Performance characteristics and costs of serological tests for brucellosis in a pastoralist community of northern Tanzania.

The control of brucellosis across sub-Saharan Africa is hampered by the lack of standardized testing and the use of tests with poor performance. This study evaluated the performance and costs of serological assays for human brucellosis in a pastoralist community in northern Tanzania. Serum collected from 218 febrile hospital patients was used to evaluate the performance of seven index tests, selected based on international recommendation or current use. We evaluated the Rose Bengal test (RBT) using two protocols, four commercial agglutination tests and a competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (cELISA). The sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, negative predictive value, Youden's index, diagnostic accuracy, and per-sample cost of each index test were estimated. The diagnostic accuracy estimates ranged from 95.9 to 97.7% for the RBT, 55.0 to 72.0% for the commercial plate tests, and 89.4% for the cELISA. The per-sample cost range was $0.69-$0.79 for the RBT, $1.03-$1.14 for the commercial plate tests, and $2.51 for the cELISA. The widely used commercial plate tests performed poorly and cost more than the RBT. These findings provide evidence for the public health value of discontinuing the use of commercial agglutination tests for human brucellosis in Tanzania.

Socially vs. Privately Optimal Control of Livestock Diseases: A Case for Integration of Epidemiology and Economics.

This paper aims to illustrate the interdependencies between key epidemiological and economic factors that influence the control of many livestock infectious diseases. The factors considered here are (i) farmer heterogeneity (i.e., differences in how farmers respond to a perceived disease risk), (ii) off-farm effects of farmers' actions to control a disease (i.e., costs and benefits borne by agents that are external to the farm), and (iii) misalignment between privately and socially optimal control efforts (i.e., privately optimal behavior not conducive to a socially optimal outcome). Endemic chronic diseases cause a wide range of adverse social and economic impacts, particularly in low-income countries. The actions taken by farmers to control livestock diseases minimize some of these impacts, and heterogeneity in those actions leads to variation in prevalence at the farm level. While some farmers respond to perceived disease risks, others free-ride on the actions of these individuals, thereby compromising the potential benefits of collective, coordinated behavior. When evaluating a plausible range of disease cost to price of control ratios and assuming that farmers choose their privately optimal control effort, we demonstrate that achievement of a socially optimal disease control target is unlikely, occurring in <25% of all price-cost combinations. To achieve a socially optimal disease control outcome (reliant on farmers' voluntary actions), control policies must consider farmer heterogeneity, off-farm effects, and the predicted uptake of control measures under the assumption of optimized behavior.