Phi fluctuates with surprisal: An empirical pre-study for the synthesis of the free energy principle and integrated information theory.

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT) are two ambitious theoretical approaches. The first aims to make a formal framework for describing self-organizing and life-like systems in general, and the second attempts a mathematical theory of conscious experience based on the intrinsic properties of a system. They are each concerned with complementary aspects of the properties of systems, one with life and behavior, the other with meaning and experience, so combining them has potential for scientific value. In this paper, we take a first step towards such a synthesis by expanding on the results of an earlier published evolutionary simulation study, which show a relationship between IIT-measures and fitness in differing complexities of tasks. We relate a basic information theoretic measure from the FEP, surprisal, to this result, finding that the surprisal of simulated agents' observations is inversely related to the general increase in fitness and integration over evolutionary time. Moreover, surprisal fluctuates together with IIT-based consciousness measures in within-trial time. This suggests that the consciousness measures used in IIT indirectly depend on the relation between the agent and the external world, and that it should therefore be possible to relate them to the theoretical concepts used in the FEP. Lastly, we suggest a future approach for investigating this relationship empirically.

Ketamine Affects Prediction Errors about Statistical Regularities: A Computational Single-Trial Analysis of the Mismatch Negativity.

The auditory mismatch negativity (MMN) is significantly reduced in schizophrenia. Notably, a similar MMN reduction can be achieved with NMDA receptor (NMDAR) antagonists. Both phenomena have been interpreted as reflecting an impairment of predictive coding or, more generally, the "Bayesian brain" notion that the brain continuously updates a hierarchical model to infer the causes of its sensory inputs. Specifically, neurobiological interpretations of predictive coding view perceptual inference as an NMDAR-dependent process of minimizing hierarchical precision-weighted prediction errors (PEs), and disturbances of this putative process play a key role in hierarchical Bayesian theories of schizophrenia. Here, we provide empirical evidence for this theory, demonstrating the existence of multiple, hierarchically related PEs in a "roving MMN" paradigm. We applied a hierarchical Bayesian model to single-trial EEG data from healthy human volunteers of either sex who received the NMDAR antagonist S-ketamine in a placebo-controlled, double-blind, within-subject fashion. Using an unrestricted analysis of the entire time-sensor space, our trial-by-trial analysis indicated that low-level PEs (about stimulus transitions) are expressed early (102-207 ms poststimulus), while high-level PEs (about transition probability) are reflected by later components (152-199 and 215-277 ms) of single-trial responses. Furthermore, we find that ketamine significantly diminished the expression of high-level PE responses, implying that NMDAR antagonism disrupts the inference on abstract statistical regularities. Our findings suggest that NMDAR dysfunction impairs hierarchical Bayesian inference about the world's statistical structure. Beyond the relevance of this finding for schizophrenia, our results illustrate the potential of computational single-trial analyses for assessing potential pathophysiological mechanisms.

Cholinergic and dopaminergic effects on prediction error and uncertainty responses during sensory associative learning.

