The least-cost biodiversity impact mitigation hierarchy with a focus on marine fisheries and bycatch issues.

Least-cost implementation of the mitigation hierarchy of impacts on biodiversity minimizes the cost of a given level of biodiversity conservation, at project or ecosystem levels, and requires minimizing costs across and within hierarchy steps. Incentive-based policy instruments that price biodiversity to alter producer and consumer behavior and decision making are generally the most effective way to achieve least-cost implementation across and within the different hierarchy steps and across all producers and conservation channels. Nonetheless, there are circumstances that favor direct regulation or intrinsic motivation. Conservatory offsets, introduced within the conservatory first three steps of the mitigation hierarchy, rather than the fourth step to compensate the residual, provide an additional incentive-based policy instrument. The least-cost mitigation hierarchy framework, induced through incentive-based policy instruments, including conservatory offsets, mitigates fisheries bycatch consistent with given targets, the Law of the Sea, and the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Will a catch share for whales improve social welfare?

We critique a proposal to use catch shares to manage transboundary wildlife resources with potentially high non-extractive values, and we focus on the case of whales. Because whales are impure public goods, a policy that fails to capture all nonmarket benefits (due to free riding) could lead to a suboptimal outcome. Even if free riding were overcome, whale shares would face four implementation challenges. First, a whale share could legitimize the international trade in whale meat and expand the whale meat market. Second, a legal whale trade creates monitoring and enforcement challenges similar to those of organizations that manage highly migratory species such as tuna. Third, a whale share could create a new political economy of management that changes incentives and increases costs for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to achieve the current level of conservation. Fourth, a whale share program creates new logistical challenges for quota definition and allocation regardless of whether the market for whale products expands or contracts. Each of these issues, if left unaddressed, could result in lower overall welfare for society than under the status quo.

Cost-effectiveness of alternative conservation strategies with application to the Pacific leatherback turtle.

Although holistic conservation addressing all sources of mortality for endangered species or stocks is the preferred conservation strategy, limited budgets require a criterion to prioritize conservation investments. We compared the cost-effectiveness of nesting site and at-sea conservation strategies for Pacific leatherback turtles (Dermochelys coriacea). We sought to determine which conservation strategy or mix of strategies would produce the largest increase in population growth rate per dollar. Alternative strategies included protection of nesters and their eggs at nesting beaches in Indonesia, gear changes, effort restrictions, and caps on turtle takes in the Hawaiian (U.S.A.) longline swordfish fishery, and temporal and area closures in the California (U.S.A.) drift gill net fishery. We used a population model with a biological metric to measure the effects of conservation alternatives. We normalized all effects by cost to prioritize those strategies with the greatest biological effect relative to its economic cost. We used Monte Carlo simulation to address uncertainty in the main variables and to calculate probability distributions for cost-effectiveness measures. Nesting beach protection was the most cost-effective means of achieving increases in leatherback populations. This result creates the possibility of noncompensatory bycatch mitigation, where high-bycatch fisheries invest in protecting nesting beaches. An example of this practice is U.S. processors of longline tuna and California drift gill net fishers that tax themselves to finance low-cost nesting site protection. Under certain conditions, fisheries interventions, such as technologies that reduce leatherback bycatch without substantially decreasing target species catch, can be cost-effective. Reducing bycatch in coastal areas where bycatch is high, particularly adjacent to nesting beaches, may be cost-effective, particularly, if fisheries in the area are small and of little commercial value.

Bycatch levies could reconcile trade-offs between blue growth and biodiversity conservation.

Economic activities in the ocean (that is, the 'blue economy') provide value to society, yet also jeopardize marine ecosystems. For example, fisheries are an essential source of income and food security for billions of people, yet bycatch poses a major threat to marine biodiversity, creating trade-offs between economic growth and biodiversity conservation. This Perspective explores bycatch levies as a market-based instrument for reconciling these trade-offs. We outline the theory and practice of bycatch levies to demonstrate how they could incentivize bycatch prevention and raise revenue for compensatory conservation, provided they are well designed, as part of a policy mix for sustainable and equitable ocean governance. We then explore ways forward for mainstreaming bycatch levies into the blue economy. While compensatory bycatch mitigation has been controversial, increasing adoption of net outcome approaches to biodiversity conservation suggests they could become mainstreamed within the next decade. Bycatch levies could raise billions of dollars towards closing global biodiversity financing gaps, delivering net outcomes for biodiversity under the United Nations Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework while enabling blue growth, and moving towards win-wins for economic welfare and biodiversity conservation.

