Resolving selfish and spiteful interdependent conflict.

Interdependence occurs when individuals have a stake in the success or failure of others, such that the outcomes experienced by one individual also generate costs or benefits for others. Discussion on this topic has typically focused on positive interdependence (where gains for one individual result in gains for another) and on the consequences for cooperation. However, interdependence can also be negative (where gains for one individual result in losses for another), which can spark conflict. In this article, we explain when negative interdependence is likely to arise and, crucially, the role played by (mis)perception in shaping an individual's understanding of their interdependent relationships. We argue that, owing to the difficulty in accurately perceiving interdependence with others, individuals might often be mistaken about the stake they hold in each other's outcomes, which can spark needless, resolvable forms of conflict. We then discuss when and how reducing misperceptions can help to resolve such conflicts. We argue that a key mechanism for resolving interdependent conflict, along with better sources of exogenous information, is to reduce reliance on heuristics such as stereotypes when assessing the nature of our interdependent relationships.

Group reciprocity and the evolution of stereotyping.

Stereotypes are generalized beliefs about groups of people, which are used to make decisions and judgements about them. Although such heuristics can be useful when decisions must be made quickly, or when information is lacking, they can also serve as the basis for prejudice and discrimination. In this paper, we study the evolution of stereotypes through group reciprocity. We characterize the warmth of a stereotype as the willingness to cooperate with an individual based solely on the identity of the group they belong to. We show that when stereotype groups are large, such group reciprocity is less likely to evolve, and stereotypes tend to be negative. We also show that, even when stereotypes are broadly positive, individuals are often overly pessimistic about the willingness of those they stereotype to cooperate. We then show that the tendency for stereotyping itself to evolve is driven by the costs of cognition, so that more people are stereotyped with greater coarseness as costs increase. Finally we show that extrinsic 'shocks', in which the benefits of cooperation are suddenly reduced, can cause stereotype warmth and judgement bias to turn sharply negative, consistent with the view that economic and other crises are drivers of out-group animosity.

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game.

Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.

The roles of coalitional threat and safety in paranoia: A network approach.

OBJECTIVE: Paranoia is known to vary with levels of coalitional threat and safety present in the social environment. However, it remains underexplored whether threat and safety are differentially associated with paranoia, if these relationships vary with the source of threat and safety, and whether such effects hold across the continuum of severity of paranoid thoughts. METHODS: We employed a network analysis approach with community analysis on a large dataset (n = 6,337), the UK Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey 2007, to explore these questions. We included one node to capture paranoia typical in the general population, and one pertaining to thought interference common in persecutory delusions in psychosis. RESULTS: Nodes reflecting paranoia in the general population as well as persecution-related concerns in psychosis shared the strongest positive edges with nodes representing threat stemming from close social relationships. Paranoia common in the general population was negatively associated with both safety stemming from the wider social environment, and safety in close relationships, where the former association was strongest. CONCLUSIONS: Our results suggest that threat from within one's immediate social group is more closely linked to paranoid thoughts than is safety from either one's social group or the wider social environment. Further, our results imply that coalitional threat may be a particularly associated with concerns common in psychosis, whereas paranoid ideation more common in the general population is also associated with reduced coalitional safety. Overall, this network analysis offers a broad view of how paranoia relates to multiple aspects of our coalitional environment and provides some testable predictions for future research in this area. PRACTITIONER POINTS: Individuals with paranoia more typical of delusions may find threat in close social relationships most challenging Variation in paranoia in the general population may be attributed to feeling safe in the wider social environment more than in close social relationships.

Paranoia reveals the complexity in assigning individuals to groups on the basis of inferred intentions.

We suggest that variation, error, and bias will be essential to include in a complete computational theory of groups - particularly given that formation of group representations must often rely on inferences of intentions. We draw on the case study of paranoia to illustrate that intentions that do not correspond to group-constitutive roles may often be perceived as such.

Trusting and learning from others: immediate and long-term effects of learning from observation and advice.

