The effects of jury size, evidence complexity, and note taking on jury process and performance in a civil trial.

A total of 567 jury-eligible men and women who were assigned to 6- or 12-person juries saw a videotaped civil trial that contained either I or 4 plaintiffs. Half the juries took notes, whereas the remainder did not. Six-person juries that did not take notes awarded multiple plaintiffs the highest amounts of compensation. Six-person juries also gave the highest punitive damages when they did not take notes and judged multiple plaintiffs. The punitive awards of 6-person juries were highly variable compared with 12-person juries. Multiple plaintiffs also increased the unpredictability of jury punitive awards. Twelve-person juries deliberated longer, recalled more probative information, and relied less than 6-person juries on evaluative statements and nonprobative evidence. Limitations and implications are discussed.

The effects of defendant race, victim race, and juror gender on evidence processing in a murder trial.

The effects of defendant race, victim race, and juror gender on sentencing and information processing were examined within the context of a murder trial. A sample consisting of 96, jury eligible White Australians read one of four versions of a real trial transcript, in which the race of a male defendant and female victim were varied. The participants imposed the severest sentences on the Indigenous (Black) defendant. Jurors were most lenient with White defendants who killed a White victim. Female jurors were more punitive than the males toward the Indigenous defendant. Jurors processed evidence systematically in same-race trials, but used both systematic and heuristic processing in mixed-race trials. In these instances, female jurors employed significantly more emotive responses, especially when the victim was Black. The effects of subtle racism and the black processing effect when the victim was non-White are considered.

Chaos in the courtroom reconsidered: emotional bias and juror nullification.

A widespread presumption in the law is that giving jurors nullification instructions would result in "chaos"-jurors guided not by law but by their emotions and personal biases. We propose a model of juror nullification that posits an interaction between the nature of the trial (viz. whether the fairness of the law is at issue), nullification instructions, and emotional biases on juror decision-making. Mock jurors considered a trial online which varied the presence a nullification instructions, whether the trial raised issues of the law's fairness (murder for profit vs. euthanasia), and emotionally biasing information (that affected jurors' liking for the victim). Only when jurors were in receipt of nullification instructions in a nullification-relevant trial were they sensitive to emotionally biasing information. Emotional biases did not affect evidence processing but did affect emotional reactions and verdicts, providing the strongest support to date for the chaos theory.