Expert elicitation of the timing and uncertainty to establish a geologic sequestration well for CO2 in the United States.

Many studies anticipate that carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) will be essential to decarbonizing the U.S. economy. However, prior work has not estimated the time required to develop, approve, and implement a geologic sequestration site in the United States. We generate such an estimate by identifying six clearance points that must be passed before a sequestration site can become operational. For each clearance point (CP), we elicit expert judgments of the time required in the form of probability distributions and then use stochastic simulation to combine and sum the results. We find that, on average, there is a 90% chance that the time required lies between 5.5 and 9.6 y, with an upper bound of 12 y. Even using the most optimistic expert judgements, the lower bound on time is 2.7 y, and the upper bound is 8.3 y. Using the most pessimistic judgements, the lower bound is 3.5 y and the upper bound is 19.2 y. These estimates suggest that strategies must be found to safely accelerate the process. We conclude the paper by discussing seven potential strategies.

A strategy to improve expert technology forecasts.

Forecasts of the future cost and performance of technologies are often used to support decision-making. However, retrospective reviews find that many forecasts made by experts are not very accurate and are often seriously overconfident, with realized values too frequently falling outside of forecasted ranges. Here, we outline a hybrid approach to expert elicitation that we believe might improve forecasts of future technologies. The proposed approach iteratively combines the judgments of technical domain experts with those of experts who are knowledgeable about broader issues of technology adoption and public policy. We motivate the approach with results from a pilot study designed to help forecasters think systematically about factors beyond the technology itself that may shape its future, such as policy, economic, and social factors. Forecasters who received briefings on these topics provided wider forecast intervals than those receiving no assistance.

Reflections on an interdisciplinary collaboration to inform public understanding of climate change, mitigation, and impacts.

We describe two interdisciplinary projects in which natural scientists and engineers, as well as psychologists and other behavioral scientists, worked together to better communicate about climate change, including mitigation and impacts. One project focused on understanding and informing public perceptions of an emerging technology to capture and sequester carbon dioxide from coal-fired power plants, as well as other low-carbon electricity-generation technologies. A second project focused on public understanding about carbon dioxide's residence time in the atmosphere. In both projects, we applied the mental-models approach, which aims to design effective communications by using insights from interdisciplinary teams of experts and mental models elicited from intended audience members. In addition to summarizing our findings, we discuss the process of interdisciplinary collaboration that we pursued in framing and completing both projects. We conclude by describing what we think we have learned about the conditions that supported our ongoing interdisciplinary collaborations.

Converting existing transmission corridors to HVDC is an overlooked option for increasing transmission capacity.

A changing generation mix and growing demand for carbon-free electricity will almost certainly require dramatic changes in the infrastructure and topology of the electricity system. Rather than build new lines, one way to minimize social opposition and regulatory obstacles is to increase the capacity of existing transmission corridors. In addition to upgrading the capacity of high-voltage alternating current (HVAC) lines, we identify a number of situations in which conversion from HVAC to high-voltage direct current (HVDC) is the least-cost strategy to increase the capacity of the corridor. If restricted to the existing right-of-way (ROW), we find DC conversion to be the least-cost, and in some cases the only, option for distances of >200 km or for increases of >50% capacity. Across all configurations analyzed, we assess HVDC conversion to be the lower-cost option at >350 km and >50% capacity increases. While we recognize that capacity expansion through HVDC conversion may be the optimal solution in only some situations, with future improvements in the cost and performance of solid-state power electronics, conversion to HVDC could be attractive in a growing set of circumstances.

Individual and Collective Strategies to Limit the Impacts of Large Power Outages of Long Duration.

As modern society becomes ever more dependent on the availability of electric power, the costs that could arise from individual and social vulnerability to large outages of long duration (LLD-outages) increases. During such an outage, even a small amount of power would be very valuable. This article compares individual and collective strategies for providing limited amounts of electric power to residential customers in a hypothetical New England community during a large electric power outage of long duration. We develop estimates of the emergency load required for survival and assess the cost of strategies to address outages that last 5, 10, and 20 days in either winter or summer. We find that the cost of collective solutions could be as much as 10 to 40 times less than individual solutions (less than $2 per month per home). However, collective solutions would require community-wide coordination, and if local distribution system lines are destroyed, only individual back-up systems could provide contingency power until those lines are repaired. Costs might be reduced if more robust distributed generation were employed that could be operated continuously with the ability to sell power back to the grid. Our cost-effectiveness analysis only assesses what could be done, developing estimates of preparedness cost. A decision about what should be done would require additional input from a range of stakeholders as well as some form of analytical deliberative process.

US nuclear power: The vanishing low-carbon wedge.