Social learning underpins our species's extraordinary success. Learning through observation has been investigated in several species, but learning from advice-where information is intentionally broadcast-is less understood. We used a pre-registered, online experiment (n = 1492) combined with computational modelling to examine learning through observation and advice. Participants were more likely to immediately follow advice than to copy an observed choice, but this was dependent upon trust in the adviser: highly paranoid participants were less likely to follow advice in the short term. Reinforcement learning modelling revealed two distinct patterns regarding the long-term effects of social information: some individuals relied fully on social information, whereas others reverted to trial-and-error learning. This variation may affect the prevalence and fidelity of socially transmitted information. Our results highlight the privileged status of advice relative to observation and how the assimilation of intentionally broadcast information is affected by trust in others.

Neighbourhood wealth, not urbanicity, predicts prosociality towards strangers.

Urbanization is perhaps the most significant and rapid cause of demographic change in human societies, with more than half the world's population now living in cities. Urban lifestyles have been associated with increased risk for mental disorders, greater stress responses, and lower trust. However, it is not known whether a general tendency towards prosocial behaviour varies across the urban-rural gradient, or whether other factors such as neighbourhood wealth might be more predictive of variation in prosocial behaviour. Here, we present findings from three real-world experiments conducted in 37 different neighbourhoods, in 12 cities and 12 towns and villages across the UK. We measured whether people: (i) posted a lost letter; (ii) returned a dropped item; and (iii) stopped to let someone cross the road in each neighbourhood. We expected to find that people were less willing to help a stranger in more urban locations, with increased diffusion of responsibility and perceived anonymity in cities being measured as variables that might drive this effect. Our data did not support this hypothesis. There was no effect of either urbanicity or population density on people's willingness to help a stranger. Instead, the neighbourhood level of deprivation explained most of the variance in helping behaviour with help being offered less frequently in more deprived neighbourhoods. These findings highlight the importance of socio-economic factors, rather than urbanicity per se, in shaping variation in prosocial behaviour in humans.

Helping in humans and other animals: a fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue.

Humans are arguably unique in the extent and scale of cooperation with unrelated individuals. While pairwise interactions among non-relatives occur in some non-human species, there is scant evidence of the large-scale, often unconditional prosociality that characterizes human social behaviour. Consequently, one may ask whether research on cooperation in humans can offer general insights to researchers working on similar questions in non-human species, and whether research on humans should be published in biology journals. We contend that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Most importantly, social behaviour in humans and other species operates under the same evolutionary framework. Moreover, we highlight how an open dialogue between different fields can inspire studies on humans and non-human species, leading to novel approaches and insights. Biology journals should encourage these discussions rather than drawing artificial boundaries between disciplines. Shared current and future challenges are to study helping in ecologically relevant contexts in order to correctly interpret how payoff matrices translate into inclusive fitness, and to integrate mechanisms into the hitherto largely functional theory. We can and should study human cooperation within a comparative framework in order to gain a full understanding of the evolution of helping.

The proximate-ultimate confusion in teaching and cooperation.

Kline does an admirable job of extending the functionalist framework developed by comparative researchers to help understand the function and form of human teaching. Functionalist approaches consider the adaptive value and underlying mechanisms of behaviour as separate but complementary questions, avoiding the conflation of ultimate and proximate explanations that has long hindered research on teaching and other forms of cooperation.

Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties.

Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals that are punished. We used a public goods game with third-party punishment to test whether punishment of defectors was reduced when defecting was typical, as predicted if punishment is responsive to norm violation. The cost of punishment was fixed, regardless of the number of players punished, meaning that it was not more costly to punish typical, relative to atypical, behaviour. Under these conditions, atypical behaviour was not punished more often than typical behaviour. In fact, most punishment was targeted at defectors, irrespective of whether defecting was typical or atypical. We suggest that the reduced punishment of defectors when they are common might often be explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators.

Exploring open science practices in behavioural public policy research.

