The serial reproduction of an urban myth: revisiting Bartlett's schema theory.

Frederic Bartlett's schema theory is still widely misunderstood as claiming that remembering is inevitably unreliable. However, according to the logic of his schema theory, remembering should, in relation to certain kinds of material, be relatively reliable. In this study we examined whether a "well-worn" urban myth (the Vanishing Hitchhiker) could be exempt from the fate of other material used in Bartlett's own research on serial reproduction. Supporting Bartlett's ideas, we found that recall of the Hitchhiker story was better (if not perfect) over a series of five reproductions than recall of the classic War of the Ghosts. Recall was also better for a strict (as opposed to a lenient) audience, in line with another prediction from Bartlett's social theory of remembering. Notwithstanding this, we conclude with some critical remarks on the serial reproduction method as an approach to cultural memory.

Structured word-lists as a model of basic schemata: deviations from content and order in a repeated event paradigm.

Repeated events are common in everyday life, but relatively neglected as a topic within memory psychology. In two samples of adults, we investigated memory for repeated, schema-establishing simple events (operationalised as structured word-lists), and the effects of deviations within those events. We focused on the effects of deviations from two core dimensions of schema: content and order. Across three successive word-list events, we established and reinforced a basic list schema by always presenting three content categories in the same order. These expectations were violated in a fourth and final word-list. We measured the effects on memory of both the violating and the schema-establishing lists in multiple recall attempts over a period of one month. We measured correct recall, misattribution errors, metacognitive awareness of list-organisation and deviations, and recall organisation. Across all delays and across all word-lists (not only the final one), content changes increased recall, whereas order changes decreased recall. Participants were also more aware of content changes than order changes. These disparate effects suggest that the two types of schema-deviations may have qualitatively different effects on memory for specific instances of a repeated generic event. Cognitive processes underlying memory for typical and exceptional instances of repeated events are discussed.

Using metamemory measures and memory tests to estimate eyewitness free recall performance.

Using a mock witness methodology, we investigated the predictive value of metamemory measures and objective memory tests as indicators of eyewitness free recall performance. Participants (n = 208) first completed a metamemory assessment that included assessments of self-rated memory capacity, memory development and use of strategies. In a separate session, participants watched a mock-crime video and provided a free recall account, followed by one out of four independent memory tests (i.e., free recall, cued recall, face recognition and general knowledge). Accuracy, amount of details reported, confidence and over/underconfidence in the eyewitness free recall were the main dependent variables. Results indicated three main findings: (1) subjective assessments of memory capacity were not related to eyewitness free recall performance; (2) although individual confidence and over/underconfidence was somewhat stable across different memory tests, accuracy was less stable; and (3) individuals with higher self-rated memory capacity had a slightly stronger confidence-accuracy relation in free recall. These results are discussed with respect to metamemory assessments and performance stability across memory tests of different domains.

The effects of co-witness discussion on confidence and precision in eyewitness memory reports.

We examined the influence of co-witness discussion on the metacognitive regulation of memory reports. Participants (N = 92) watched a crime video. Later, a confederate confidently agreed with (gave confirming feedback), disagreed with (gave disconfirming feedback), or gave no feedback (control) regarding participants' answers to questions about the video. Participants who received disconfirming feedback reported fewer fine-grain details than participants in the confirming and control conditions on a subsequent, individual recall test for a different question set. Unexpectedly, this decrease in fine-grain reporting was not accompanied by a decrease in participants' confidence in the accuracy of their fine-grain responses. These results indicate that receiving social comparative feedback about one's memory performance can affect rememberers' metamemorial control decisions, and potentially decrease the level of detail they volunteer in later memory reports. Further research is needed to assess whether these results replicate under different experimental conditions, and to explore the effects of social influences on metamemory.

Adults' retractions of childhood sexual abuse allegations: high-stakes and the (in)validation of recollection.

Retractors are individuals who have repudiated their earlier claims of having been sexually abused. There has been relatively little research conducted with this population. The growing literature on memory verification strategies and non-believed memories provide a conceptual and empirical lens through which to revisit the accounts of these individuals to try and learn more about the process of making and retracting high stake, consequential beliefs or recollections about the past. Do people attempt to validate or invalidate beliefs and recollections of such events in the same way as they do for the moderately significant events studied to date? The paper concludes by re-emphasising the social and contextual nature of remembering and argues for the primacy of belief over recollection.

Latent variables underlying the memory beliefs of Chartered Clinical Psychologists, Hypnotherapists and undergraduate students.

