenomenon that the same message is more likely judged as true when framed negatively compared to positively. This manuscript investigates the negativity bias in conditions of psychological proximity and the possibility that the bias decreases when distance increases. This notion is informed by construal level theory, which holds that negative information is more salient and weighed more strongly in conditions of psychological proximity compared to distance. Against this background, we hypothesize that a negativity bias likely occurs in conditions of proximity. With increasing psychological distance, however, positively compared to negatively framed information is more likely to be judged true, therefore attenuating or even reversing the bias. Two studies provide preliminary yet weak support for this hypothesis. A final registered study put the preliminary conclusions to a critical test and yielded consistent results: We find a significant interaction between frame and distance, indicating a descriptive trend for a negativity bias in conditions of proximity, yet a positivity bias in conditions of distance. This interaction illustrates that psychological distance may impact the negativity bias in truth judgments.

The experience of ostracism over the adult life span.

Ostracism, that is, being excluded and ignored by others, is a highly painful and threatening experience for individuals. Most empirical research on ostracism has been carried out in the lab or focused on samples in specific contexts. Here, we investigate the effects of age on how individuals experience ostracism within a broad, representative sample of the adult German population (the Socio-Economic Panel). We find a generally negative relation between ostracism and age, such that older adults report experiencing ostracism less frequently. Further analyses show that a particular dip in the ostracism frequency curve around the age of 65 might be at least partly due to leaving the workforce. We further investigate cross-sectional as well as longitudinal effects of age on relations between ostracism frequency and psychological well-being, showing relatively stable associations between ostracism and negative emotions, reduced life satisfaction, as well as dysfunctional social behavior across the adult life span. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

When and Why Being Ostracized Affects Veracity Judgments.

Ostracism-being ignored and excluded by others-is a ubiquitous experience with adverse effects on well-being. To prevent further exclusion and regain belonging, ostracized individuals are well advised to identify affiliation partners who are sincerely well-disposed. Humans' ability to detect lies, however, is generally not very high. Yet, veracity judgments can become more accurate with decreasing reliance on common stereotypic beliefs about the nonverbal behavior of liars and truth-tellers. We hypothesize that ostracized (vs. included) individuals base their veracity judgments less on such stereotypical nonverbal cues if message content is affiliation-relevant. In line with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 shows that ostracized (vs. included) individuals are better at discriminating affiliation-relevant lies from truths. Experiments 2 and 3 further show that ostracized (vs. included) individuals base their veracity judgments less on stereotypical nonverbal cues if messages are of high (but not low) affiliation relevance.

Who gets ostracized? A personality perspective on risk and protective factors of ostracism.

Ostracism, excluding and ignoring others, results from a variety of factors. Here, we investigate the effect of personality on the likelihood of becoming a target of ostracism. Theorizing that individuals low in conscientiousness or agreeableness are at risk of getting ostracized, we tested our hypotheses within 5 preregistered studies: Four experiments investigating participants' willingness to ostracize targets characterized by different personality traits and a reverse correlation face modeling study where we determined and subsequently validated the stereotypical face of an ostracized person. A survey study within a representative German data panel further corroborated our findings. In line with our hypotheses, persons low in conscientiousness or agreeableness provoke more ostracism intentions (Studies 1, 2, and 4), are more likely to be actually ostracized by others (Study 3), represent the stereotype of an "ostracizable" person (Study 5), and report experiencing more ostracism (Study 6). Effects remained stable even after controlling for likability of the target (Study 2 and 4). Moreover, being described as negative on 1 personality dimension could not be compensated by being described as positive on the other (Study 4). In exploratory analyses, we further investigated the effects of openness to experience, neuroticism, and extraversion. In sum, we find evidence that personality affects the likelihood of becoming a target of ostracism, and that especially low agreeableness and conscientiousness represent risk factors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Catalyzing decisions: How a coin flip strengthens affective reactions.