Nuclear power holds the potential to make a significant contribution to decarbonizing the US energy system. Whether it could do so in its current form is a critical question: Existing large light water reactors in the United States are under economic pressure from low natural gas prices, and some have already closed. Moreover, because of their great cost and complexity, it appears most unlikely that any new large plants will be built over the next several decades. While advanced reactor designs are sometimes held up as a potential solution to nuclear power's challenges, our assessment of the advanced fission enterprise suggests that no US design will be commercialized before midcentury. That leaves factory-manufactured, light water small modular reactors (SMRs) as the only option that might be deployed at significant scale in the climate-critical period of the next several decades. We have systematically investigated how a domestic market could develop to support that industry over the next several decades and, in the absence of a dramatic change in the policy environment, have been unable to make a convincing case. Achieving deep decarbonization of the energy system will require a portfolio of every available technology and strategy we can muster. It should be a source of profound concern for all who care about climate change that, for entirely predictable and resolvable reasons, the United States appears set to virtually lose nuclear power, and thus a wedge of reliable and low-carbon energy, over the next few decades.

Empirical prediction intervals improve energy forecasting.

Hundreds of organizations and analysts use energy projections, such as those contained in the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s Annual Energy Outlook (AEO), for investment and policy decisions. Retrospective analyses of past AEO projections have shown that observed values can differ from the projection by several hundred percent, and thus a thorough treatment of uncertainty is essential. We evaluate the out-of-sample forecasting performance of several empirical density forecasting methods, using the continuous ranked probability score (CRPS). The analysis confirms that a Gaussian density, estimated on past forecasting errors, gives comparatively accurate uncertainty estimates over a variety of energy quantities in the AEO, in particular outperforming scenario projections provided in the AEO. We report probabilistic uncertainties for 18 core quantities of the AEO 2016 projections. Our work frames how to produce, evaluate, and rank probabilistic forecasts in this setting. We propose a log transformation of forecast errors for price projections and a modified nonparametric empirical density forecasting method. Our findings give guidance on how to evaluate and communicate uncertainty in future energy outlooks.

Evaluation of a proposal for reliable low-cost grid power with 100% wind, water, and solar.

A number of analyses, meta-analyses, and assessments, including those performed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, and the International Energy Agency, have concluded that deployment of a diverse portfolio of clean energy technologies makes a transition to a low-carbon-emission energy system both more feasible and less costly than other pathways. In contrast, Jacobson et al. [Jacobson MZ, Delucchi MA, Cameron MA, Frew BA (2015) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 112(49):15060-15065] argue that it is feasible to provide "low-cost solutions to the grid reliability problem with 100% penetration of WWS [wind, water and solar power] across all energy sectors in the continental United States between 2050 and 2055", with only electricity and hydrogen as energy carriers. In this paper, we evaluate that study and find significant shortcomings in the analysis. In particular, we point out that this work used invalid modeling tools, contained modeling errors, and made implausible and inadequately supported assumptions. Policy makers should treat with caution any visions of a rapid, reliable, and low-cost transition to entire energy systems that relies almost exclusively on wind, solar, and hydroelectric power.

A Solar-Centric Approach to Improving Estimates of Exposure Processes for Coronal Mass Ejections.

We present a solar-centric approach to estimating the probability of extreme coronal mass ejections (CME) using the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO)/Large Angle and Spectrometric Coronagraph Experiment (LASCO) CME Catalog observations updated through May 2018 and an updated list of near-Earth interplanetary coronal mass ejections (ICME). We examine robust statistical approaches to the estimation of extreme events. We then assume a variety of time-independent distributions fitting, and then comparing, the different probability distributions to the relevant regions of the cumulative distributions of the observed CME speeds. Using these results, we then obtain the probability that the velocity of a CME exceeds a particular threshold by extrapolation. We conclude that about 1.72% of the CMEs recorded with SOHO LASCO arrive at the Earth over the time both data sets overlap (November 1996 to September 2017). Then, assuming that 1.72% of all CMEs pass the Earth, we can obtain a first-order estimate of the probability of an extreme space weather event on Earth. To estimate the probability over the next decade of a CME, we fit a Poisson distribution to the complementary cumulative distribution function. We inferred a decadal probability of between 0.01 and 0.09 for an event of at least the size of the large 2012 event, and a probability between 0.0002 and 0.016 for the size of the 1859 Carrington event.

Illustration of a Method to Incorporate Preference Uncertainty in Benefit-Cost Analysis.

