Incentives for Smoking Cessation During Pregnancy: An Ethical Framework.

INTRODUCTION: Smoking during pregnancy increases the risk of morbidity and mortality of the mother and child. The inability of the unborn child to protect itself, raises the social and academic responsibility to protect the child from the harmful effects of smoking. Interventions including rewards (incentives) for lifestyle changes are an upcoming trend and can encourage women to quit smoking. However, these incentives can, as we will argue, also have negative consequences, for example the restriction of personal autonomy and encouragement of smoking to become eligible for participation. To prevent these negative consequences, we developed an ethical framework that enables to assess and address unwanted consequences of incentive-based interventions whereby moral permissibility can be evaluated. AIMS AND METHODS: The possible adverse consequences of incentives were identified through an extensive literature search. Subsequently, we developed ethical criteria to identify these consequences based on the biomedical ethical principles of Beauchamp and Childress. RESULTS: Our framework consists of 12 criteria. These criteria concern (1) effectiveness, (2) support of a healthy lifestyle, (3) motivational for the target population, (4) stimulating unhealthy behavior, (5) negative attitudes, (6) personal autonomy, (7) intrinsic motivation, (8) privacy, (9) fairness, (10) allocation of incentives, (11) cost-effectiveness, and (12) health inequity. Based on these criteria, the moral permissibility of potential interventions can be evaluated. CONCLUSIONS: Incentives for smoking cessation are a response to the responsibility to protect the unborn child. But these interventions might have possible adverse effects. This ethical framework aims to identify and address ethical pitfalls in order to avoid these adverse effects. IMPLICATIONS: Although various interventions to promote smoking cessation during pregnancy exist, many women still smoke during pregnancy. Interventions using incentives for smoking cessation during pregnancy are a promising and upcoming trend but can have unwanted consequences. This ethical framework helps to identify and address ethical pitfalls in order to avoid these adverse effects.It can be a practical tool in the development and evaluation of these interventions and in evaluating the moral permissibility of interventions using incentives for smoking cessation during pregnancy.

Prevention in the age of personal responsibility: epigenetic risk-predictive screening for female cancers as a case study.

Epigenetic markers could potentially be used for risk assessment in risk-stratified population-based cancer screening programmes. Whereas current screening programmes generally aim to detect existing cancer, epigenetic markers could be used to provide risk estimates for not-yet-existing cancers. Epigenetic risk-predictive tests may thus allow for new opportunities for risk assessment for developing cancer in the future. Since epigenetic changes are presumed to be modifiable, preventive measures, such as lifestyle modification, could be used to reduce the risk of cancer. Moreover, epigenetic markers might be used to monitor the response to risk-reducing interventions. In this article, we address ethical concerns related to personal responsibility raised by epigenetic risk-predictive tests in cancer population screening. Will individuals increasingly be held responsible for their health, that is, will they be held accountable for bad health outcomes? Will they be blamed or subject to moral sanctions? We will illustrate these ethical concerns by means of a Europe-wide research programme that develops an epigenetic risk-predictive test for female cancers. Subsequently, we investigate when we can hold someone responsible for her actions. We argue that the standard conception of personal responsibility does not provide an appropriate framework to address these concerns. A different, prospective account of responsibility meets part of our concerns, that is, concerns about inequality of opportunities, but does not meet all our concerns about personal responsibility. We argue that even if someone is responsible on grounds of a negative and/or prospective account of responsibility, there may be moral and practical reasons to abstain from moral sanctions.

Why NIPT should be publicly funded.

Asking pregnant women to (co)pay for non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) out of pocket leads to unequal access across socioeconomic strata. To avoid these social justice issues, first-trimester prenatal screening should be publicly funded in countries such as the Netherlands, with universal coverage healthcare systems that offer all other antenatal care services and screening programmes free of charge. In this reply, we offer three additional reasons for public funding of NIPT. First, NIPT may not primarily have medical utility for women and children, but rather offers relevant information and reproductive options, and thus serves important autonomy interests of women. Second, public funding of NIPT can be justified because it results in a reduction of collectively borne costs associated with care and support for children with chromosomal abnormalities. It is important to note that this is not an argument for individual women to take part in screening or to terminate an affected pregnancy. However, it is a legitimate argument in policy making regarding funding arrangements for screening programmes. Finally, public funding would help to amend current misunderstandings among pregnant women (eg, that they are not at risk), and thus to support informed consent for first-trimester prenatal screening.

Should pregnant women be charged for non-invasive prenatal screening? Implications for reproductive autonomy and equal access.

The introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in healthcare systems around the world offers an opportunity to reconsider funding policies for prenatal screening. In some countries with universal access healthcare systems, pregnant women and their partners are asked to (co)pay for NIPT. In this paper, we discuss two important rationales for charging women for NIPT: (1) to prevent increased uptake of NIPT and (2) to promote informed choice. First, given the aim of prenatal screening (reproductive autonomy), high or low uptake rates are not intrinsically desirable or undesirable. Using funding policies to negatively affect uptake, however, is at odds with the aim of screening. Furthermore, copayment disproportionally affects those of lower socioeconomic status, which conflicts with justice requirements and impedes equal access to prenatal screening. Second, we argue that although payment models may influence pregnant women's choice behaviours and perceptions of the relevance of NIPT, the copayment requirement does not necessarily lead to better-informed choices. On the contrary, external (ie, financial) influences on women's personal choices for or against prenatal screening should ideally be avoided. To improve informed decision-making, healthcare systems should instead invest in adequate non-directive, value-focused pretest counselling. This paper concludes that requiring (substantial) copayments for NIPT in universal access healthcare systems fails to promote reproductive autonomy and is unfair.