Navigating the physical world requires learning probabilistic associations between sensory events and their change in time (volatility). Bayesian accounts of this learning process rest on hierarchical prediction errors (PEs) that are weighted by estimates of uncertainty (or its inverse, precision). In a previous fMRI study we found that low-level precision-weighted PEs about visual outcomes (that update beliefs about associations) activated the putative dopaminergic midbrain; by contrast, precision-weighted PEs about cue-outcome associations (that update beliefs about volatility) activated the cholinergic basal forebrain. These findings suggested selective dopaminergic and cholinergic influences on precision-weighted PEs at different hierarchical levels. Here, we tested this hypothesis, repeating our fMRI study under pharmacological manipulations in healthy participants. Specifically, we performed two pharmacological fMRI studies with a between-subject double-blind placebo-controlled design: study 1 used antagonists of dopaminergic (amisulpride) and muscarinic (biperiden) receptors, study 2 used enhancing drugs of dopaminergic (levodopa) and cholinergic (galantamine) modulation. Pooled across all pharmacological conditions of study 1 and study 2, respectively, we found that low-level precision-weighted PEs activated the midbrain and high-level precision-weighted PEs the basal forebrain as in our previous study. However, we found pharmacological effects on brain activity associated with these computational quantities only when splitting the precision-weighted PEs into their PE and precision components: in a brainstem region putatively containing cholinergic (pedunculopontine and laterodorsal tegmental) nuclei, biperiden (compared to placebo) enhanced low-level PE responses and attenuated high-level PE activity, while amisulpride reduced high-level PE responses. Additionally, in the putative dopaminergic midbrain, galantamine compared to placebo enhanced low-level PE responses (in a body-weight dependent manner) and amisulpride enhanced high-level precision activity. Task behaviour was not affected by any of the drugs. These results do not support our hypothesis of a clear-cut dichotomy between different hierarchical inference levels and neurotransmitter systems, but suggest a more complex interaction between these neuromodulatory systems and hierarchical Bayesian quantities. However, our present results may have been affected by confounds inherent to pharmacological fMRI. We discuss these confounds and outline improved experimental tests for the future.

Aberrant computational mechanisms of social learning and decision-making in schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder.

Psychiatric disorders are ubiquitously characterized by debilitating social impairments. These difficulties are thought to emerge from aberrant social inference. In order to elucidate the underlying computational mechanisms, patients diagnosed with major depressive disorder (N = 29), schizophrenia (N = 31), and borderline personality disorder (N = 31) as well as healthy controls (N = 34) performed a probabilistic reward learning task in which participants could learn from social and non-social information. Patients with schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder performed more poorly on the task than healthy controls and patients with major depressive disorder. Broken down by domain, borderline personality disorder patients performed better in the social compared to the non-social domain. In contrast, controls and major depressive disorder patients showed the opposite pattern and schizophrenia patients showed no difference between domains. In effect, borderline personality disorder patients gave up a possible overall performance advantage by concentrating their learning in the social at the expense of the non-social domain. We used computational modeling to assess learning and decision-making parameters estimated for each participant from their behavior. This enabled additional insights into the underlying learning and decision-making mechanisms. Patients with borderline personality disorder showed slower learning from social and non-social information and an exaggerated sensitivity to changes in environmental volatility, both in the non-social and the social domain, but more so in the latter. Regarding decision-making the modeling revealed that compared to controls and major depression patients, patients with borderline personality disorder and schizophrenia showed a stronger reliance on social relative to non-social information when making choices. Depressed patients did not differ significantly from controls in this respect. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion of a general interpersonal hypersensitivity in borderline personality disorder and schizophrenia based on a shared computational mechanism characterized by an over-reliance on beliefs about others in making decisions and by an exaggerated need to make sense of others during learning specifically in borderline personality disorder.

Variability in Action Selection Relates to Striatal Dopamine 2/3 Receptor Availability in Humans: A PET Neuroimaging Study Using Reinforcement Learning and Active Inference Models.

Choosing actions that result in advantageous outcomes is a fundamental function of nervous systems. All computational decision-making models contain a mechanism that controls the variability of (or confidence in) action selection, but its neural implementation is unclear-especially in humans. We investigated this mechanism using two influential decision-making frameworks: active inference (AI) and reinforcement learning (RL). In AI, the precision (inverse variance) of beliefs about policies controls action selection variability-similar to decision 'noise' parameters in RL-and is thought to be encoded by striatal dopamine signaling. We tested this hypothesis by administering a 'go/no-go' task to 75 healthy participants, and measuring striatal dopamine 2/3 receptor (D2/3R) availability in a subset (n = 25) using [11C]-(+)-PHNO positron emission tomography. In behavioral model comparison, RL performed best across the whole group but AI performed best in participants performing above chance levels. Limbic striatal D2/3R availability had linear relationships with AI policy precision (P = 0.029) as well as with RL irreducible decision 'noise' (P = 0.020), and this relationship with D2/3R availability was confirmed with a 'decision stochasticity' factor that aggregated across both models (P = 0.0006). These findings are consistent with occupancy of inhibitory striatal D2/3Rs decreasing the variability of action selection in humans.

