Neural Mechanisms of Social Cognition in Primates.

Activity in a network of areas spanning the superior temporal sulcus, dorsomedial frontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex is concerned with how nonhuman primates negotiate the social worlds in which they live. Central aspects of these circuits are retained in humans. Activity in these areas codes for primates' interactions with one another, their attempts to find out about one another, and their attempts to prevent others from finding out too much about themselves. Moreover, important features of the social world, such as dominance status, cooperation, and competition, modulate activity in these areas. We consider the degree to which activity in these regions is simply encoding an individual's own actions and choices or whether this activity is especially and specifically concerned with social cognition. Recent advances in comparative anatomy and computational modeling may help us to gain deeper insights into the nature and boundaries of primate social cognition.

Reduced prosocial motivation and effort in adolescents with conduct problems and callous-unemotional traits.

BACKGROUND: Prosocial behaviours - acts that benefit others - are of crucial importance for many species including humans. However, adolescents with conduct problems (CP), unlike their typically developing (TD) peers, demonstrate markedly reduced engagement in prosocial behaviours. This pattern is particularly pronounced in adolescents with CP and high levels of callous-unemotional traits (CP/HCU) who are at increased risk of developing psychopathy in adulthood. While a substantial amount of research has investigated the cognitive-affective mechanisms thought to underlie antisocial behaviour, much less is known about the mechanisms that could explain reduced prosocial behaviours in adolescents with CP. METHODS: Here we examined the willingness to exert effort to benefit oneself (self) and another person (other, prosocial condition) in children with CP/HCU, CP and lower levels of CU traits (CP/LCU) and their TD peers. The task captured both prosocial choices, and actual effort exerted following prosocial choices, in adolescent boys aged 11-16 (27 CP/HCU; 34 CP/LCU; 33 TD). We used computational modelling to reveal the mechanistic processes involved when choosing prosocial acts. RESULTS: We found that both CP/HCU and CP/LCU groups were more averse to initiating effortful prosocial acts than TD adolescents - both at a cognitive and at a behavioural level. Strikingly, even if they chose to initiate a prosocial act, the CP/HCU group exerted less effort following this prosocial choice than other groups. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings indicate that reduced exertion of effort to benefit others may be an important factor that differentiates adolescents with CP/HCU from their peers with CP/LCU. They offer new insights into what might drive low prosocial behaviour in adolescents with CP, including vulnerabilities that may particularly characterise those with high levels of CU traits.

l-DOPA and oxytocin influence the neurocomputational mechanisms of self-benefitting and prosocial reinforcement learning.

Humans learn through reinforcement, particularly when outcomes are unexpected. Recent research suggests similar mechanisms drive how we learn to benefit other people, that is, how we learn to be prosocial. Yet the neurochemical mechanisms underlying such prosocial computations remain poorly understood. Here, we investigated whether pharmacological manipulation of oxytocin and dopamine influence the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying self-benefitting and prosocial reinforcement learning. Using a double-blind placebo-controlled cross-over design, we administered intranasal oxytocin (24 IU), dopamine precursor l-DOPA (100 mg + 25 mg carbidopa), or placebo over three sessions. Participants performed a probabilistic reinforcement learning task with potential rewards for themselves, another participant, or no one, during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Computational models of reinforcement learning were used to calculate prediction errors (PEs) and learning rates. Participants behavior was best explained by a model with different learning rates for each recipient, but these were unaffected by either drug. On the neural level, however, both drugs blunted PE signaling in the ventral striatum and led to negative signaling of PEs in the anterior mid-cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior parietal gyrus, and precentral gyrus, compared to placebo, and regardless of recipient. Oxytocin (versus placebo) administration was additionally associated with opposing tracking of self-benefitting versus prosocial PEs in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, insula and superior temporal gyrus. These findings suggest that both l-DOPA and oxytocin induce a context-independent shift from positive towards negative tracking of PEs during learning. Moreover, oxytocin may have opposing effects on PE signaling when learning to benefit oneself versus another.

Neural representations of vicarious rewards are linked to interoception and prosocial behaviour.

