Minority salience and the overestimation of individuals from minority groups in perception and memory.

Our cognitive system is tuned toward spotting the uncommon and unexpected. We propose that individuals coming from minority groups are, by definition, just that­uncommon and often unexpected. Consequently, they are psychologically salient in perception, memory, and visual awareness. This minority salience creates a tendency to overestimate the prevalence of minorities, leading to an erroneous picture of our social environments­an illusion of diversity. In 12 experiments with 942 participants, we found evidence that the presence of minority group members is indeed overestimated in memory and perception and that masked images of minority group members are prioritized for visual awareness. These findings were consistent when participants were members of both the majority group and the minority group. Moreover, this overestimated prevalence of minorities led to decreased support for diversity-promoting policies. We discuss the theoretical implications of the illusion of diversity and how it may inform more equitable and inclusive decision-making.

Disentangling perceptual awareness from nonconscious processing in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

Scholars have long debated whether animals, which display impressive intelligent behaviors, are consciously aware or not. Yet, because many complex human behaviors and high-level functions can be performed without conscious awareness, it was long considered impossible to untangle whether animals are aware or just conditionally or nonconsciously behaving. Here, we developed an empirical approach to address this question. We harnessed a well-established cross-over double dissociation between nonconscious and conscious processing, in which people perform in completely opposite ways when they are aware of stimuli versus when they are not. To date, no one has explored if similar performance dissociations exist in a nonhuman species. In a series of seven experiments, we first established these signatures in humans using both known and newly developed nonverbal double-dissociation tasks and then identified similar signatures in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). These results provide robust evidence for two distinct modes of processing in nonhuman primates. This empirical approach makes it feasible to disentangle conscious visual awareness from nonconscious processing in nonhuman species; hence, it can be used to strip away ambiguity when exploring the processes governing intelligent behavior across the animal kingdom. Taken together, these results strongly support the existence of both nonconscious processing as well as functional human-like visual awareness in nonhuman animals.

Getting to the heart of it: Multi-method exploration of nonconscious prioritization processes.

Understanding the determinants of consciousness is crucial for theories that see it as functionally adaptive, and for explaining how consciousness affects higher-level cognition. The invention of continuous flash suppression (CFS), a long-duration suppression technique, resulted in a proliferation of research into the process of prioritization for consciousness. We developed a new technique, repeated masked suppression (RMS), that facilitates the measurement of long suppression times, but relies on different visual principles. RMS enables a theoretical leap: It allows scientists to examine the central process of prioritization across different suppression methods. In five experiments (n = 282) we collected chronometric RMS and CFS data, finding that the previously reported face inversion effect and the face priority-dimension generalize beyond CFS. Our results validate the use of multi-method designs in the study of prioritization for consciousness. Furthermore, we show how RMS could be used online to reach diverse samples, previously beyond the reach of consciousness science.

Self-regulation via neural simulation.

Can taking the perspective of other people modify our own affective responses to stimuli? To address this question, we examined the neurobiological mechanisms supporting the ability to take another person's perspective and thereby emotionally experience the world as they would. We measured participants' neural activity as they attempted to predict the emotional responses of two individuals that differed in terms of their proneness to experience negative affect. Results showed that behavioral and neural signatures of negative affect (amygdala activity and a distributed multivoxel pattern reflecting affective negativity) simulated the presumed affective state of the target person. Furthermore, the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)-a region implicated in mental state inference-exhibited a perspective-dependent pattern of connectivity with the amygdala, and the multivoxel pattern of activity within the mPFC differentiated between the two targets. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on perspective-taking and self-regulation.

Implicit motivation improves executive functions of older adults.

It is widely accepted that while controlled processes (e.g., working memory and executive functions) decline with age, implicit (automatic) processes are not affected by age. In this paper we challenge this view by arguing that high-level automatic processes (e.g., recruiting motivation) decline with age, and that this decline plays an unappreciated role in cognitive aging. Specifically, we hypothesized that due to their decline, automatic motivational processes are less likely to be spontaneously activated in old age; thus, implicit external activation of them should have stronger effects on older (vs. younger) adults. In two experiments we used different methods of implicitly activating motivation, and measured executive functions of younger and older adults using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. In both experiments, implicit modulation of motivation resulted in improved executive functioning for older adults. The framework we propose is general and offers a new look at various aspects of cognitive aging.

