RESUMO
The processing of reinforcers and punishers is crucial to adapt to an ever changing environment and its dysregulation is prevalent in mental health and substance use disorders. While many human brain measures related to reward have been based on activity in individual brain regions, recent studies indicate that many affective and motivational processes are encoded in distributed systems that span multiple regions. Consequently, decoding these processes using individual regions yields small effect sizes and limited reliability, whereas predictive models based on distributed patterns yield larger effect sizes and excellent reliability. To create such a predictive model for the processes of rewards and losses, termed the Brain Reward Signature (BRS), we trained a model to predict the signed magnitude of monetary rewards on the Monetary Incentive Delay task (MID; N = 39) and achieved a highly significant decoding performance (92% for decoding rewards versus losses). We subsequently demonstrate the generalizability of our signature on another version of the MID in a different sample (92% decoding accuracy; N = 12) and on a gambling task from a large sample (73% decoding accuracy, N = 1084). We further provided preliminary data to characterize the specificity of the signature by illustrating that the signature map generates estimates that significantly differ between rewarding and negative feedback (92% decoding accuracy) but do not differ for conditions that differ in disgust rather than reward in a novel Disgust-Delay Task (N = 39). Finally, we show that passively viewing positive and negatively valenced facial expressions loads positively on our signature, in line with previous studies on morbid curiosity. We thus created a BRS that can accurately predict brain responses to rewards and losses in active decision making tasks, and that possibly relates to information seeking in passive observational tasks.
Assuntos
Encéfalo , Jogo de Azar , Humanos , Reprodutibilidade dos Testes , Encéfalo/fisiologia , Recompensa , Motivação , Jogo de Azar/psicologia , Imageamento por Ressonância Magnética , Mapeamento EncefálicoRESUMO
Every day, we are faced with the conflict between the temptation to cheat for financial gains and maintaining a positive image of ourselves as being a "good person." While it has been proposed that cognitive control is needed to mediate this conflict between reward and our moral self-image, the exact role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty remains elusive. Here we identify this role, by investigating the neural mechanism underlying cheating. We developed a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating on a trial-by-trial basis in the MRI scanner. We found that activity in the nucleus accumbens promotes cheating, particularly for individuals who cheat a lot, while a network consisting of posterior cingulate cortex, temporoparietal junction, and medial prefrontal cortex promotes honesty, particularly in individuals who are generally honest. Finally, activity in areas associated with cognitive control (anterior cingulate cortex and inferior frontal gyrus) helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. Thus, our results suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual's moral default.
Assuntos
Cognição , Enganação , Adolescente , Adulto , Mapeamento Encefálico , Tomada de Decisões , Feminino , Humanos , Imageamento por Ressonância Magnética , Masculino , Princípios Morais , Córtex Pré-Frontal/diagnóstico por imagem , Córtex Pré-Frontal/fisiologia , Recompensa , Adulto JovemRESUMO
Measurement of the determinants of socially undesirable behaviors, such as dishonesty, are complicated and obscured by social desirability biases. To circumvent these biases, we used connectome-based predictive modeling (CPM) on resting state functional connectivity patterns in combination with a novel task which inconspicuously measures voluntary cheating to gain access to the neurocognitive determinants of (dis)honesty. Specifically, we investigated whether task-independent neural patterns within the brain at rest could be used to predict a propensity for (dis)honest behavior. Our analyses revealed that functional connectivity, especially between brain networks linked to self-referential thinking (vmPFC, temporal poles, and PCC) and reward processing (caudate nucleus), reliably correlates, in an independent sample, with participants' propensity to cheat. Participants who cheated the most also scored highest on several self-report measures of impulsivity which underscores the generalizability of our results. Notably, when comparing neural and self-report measures, the neural measures were found to be more important in predicting cheating propensity.
Assuntos
Córtex Cerebral/fisiologia , Conectoma , Enganação , Comportamento Impulsivo/fisiologia , Individualidade , Imageamento por Ressonância Magnética , Adolescente , Adulto , Córtex Cerebral/diagnóstico por imagem , Feminino , Humanos , Aprendizado de Máquina , Masculino , Descanso/fisiologia , Adulto JovemRESUMO
In daily life we regularly must decide whether to act dishonestly for personal gain or to be honest and maintain a positive image of ourselves. While evidence suggests that acute stress influences moral decisions, it is unclear whether stress increases or decreases immoral behavior. Here, we hypothesize that stress, through its effects on cognitive control, has different effects on moral decision making for different individuals, depending on their moral default. We test this hypothesis by combining a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating with a well-established stress induction task. Our findings confirm our hypothesis, revealing that effects of stress on dishonesty are not uniform, but instead depend on the individual: for those who are relatively dishonest, stress increases dishonesty, whereas for participants who are relatively honest stress makes them more honest. These findings go a long way in resolving the conflicting findings in the literature on the effects of stress on moral decisions, suggesting that stress affects dishonesty differently for different individuals, depending on their moral default.