Every day we constantly observe other people receiving rewards. Theoretical accounts posit that vicarious reward processing might be linked to people's sensitivity to internal body states (interoception) and facilitates a tendency to act prosocially. However, the neural processes underlying the links between vicarious reward processing, interoception, and prosocial behaviour are poorly understood. Previous research has linked vicarious reward processing to the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg) and the anterior insula (AI). Can we predict someone's propensity to be prosocial or to be aware of interoceptive signals from variability in how the ACCg and AI process rewards? Here, participants monitored rewards being delivered to themselves or a stranger during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Later, they performed a task measuring their willingness to exert effort to obtain rewards for others, and a task measuring their propensity to be aware and use interoceptive respiratory signals. Using multivariate similarity analysis, we show that people's willingness to be prosocial is predicted by greater similarity between self and other representations in the ACCg. Moreover, greater dissimilarity in self-other representations in the AI is linked to interoceptive propensity. These findings highlight that vicarious reward is linked to bodily signals in AI, and foster prosocial tendencies through the ACCg.

Anterior cingulate cortex: A brain system necessary for learning to reward others?

Helping a friend move house, donating to charity, volunteering assistance during a crisis. Humans and other species alike regularly undertake prosocial behaviors-actions that benefit others without necessarily helping ourselves. But how does the brain learn what acts are prosocial? Basile and colleagues show that removal of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) prevents monkeys from learning what actions are prosocial but does not stop them carrying out previously learned prosocial behaviors. This highlights that the ability to learn what actions are prosocial and choosing to perform helpful acts may be distinct cognitive processes, with only the former depending on ACC.

Model-free decision making is prioritized when learning to avoid harming others.

Moral behavior requires learning how our actions help or harm others. Theoretical accounts of learning propose a key division between "model-free" algorithms that cache outcome values in actions and "model-based" algorithms that map actions to outcomes. Here, we tested the engagement of these mechanisms and their neural basis as participants learned to avoid painful electric shocks for themselves and a stranger. We found that model-free decision making was prioritized when learning to avoid harming others compared to oneself. Model-free prediction errors for others relative to self were tracked in the thalamus/caudate. At the time of choice, neural activity consistent with model-free moral learning was observed in subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC), and switching after harming others was associated with stronger connectivity between sgACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Finally, model-free moral learning varied with individual differences in moral judgment. Our findings suggest moral learning favors efficiency over flexibility and is underpinned by specific neural mechanisms.

Probing apathy in children and adolescents with the Apathy Motivation Index-Child version.

Apathy is linked to mental health and altered neurocognitive functions such as learning and decision-making in healthy adults. Mental health problems typically begin to emerge during adolescence, yet little is known about how apathy develops due to an absence of quantitative measurements specific to young people. Here, we present and evaluate the Apathy Motivation Index-Child Version (AMI-CV) for children and adolescents. We show across two samples of young people (aged 8 to 17 years, total N = 191) tested in schools in the UK and on a smartphone app, that the AMI-CV is a short, psychometrically sound measure to assess levels of apathy and motivation in young people. Similar to adult versions, the AMI-CV captures three distinct apathy domains: Behavioural Activation, Social Motivation and Emotional Sensitivity. The AMI-CV showed excellent construct validity with an alternative measure of apathy and external validity replicating specific links with related mental health traits shown in adults. Our results provide a short measure of self-reported apathy in young people that enables research into apathy development. The AMI-CV can be used in conjunction with the adult version to investigate the impact of levels of apathy across the lifespan.

When Implicit Prosociality Trumps Selfishness: The Neural Valuation System Underpins More Optimal Choices When Learning to Avoid Harm to Others Than to Oneself.

Humans learn quickly which actions cause them harm. As social beings, we also need to learn to avoid actions that hurt others. It is currently unknown whether humans are as good at learning to avoid others' harm (prosocial learning) as they are at learning to avoid self-harm (self-relevant learning). Moreover, it remains unclear how the neural mechanisms of prosocial learning differ from those of self-relevant learning. In this fMRI study, 96 male human participants learned to avoid painful stimuli either for themselves or for another individual. We found that participants performed more optimally when learning for the other than for themselves. Computational modeling revealed that this could be explained by an increased sensitivity to subjective values of choice alternatives during prosocial learning. Increased value sensitivity was further associated with empathic traits. On the neural level, higher value sensitivity during prosocial learning was associated with stronger engagement of the ventromedial PFC during valuation. Moreover, the ventromedial PFC exhibited higher connectivity with the right temporoparietal junction during prosocial, compared with self-relevant, choices. Our results suggest that humans are particularly adept at learning to protect others from harm. This ability appears implemented by neural mechanisms overlapping with those supporting self-relevant learning, but with the additional recruitment of structures associated to the social brain. Our findings contrast with recent proposals that humans are egocentrically biased when learning to obtain monetary rewards for self or others. Prosocial tendencies may thus trump egocentric biases in learning when another person's physical integrity is at stake.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT We quickly learn to avoid actions that cause us harm. As "social animals," we also need to learn and consider the harmful consequences our actions might have for others. Here, we investigated how learning to protect others from pain (prosocial learning) differs from learning to protect oneself (self-relevant learning). We found that human participants performed better during prosocial learning than during self-relevant learning, as they were more sensitive toward the information they collected when making choices for the other. Prosocial learning recruited similar brain areas as self-relevant learning, but additionally involved parts of the "social brain" that underpin perspective-taking and self-other distinction. Our findings suggest that people show an inherent tendency toward "intuitive" prosociality.