Benefit-cost analysis is widely used to evaluate alternative courses of action that are designed to achieve policy objectives. Although many analyses take uncertainty into account, they typically only consider uncertainty about cost estimates and physical states of the world, whereas uncertainty about individual preferences, thus the benefit of policy intervention, is ignored. Here, we propose a strategy to integrate individual uncertainty about preferences into benefit-cost analysis using societal preference intervals, which are ranges of values over which it is unclear whether society as a whole should accept or reject an option. To illustrate the method, we use preferences for implementing a smart grid technology to sustain critical electricity demand during a 24-hour regional power blackout on a hot summer weekend. Preferences were elicited from a convenience sample of residents in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. This illustrative example shows that uncertainty in individual preferences, when aggregated to form societal preference intervals, can substantially change society's decision. We conclude with a discussion of where preference uncertainty comes from, how it might be reduced, and why incorporating unresolved preference uncertainty into benefit-cost analyses can be important.

Providing Limited Local Electric Service During a Major Grid Outage: A First Assessment Based on Customer Willingness to Pay.

While they are rare, widespread blackouts of the bulk power system can result in large costs to individuals and society. If local distribution circuits remain intact, it is possible to use new technologies including smart meters, intelligent switches that can change the topology of distribution circuits, and distributed generation owned by customers and the power company, to provide limited local electric power service. Many utilities are already making investments that would make this possible. We use customers' measured willingness to pay to explore when the incremental investments needed to implement these capabilities would be justified. Under many circumstances, upgrades in advanced distribution systems could be justified for a customer charge of less than a dollar a month (plus the cost of electricity used during outages), and would be less expensive and safer than the proliferation of small portable backup generators. We also discuss issues of social equity, extreme events, and various sources of underlying uncertainty.

Assessing the Cost of Large-Scale Power Outages to Residential Customers.

Residents in developed economies depend heavily on electric services. While distributed resources and a variety of new smart technologies can increase the reliability of that service, adopting them involves costs, necessitating tradeoffs between cost and reliability. An important input to making such tradeoffs is an estimate of the value customers place on reliable electric services. We develop an elicitation framework that helps individuals think systematically about the value they attach to reliable electric service. Our approach employs a detailed and realistic blackout scenario, full or partial (20 A) backup service, questions about willingness to pay (WTP) using a multiple bounded discrete choice method, information regarding inconveniences and economic losses, and checks for bias and consistency. We applied this method to a convenience sample of residents in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, finding that respondents valued a kWh for backup services they assessed to be high priority more than services that were seen as low priority ($0.75/kWh vs. $0.51/kWh). As more information about the consequences of a blackout was provided, this difference increased ($1.2/kWh vs. $0.35/kWh), and respondents' uncertainty about the backup services decreased (Full: $11 to $9.0, Partial: $13 to $11). There was no evidence that the respondents were anchored by their previous WTP statements, but they demonstrated only weak scope sensitivity. In sum, the consumer surplus associated with providing a partial electric backup service during a blackout may justify the costs of such service, but measurement of that surplus depends on the public having accurate information about blackouts and their consequences.

Public Perceptions of How Long Air Pollution and Carbon Dioxide Remain in the Atmosphere.

The atmospheric residence time of carbon dioxide is hundreds of years, many orders of magnitude longer than that of common air pollution, which is typically hours to a few days. However, randomly selected respondents in a mail survey in Allegheny County, PA (N = 119) and in a national survey conducted with MTurk (N = 1,013) judged the two to be identical (in decades), considerably overestimating the residence time of air pollution and drastically underestimating that of carbon dioxide. Moreover, while many respondents believed that action is needed today to avoid climate change (regardless of cause), roughly a quarter held the view that if climate change is real and serious, we will be able to stop it in the future when it happens, just as we did with common air pollution. In addition to assessing respondents' understanding of how long carbon dioxide and common air pollution stay in the atmosphere, we also explored the extent to which people correctly identified causes of climate change and how their beliefs affect support for action. With climate change at the forefront of politics and mainstream media, informing discussions of policy is increasingly important. Confusion about the causes and consequences of climate change, and especially about carbon dioxide's long atmospheric residence time, could have profound implications for sustained support of policies to achieve reductions in carbon dioxide emissions and other greenhouse gases.

Use (and abuse) of expert elicitation in support of decision making for public policy.

The elicitation of scientific and technical judgments from experts, in the form of subjective probability distributions, can be a valuable addition to other forms of evidence in support of public policy decision making. This paper explores when it is sensible to perform such elicitation and how that can best be done. A number of key issues are discussed, including topics on which there are, and are not, experts who have knowledge that provides a basis for making informed predictive judgments; the inadequacy of only using qualitative uncertainty language; the role of cognitive heuristics and of overconfidence; the choice of experts; the development, refinement, and iterative testing of elicitation protocols that are designed to help experts to consider systematically all relevant knowledge when they make their judgments; the treatment of uncertainty about model functional form; diversity of expert opinion; and when it does or does not make sense to combine judgments from different experts. Although it may be tempting to view expert elicitation as a low-cost, low-effort alternative to conducting serious research and analysis, it is neither. Rather, expert elicitation should build on and use the best available research and analysis and be undertaken only when, given those, the state of knowledge will remain insufficient to support timely informed assessment and decision making.