Enhanced discriminability for nonbiological motion violating the two-thirds power law.

The two-thirds power law describes the relationship between velocity and curvature in human motor movements. Interestingly, this motor law also affects visual motion perception, in which stimuli moving according to the two-thirds power law are perceived to have a constant velocity compared to stimuli actually moving at constant velocity. Thus, visual motion adhering to biological motion principles causes a kinematic illusion of smooth and velocity-invariant motion. However, it is yet unclear how this motion law affects the discrimination of visual stimuli and if its encoding requires attention. Here we tested the perceptual discrimination of stimuli following biological (two-thirds power law) or nonbiological movement under conditions in which the stimuli were degraded or masked through continuous flash suppression. Additionally, we tested subjective perception of naturalness and velocity consistency. Our results show that the discriminability of a visual target is inversely related to the perceived "naturalness" of its movement. Discrimination of stimuli following the two-thirds power law required more time than the same stimuli moving at constant velocity or nonecological variants of the two-thirds power law and was present for both masked and degraded stimuli.

Reading and doing arithmetic nonconsciously.

The modal view in the cognitive and neural sciences holds that consciousness is necessary for abstract, symbolic, and rule-following computations. Hence, semantic processing of multiple-word expressions, and performing of abstract mathematical computations, are widely believed to require consciousness. We report a series of experiments in which we show that multiple-word verbal expressions can be processed outside conscious awareness and that multistep, effortful arithmetic equations can be solved unconsciously. All experiments used Continuous Flash Suppression to render stimuli invisible for relatively long durations (up to 2,000 ms). Where appropriate, unawareness was verified using both objective and subjective measures. The results show that novel word combinations, in the form of expressions that contain semantic violations, become conscious before expressions that do not contain semantic violations, that the more negative a verbal expression is, the more quickly it becomes conscious, and that subliminal arithmetic equations prime their results. These findings call for a significant update of our view of conscious and unconscious processes.

But what if the default is defaulting?

We critically consider the default view of consciousness and decision making, and we explore the implications of this view to the authors' argument. We therefore call for rigorous collection of data regarding the role of consciousness in decisions. We also propose that the section on subliminal effects significantly underestimates existing data and succinctly review relevant findings.

Guess what? Implicit motivation boosts the influence of subliminal information on choice.

When is choice affected by subliminal messages? This question has fascinated scientists and lay people alike, but it is only recently that reliable empirical data began to emerge. In the current paper we bridge the literature on implicit motivation and that on subliminal persuasion. We suggest that motivation in general, and implicit motivation more specifically, plays an important role in subliminal persuasion: It sensitizes us to subliminal cues. To examine this hypothesis we developed a new paradigm that allows powerful tests of subliminal influences as well as stringent assessments of subliminality. The results of two experiments suggest that implicit motivation can enhance the effects of subliminal priming on choice.

An energizing role for motivation in information-seeking during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of understanding and managing information seeking behavior. Information-seeking in humans is often viewed as irrational rather than utility maximizing. Here, we hypothesized that this apparent disconnect between utility and information-seeking is due to a latent third variable, motivation. We quantified information-seeking, learning, and COVID-19-related concern (which we used as a proxy for motivation regarding COVID-19 and the changes in circumstance it caused) in a US-based sample (n = 5376) during spring 2020. We found that self-reported levels of COVID-19 concern were associated with directed seeking of COVID-19-related content and better memory for such information. Interestingly, this specific motivational state was also associated with a general enhancement of information-seeking for content unrelated to COVID-19. These effects were associated with commensurate changes to utility expectations and were dissociable from the influence of non-specific anxiety. Thus, motivation both directs and energizes epistemic behavior, linking together utility and curiosity.

When pooping babies become more appealing: the effects of nonconscious goal pursuit on experienced emotions.