Correction: A unifying Bayesian account of contextual effects in value-based choice.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.].

Attractor-like Dynamics in Belief Updating in Schizophrenia.

Subjects with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Scz) overweight unexpected evidence in probabilistic inference: such evidence becomes "aberrantly salient." A neurobiological explanation for this effect is that diminished synaptic gain (e.g., hypofunction of cortical NMDARs) in Scz destabilizes quasi-stable neuronal network states (or "attractors"). This attractor instability account predicts that (1) Scz would overweight unexpected evidence but underweight consistent evidence, (2) belief updating would be more vulnerable to stochastic fluctuations in neural activity, and (3) these effects would correlate. Hierarchical Bayesian belief updating models were tested in two independent datasets (n = 80 male and n = 167 female) comprising human subjects with Scz, and both clinical and nonclinical controls (some tested when unwell and on recovery) performing the "probability estimates" version of the beads task (a probabilistic inference task). Models with a standard learning rate, or including a parameter increasing updating to "disconfirmatory evidence," or a parameter encoding belief instability were formally compared. The "belief instability" model (based on the principles of attractor dynamics) had most evidence in all groups in both datasets. Two of four parameters differed between Scz and nonclinical controls in each dataset: belief instability and response stochasticity. These parameters correlated in both datasets. Furthermore, the clinical controls showed similar parameter distributions to Scz when unwell, but were no different from controls once recovered. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that attractor network instability contributes to belief updating abnormalities in Scz, and suggest that similar changes may exist during acute illness in other psychiatric conditions.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Subjects with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Scz) make large adjustments to their beliefs following unexpected evidence, but also smaller adjustments than controls following consistent evidence. This has previously been construed as a bias toward "disconfirmatory" information, but a more mechanistic explanation may be that in Scz, neural firing patterns ("attractor states") are less stable and hence easily altered in response to both new evidence and stochastic neural firing. We model belief updating in Scz and controls in two independent datasets using a hierarchical Bayesian model, and show that all subjects are best fit by a model containing a belief instability parameter. Both this and a response stochasticity parameter are consistently altered in Scz, as the unstable attractor hypothesis predicts.

Pharmacological Fingerprints of Contextual Uncertainty.

Successful interaction with the environment requires flexible updating of our beliefs about the world. By estimating the likelihood of future events, it is possible to prepare appropriate actions in advance and execute fast, accurate motor responses. According to theoretical proposals, agents track the variability arising from changing environments by computing various forms of uncertainty. Several neuromodulators have been linked to uncertainty signalling, but comprehensive empirical characterisation of their relative contributions to perceptual belief updating, and to the selection of motor responses, is lacking. Here we assess the roles of noradrenaline, acetylcholine, and dopamine within a single, unified computational framework of uncertainty. Using pharmacological interventions in a sample of 128 healthy human volunteers and a hierarchical Bayesian learning model, we characterise the influences of noradrenergic, cholinergic, and dopaminergic receptor antagonism on individual computations of uncertainty during a probabilistic serial reaction time task. We propose that noradrenaline influences learning of uncertain events arising from unexpected changes in the environment. In contrast, acetylcholine balances attribution of uncertainty to chance fluctuations within an environmental context, defined by a stable set of probabilistic associations, or to gross environmental violations following a contextual switch. Dopamine supports the use of uncertainty representations to engender fast, adaptive responses.

Modeling subjective relevance in schizophrenia and its relation to aberrant salience.