In courts in the United Kingdom, understanding of memory phenomena is often assumed to be a matter of common sense. To test this assumption 337 UK respondents, consisting of 125 Chartered Clinical Psychologists, 88 individuals who advertised their services as Hypnotherapists (HTs) in a classified directory, the Yellow PagesTM, and 124 first year undergraduate psychology students, completed a questionnaire that assessed their knowledge of 10 memory phenomena about which there is a broad scientific consensus. HTs' responses were the most inconsistent with the scientific consensus, scoring lowest on six of these ten items. Principal Components Analysis indicated two latent variables - reflecting beliefs about memory quality and malleability - underlying respondents' responses. In addition, respondents were asked to rate their own knowledge of the academic memory literature in general. There was no significant relationship between participants' self reported knowledge and their actual knowledge (as measured by their responses to the 10-item questionnaire). There was evidence of beliefs among the HTs that could give rise to some concern (e.g., that early memories from the first year of life are accurately stored and are retrievable).

A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies.

Understanding that suggestive practices can promote false beliefs and false memories for childhood events is important in many settings (e.g., psychotherapeutic, medical, and legal). The generalisability of findings from memory implantation studies has been questioned due to variability in estimates across studies. Such variability is partly due to false memories having been operationalised differently across studies and to differences in memory induction techniques. We explored ways of defining false memory based on memory science and developed a reliable coding system that we applied to reports from eight published implantation studies (N = 423). Independent raters coded transcripts using seven criteria: accepting the suggestion, elaboration beyond the suggestion, imagery, coherence, emotion, memory statements, and not rejecting the suggestion. Using this scheme, 30.4% of cases were classified as false memories and another 23% were classified as having accepted the event to some degree. When the suggestion included self-relevant information, an imagination procedure, and was not accompanied by a photo depicting the event, the memory formation rate was 46.1%. Our research demonstrates a useful procedure for systematically combining data that are not amenable to meta-analysis, and provides the most valid estimate of false memory formation and associated moderating factors within the implantation literature to date.

Schema and deviation effects in remembering repeated unfamiliar stories.

In today's globalized world, we frequently encounter unfamiliar events that we may have difficulty comprehending - and in turn remembering - due to a lack of appropriate schemata. This research investigated schema effects in a situation where participants established a complex new schema for an unfamiliar type of story through exposure to four variations. We found that immediate recall increased across subsequent stories and that distortions occurred less frequently - participants built on the emerging schema and gradually established representations of parts of the story that were initially transformed. In recall with delays increasing up to 1 month, quantitative measures indicated forgetting while distortions increased. The second focus of this research was on content and order deviation effects on recall. The content deviation, in contrast with previous repeated-event research, was not remembered well and was associated with lower recall; the order deviation had a similar (but expected) effect. We discuss discrepancies between results of this study and previous literature, which had focused on schemata for familiar events, in relation to stages of schema development: it seems that in unfamiliar repeated events, a complex new schema is in the early stages of formation, where the lack of attentional resources limits active processing of deviations.

Detecting feigned high impact experiences: A symptom over-report questionnaire outperforms the emotional Stroop task.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: The Modified Stroop Task (MST) effect refers to a prolonged reaction time (RT) in color-naming words related to an individual's disorder. Some authors argue that its absence in people who claim symptoms might be an indication of feigning. METHOD: We tested whether the MST effect is robust against feigning attempts and compared its absence as an index of feigning with over-reporting tendencies on a symptom questionnaire (i.e., the Self-Reported Symptom Inventory (SRSI)). We included participants (n = 22) who i) reported current high impact of aversive experiences (High scorers), ii) reported current low impact (Low scorers) of aversive experiences (n = 24), and iii) actors (n = 18) with low impact, but instructed to feign current high psychological impact of aversive life events (Simulators). We administered the MST, including impact-related, neutral, and feigning-related words, and the SRSI. RESULTS: We found no MST effect for impact-related words in the high scorers group, or for feigning-related words in the simulators. Relative to high scorers and low scorers, simulators exhibited significantly longer RTs on all types of words and they also endorsed significantly more bogus symptoms on the SRSI. Thus, the SRSI was a more sensitive measure of feigning than the absence of an MST effect. LIMITATION: Some limitations are related to our reliance on a sub-clinical student sample, whereas others reflect the unresolved issues surrounding the MST. Thus, the generalizability of our results is uncertain. CONCLUSION: Our findings add to the doubts on the idea that the MST can be used to differentiate between genuine and feigned complaints.

The effects of confederate influence and confidence on the accuracy of crime judgements.