When individuals are undecided between options, they may flip a coin or use other aids that produce random outcomes to support decision-making. Such aids lead to clear suggestions, which, interestingly, individuals do not necessarily follow. Instead when looking at the outcome, individuals sometimes appear to like or dislike the suggestion, and then decide according to this feeling. In this manuscript we argue that such a decision aid can function as a catalyst. As it points to one option over the other, individuals focus on obtaining this option and engage in a more vivid representation of the same. By imagining obtaining the option, feelings related to the option become stronger, which then drive feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the outcome of the decision aid. We provide support for this phenomenon throughout two studies. Study 1 indicates that using a catalyst leads to stronger feelings. Study 2 replicates this finding using a different catalyst, and rules out alternative explanations. Here, participants report that after having used a catalyst, they experienced a stronger feeling of suddenly knowing what they want compared to the control group that did not use a catalyst. Implications of these results for research and practice are discussed.

Manipulating the odds: The effects of Machiavellianism and construal level on cheating behavior.

Values, beliefs, and traits differ across individuals, and these concepts might impact whether individuals choose to engage in (dis)honest behavior. This project focuses on interindividual differences in Machiavellianism, which is defined as a tendency toward cynicism and manipulativeness, and the belief that the ends justify the means. We hypothesized that trait Machiavellianism would predict dishonest behavior. Furthermore, we speculated that some situations are more conducive than others for Machiavellianism to translate into behavior. In particular, Construal Level Theory holds that individuals construe social situations on a concrete level, or an abstract level, and that an abstract construal level triggers values and value-related traits to be more influential on behavior. Against this background, we hypothesized that differences in Machiavellianism produce differences in dishonest monetary behavior when situations are construed abstractly. Four studies tested these considerations by asking participants to toss a coin and self-report the toss' outcome. Inconsistent with our theorizing, we did not find that higher Machiavellianism is consistently associated with a higher self-reported probability of receiving an individual bonus. We also did not find consistent support that higher Machiavellianism is associated with cheating under abstract compared to concrete construal.

The Basel Face Database: A validated set of photographs reflecting systematic differences in Big Two and Big Five personality dimensions.

Upon a first encounter, individuals spontaneously associate faces with certain personality dimensions. Such first impressions can strongly impact judgments and decisions and may prove highly consequential. Researchers investigating the impact of facial information often rely on (a) real photographs that have been selected to vary on the dimension of interest, (b) morphed photographs, or (c) computer-generated faces (avatars). All three approaches have distinct advantages. Here we present the Basel Face Database, which combines these advantages. In particular, the Basel Face Database consists of real photographs that are subtly, but systematically manipulated to show variations in the perception of the Big Two and the Big Five personality dimensions. To this end, the information specific to each psychological dimension is isolated and modeled in new photographs. Two studies serve as systematic validation of the Basel Face Database. The Basel Face Database opens a new pathway for researchers across psychological disciplines to investigate effects of perceived personality.

Who's to blame? Dissimilarity as a cue in moral judgments of observed ostracism episodes.

When observing an ostracism episode, observers may wish to know whether ostracism is justified or not. If ostracism appears unjustified, observers will likely blame the sources and sympathize with the target; if it appears justified, observers will likely blame and devalue the target. Here we introduce the "social dissimilarity rule," which holds that observers base their moral judgments on dissimilarities between the members of the observed group. In five studies, participants either recalled observed ostracism episodes or observed group interactions in which one group member was ostracized (e.g., in a chat or a group-working task). Results show that if similar persons exclude a dissimilar target (target is an "odd-one-out"), observers attribute ostracism to malicious motives of the ostracizers, such as ingroup favoritism, and devalue the ostracizers. However, if ostracism cannot be explained by social dissimilarity between the sources and the target, observers assume that the target is being punished for a norm deviation (punitive motive) and devalue the target. Use of the social dissimilarity rule was neither moderated by cognitive load (Study 3) nor by the perceived essentiality of the group distinction (Study 4). But if participants knew that the target previously deviated from a norm, knowledge about the situation had a stronger effect on moral judgments (Study 5) than social dissimilarity. These findings further our understanding of how observers make moral judgments about ostracism, which is important given that an observer's moral judgment can strongly impact bystander behavior and thus target recovery and well-being. (PsycINFO Database Record