In schizophrenia, increased aberrant salience to irrelevant events and reduced learning of relevant information may relate to an underlying deficit in relevance detection. So far, subjective estimates of relevance have not been probed in schizophrenia patients. The mechanisms underlying belief formation about relevance and their translation into decisions are unclear. Using novel computational methods, we investigated relevance detection during implicit learning in 42 schizophrenia patients and 42 healthy individuals. Participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while detecting the outcomes in a learning task. These were preceded by cues differing in color and shape, which were either relevant or irrelevant for outcome prediction. We provided a novel definition of relevance based on Bayesian precision and modeled reaction times as a function of relevance weighted unsigned prediction errors (UPE). For aberrant salience, we assessed responses to subjectively irrelevant cue manifestations. Participants learned the contingencies and slowed down their responses following unexpected events. Model selection revealed that individuals inferred the relevance of cue features and used it for behavioral adaption to the relevant cue feature. Relevance weighted UPEs correlated with dorsal anterior cingulate cortex activation and hippocampus deactivation. In patients, the aberrant salience bias to subjectively task-irrelevant information was increased and correlated with decreased striatal UPE activation and increased negative symptoms. This study shows that relevance estimates based on Bayesian precision can be inferred from observed behavior. This underscores the importance of relevance detection as an underlying mechanism for behavioral adaptation in complex environments and enhances the understanding of aberrant salience in schizophrenia.

A unifying Bayesian account of contextual effects in value-based choice.

Empirical evidence suggests the incentive value of an option is affected by other options available during choice and by options presented in the past. These contextual effects are hard to reconcile with classical theories and have inspired accounts where contextual influences play a crucial role. However, each account only addresses one or the other of the empirical findings and a unifying perspective has been elusive. Here, we offer a unifying theory of context effects on incentive value attribution and choice based on normative Bayesian principles. This formulation assumes that incentive value corresponds to a precision-weighted prediction error, where predictions are based upon expectations about reward. We show that this scheme explains a wide range of contextual effects, such as those elicited by other options available during choice (or within-choice context effects). These include both conditions in which choice requires an integration of multiple attributes and conditions where a multi-attribute integration is not necessary. Moreover, the same scheme explains context effects elicited by options presented in the past or between-choice context effects. Our formulation encompasses a wide range of contextual influences (comprising both within- and between-choice effects) by calling on Bayesian principles, without invoking ad-hoc assumptions. This helps clarify the contextual nature of incentive value and choice behaviour and may offer insights into psychopathologies characterized by dysfunctional decision-making, such as addiction and pathological gambling.

Cortical Coupling Reflects Bayesian Belief Updating in the Deployment of Spatial Attention.

The deployment of visuospatial attention and the programming of saccades are governed by the inferred likelihood of events. In the present study, we combined computational modeling of psychophysical data with fMRI to characterize the computational and neural mechanisms underlying this flexible attentional control. Sixteen healthy human subjects performed a modified version of Posner's location-cueing paradigm in which the percentage of cue validity varied in time and the targets required saccadic responses. Trialwise estimates of the certainty (precision) of the prediction that the target would appear at the cued location were derived from a hierarchical Bayesian model fitted to individual trialwise saccadic response speeds. Trial-specific model parameters then entered analyses of fMRI data as parametric regressors. Moreover, dynamic causal modeling (DCM) was performed to identify the most likely functional architecture of the attentional reorienting network and its modulation by (Bayes-optimal) precision-dependent attention. While the frontal eye fields (FEFs), intraparietal sulcus, and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) of both hemispheres showed higher activity on invalid relative to valid trials, reorienting responses in right FEF, TPJ, and the putamen were significantly modulated by precision-dependent attention. Our DCM results suggested that the precision of predictability underlies the attentional modulation of the coupling of TPJ with FEF and the putamen. Our results shed new light on the computational architecture and neuronal network dynamics underlying the context-sensitive deployment of visuospatial attention. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Spatial attention and its neural correlates in the human brain have been studied extensively with the help of fMRI and cueing paradigms in which the location of targets is pre-cued on a trial-by-trial basis. One aspect that has so far been neglected concerns the question of how the brain forms attentional expectancies when no a priori probability information is available but needs to be inferred from observations. This study elucidates the computational and neural mechanisms under which probabilistic inference governs attentional deployment. Our results show that Bayesian belief updating explains changes in cortical connectivity; in that directional influences from the temporoparietal junction on the frontal eye fields and the putamen were modulated by (Bayes-optimal) updates.