Building on recent work which has investigated social influences on memory and remembering, the present experiment examined the effects of social pressure and confederate confidence on the accuracy and confidence of eyewitnesses. Sixty undergraduate participants watched a video of a staged mugging and then answered questions about the video out loud in the presence of either one or three confederates who had also watched the film with them. Unbeknownst to the participant, the confederate(s) always gave incorrect responses to four out of the eight questions. Participants and confederates were also asked to give confidence scores out loud for each of their answers. Again, unbeknownst to the participant, the confederate(s) always expressed either high or low confidence scores for the incorrect information, depending on condition. Participants gave fewer correct answers, and were less confident, in the presence of three, as opposed to one, confederates. Participants were also more confident, yet no more accurate, when the confederate(s) gave high, as opposed to low, confidence scores. Thus the presumed independence of evidence given by multiple witnesses cannot be safely assumed.

"With a little help from my friends...": the role of co-witness relationship in susceptibility to misinformation.

Inaccuracies in eyewitness accounts can occur when witnesses are exposed to post-event misinformation via discussion with a co-witness. The current study examined the role of co-witness relationship by comparing the memory performance of pairs of romantic couples, friends and previously unacquainted strangers with that of individuals. Ninety-six participants viewed an event and then discussed the witnessed event with a stranger, a romantic partner or a friend. One member of each pair saw a theft take place during the witnessed event. Individual group participants did not discuss the witnessed event with anyone. Results indicate that all co-witness dyads produced less accurate recall accounts than participants who did not interact with another witness. However, witnesses who were previously acquainted with their co-witness (either in a friendship or romantic relationship) were significantly more likely to report information obtained from their co-witness that they had not seen themselves. Prior acquaintance also led to an increased number of incorrect attributions of both guilt and innocence.

Misrepresentations and Flawed Logic About the Prevalence of False Memories.

Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview, they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an "upper bound" on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.

Computer Mediated Social Comparative Feedback Does Not Affect Metacognitive Regulation of Memory Reports.

In two experiments, we investigated how social comparative feedback affects the metacognitive regulation of eyewitness memory reports. In Experiment 1, 87 participants received negative, positive, or no feedback about a co-witness's performance on a task querying recall of a crime video. Participants then completed the task individually. There were no significant differences between negative and positive feedback groups on any measure. However, participants in both of these conditions volunteered more fine-grain details than participants in the control condition. In Experiment 2, 90 participants answered questions about a crime video. Participants in the experimental groups received either positive or negative feedback, which compared their performance to that of others. Participants then completed a subsequent recall task, for which they were told their performance would not be scored. Feedback did not significantly affect participants' confidence, accuracy, or the level of detail they reported in comparison to a no feedback control group. These findings advance our understanding of the boundary conditions for social feedback effects on meta-memory.

Misremembering Bartlett: a study in serial reproduction.

According to much of the recent psychological literature on memory, Bartlett should be credited with the insight that remembering can never be accurate but is, instead, more or less of a distortion (a view to which many modern authors themselves seem to subscribe). In the present paper, we argue that Bartlett did not himself provide such an unqualified account of remembering. Although he sought to challenge the idea that remembering is largely an accurate record of past events, he did not maintain that it is always inaccurate. Despite unqualified claims by Bartlett to the contrary, neither his own experiments nor his theoretical position warrant the conclusion that remembering is inherently unreliable. Indeed, as we explain, Bartlett himself provides several examples of impressively detailed and accurate recall, and sought to explain them within the framework of his schema theory.

False memory ≠ false memory: DRM errors are unrelated to the misinformation effect.

The DRM method has proved to be a popular and powerful, if controversial, way to study 'false memories'. One reason for the controversy is that the extent to which the DRM effect generalises to other kinds of memory error has been neither satisfactorily established nor subject to much empirical attention. In the present paper we contribute data to this ongoing debate. One hundred and twenty participants took part in a standard misinformation effect experiment, in which they watched some CCTV footage, were exposed to misleading post-event information about events depicted in the footage, and then completed free recall and recognition tests. Participants also completed a DRM test as an ostensibly unrelated filler task. Despite obtaining robust misinformation and DRM effects, there were no correlations between a broad range of misinformation and DRM effect measures (mean r  = -.01). This was not due to reliability issues with our measures or a lack of power. Thus DRM 'false memories' and misinformation effect 'false memories' do not appear to be equivalent.

Comparing the influence of directly vs. indirectly encountered post-event misinformation on eyewitness remembering.

