The Psychology of Cultural Dynamics: What Is It, What Do We Know, and What Is Yet to Be Known?

The psychology of cultural dynamics is the psychological investigation of the formation, maintenance, and transformation of culture over time. This article maps out the terrain, reviews the existing literature, and points out potential future directions of this research. It is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on micro-cultural dynamics, which refers to the social and psychological processes that contribute to the dissemination and retention of cultural information. The second part, on micro-macro dynamics, investigates how micro-level processes give rise to macro-cultural dynamics. The third part focuses on macro-cultural dynamics, referring to the distribution and long-term trends involving cultural information in a population, which in turn enable and constrain the micro-level processes. We conclude the review with a consideration of future directions, suggesting behavior change research as translational research on cultural dynamics.

Sample size, number of categories and sampling assumptions: Exploring some differences between categorization and generalization.

Categorization and generalization are fundamentally related inference problems. Yet leading computational models of categorization (as exemplified by, e.g., Nosofsky, 1986) and generalization (as exemplified by, e.g., Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001) make qualitatively different predictions about how inference should change as a function of the number of items. Assuming all else is equal, categorization models predict that increasing the number of items in a category increases the chance of assigning a new item to that category; generalization models predict a decrease, or category tightening with additional exemplars. This paper investigates this discrepancy, showing that people do indeed perform qualitatively differently in categorization and generalization tasks even when all superficial elements of the task are kept constant. Furthermore, the effect of category frequency on generalization is moderated by assumptions about how the items are sampled. We show that neither model naturally accounts for the pattern of behavior across both categorization and generalization tasks, and discuss theoretical extensions of these frameworks to account for the importance of category frequency and sampling assumptions.

The "Small World of Words" English word association norms for over 12,000 cue words.

Word associations have been used widely in psychology, but the validity of their application strongly depends on the number of cues included in the study and the extent to which they probe all associations known by an individual. In this work, we address both issues by introducing a new English word association dataset. We describe the collection of word associations for over 12,000 cue words, currently the largest such English-language resource in the world. Our procedure allowed subjects to provide multiple responses for each cue, which permits us to measure weak associations. We evaluate the utility of the dataset in several different contexts, including lexical decision and semantic categorization. We also show that measures based on a mechanism of spreading activation derived from this new resource are highly predictive of direct judgments of similarity. Finally, a comparison with existing English word association sets further highlights systematic improvements provided through these new norms.

An argument for how (and why) to incentivise replication.

Although Zwaan et al. (2018) have made a compelling case as to why direct replications should occur more frequently than they do, they do not address how such replications attempts can best be encouraged. We propose a novel method for incentivising replication attempts and discuss some issues surrounding its implementation.

How do people learn from negative evidence? Non-monotonic generalizations and sampling assumptions in inductive reasoning.

A robust finding in category-based induction tasks is for positive observations to raise the willingness to generalize to other categories while negative observations lower the willingness to generalize. This pattern is referred to as monotonic generalization. Across three experiments we find systematic non-monotonicity effects, in which negative observations raise the willingness to generalize. Experiments 1 and 2 show that this effect emerges in hierarchically structured domains when a negative observation from a different category is added to a positive observation. They also demonstrate that this is related to a specific kind of shift in the reasoner's hypothesis space. Experiment 3 shows that the effect depends on the assumptions that the reasoner makes about how inductive arguments are constructed. Non-monotonic reasoning occurs when people believe the facts were put together by a helpful communicator, but monotonicity is restored when they believe the observations were sampled randomly from the environment.

Epistemic trust: modeling children's reasoning about others' knowledge and intent.

A core assumption of many theories of development is that children can learn indirectly from other people. However, indirect experience (or testimony) is not constrained to provide veridical information. As a result, if children are to capitalize on this source of knowledge, they must be able to infer who is trustworthy and who is not. How might a learner make such inferences while at the same time learning about the world? What biases, if any, might children bring to this problem? We address these questions with a computational model of epistemic trust in which learners reason about the helpfulness and knowledgeability of an informant. We show that the model captures the competencies shown by young children in four areas: (1) using informants' accuracy to infer how much to trust them; (2) using informants' recent accuracy to overcome effects of familiarity; (3) inferring trust based on consensus among informants; and (4) using information about mal-intent to decide not to trust. The model also explains developmental changes in performance between 3 and 4 years of age as a result of changing default assumptions about the helpfulness of other people.