Assessing information-sharing networks within small-scale fisheries and the implications for conservation interventions.

The effectiveness of behavioural interventions in conservation often depends on local resource users' underlying social interactions. However, it remains unclear to what extent differences in related topics of information shared between resource users can alter network structure-holding implications for information flows and the spread of behaviours. Here, we explore the differences in nine subtopics of fishing information related to the planned expansion of a community co-management scheme aiming to reduce sea turtle bycatch at a small-scale fishery in Peru. We show that the general network structure detailing information sharing about sea turtle bycatch is dissimilar from other fishing information sharing. Specifically, no significant degree assortativity (degree homophily) was identified, and the variance in node eccentricity was lower than expected under our null models. We also demonstrate that patterns of information sharing between fishers related to sea turtle bycatch are more similar to information sharing about fishing regulations, and vessel technology and maintenance, than to information sharing about weather, fishing activity, finances and crew management. Our findings highlight the importance of assessing information-sharing networks in contexts directly relevant to the desired intervention and demonstrate the identification of social contexts that might be more or less appropriate for information sharing related to planned conservation actions.

More landings for higher profit? Inverse demand analysis of the bluefin tuna auction price in Japan and economic incentives in global bluefin tuna fisheries management.

This paper estimates the price changes in global bluefin tuna (BFT) markets in response to shifts in regional and global landings to evaluate the conservation and economic incentives from changes in the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) managed by all three Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. A fisherman's income, and thus the financial incentive to accept management measures controlling catch levels, depends in part on how responsive price is to overall catch. Individual fisherman, with their own best interest in mind, used to wish to increase their individual landings and create an incentive to ask to increase the TAC for the industry, without realizing the possible revenue loss due to the resulting falling prices. To protect the value of all stakeholders' property rights, a consensus to avoid abruptly raising the TAC, without first considering the potential loss due to market response, is needed. Alternatively, if revenue increases with lower TAC, a positive economic incentive for conservation is created if price increasing proportionately more than the lower supply, with harvest profits boosted by lower costs of production. To capture the complexity of substituting across various sources of supply and product form, a general synthetic inverse demand system is estimated to identify the impact of overall landings on BFT prices. This system estimates price flexibilities of both fresh and frozen longline-caught sashimi-grade tunas (Pacific, Atlantic and southern bluefins, and bigeye) at the Tokyo Center Market in Japan, including the Tsukiji Market, the world's largest fish auction market that served as the single global price leader for BFT. The resulting estimation shows that own-quantity price flexibilities of every type of fresh and frozen BFTs are less than unity and inflexible in their own consumption. This creates poor individual producer incentives for fishermen to reduce wild or farmed BFT supply, as there is a chance to increase their own revenue, under the unlikely condition that the total supply is fixed. However, by observing the rapid increases in the TAC of Eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna (EABFT) in the coming years, suppliers may not be better off as price will drop proportionally faster and total revenue if the estimated scale flexibility is greater than one. Based on the estimated scale flexibility of frozen BFT, which is slightly less than unity, the frozen subsector of EABFT suppliers is the only winner under the supply increases. Suppliers of frozen BFT in other regions, fresh BFT (in the Atlantic and elsewhere), and southern BFT and bigeye tuna will all be harmed through lower revenue by the supply increases. Additionally, while total revenue might stay the same for frozen BFT suppliers, fishermen will potentially receive lower profits due to higher operating costs associated with increased landings when the supply of EABFT increases. Given the number of sectors that ultimately lose financially in the short term and given the ecological (and production) risks accompanying an abrupt increase in fishing pressure in the long term, the global economic losses resulting from an increase in the allowable catch of Atlantic bluefin tuna will outweigh any potential increases to revenue.