Reorienting psychological science.

Psychological phenomena occur across a wide range of scales, ranging from small, quick events of neurology and biology, to broader, more prolonged unfoldings typical of extended cultural practices. Although theories deployed by psychologists of different stripes have tended to incorporate these different scales, this is typically done in a manner that is implicit, and often unsystematic. That is, typical psychological research is conducted in a manner that is 'scale-blind'. In this article, I explore some of the historical and more recent recognition of this scale-blindness and place it in the context of recent work on the concept and implications of scale. I conclude by elucidating some of the important ways in which behaviour settings theory, and the researchers who developed it, are explicit and disciplined in their approach to scale, and how such scale-aware work promises practical value in improving scientific practice. This article is part of the theme issue 'People, places, things, and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the 21st century'.

People, places, things and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century.

Trends and developments in recent behavioural and cognitive sciences demonstrate the need for a well-developed theoretical and empirical framework for examining the ecology of human behaviour. The increasing recognition of the role of the environment and interaction with the environment in the organization of behaviour within the cognitive sciences has not been met with an equally disciplined and systematic account of that environment (Heft 2018 Ecol. Psychol. 30, 99-123 (doi:10.1080/10407413.2018.1410045); McGann 2014 Synth. Philos. 29, 217-233). Several bodies of work in behavioural ecology, anthropology and ecological psychology provide some frameworks for such an account. At present, however, the most systematic and theoretically disciplined account of the human behavioural ecosystem is that of behaviour settings, as developed by the researchers of the Midwest Psychological Field Station (see Barker 1968 Ecological psychology: concepts and methods for studying the environment of human behavior). The articles in this theme issue provide a critical examination of these theoretical and methodological resources. The collection addresses their theoretical value in connecting with contemporary issues in cognitive science and research practice in psychology, as well as the importance of the methodological specifics of behaviour settings research. Additionally, articles diagnose limitations and identify points of potential extension of both theory and methods, particularly with regard to changes owing to the advance of technology, and the complex relationship between the individual and the collective in behaviour settings work. This article is part of the theme issue 'People, places, things, and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century'.

Moral Judgment as Categorization (MJAC).

Observed variability and complexity of judgments of "right" and "wrong" cannot be readily accounted for within extant approaches to understanding moral judgment. In response to this challenge, we present a novel perspective on categorization in moral judgment. Moral judgment as categorization (MJAC) incorporates principles of category formation research while addressing key challenges of existing approaches to moral judgment. People develop skills in making context-relevant categorizations. They learn that various objects (events, behaviors, people, etc.) can be categorized as morally right or wrong. Repetition and rehearsal result in reliable, habitualized categorizations. According to this skill-formation account of moral categorization, the learning and the habitualization of the forming of moral categories occur within goal-directed activity that is sensitive to various contextual influences. By allowing for the complexity of moral judgments, MJAC offers greater explanatory power than existing approaches while also providing opportunities for a diverse range of new research questions.

Convergently Emergent: Ecological and Enactive Approaches to the Texture of Agency.

Enactive and ecological approaches to cognitive science both claim a "mutuality" between agents and their environments - that they have a complementary nature and should be addressed as a single whole system. Despite this apparent agreement, each offers criticisms of the other on precisely this point - enactivists claiming that ecological psychologists over-emphasize the environment, while the complementary criticism, of agent-centered constructivism, is leveled by ecological psychologists at enactivists. In this paper I suggest that underlying the confusion between the two approaches is the complexity of agency, which comes in different forms, at different scales or levels of analysis. Cognitive science has not theorized the relationship between these different forms in a sufficiently disciplined manner, and a task therefore remains of finding a way to map the complex territory of agency.

Statements About the Pervasiveness of Behavior Require Data About the Pervasiveness of Behavior.

Despite recent close attention to issues related to the reliability of psychological research (e.g., the replication crisis), issues of the validity of this research have not been considered to the same extent. This paper highlights an issue that calls into question the validity of the common research practice of studying samples of individuals, and using sample-based statistics to infer generalizations that are applied not only to the parent population, but to individuals. The lack of ergodicity in human data means that such generalizations are not justified. This problem is illustrated with respect to two common scenarios in psychological research that raise questions for the sorts of theories that are typically proposed to explain human behavior and cognition. The paper presents a method of data analysis that requires closer attention to the range of behaviors exhibited by individuals in our research to determine the pervasiveness of effects observed in sample data. Such an approach to data analysis will produce results that are more in tune with the types of generalizations typical in reports of psychological research than mainstream analysis methods.

From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent Revolution.

In this paper, we argue that several recent 'wide' perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives toward building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. Wide perspectives are essentially research heuristics for building mechanistic explanations. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the study of "mindreading" and debates on emotions. We argue that the current practice in cognitive (neuro)science has undergone, in effect, a silent mechanistic revolution, and has turned from initial binary oppositions and abstract proposals toward the integration of wide perspectives with the rest of the cognitive (neuro)sciences.

Sampling Participants' Experience in Laboratory Experiments: Complementary Challenges for More Complete Data Collection.

Speelman and McGann's (2013) examination of the uncritical way in which the mean is often used in psychological research raises questions both about the average's reliability and its validity. In the present paper, we argue that interrogating the validity of the mean involves, amongst other things, a better understanding of the person's experiences, the meaning of their actions, at the time that the behavior of interest is carried out. Recently emerging approaches within Psychology and Cognitive Science have argued strongly that experience should play a more central role in our examination of behavioral data, but the relationship between experience and behavior remains very poorly understood. We outline some of the history of the science on this fraught relationship, as well as arguing that contemporary methods for studying experience fall into one of two categories. "Wide" approaches tend to incorporate naturalistic behavior settings, but sacrifice accuracy and reliability in behavioral measurement. "Narrow" approaches maintain controlled measurement of behavior, but involve too specific a sampling of experience, which obscures crucial temporal characteristics. We therefore argue for a novel, mid-range sampling technique, that extends Hurlburt's descriptive experience sampling, and adapts it for the controlled setting of the laboratory. This controlled descriptive experience sampling may be an appropriate tool to help calibrate both the mean and the meaning of an experimental situation with one another.

Enacting a social ecology: radically embodied intersubjectivity.

Embodied approaches to cognitive science frequently describe the mind as "world-involving," indicating complementary and interdependent relationships between an agent and its environment. The precise nature of the environment is frequently left ill-described, however, and provides a challenge for such approaches, particularly, it is noted here, for the enactive approach which emphasizes this complementarity in quite radical terms. This paper argues that enactivists should work to find common cause with a dynamic form of ecological psychology, a theoretical perspective that provides the most explicit theory of the psychological environment currently extant. In doing so, the intersubjective, cultural nature of the ecology of human psychology is explored, with the challenges this poses for both enactivist and ecological approaches outlined. The theory of behavior settings (Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989) is used to present a framework for resolving some of these challenges. Drawing these various strands together an outline of a radical embodied account of intersubjectivity and social activity is presented.

How Mean is the Mean?

In this paper we voice concerns about the uncritical manner in which the mean is often used as a summary statistic in psychological research. We identify a number of implicit assumptions underlying the use of the mean and argue that the fragility of these assumptions should be more carefully considered. We examine some of the ways in which the potential violation of these assumptions can lead us into significant theoretical and methodological error. Illustrations of alternative models of research already extant within Psychology are used to explore methods of research less mean-dependent and suggest that a critical assessment of the assumptions underlying its use in research play a more explicit role in the process of study design and review.