Variability, negative evidence, and the acquisition of verb argument constructions.

We present a hierarchical Bayesian framework for modeling the acquisition of verb argument constructions. It embodies a domain-general approach to learning higher-level knowledge in the form of inductive constraints (or overhypotheses), and has been used to explain other aspects of language development such as the shape bias in learning object names. Here, we demonstrate that the same model captures several phenomena in the acquisition of verb constructions. Our model, like adults in a series of artificial language learning experiments, makes inferences about the distributional statistics of verbs on several levels of abstraction simultaneously. It also produces the qualitative learning patterns displayed by children over the time course of acquisition. These results suggest that the patterns of generalization observed in both children and adults could emerge from basic assumptions about the nature of learning. They also provide an example of a broad class of computational approaches that can resolve Baker's Paradox.

Indirect evidence and the poverty of the stimulus: the case of anaphoric one.

It is widely held that children's linguistic input underdetermines the correct grammar, and that language learning must therefore be guided by innate linguistic constraints. Here, we show that a Bayesian model can learn a standard poverty-of-stimulus example, anaphoric one, from realistic input by relying on indirect evidence, without a linguistic constraint assumed to be necessary. Our demonstration does, however, assume other linguistic knowledge; thus, we reduce the problem of learning anaphoric one to that of learning this other knowledge. We discuss whether this other knowledge may itself be acquired without linguistic constraints.

Cross-situational learning in a Zipfian environment.

Both adults and children have shown impressive cross-situational word learning in which they leverage the statistics of word usage across many different scenes in order to isolate specific word meanings (e.g., Yu & Smith, 2007). However, relatively little is known about how this learning scales to real language. Some theoretical analyses suggest that when words follow a Zipfian distribution, as they do in natural language, it should be more difficult to learn a lexicon because of the many low-frequency words that are only observed a few times (Blythe, Smith, & Smith, 2010; Vogt, 2012). Although this effect can be mitigated somewhat by assuming mutual exclusivity (Reisenauer, Smith, & Blythe, 2013), no mathematical analyses suggest that learning in a Zipfian environment should be easier. In this work, we show the opposite of the predicted effect using cross-situational learning experiments with adults: when the distribution of words and meanings is Zipfian, learning is not impaired and is usually improved. Over a series of experiments, we provide evidence that this is because Zipfian distributions help people to disambiguate the meanings of the other words in the situation.

Conformity to the descriptive norms of people with opposing political or social beliefs.

The descriptive norm effect refers to findings that individuals will tend to prefer behaving certain ways when they know that other people behave similarly. An open question is whether individuals will still conform to other people's behaviour when they do not identify with these other people, such as a Democrat being biased towards following a popular behaviour amongst Republicans. Self-categorization theory makes the intuitive prediction that people will actively avoid conforming to the norms of groups with which they do not identify. We tested this by informing participants that a particular action was more popular amongst people they identified with and additionally informed some participants that this action was unpopular amongst people they did not identify with. Specifically, we presented descriptive norms of people who supported different political parties or had opposing stances on important social issues. Counter to self-categorization theory's prediction, we found that informing participants that an action was unpopular amongst people they did not identify with led participants' preferences to shift away from that action. These results suggest that a general desire to conform with others may outpower the common ingroup vs outgroup mentality.

Even arbitrary norms influence moral decision-making.

It is well known that individuals tend to copy behaviours that are common among other people-a phenomenon known as the descriptive norm effect1-3. This effect has been successfully used to encourage a range of real-world prosocial decisions4-7, such as increasing organ donor registrations8. However, it is still unclear why it occurs. Here, we show that people conform to social norms, even when they understand that the norms in question are arbitrary and do not reflect the actual preferences of other people. These results hold across multiple contexts and when controlling for confounds such as anchoring or mere-exposure effects. Moreover, we demonstrate that the degree to which participants conform to an arbitrary norm is determined by the degree to which they self-identify with the group that exhibits the norm. Two prominent explanations of norm adherence-the informational and social sanction accounts2,9-11-cannot explain these results, suggesting that these theories need to be supplemented by an additional mechanism that takes into account self-identity.