Some research has found a stronger influence of directly (face-to-face; co-witness; 'social') vs. indirectly (through written reports, 'non-social') encountered post-event misinformation on eyewitness memory reports, whereas other research finds no (big) difference. We argue and demonstrate that a crucial but so far neglected variable underlying this difference is memory for the misleading information itself. In a study with N=120 participants who encountered misinformation directly or indirectly, we found misinformation retention (as assessed in a separate test) to be positively associated with a broad range of misinformation effects. Influence type (direct vs. indirect), however, did not moderate the misinformation effect in terms of memory for original details, and misinformation endorsement was even weaker in the direct influence condition. In our view, these findings reflect differential conversion of retained misinformation into test performance. Other than this, influence type had essentially no effects on remembering; nor did an additional post-warning manipulation.

Is the truth in the details? Extended narratives help distinguishing false "memories" from false "reports".

The present study examined the effects of fantasy proneness on false "reports" and false "memories", of existent and non-existent footage of a public event. We predicted that highly fantasy prone individuals would be more likely to stand by their initial claim of having seen a film of the event than low fantasy prone participants when prompted for more details about their experiences. Eighty creative arts students and 80 other students were asked whether they had seen CCTV footage preceding the attack on Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh up to, and including, non-existent footage of the actual moment of the attack. If affirmative, they were probed for extended narratives of what they claimed to have seen. Overall, 64% of participants provided a false "report" by answering yes to the initial question. Of these, 30% provided no explicit details of the attack, and a further 15% retracted their initial answer in their narratives. This left 19% of the sample who appeared to have false "memories" because they provided explicit details of the actual moment of the attack. Women scored higher than men and art students scored higher than other students on fantasy proneness, but there was no effect on levels of false reporting or false "memory". Memories were rated more vivid and clear for existent compared to non-existent aspects of the event. In sum, these data suggest a more complex relationship between memory distortions and fantasy proneness than previously observed.

How interviewers' nonverbal behaviors can affect children's perceptions and suggestibility.

We conducted two studies to examine how interviewers' nonverbal behaviors affect children's perceptions and suggestibility. In the first study, 42 8- to 10-year-olds watched video clips showing an interviewer displaying combinations of supportive and nonsupportive nonverbal behaviors and were asked to rate the interviewer on six attributes (e.g., friendliness, strictness). Smiling received high ratings on the positive attributes (i.e., friendly, helpful, and sincere), and fidgeting received high ratings on the negative attributes (i.e., strict, bored, and stressed). For the second study, 86 8- to 10-year-olds participated in a learning activity about the vocal chords. One week later, they were interviewed individually about the activity by an interviewer adopting either the supportive (i.e., smiling) or nonsupportive (i.e., fidgeting) behavior. Children questioned by the nonsupportive interviewer were less accurate and more likely to falsely report having been touched than were those questioned by the supportive interviewer. Children questioned by the supportive interviewer were also more likely to say that they did not know an answer than were children questioned by the nonsupportive interviewer. Participants in both conditions gave more correct answers to questions about central, as opposed to peripheral, details of the activity. Implications of these findings for the appropriate interviewing of child witnesses are discussed.

Familiarity breeds distortion: the effects of media exposure on false reports concerning media coverage of the terrorist attacks in london on 7 July 2005.

The present experiment investigated whether increased media exposure could lead to an increase in memory distortions regarding a traumatic public event: the explosion of the No. 30 bus in Tavistock Square, London on 7 July 2005. A total of 150 Swedish and 150 UK participants completed a series of questionnaires about their memory of either (i) the aftermath of the explosion, (ii) a non-existent computerised reconstruction of the moment of the explosion, or (iii) non-existent closed circuit television footage of the moment of the explosion. In line with the availability heuristic, U.K. participants were more likely than Swedish participants to claim to have seen all three types of footage. Furthermore, a subsample of U.K. participants who appeared to have developed false "memories" of seeing the No. 30 bus explode scored significantly higher on measures of dissociation and fantasy proneness than participants who did not develop false "memories". This experiment provides further support for the role of imaginative processes in the development of false memories.

False reports of childhood events in appropriate interviews.

The present study employed the "parental misinformation" paradigm to examine whether individuals report false events from their childhood even when they are interviewed in an appropriate manner by a trained interviewer. Each participant was interviewed on three occasions. By the final interview, one participant produced a "full" report, and six participants produced "partial" reports, of childhood events that did not occur. Although participants reported perceiving greater pressure to report the false events than the real events, independent judges' ratings of social pressure in the interviews did not differ as a function of what type of event participants were being asked about. Participants also reported higher confidence in their parents', compared to their own, recall of events from their childhood. False reports were also positively correlated with scores on both the full and the revised versions of the Dissociative Experiences Scale, and negatively correlated with score on the Self-Monitoring scale. These results indicate that, despite being interviewed in an appropriate manner by a trained interviewer, some participants will falsely report events from their childhoods.