In this report, we argue that the intensity of the emotions people experience is partly determined by the goals they nonconsciously pursue, and that this effect is functional in nature: Emotions are modulated in ways that may increase the probability of goal achievement. To test this hypothesis, we primed female participants with a motherhood goal and then measured their level of disgust in response to mildly disgusting pictures. Priming led to a reduction of disgust in response to goal-relevant stimuli (e.g., pictures of babies with runny noses) but not goal-irrelevant stimuli. This effect was moderated by the women's probability of conception, a proxy of their ability to pursue the motherhood goal.

A single exposure to the American flag shifts support toward Republicanism up to 8 months later.

There is scant evidence that incidental cues in the environment significantly alter people's political judgments and behavior in a durable way. We report that a brief exposure to the American flag led to a shift toward Republican beliefs, attitudes, and voting behavior among both Republican and Democratic participants, despite their overwhelming belief that exposure to the flag would not influence their behavior. In Experiment 1, which was conducted online during the 2008 U.S. presidential election, a single exposure to an American flag resulted in a significant increase in participants' Republican voting intentions, voting behavior, political beliefs, and implicit and explicit attitudes, with some effects lasting 8 months after the exposure to the prime. In Experiment 2, we replicated the findings more than a year into the current Democratic presidential term. These results constitute the first evidence that nonconscious priming effects from exposure to a national flag can bias the citizenry toward one political party and can have considerable durability.

Consciousness might still be in business, but not in this business.

In a recent comment on our paper Implicit Working Memory (Hassin, Bargh, Engell, & McCulluch, 2009) Guterman (2010) argued that a possible interpretation of the results of one of our experiments is that "conscious awareness…enabled the participants to find ways to benefit from the predictability…while nullifying the cost." Unfortunately, the data do not support this interpretation. Additionally, Guterman (2010) seems to have suggested that our results may be explained by non-working memory processes. We argue against this interpretation.

From non-conscious processing to conscious events: a minimalist approach.

The minimalist approach that we develop here is a framework that allows to appreciate how non-conscious processing and conscious contents shape human cognition, broadly defined. It is composed of three simple principles. First, cognitive processes are inherently non-conscious, while their inputs and (interim) outputs may be consciously experienced. Second, non-conscious processes and elements of the cognitive architecture prioritize information for conscious experiences. Third, conscious events are composed of series of conscious contents and non-conscious processes, with increased duration leading to more opportunity for processing. The narrowness of conscious experiences is conceptualized here as a solution to the problem of channeling the plethora of non-conscious processes into action and communication processes that are largely serial. The framework highlights the importance of prioritization for consciousness, and we provide an illustrative review of three main factors that shape prioritization-stimulus strength, motivational relevance and mental accessibility. We further discuss when and how this framework (i) is compatible with previous theories, (ii) enables new understandings of established findings and models, and (iii) generates new predictions and understandings.

Regression to the Mean Does Not Explain Away Nonconscious Processing.

In studies that use subliminal presentations, participants may become aware of stimuli that are intended to remain subliminal. A common solution to this problem is to analyze the results of the group of participants for whom the stimuli remained subliminal. A recent article (Shanks, 2017) argued that this method leads to a regression to the mean artifact, which may account for many of the observed effects. However, conceptual and statistical characteristics of the original publication lead to overestimation of the influence of the artifact. Using simulations, we demonstrate that this overestimation leads to the mistaken conclusion that regression to the mean accounts for nonconscious effects. We conclude by briefly outlining a new description of the influence of the artifact and how it should be statistically addressed.

Ancient visual channels have a causal role in arithmetic calculations.

Humans exhibit complex arithmetic skills, often attributed to our exceptionally large neocortex. However, the past decade has provided ample evidence that the functional domain of the subcortex extends well beyond basic functions. Using a sensitive behavioral method, for the first time, we explored the contributions of lower-order visual monocular channels to symbolic arithmetic operations, addition and subtraction. The pattern of results from 4 different experiments provides converging evidence for a causal relation between mental arithmetic and primitive subcortical regions. The results have major implications for our understanding of the neuroevolutionary development of general numerical abilities-subcortical regions, which are shared across different species, are essential to complex numerical operations. In a bigger conceptual framework, these findings and others call for a shift from the modal view of the exclusive role of the neocortex in high-level cognition to a view that emphasizes the interplay between subcortical and cortical brain networks.