Do Additional Features Help or Hurt Category Learning? The Curse of Dimensionality in Human Learners.

The curse of dimensionality, which has been widely studied in statistics and machine learning, occurs when additional features cause the size of the feature space to grow so quickly that learning classification rules becomes increasingly difficult. How do people overcome the curse of dimensionality when acquiring real-world categories that have many different features? Here we investigate the possibility that the structure of categories can help. We show that when categories follow a family resemblance structure, people are unaffected by the presence of additional features in learning. However, when categories are based on a single feature, they fall prey to the curse, and having additional irrelevant features hurts performance. We compare and contrast these results to three different computational models to show that a model with limited computational capacity best captures human performance across almost all of the conditions in both experiments.

When Extremists Win: Cultural Transmission Via Iterated Learning When Populations Are Heterogeneous.

How does the process of information transmission affect the cultural or linguistic products that emerge? This question is often studied experimentally and computationally via iterated learning, a procedure in which participants learn from previous participants in a chain. Iterated learning is a powerful tool because, when all participants share the same priors, the stationary distributions of the iterated learning chains reveal those priors. In many situations, however, it is unreasonable to assume that all participants share the same prior beliefs. We present four simulation studies and one experiment demonstrating that when the population of learners is heterogeneous, the behavior of an iterated learning chain can be unpredictable and is often systematically distorted by the learners with the most extreme biases. This results in group-level outcomes that reflect neither the behavior of any individuals within the population nor the overall population average. We discuss implications for the use of iterated learning as a methodological tool as well as for the processes that might have shaped cultural and linguistic evolution in the real world.

Bayesian models of cognition revisited: Setting optimality aside and letting data drive psychological theory.

Recent debates in the psychological literature have raised questions about the assumptions that underpin Bayesian models of cognition and what inferences they license about human cognition. In this paper we revisit this topic, arguing that there are 2 qualitatively different ways in which a Bayesian model could be constructed. The most common approach uses a Bayesian model as a normative standard upon which to license a claim about optimality. In the alternative approach, a descriptive Bayesian model need not correspond to any claim that the underlying cognition is optimal or rational, and is used solely as a tool for instantiating a substantive psychological theory. We present 3 case studies in which these 2 perspectives lead to different computational models and license different conclusions about human cognition. We demonstrate how the descriptive Bayesian approach can be used to answer different sorts of questions than the optimal approach, especially when combined with principled tools for model evaluation and model selection. More generally we argue for the importance of making a clear distinction between the 2 perspectives. Considerable confusion results when descriptive models and optimal models are conflated, and if Bayesians are to avoid contributing to this confusion it is important to avoid making normative claims when none are intended. (PsycINFO Database Record

Language learning, language use and the evolution of linguistic variation.

Linguistic universals arise from the interaction between the processes of language learning and language use. A test case for the relationship between these factors is linguistic variation, which tends to be conditioned on linguistic or sociolinguistic criteria. How can we explain the scarcity of unpredictable variation in natural language, and to what extent is this property of language a straightforward reflection of biases in statistical learning? We review three strands of experimental work exploring these questions, and introduce a Bayesian model of the learning and transmission of linguistic variation along with a closely matched artificial language learning experiment with adult participants. Our results show that while the biases of language learners can potentially play a role in shaping linguistic systems, the relationship between biases of learners and the structure of languages is not straightforward. Weak biases can have strong effects on language structure as they accumulate over repeated transmission. But the opposite can also be true: strong biases can have weak or no effects. Furthermore, the use of language during interaction can reshape linguistic systems. Combining data and insights from studies of learning, transmission and use is therefore essential if we are to understand how biases in statistical learning interact with language transmission and language use to shape the structural properties of language.This article is part of the themed issue 'New frontiers for statistical learning in the cognitive sciences'.