The Dopaminergic Midbrain Encodes the Expected Certainty about Desired Outcomes.

Dopamine plays a key role in learning; however, its exact function in decision making and choice remains unclear. Recently, we proposed a generic model based on active (Bayesian) inference wherein dopamine encodes the precision of beliefs about optimal policies. Put simply, dopamine discharges reflect the confidence that a chosen policy will lead to desired outcomes. We designed a novel task to test this hypothesis, where subjects played a "limited offer" game in a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. Subjects had to decide how long to wait for a high offer before accepting a low offer, with the risk of losing everything if they waited too long. Bayesian model comparison showed that behavior strongly supported active inference, based on surprise minimization, over classical utility maximization schemes. Furthermore, midbrain activity, encompassing dopamine projection neurons, was accurately predicted by trial-by-trial variations in model-based estimates of precision. Our findings demonstrate that human subjects infer both optimal policies and the precision of those inferences, and thus support the notion that humans perform hierarchical probabilistic Bayesian inference. In other words, subjects have to infer both what they should do as well as how confident they are in their choices, where confidence may be encoded by dopaminergic firing.

Cholinergic stimulation enhances Bayesian belief updating in the deployment of spatial attention.

The exact mechanisms whereby the cholinergic neurotransmitter system contributes to attentional processing remain poorly understood. Here, we applied computational modeling to psychophysical data (obtained from a spatial attention task) under a psychopharmacological challenge with the cholinesterase inhibitor galantamine (Reminyl). This allowed us to characterize the cholinergic modulation of selective attention formally, in terms of hierarchical Bayesian inference. In a placebo-controlled, within-subject, crossover design, 16 healthy human subjects performed a modified version of Posner's location-cueing task in which the proportion of validly and invalidly cued targets (percentage of cue validity, % CV) changed over time. Saccadic response speeds were used to estimate the parameters of a hierarchical Bayesian model to test whether cholinergic stimulation affected the trial-wise updating of probabilistic beliefs that underlie the allocation of attention or whether galantamine changed the mapping from those beliefs to subsequent eye movements. Behaviorally, galantamine led to a greater influence of probabilistic context (% CV) on response speed than placebo. Crucially, computational modeling suggested this effect was due to an increase in the rate of belief updating about cue validity (as opposed to the increased sensitivity of behavioral responses to those beliefs). We discuss these findings with respect to cholinergic effects on hierarchical cortical processing and in relation to the encoding of expected uncertainty or precision.

Inferring on the intentions of others by hierarchical Bayesian learning.

Inferring on others' (potentially time-varying) intentions is a fundamental problem during many social transactions. To investigate the underlying mechanisms, we applied computational modeling to behavioral data from an economic game in which 16 pairs of volunteers (randomly assigned to "player" or "adviser" roles) interacted. The player performed a probabilistic reinforcement learning task, receiving information about a binary lottery from a visual pie chart. The adviser, who received more predictive information, issued an additional recommendation. Critically, the game was structured such that the adviser's incentives to provide helpful or misleading information varied in time. Using a meta-Bayesian modeling framework, we found that the players' behavior was best explained by the deployment of hierarchical learning: they inferred upon the volatility of the advisers' intentions in order to optimize their predictions about the validity of their advice. Beyond learning, volatility estimates also affected the trial-by-trial variability of decisions: participants were more likely to rely on their estimates of advice accuracy for making choices when they believed that the adviser's intentions were presently stable. Finally, our model of the players' inference predicted the players' interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) scores, explicit ratings of the advisers' helpfulness and the advisers' self-reports on their chosen strategy. Overall, our results suggest that humans (i) employ hierarchical generative models to infer on the changing intentions of others, (ii) use volatility estimates to inform decision-making in social interactions, and (iii) integrate estimates of advice accuracy with non-social sources of information. The Bayesian framework presented here can quantify individual differences in these mechanisms from simple behavioral readouts and may prove useful in future clinical studies of maladaptive social cognition.