Assuntos
Tomada de Decisões , Individualidade , Humanos , Princípios Morais , EnganaçãoRESUMO
Learning to predict action outcomes in morally conflicting situations is essential for social decision-making but poorly understood. Here we tested which forms of Reinforcement Learning Theory capture how participants learn to choose between self-money and other-shocks, and how they adapt to changes in contingencies. We find choices were better described by a reinforcement learning model based on the current value of separately expected outcomes than by one based on the combined historical values of past outcomes. Participants track expected values of self-money and other-shocks separately, with the substantial individual difference in preference reflected in a valuation parameter balancing their relative weight. This valuation parameter also predicted choices in an independent costly helping task. The expectations of self-money and other-shocks were biased toward the favored outcome but fMRI revealed this bias to be reflected in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex while the pain-observation network represented pain prediction errors independently of individual preferences.
Assuntos
Aprendizagem , Princípios Morais , Humanos , Viés , Dor , Córtex Pré-Frontal/diagnóstico por imagemRESUMO
Dishonesty is ubiquitous and imposes substantial financial and social burdens on society. Intuitively, dishonesty results from a failure of willpower to control selfish behavior. However, recent research suggests that the role of cognitive control in dishonesty is more complex. We review evidence that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se, but that it depends on individual differences in what we call one's 'moral default': for those who are prone to dishonesty, cognitive control indeed aids in being honest, but for those who are already generally honest, cognitive control may help them cheat to occasionally profit from small acts of dishonesty. Thus, the role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty is to override the moral default.
Assuntos
Enganação , Princípios Morais , Cognição , Humanos , IndividualidadeRESUMO
Numerous studies demonstrate that moment-to-moment neural variability is behaviorally relevant and beneficial for tasks and behaviors requiring cognitive flexibility. However, it remains unclear whether the positive effect of neural variability also holds for cognitive persistence. Moreover, different brain variability measures have been used in previous studies, yet comparisons between them are lacking. In the current study, we examined the association between resting-state BOLD signal variability and two metacontrol policies (i.e., persistence vs. flexibility). Brain variability was estimated from resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) data using two different approaches (i.e., Standard Deviation (SD), and Mean Square Successive Difference (MSSD)) and metacontrol biases were assessed by three metacontrol-sensitive tasks. Results showed that brain variability measured by SD and MSSD was highly positively related. Critically, higher variability measured by MSSD in the attention network, parietal and frontal network, frontal and ACC network, parietal and motor network, and higher variability measured by SD in the parietal and motor network, parietal and frontal network were associated with reduced persistence (or greater flexibility) of metacontrol (i.e., larger Stroop effect or worse RAT performance). These results show that the beneficial effect of brain signal variability on cognitive control depends on the metacontrol states involved. Our study highlights the importance of temporal variability of rsfMRI activity in understanding the neural underpinnings of cognitive control.
Assuntos
Mapeamento Encefálico , Individualidade , Mapeamento Encefálico/métodos , Encéfalo , Imageamento por Ressonância Magnética/métodos , Teste de StroopRESUMO
There is a long-standing debate regarding the cognitive nature of (dis)honesty: Is honesty an automatic response or does it require willpower in the form of cognitive control in order to override an automatic dishonest response. In a recent study (Speer et al., 2020), we proposed a reconciliation of these opposing views by showing that activity in areas associated with cognitive control, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. These findings suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual's moral default. However, while our findings provided insights into the role of cognitive control in overriding a moral default, they did not reveal whether overriding honest default behavior (non-habitual dishonesty) is the same as overriding dishonest default behavior (non-habitual honesty) at the neural level. This speaks to the question as to whether cognitive control mechanisms are domain-general or may be context specific. To address this, we applied multivariate pattern analysis to compare neural patterns of non-habitual honesty to non-habitual dishonesty. We found that these choices are differently encoded in the IFG, suggesting that engaging cognitive control to follow the norm (that cheating is wrong) fundamentally differs from applying control to violate this norm.
RESUMO
A preference for fairness may originate from prosocial or strategic motivations: we may wish to improve others' well-being or avoid the repercussions of selfish behavior. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify neural patterns that dissociate these two motivations. Participants played both the ultimatum and dictator game (UG-DG) as proposers. Because responders can reject the offer in the UG, but not the DG, offers and neural patterns between the games should differ for strategic players but not prosocial players. Using multivariate pattern analysis, we found that the decoding accuracy of neural patterns associated with UG and DG decisions correlated significantly with differences in offers between games in regions associated with theory of mind (ToM), such as the temporoparietal junction, and cognitive control, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior frontal cortex. We conclude that individual differences in prosocial behavior may be driven by variations in the degree to which self-control and ToM processes are engaged during decision-making such that the extent to which these processes are engaged is indicative of either selfish or prosocial motivations.