Picking up speed in understanding: Speech processing efficiency and vocabulary growth across the 2nd year.

To explore how online speech processing efficiency relates to vocabulary growth in the 2nd year, the authors longitudinally observed 59 English-learning children at 15, 18, 21, and 25 months as they looked at pictures while listening to speech naming one of the pictures. The time course of eye movements in response to speech revealed significant increases in the efficiency of comprehension over this period. Further, speed and accuracy in spoken word recognition at 25 months were correlated with measures of lexical and grammatical development from 12 to 25 months. Analyses of growth curves showed that children who were faster and more accurate in online comprehension at 25 months were those who showed faster and more accelerated growth in expressive vocabulary across the 2nd year.

Leaping to Conclusions: Why Premise Relevance Affects Argument Strength.

Everyday reasoning requires more evidence than raw data alone can provide. We explore the idea that people can go beyond this data by reasoning about how the data was sampled. This idea is investigated through an examination of premise non-monotonicity, in which adding premises to a category-based argument weakens rather than strengthens it. Relevance theories explain this phenomenon in terms of people's sensitivity to the relationships among premise items. We show that a Bayesian model of category-based induction taking premise sampling assumptions and category similarity into account complements such theories and yields two important predictions: First, that sensitivity to premise relationships can be violated by inducing a weak sampling assumption; and second, that premise monotonicity should be restored as a result. We test these predictions with an experiment that manipulates people's assumptions in this regard, showing that people draw qualitatively different conclusions in each case.

The structure of sequential effects.

There is a long history of research into sequential effects, extending more than one hundred years. The pattern of sequential effects varies widely with both experimental conditions as well as for different individuals performing the same experiment. Yet this great diversity of results is poorly understood, particularly with respect to individual variation, which save for some passing mentions has largely gone unreported in the literature. Here we seek to understand the way in which sequential effects vary by identifying the causes underlying the differences observed in sequential effects. In order to achieve this goal we perform principal component analysis on a dataset of 158 individual results from participants performing different experiments with the aim of identifying hidden variables responsible for sequential effects. We find a latent structure consisting of 3 components related to sequential effects-2 main and 1 minor. A relationship between the 2 main components and the separate processing of stimuli and of responses is proposed on the basis of previous empirical evidence. It is further speculated that the minor component of sequential effects arises as the consequence of processing delays. Independently of the explanation for the latent variables encountered, this work provides a unified descriptive model for a wide range of different types of sequential effects previously identified in the literature. In addition to explaining individual differences themselves, it is demonstrated how the latent structure uncovered here is useful in understanding the classical problem of the dependence of sequential effects on the interval between successive stimuli.

Structure at every scale: A semantic network account of the similarities between unrelated concepts.

Similarity plays an important role in organizing the semantic system. However, given that similarity cannot be defined on purely logical grounds, it is important to understand how people perceive similarities between different entities. Despite this, the vast majority of studies focus on measuring similarity between very closely related items. When considering concepts that are very weakly related, little is known. In this article, we present 4 experiments showing that there are reliable and systematic patterns in how people evaluate the similarities between very dissimilar entities. We present a semantic network account of these similarities showing that a spreading activation mechanism defined over a word association network naturally makes correct predictions about weak similarities, whereas, though simpler, models based on direct neighbors between word pairs derived using the same network cannot. (PsycINFO Database Record

Language evolution can be shaped by the structure of the world.

Human languages vary in many ways but also show striking cross-linguistic universals. Why do these universals exist? Recent theoretical results demonstrate that Bayesian learners transmitting language to each other through iterated learning will converge on a distribution of languages that depends only on their prior biases about language and the quantity of data transmitted at each point; the structure of the world being communicated about plays no role (Griffiths & Kalish, 2005, 2007). We revisit these findings and show that when certain assumptions about the relationship between language and the world are abandoned, learners will converge to languages that depend on the structure of the world as well as their prior biases. These theoretical results are supported with a series of experiments showing that when human learners acquire language through iterated learning, the ultimate structure of those languages is shaped by the structure of the meanings to be communicated.