Spatial attention, precision, and Bayesian inference: a study of saccadic response speed.

Inferring the environment's statistical structure and adapting behavior accordingly is a fundamental modus operandi of the brain. A simple form of this faculty based on spatial attentional orienting can be studied with Posner's location-cueing paradigm in which a cue indicates the target location with a known probability. The present study focuses on a more complex version of this task, where probabilistic context (percentage of cue validity) changes unpredictably over time, thereby creating a volatile environment. Saccadic response speed (RS) was recorded in 15 subjects and used to estimate subject-specific parameters of a Bayesian learning scheme modeling the subjects' trial-by-trial updates of beliefs. Different response models-specifying how computational states translate into observable behavior-were compared using Bayesian model selection. Saccadic RS was most plausibly explained as a function of the precision of the belief about the causes of sensory input. This finding is in accordance with current Bayesian theories of brain function, and specifically with the proposal that spatial attention is mediated by a precision-dependent gain modulation of sensory input. Our results provide empirical support for precision-dependent changes in beliefs about saccade target locations and motivate future neuroimaging and neuropharmacological studies of how Bayesian inference may determine spatial attention.

Computational phenotyping of aberrant belief updating in individuals with schizotypal traits and schizophrenia.

BACKGROUND: Psychotic experiences are thought to emerge from various interrelated patterns of disrupted belief updating, such as overestimating the reliability of sensory information and misjudging task volatility. Yet, these substrates have never been jointly addressed under one computational framework and it is not clear to what degree they reflect trait-like computational patterns. METHODS: We introduced a novel hierarchical Bayesian model that describes how individuals simultaneously update their beliefs about the task volatility and noise in observation. We applied this model to data from a modified Predictive inference task in a test-retest study with healthy volunteers (N=45, 4 sessions) and examined the relationship between model parameters and schizotypal traits in a larger online sample (N = 437) and in a cohort of patients with schizophrenia (N = 100). RESULTS: The interclass correlations were moderate to high for model parameters and excellent for averaged belief trajectories and precision-weighted learning rates estimated through hierarchical Bayesian inference. We found that uncertainty about the task volatility was related to schizotypal traits and to positive symptoms in patients, when learning to gain rewards. In contrast, negative symptoms in patients were associated with more rigid beliefs about observational noise, when learning to avoid losses. CONCLUSION: These findings suggest that individuals with schizotypal traits across the psychosis continuum are less likely to learn or utilize higher-order statistical regularities of the environment and showcase the potential of clinically relevant computational phenotypes for differentiating symptom groups in a transdiagnostic manner.

Diminished pain sensitivity mediates the relationship between psychopathic traits and reduced learning from pain.

Individuals with elevated psychopathic traits exhibit decision-making deficits linked to a failure to learn from negative outcomes. We investigated how reduced pain sensitivity affects reinforcement-based decision-making in individuals with varying levels of psychopathic traits, as measured by the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Short Form. Using computational modelling, we estimated the latent cognitive processes in a community non-offender sample (n = 111) that completed a task with choices leading to painful and non-painful outcomes. Higher psychopathic traits were associated with reduced pain sensitivity and disturbances in reinforcement learning from painful outcomes. In a Structural Equation Model, a superordinate psychopathy factor was associated with a faster return to original stimulus-outcome associations as pain tolerance increased. This provides evidence directly linking reduced pain sensitivity and learning from painful outcomes with elevated psychopathic traits. Our results offer insights into the computational mechanisms of maladaptive decision-making in psychopathy and antisocial behavior.