Did you see it? Robust individual differences in the speed with which meaningful visual stimuli break suppression.

Perceptual conscious experiences result from non-conscious processes that precede them. We document a new characteristic of the cognitive system: the speed with which visual meaningful stimuli are prioritized to consciousness over competing noise in visual masking paradigms. In ten experiments (N = 399) we find that an individual's non-conscious visual prioritization speed (NVPS) is ubiquitous across a wide variety of stimuli, and generalizes across visual masks, suppression tasks, and time. We also find that variation in NVPS is unique, in that it cannot be explained by variation in general speed, perceptual decision thresholds, short-term visual memory, or three networks of attention (alerting, orienting and executive). Finally, we find that NVPS is correlated with subjective measures of sensitivity, as they are measured by the Highly Sensitive Person scale. We conclude by discussing the implications of variance in NVPS for understanding individual variance in behavior and the neural substrates of consciousness.

Not on the face alone: perception of contextualized face expressions in Huntington's disease.

Numerous studies have demonstrated that Huntington's disease mutation-carriers have deficient explicit recognition of isolated facial expressions. There are no studies, however, which have investigated the recognition of facial expressions embedded within an emotional body and scene context. Real life facial expressions are typically embedded in contexts which may dramatically change the emotion recognized in the face. Moreover, a recent study showed that the magnitude of the contextual bias is modulated by the similarity between the actual expression of the presented face and the facial expression that would typically fit the context, e.g. disgust faces are more similar to anger than to sadness faces and, consequently, are more strongly influenced by contexts expressing anger than by contexts expressing sadness. Since context effects on facial expression perception are not explicitly controlled, their pattern serves as an implicit measure of the processing of facial expressions. In this study we took advantage of the face-in-context design to compare explicit recognition of face-expressions by Huntington's disease mutation-carriers, with evidence for processing the expressions deriving from implicit measures. In an initial experiment we presented a group of 21 Huntington's disease mutation-carriers with standard tests of face-expression recognition. Relative to controls, they displayed deficits in recognizing disgust and anger faces despite intact recognition of these emotions from non-facial images. In a subsequent experiment, we embedded the disgust faces on images of people conveying sadness and anger as expressed by body language and additional paraphernalia. In addition, sadness and anger faces were embedded on context images conveying disgust. In both cases participants were instructed to categorize the facial expressions, ignoring the context. Despite the deficient explicit recognition of isolated disgust and anger faces, the perception of the emotions expressed by the faces was affected by context in Huntington's disease mutation-carriers in a similar manner as in control participants. Specifically, they displayed the same sensitivity to face-context pairings. These findings suggest that, despite their impaired explicit recognition of facial expressions, Huntington's disease mutation-carriers display relatively preserved processing of the same facial configurations when embedded in context. The results also show intact utilization of the information elicited by contextual cues about faces expressing disgust even when the actually presented face expresses a different emotion. Overall, our findings shed light on the nature of the deficit in facial expression recognition in Huntington's disease mutation-carriers as well as underscore the importance of context in emotion perception.

Subliminal exposure to national flags affects political thought and behavior.

Political thought and behavior play an important role in our lives, from ethnic tensions in Europe, to the war in Iraq and the Middle Eastern conflict, to parliamentary and presidential elections. However, little is known about how the individual's political attitudes and decisions are shaped by subtle national cues that are so prevalent in our environment. We report a series of experiments that show that subliminal exposure to one's national flag influences political attitudes, intentions, and decisions, both in laboratory settings and in "real-life" behavior. Furthermore, this manipulation consistently narrowed the gap between those who score high vs. low on a scale of identification with Israeli nationalism. The first two experiments examined participants' stance toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Jewish settlers in the West Bank. Experiment 3 examined voting intentions and actual voting in Israel's recently held general elections. The results portray a consistent picture: subtle reminders of one's nationality significantly influence political thought and overt political behavior.