Aging Increases Prosocial Motivation for Effort.

Social cohesion relies on prosociality in increasingly aging populations. Helping other people requires effort, yet how willing people are to exert effort to benefit themselves and others, and whether such behaviors shift across the life span, is poorly understood. Using computational modeling, we tested the willingness of 95 younger adults (18-36 years old) and 92 older adults (55-84 years old) to put physical effort into self- and other-benefiting acts. Participants chose whether to work and exert force (30%-70% of maximum grip strength) for rewards (2-10 credits) accrued for themselves or, prosocially, for another. Younger adults were somewhat selfish, choosing to work more at higher effort levels for themselves, and exerted less force in prosocial work. Strikingly, compared with younger adults, older people were more willing to put in effort for others and exerted equal force for themselves and others. Increased prosociality in older people has important implications for human behavior and societal structure.

Recommendations for the Nonpharmacological Treatment of Apathy in Brain Disorders.

Apathy is a common neuropsychiatric syndrome observed across many neurocognitive and psychiatric disorders. Although there are currently no definitive standard therapies for the treatment of apathy, nonpharmacological treatment (NPT) is often considered to be at the forefront of clinical management. However, guidelines on how to select, prescribe, and administer NPT in clinical practice are lacking. Furthermore, although new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are beginning to be employed in NPT, their role is still unclear. The objective of the present work is to provide recommendations for the use of NPT for apathy, and to discuss the role of ICT in this domain, based on opinions gathered from experts in the field. The expert panel included 20 researchers and healthcare professionals working on brain disorders and apathy. Following a standard Delphi methodology, experts answered questions via several rounds of web-surveys, and then discussed the results in a plenary meeting. The experts suggested that NPT are useful to consider as therapy for people presenting with different neurocognitive and psychiatric diseases at all stages, with evidence of apathy across domains. The presence of a therapist and/or a caregiver is important in delivering NPT effectively, but parts of the treatment may be performed by the patient alone. NPT can be delivered both in clinical settings and at home. However, while remote treatment delivery may be cost and time-effective, it should be considered with caution, and tailored based on the patient's cognitive and physical profile and living conditions.

Neurocomputational mechanisms of prosocial learning and links to empathy.

Reinforcement learning theory powerfully characterizes how we learn to benefit ourselves. In this theory, prediction errors-the difference between a predicted and actual outcome of a choice-drive learning. However, we do not operate in a social vacuum. To behave prosocially we must learn the consequences of our actions for other people. Empathy, the ability to vicariously experience and understand the affect of others, is hypothesized to be a critical facilitator of prosocial behaviors, but the link between empathy and prosocial behavior is still unclear. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) participants chose between different stimuli that were probabilistically associated with rewards for themselves (self), another person (prosocial), or no one (control). Using computational modeling, we show that people can learn to obtain rewards for others but do so more slowly than when learning to obtain rewards for themselves. fMRI revealed that activity in a posterior portion of the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex/basal forebrain (sgACC) drives learning only when we are acting in a prosocial context and signals a prosocial prediction error conforming to classical principles of reinforcement learning theory. However, there is also substantial variability in the neural and behavioral efficiency of prosocial learning, which is predicted by trait empathy. More empathic people learn more quickly when benefitting others, and their sgACC response is the most selective for prosocial learning. We thus reveal a computational mechanism driving prosocial learning in humans. This framework could provide insights into atypical prosocial behavior in those with disorders of social cognition.