Attachment and borderline personality disorder as the dance unfolds: A quantitative analysis of a novel paradigm.

Current research on personality disorders strives to identify key behavioural and cognitive facets of patient functioning, to unravel the underlying root causes and maintenance mechanisms. This process often involves the application of social paradigms - however, these often only include momentary affective depictions rather than unfolding interactions. This constitutes a limitation in our capacity to probe core symptoms, and leaves potential findings uncovered which could help those who are in close relationships with affected individuals. Here, we deployed a novel task in which subjects interact with four unknown virtual partners in a turn-taking paradigm akin to a dance, and report on their experience with each. The virtual partners embody four combinations of low/high expressivity of positive/negative mood. Higher scores on our symptomatic measures of attachment anxiety, avoidance, and borderline personality disorder (BPD) were all linked to a general negative appraisal of all the interpersonal experiences. Moreover, the negative appraisal of the partner who displayed a high negative/low positive mood was tied with attachment anxiety and BPD symptoms. The extent to which subjects felt responsible for causing partners' distress was most strongly linked to attachment anxiety. Finally, we provide a fully-fledged exploration of move-by-move action latencies and click distances from partners. This analysis underscored slower movement initiation from anxiously attached individuals throughout all virtual interactions. In summary, we describe a novel paradigm for second-person neuroscience, which allowed both the replication of established results and the capture of new behavioural signatures associated with attachment anxiety, and discuss its limitations.

Lesions to the mediodorsal thalamus, but not orbitofrontal cortex, enhance volatility beliefs linked to paranoia.

Beliefs-attitudes toward some state of the environment-guide action selection and should be robust to variability but sensitive to meaningful change. Beliefs about volatility (expectation of change) are associated with paranoia in humans, but the brain regions responsible for volatility beliefs remain unknown. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is central to adaptive behavior, whereas the magnocellular mediodorsal thalamus (MDmc) is essential for arbitrating between perceptions and action policies. We assessed belief updating in a three-choice probabilistic reversal learning task following excitotoxic lesions of the MDmc (n = 3) or OFC (n = 3) and compared performance with that of unoperated monkeys (n = 14). Computational analyses indicated a double dissociation: MDmc, but not OFC, lesions were associated with erratic switching behavior and heightened volatility belief (as in paranoia in humans), whereas OFC, but not MDmc, lesions were associated with increased lose-stay behavior and reward learning rates. Given the consilience across species and models, these results have implications for understanding paranoia.

Variational Bayesian mixed-effects inference for classification studies.

Multivariate classification algorithms are powerful tools for predicting cognitive or pathophysiological states from neuroimaging data. Assessing the utility of a classifier in application domains such as cognitive neuroscience, brain-computer interfaces, or clinical diagnostics necessitates inference on classification performance at more than one level, i.e., both in individual subjects and in the population from which these subjects were sampled. Such inference requires models that explicitly account for both fixed-effects (within-subjects) and random-effects (between-subjects) variance components. While models of this sort are standard in mass-univariate analyses of fMRI data, they have not yet received much attention in multivariate classification studies of neuroimaging data, presumably because of the high computational costs they entail. This paper extends a recently developed hierarchical model for mixed-effects inference in multivariate classification studies and introduces an efficient variational Bayes approach to inference. Using both synthetic and empirical fMRI data, we show that this approach is equally simple to use as, yet more powerful than, a conventional t-test on subject-specific sample accuracies, and computationally much more efficient than previous sampling algorithms and permutation tests. Our approach is independent of the type of underlying classifier and thus widely applicable. The present framework may help establish mixed-effects inference as a future standard for classification group analyses.