Evaluating the Cost, Safety, and Proliferation Risks of Small Floating Nuclear Reactors.

It is hard to see how our energy system can be decarbonized if the world abandons nuclear power, but equally hard to introduce the technology in nonnuclear energy states. This is especially true in countries with limited technical, institutional, and regulatory capabilities, where safety and proliferation concerns are acute. Given the need to achieve serious emissions mitigation by mid-century, and the multidecadal effort required to develop robust nuclear governance institutions, we must look to other models that might facilitate nuclear plant deployment while mitigating the technology's risks. One such deployment paradigm is the build-own-operate-return model. Because returning small land-based reactors containing spent fuel is infeasible, we evaluate the cost, safety, and proliferation risks of a system in which small modular reactors are manufactured in a factory, and then deployed to a customer nation on a floating platform. This floating small modular reactor would be owned and operated by a single entity and returned unopened to the developed state for refueling. We developed a decision model that allows for a comparison of floating and land-based alternatives considering key International Atomic Energy Agency plant-siting criteria. Abandoning onsite refueling is beneficial, and floating reactors built in a central facility can potentially reduce the risk of cost overruns and the consequences of accidents. However, if the floating platform must be built to military-grade specifications, then the cost would be much higher than a land-based system. The analysis tool presented is flexible, and can assist planners in determining the scope of risks and uncertainty associated with different deployment options.

Viability of Carbon Capture and Sequestration Retrofits for Existing Coal-Fired Power Plants under an Emission Trading Scheme.

Using data on the coal-fired electric generating units (EGUs) in Texas we assess the economic feasibility of retrofitting existing units with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) in order to comply with the Clean Power Plan's rate-based emission standards under an emission trading scheme. CCS with 90% capture is shown to be more economically attractive for a range of existing units than purchasing emission rate credits (ERCs) from a trading market at an average credit price above $28 per MWh under the final state standard and $35 per MWh under the final national standard. The breakeven ERC trading prices would decrease significantly if the captured CO2 were sold for use in enhanced oil recovery, making CCS retrofits viable at lower trading prices. The combination of ERC trading and CO2 use can greatly reinforce economic incentives and market demands for CCS and hence accelerate large-scale deployment, even under scenarios with high retrofit costs. Comparing the levelized costs of electricity generation between CCS retrofits and new renewable plants under the ERC trading scheme, retrofitting coal-fired EGUs with CCS may be significantly cheaper than new solar plants under some market conditions.

Shore Power for Vessels Calling at U.S. Ports: Benefits and Costs.

When in port, ships burn marine diesel in on-board generators to produce electricity and are significant contributors to poor local and regional air quality. Supplying ships with grid electricity can reduce these emissions. We use two integrated assessment models to quantify the benefits of reducing the emissions of NOX, SO2, PM2.5, and CO2 that would occur if shore power were used. Using historical vessel call data, we identify combinations of vessels and berths at U.S. ports that could be switched to shore power to yield the largest gains for society. Our results indicate that, depending on the social costs of pollution assumed, an air quality benefit of $70-150 million per year could be achieved by retrofitting a quarter to two-thirds of all vessels that call at U.S. ports. Such a benefit could be produced at no net cost to society (health and environmental benefits would be balanced by the cost of ship and port retrofit) but would require many ships to be equipped to receive shore power, even if doing so would result in a private loss for the operator. Policy makers could produce a net societal gain by implementing incentives and mandates to encourage a shift toward shore power.

Consumptive Water Use from Electricity Generation in the Southwest under Alternative Climate, Technology, and Policy Futures.

This research assesses climate, technological, and policy impacts on consumptive water use from electricity generation in the Southwest over a planning horizon of nearly a century. We employed an integrated modeling framework taking into account feedbacks between climate change, air temperature and humidity, and consequent power plant water requirements. These direct impacts of climate change on water consumption by 2095 differ with technology improvements, cooling systems, and policy constraints, ranging from a 3-7% increase over scenarios that do not incorporate ambient air impacts. Upon additional factors being changed that alter electricity generation, water consumption increases by up to 8% over the reference scenario by 2095. With high penetration of wet recirculating cooling, consumptive water required for low-carbon electricity generation via fossil fuels will likely exacerbate regional water pressure as droughts become more common and population increases. Adaptation strategies to lower water use include the use of advanced cooling technologies and greater dependence on solar and wind. Water consumption may be reduced by 50% in 2095 from the reference, requiring an increase in dry cooling shares to 35-40%. Alternatively, the same reduction could be achieved through photovoltaic and wind power generation constituting 60% of the grid, consistent with an increase of over 250% in technology learning rates.