Peripheral Serotonin 1B Receptor Transcription Predicts the Effect of Acute Tryptophan Depletion on Risky Decision-Making.

Background: The effects of acute tryptophan depletion on human decision-making suggest that serotonin modulates the processing of rewards and punishments. However, few studies have assessed which of the many types of serotonin receptors are responsible. Methods: Using a within-subject, double-blind, sham-controlled design in 26 subjects, we examined whether individual differences in serotonin system gene transcription, measured in peripheral blood, predicted the effect of acute tryptophan depletion on decision-making. Participants performed a task in which they chose between successive pairs of fixed, lower-stakes (control) and variable, higher-stakes (experimental) gambles, each involving wins or losses. In 21 participants, mRNA from 9 serotonin system genes was measured in whole blood prior to acute tryptophan depletion: 5-HT1B, 5-HT1F, 5-HT2A, 5-HT2B, 5-HT3A, 5-HT3E, 5-HT7 (serotonin receptors), 5-HTT (the serotonin transporter), and tryptophan hydroxylase 1. Results: Acute tryptophan depletion did not significantly influence participants' sensitivity to probability, wins, or losses, although there was a trend for a lower tendency to choose experimental gambles overall following depletion. Significant positive correlations, which survived correction for multiple comparisons, were detected between baseline 5-HT1B mRNA levels and acute tryptophan depletion-induced increases in both the overall tendency to choose the experimental gamble and sensitivity to wins. No significant relationship was observed with any other peripheral serotonin system markers. Computational analyses of decision-making data provided results consistent with these findings. Conclusions: These results suggest that the 5-HT1B receptor may modulate the effects of acute tryptophan depletion on risky decision-making. Peripheral levels of serotonin markers may predict response to treatments that act upon the serotonin system, such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors.

Encoding of Vicarious Reward Prediction in Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Relationship with Trait Empathy.

Empathy--the capacity to understand and resonate with the experiences of others--can depend on the ability to predict when others are likely to receive rewards. However, although a plethora of research has examined the neural basis of predictions about the likelihood of receiving rewards ourselves, very little is known about the mechanisms that underpin variability in vicarious reward prediction. Human neuroimaging and nonhuman primate studies suggest that a subregion of the anterior cingulate cortex in the gyrus (ACCg) is engaged when others receive rewards. Does the ACCg show specialization for processing predictions about others' rewards and not one's own and does this specialization vary with empathic abilities? We examined hemodynamic responses in the human brain time-locked to cues that were predictive of a high or low probability of a reward either for the subject themselves or another person. We found that the ACCg robustly signaled the likelihood of a reward being delivered to another. In addition, ACCg response significantly covaried with trait emotion contagion, a necessary foundation for empathizing with other individuals. In individuals high in emotion contagion, the ACCg was specialized for processing others' rewards exclusively, but for those low in emotion contagion, this region also responded to information about the subject's own rewards. Our results are the first to show that the ACCg signals probabilistic predictions about rewards for other people and that the substantial individual variability in the degree to which the ACCg is specialized for processing others' rewards is related to trait empathy. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Successfully cooperating, competing, or empathizing with others can depend on our ability to predict when others are going to get something rewarding. Although many studies have examined how the brain processes rewards we will get ourselves, very little is known about vicarious reward processing. Here, we show that a subregion of the anterior cingulate cortex in the gyrus (ACCg) shows a degree of specialization for processing others' versus one's own rewards. However, the degree to which the ACCg is specialized varies with people's ability to empathize with others. This new insight into how vicarious rewards are processed in the brain and vary with empathy may be key for understanding disorders of social behavior, including psychopathy and autism.

Normative Processing Needs Multiple Levels of Explanation: From Algorithm to Implementation.

Norms are the rules about what is allowed or forbidden by social groups. A key debate for norm psychology is whether these rules arise from mechanisms that are domain-specific and genetically inherited or domain-general and deployed for many other nonnorm processes. Here we argue for the importance of assessing and testing domain-specific and domain-general processes at multiple levels of explanation, from algorithmic (psychological) to implementational (neural). We also critically discuss findings from cognitive neuroscience supporting that social and nonsocial learning processes, essential for accounts of cultural evolution, can be dissociated at these two levels. This multilevel framework can generate new hypotheses and empirical tests of cultural evolution accounts of norm processing against purely domain-specific nativist alternatives.