In their book 'Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness', Thaler & Sunstein (2009) argue that choice architectures are promising public policy interventions. This research programme motivated the creation of 'nudge units', government agencies which aim to apply insights from behavioural science to improve public policy. We closely examine a meta-analysis of the evidence gathered by two of the largest and most influential nudge units (DellaVigna & Linos (2022 Econometrica 90, 81-116 (doi:10.3982/ECTA18709))) and use statistical techniques to detect reporting biases. Our analysis shows evidence suggestive of selective reporting. We additionally evaluate the public pre-analysis plans from one of the two nudge units (Office of Evaluation Sciences). We identify several instances of excellent practice; however, we also find that the analysis plans and reporting often lack sufficient detail to evaluate (unintentional) reporting biases. We highlight several improvements that would enhance the effectiveness of the pre-analysis plans and reports as a means to combat reporting biases. Our findings and suggestions can further improve the evidence base for policy decisions.

"Fair" outcomes without morality in cleaner wrasse mutualism.

Baumard et al. propose a functional explanation for the evolution of a sense of fairness in humans: Fairness preferences are advantageous in an environment where individuals are in strong competition to be chosen for social interactions. Such conditions also exist in nonhuman animals. Therefore, it remains unclear why fairness (equated with morality) appears to be properly present only in humans.

A positive effect of flowers rather than eye images in a large-scale, cross-cultural dictator game.

People often consider how their behaviour will be viewed by others, and may cooperate to avoid gaining a bad reputation. Sensitivity to reputation may be elicited by subtle social cues of being watched: previous studies have shown that people behave more cooperatively when they see images of eyes rather than control images. Here, we tested whether eye images enhance cooperation in a dictator game, using the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). In contrast to our predictions and the results of most previous studies, dictators gave away more money when they saw images of flowers rather than eye images. Donations in response to eye images were not significantly different to donations under control treatments. Dictator donations varied significantly across cultures but there was no systematic variation in responses to different image types across cultures. Unlike most previous studies, players interacting via AMT may feel truly anonymous when making decisions and, as such, may not respond to subtle social cues of being watched. Nevertheless, dictators gave away similar amounts as in previous studies, so anonymity did not erase helpfulness. We suggest that eye images might only promote cooperative behaviour in relatively public settings and that people may ignore these cues when they know their behaviour is truly anonymous.

Male cleaner wrasses adjust punishment of female partners according to the stakes.

Punishment is an important deterrent against cheating in cooperative interactions. In humans, the severity of cheating affects the strength of punishment which, in turn, affects the punished individual's future behaviour. Here, we show such flexible adjustments for the first time in a non-human species, the cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus), where males are known to punish female partners. We exposed pairs of cleaners to a model client offering two types of food, preferred 'prawn' items and less-preferred 'flake' items. Analogous to interactions with real clients, eating a preferred prawn item ('cheating') led to model client removal. We varied the extent to which female cheating caused pay-off reduction to the male and measured the corresponding severity of male punishment. Males punished females more severely when females cheated during interactions with high value, rather than low value, model clients; and when females were similar in size to the male. This pattern may arise because, in this protogynous hermaphrodite, cheating by similar-sized females may reduce size differences to the extent that females change sex and become reproductive competitors. In response to more severe punishment from males, females behaved more cooperatively. Our results show that punishment can be adjusted to circumstances and that such subtleties can have an important bearing on the outcome of cooperative interactions.

Paranoia and conspiracy thinking.

Paranoia and conspiracy thinking share many risk factors, such as victimization, poverty and social isolation. They also have many phenomenological features in common, including heightened tendency to attribute negative outcomes to malevolent agents and idiosyncratic pattern detection. Nevertheless, paranoia and conspiracy thinking also differ in key respects. Specifically, paranoid thoughts tend to be held in isolation and involve perceptions of harm to the self. Conspiracy beliefs, on the other hand, are shared by others and involve the perception of collective rather than personal harm. We discuss the similarities and differences between paranoia and conspiracy thinking and outline fruitful avenues for future research.

Reward, punishment, and prosocial behavior: Recent developments and implications.

Reward and punishment change the payoff structures of social interactions and therefore can potentially play a role in promoting prosocial behavior. Yet, there are boundary conditions for them to be effective. We review recent work that addresses the conditions under which rewards and punishment can enhance prosocial behavior, the proximate and ultimate mechanisms for individuals' rewarding and punishing decisions, and the reputational and behavioral consequences of reward and punishment under noise. The reviewed evidence points to the importance of more field research on how reward and punishment can promote prosocial behavior in real-world settings. We also highlight the need to integrate different methodologies to better examine the effects of reward and punishment on prosocial behavior.

No good deed goes unpunished: the social costs of prosocial behaviour.

Performing costly helpful behaviours can allow individuals to improve their reputation. Those who gain a good reputation are often preferred as interaction partners and are consequently better able to access support through cooperative relationships with others. However, investing in prosocial displays can sometimes yield social costs: excessively generous individuals risk losing their good reputation, and even being vilified, ostracised or antisocially punished. As a consequence, people frequently try to downplay their prosocial actions or hide them from others. In this review, we explore when and why investments in prosocial behaviour are likely to yield social costs. We propose two key features of interactions that make it more likely that generous individuals will incur social costs when: (a) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; and (b) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them. We describe how the cognition required to consider ulterior motives emerges over development and how these tendencies vary across cultures - and discuss how the potential for helpful actions to result in social costs might place boundaries on prosocial behaviour as well as limiting the contexts in which it might occur. We end by outlining the key avenues and priorities for future research.

Derationalizing Delusions.

Because of the traditional conceptualization of delusion as "irrational belief," cognitive models of delusions largely focus on impairments to domain-general reasoning. Nevertheless, current rationality-impairment models do not account for the fact that (a) equivalently irrational beliefs can be induced through adaptive social cognitive processes, reflecting social integration rather than impairment; (b) delusions are overwhelmingly socially themed; and (c) delusions show a reduced sensitivity to social context both in terms of how they are shaped and how they are communicated. Consequently, we argue that models of delusions need to include alteration to coalitional cognition-processes involved in affiliation, group perception, and the strategic management of relationships. This approach has the advantage of better accounting for both content (social themes) and form (fixity) of delusion. It is also supported by the established role of mesolimbic dopamine in both delusions and social organization and the ongoing reconceptualization of belief as serving a social organizational function.

Social reward, punishment, and prosociality in paranoia.

Paranoia is the exaggerated belief that harm will occur and is intended by others. Although commonly framed in terms of attributing malicious intent to others, recent work has explored how paranoia also affects social decision-making, using economic games. Previous work found that paranoia is associated with decreased cooperation and increased punishment in the Dictator Game (where cooperating and punishing involve paying a cost to respectively increase or decrease a partner's income). These findings suggest that paranoia might be associated with variation in subjective reward from positive and/or negative social decision-making, a possibility we explore using a preregistered experiment with U.S.-based participants (n = 2,004). Paranoia was associated with increased self-reported enjoyment of negative social interactions and decreased self-reported enjoyment of prosocial interactions. More paranoid participants attributed stronger harmful intent to a partner. Harmful intent attributions and the enjoyment of negative social interactions positively predicted the tendency to pay to punish the partner. Cooperation was positively associated with the tendency to enjoy prosocial interactions and increased with participant age. There was no main effect of paranoia on tendency to cooperate in this setting. We discuss these findings in light of previous research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice.

When one individual helps another, it benefits the recipient and may also gain a reputation for being cooperative. This may induce others to favour the helper in subsequent interactions, so investing in being seen to help others may be adaptive. The best-known mechanism for this is indirect reciprocity (IR), in which the profit comes from an observer who pays a cost to benefit the original helper. IR has attracted considerable theoretical and empirical interest, but it is not the only way in which cooperative reputations can bring benefits. Signalling theory proposes that paying a cost to benefit others is a strategic investment which benefits the signaller through changing receiver behaviour, in particular by being more likely to choose the signaller as a partner. This reputation-based partner choice can result in competitive helping whereby those who help are favoured as partners. These theories have been confused in the literature. We therefore set out the assumptions, the mechanisms and the predictions of each theory for how developing a cooperative reputation can be adaptive. The benefits of being seen to be cooperative may have been a major driver of sociality, especially in humans. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.