Human ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary for prosocial motivation.

Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is vital for decision-making. Functional neuroimaging links vmPFC to processing rewards and effort, while parallel work suggests vmPFC involvement in prosocial behaviour. However, the necessity of vmPFC for these functions is unknown. Patients with rare focal vmPFC lesions (n = 25), patients with lesions elsewhere (n = 15) and healthy controls (n = 40) chose between rest and exerting effort to earn rewards for themselves or another person. vmPFC damage decreased prosociality across behavioural and computational measures. vmPFC patients earned less, discounted rewards by effort more, and exerted less force when another person benefited, compared to both control groups. Voxel-based lesion mapping revealed dissociations between vmPFC subregions. While medial damage led to antisocial behaviour, lateral damage increased prosocial behaviour relative to patients with damage elsewhere. vmPFC patients also showed reduced effort sensitivity overall, but reward sensitivity was limited to specific subregions. These results reveal multiple causal contributions of vmPFC to prosocial behaviour, effort and reward.

Acute stress reduces effortful prosocial behaviour.

Acute stress can change our cognition and emotions, but what specific consequences this has for human prosocial behaviour is unclear. Previous studies have mainly investigated prosociality with financial transfers in economic games and produced conflicting results. Yet a core feature of many types of prosocial behaviour is that they are effortful. We therefore examined how acute stress changes our willingness to exert effort that benefits others. Healthy male participants - half of whom were put under acute stress - made decisions whether to exert physical effort to gain money for themselves or another person. With this design, we could independently assess the effects of acute stress on prosocial, compared to self-benefitting, effortful behaviour. Compared to controls (n = 45), participants in the stress group (n = 46) chose to exert effort more often for self- than for other-benefitting rewards at a low level of effort. Additionally, the adverse effects of stress on prosocial effort were particularly pronounced in more selfish participants. Neuroimaging combined with computational modelling revealed a putative neural mechanism underlying these effects: more stressed participants showed increased activation to subjective value in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula when they themselves could benefit from their exerted effort relative to when someone else could. By using an effort-based task that better approximates real-life prosocial behaviour and incorporating trait differences in prosocial tendencies, our study provides important insights into how acute stress affects prosociality and its associated neural mechanisms.

Impaired Punishment Learning in Conduct Disorder.

OBJECTIVE: Conduct disorder (CD) has been associated with deficits in the use of punishment to guide reinforcement learning (RL) and decision making. This may explain the poorly planned and often impulsive antisocial and aggressive behavior in affected youths. Here, we used a computational modeling approach to examine differences in RL abilities between CD youths and typically developing controls (TDCs). Specifically, we tested 2 competing hypotheses that RL deficits in CD reflect either reward dominance (also known as reward hypersensitivity) or punishment insensitivity (also known as punishment hyposensitivity). METHOD: The study included 92 CD youths and 130 TDCs (aged 9-18 years, 48% girls) who completed a probabilistic RL task with reward, punishment, and neutral contingencies. Using computational modeling, we investigated the extent to which the 2 groups differed in their learning abilities to obtain reward and/or to avoid punishment. RESULTS: RL model comparisons showed that a model with separate learning rates per contingency explained behavioral performance best. Importantly, CD youths showed lower learning rates than TDCs specifically for punishment, whereas learning rates for reward and neutral contingencies did not differ. Moreover, callous-unemotional (CU) traits did not correlate with learning rates in CD. CONCLUSION: CD youths have a highly selective impairment in probabilistic punishment learning, regardless of their CU traits, whereas reward learning appears to be intact. In summary, our data suggest punishment insensitivity rather than reward dominance in CD. Clinically, the use of punishment-based intervention techniques to achieve effective discipline in patients with CD may be a less helpful strategy than reward-based techniques.

The computational psychiatry of antisocial behaviour and psychopathy.

Antisocial behaviours such as disobedience, lying, stealing, destruction of property, and aggression towards others are common to multiple disorders of childhood and adulthood, including conduct disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, psychopathy, and antisocial personality disorder. These disorders have a significant negative impact for individuals and for society, but whether they represent clinically different phenomena, or simply different approaches to diagnosing the same underlying psychopathology is highly debated. Computational psychiatry, with its dual focus on identifying different classes of disorder and health (data-driven) and latent cognitive and neurobiological mechanisms (theory-driven), is well placed to address these questions. The elucidation of mechanisms that might characterise latent processes across different disorders of antisocial behaviour can also provide important advances. In this review, we critically discuss the contribution of computational research to our understanding of various antisocial behaviour disorders, and highlight suggestions for how computational psychiatry can address important clinical and scientific questions about these disorders in the future.

Age Differences in Prosocial Behavior Depend on Effort Costs.

OBJECTIVES: This study examined age differences in willingness to engage in effortful and effortless prosocial behavior for a fully anonymous recipient. METHOD: Participants were recruited through the Prolific online recruitment platform. In Experiment 1, older (N = 46) and younger (N = 65) adults completed the "pay-it-forward" effortful decision-making task with fixed effort demands and a version of the Dictator Game, an effortless prosocial decision-making task. In Experiment 2, older (N = 38) and younger (N = 42) adults completed the Dictator Game and a modified pay-it-forward decision-making task in which effort demands were calibrated to one's ability. RESULTS: In both Experiments 1 and 2, older adults were more prosocial than younger adults on the effortless Dictator Game. In Experiment 1, older adults were less prosocial across all trials of the effortful pay-it-forward task. However, when the task was more achievable in Experiment 2, older adults were only less prosocial when the probability of a reward was low. DISCUSSION: In everyday life, many prosocial contexts depend on effort expenditure. When prosocial activities are effortful, older adults are less willing to engage in prosocial behavior, particularly when reward likelihood is low, and instead focus on resource conservation. In the absence of such effort costs, older adults are more prosocial than younger adults. This work suggests that older adults may prefer to engage in prosocial behavior more than younger adults, but physical resource constraints may limit their ability to engage in such effortful prosocial activities.

Neural activity tracking identity and confidence in social information.

Humans learn about the environment either directly by interacting with it or indirectly by seeking information about it from social sources such as conspecifics. The degree of confidence in the information obtained through either route should determine the impact that it has on adapting and changing behaviour. We examined whether and how behavioural and neural computations differ during non-social learning as opposed to learning from social sources. Trial-wise confidence judgements about non-social and social information sources offered a window into this learning process. Despite matching exactly the statistical features of social and non-social conditions, confidence judgements were more accurate and less changeable when they were made about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition to subjective reports of confidence, differences were also apparent in the Bayesian estimates of participants' subjective beliefs. Univariate activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and posterior temporoparietal junction more closely tracked confidence about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition, the multivariate patterns of activity in the same areas encoded identities of social information sources compared to non-social information sources.

People's decisions are influenced by their beliefs, which may be based on advice from other humans or, alternatively, on information from non-human sources such as road signs. But which sources do we find more reliable? Although scientists have studied the importance of social context in the way we process information, it is not fully understood how the brain processes information differently depending on who provides it. Trudel et al. investigated the differences in the way humans evaluate information from human sources, such as advisors, compared to non-human sources, like inanimate objects, by monitoring brain activity and analyzing the results using a computational approach. In the experiments, 24 participants received a reward for locating a hidden dot on a circle under two different conditions: they either received a clue on the dot's location from an image of a human face (social condition), representing an advisor, or from an inanimate object (non-social condition). Participants received information from many different advisors and inanimate objects, and the accuracy of the clues given by any of them varied from source to source. Each time, participants reported whether they thought the advice was reliable. The results of monitoring the participants' brain activity showed that they used different strategies when assessing the reliability of advice from a human than when the information came from a non-human source. Additionally, participants based their judgments about an advisor more strongly on past experiences with them, that is, if an advisor had given them good advice in the past, they were more likely to rely on their advice. Conversely, judgments about an inanimate object were based more strongly on recent experiences with that object. Interestingly, participants were more certain when making judgments about the accuracy of cues given by advisors compared to inanimate objects, and they also updated their assessment of human sources less according to new evidence that contradicted their initial belief. This suggests that people may form more stable opinions about the reliability of sources when they receive information in social contexts, possibly because they expect more consistent behavior from humans. This stability in judgments about advisors was also reflected in the signal of brain areas that are often involved when interacting with others. The work of Trudel et al. shows that even the suggestion that the source of a piece of advice is human can change how we process the information. This is especially important because humans spend increasingly more time in the digital world. Awareness of our biased assessment of human sources will have implications for designing interactive tools to guide human decision-making as well as strategies to develop critical thinking.