Rethinking counselling in prenatal screening: An ethical analysis of informed consent in the context of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT).

Informed consent is a key condition for prenatal screening programmes to reach their aim of promoting reproductive autonomy. Reaching this aim is currently being challenged with the introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in first-trimester prenatal screening programmes: amongst others its procedural ease-it only requires a blood draw and reaches high levels of reliability-might hinder women's understanding that they should make a personal, informed decision about screening. We offer arguments for a renewed recognition and use of informed consent compared to informed choice, and for a focus on value-consistent choices and personalized informational preferences. We argue for a three-step counselling model in which three decision moments are distinguished and differently addressed: (1) professionals explore women's values concerning whether and why they wish to know whether their baby has a genetic disorder; (2) women receive layered medical-technical information and are asked to make a decision about screening; (3) during post-test counselling, women are supported in decision-making about the continuation or termination of their pregnancy. This model might also be applicable in other fields of genetic (pre-test) counselling, where techniques for expanding genome analysis and burdensome test-outcomes challenge counselling of patients.

Implementing non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in the Netherlands: An interview study exploring opinions about and experiences with societal pressure, reimbursement, and an expanding scope.

The noninvasive prenatal test (NIPT) as the first trimester prenatal screening (FTS) for trisomies 21, 18, and 13 is offered to all pregnant women in the Netherlands. NIPT using genome sequencing allows for an expansion of the scope of FTS and the introduction of NIPT gives rise to ethical and societal concerns about deliberated decision-making, pressure to engage in screening, and possible lack of equal access due to the financial contribution (€175) to NIPT. We explored the opinions and experiences of pregnant women, who were offered FTS, about these concerns, and the possibility of a broadened scope. Nineteen pregnant women representing a diversity of backgrounds were interviewed using a semi-structured interview guide. Eight women did not opt for prenatal screening while 11 did (NIPT = 4, combined test = 7). Women experienced a free choice to accept or decline prenatal screening, despite sometimes receiving advice from others. Prior to pretest counseling, some women had already deliberated about what an abnormal test result would mean to them. Others accepted or declined FTS without deliberation. The current Dutch policy of requiring a co-payment was acceptable to some, who believed that it functioned as a threshold to think carefully about FTS. Others were concerned that a financial threshold would lead to unequal access to screening. Finally, pregnant women found it difficult to formulate opinions on the scope of FTS, because of lack of knowledge. Life expectancy, severity, and treatability were considered important criteria for the inclusion of a condition in NIPT.

The Impact of Incidental Findings Detected During Brain Imaging on Research Participants of the Rotterdam Study: An Interview Study.

This interview study investigates the short- and long-term implications of incidental findings detected through brain imaging on research participants' lives and their surroundings. For this study, nine participants of the Rotterdam Scan Study with an incidental finding were approached and interviewed. When examining research participants' narratives on the impact of the disclosure of incidental findings, the authors identified five sets of tensions with regard to motivations for and expectations of research participation, preferences regarding disclosure, short- and long-term impacts and impacts on self and others. The paper shows: (1) that the impact of incidental findings may be greater than participants at first let on; (2) incidental findings can have significant effects on participants' social environment; and (3) participants may not feel prepared for disclosure even if incidental findings have been discussed during the informed consent process. The authors call for investigators to be aware of research participants' experiences and these short- and long-term impacts when designing suitable courses of action for the detection and management of incidental findings in research settings.

Percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy in older patients with and without dementia: Survival and ethical considerations.

BACKGROUND AND AIM: Notwithstanding multiple recommendations in guidelines, percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG)-tube placement is still performed in patients with dementia. In this study, we aim to investigate survival in patients with and without dementia after PEG-tube placement. METHODS: We conducted a retrospective multicenter study in four different hospitals in the Netherlands. Furthermore, we explored the ethical considerations that may play a role in the decision whether or not to insert a PEG tube in a patient with dementia. RESULTS: Three-hundred-and-three patients were included, mean age of 77.4 years. Forty-two (13.9%) patients had dementia. Short-term complications did not differ between patients with and without cognitive disorders (P 0.224). However, patients with dementia survived significantly shorter after PEG placement than did patients without dementia. Adjusted for age and sex, patients with dementia had a 49% increased risk of mortality (hazard ratio 1.49, 95% confidence interval 1.01-2.19). In our exploratory literature search, we found that several ethical concerns and considerations play a role in the decision process of PEG placement. These considerations are both medical and nonmedical and include beliefs regarding the benefits of a PEG tube, a lack of knowledge about the natural course of dementia in both professionals and family of patients, and a fear of letting a patient die hungry. CONCLUSIONS: Patients with dementia had higher mortality rates after PEG placement than patients without dementia. Although multiple ethical concerns and considerations play a role, insertion of a PEG tube in patients with dementia is not appropriate.

Organ donation after euthanasia, morally acceptable under strict procedural safeguards.

In this paper, we will present a case of organ donation after active euthanasia (ODE) in the Netherlands from a patient who had his life ended at his explicit and voluntary request. The form of ODE we describe here concerns patients who are not unconscious and on life support, but who are conscious and want to have their life ended because of their hopeless and unbearable suffering, for instance due to a terminal illness such as Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) or Multiple Sclerosis (MS). This form of ODE is of course only possible in jurisdictions where euthanasia is allowed. In these jurisdictions, organ donation after euthanasia is an option that may be considered. We believe ODE is worthwhile to pursue, as it can strengthen patient autonomy, can give meaning to the inevitable death of the patient, and be an extra source of much needed donor organs. To ensure voluntariness of both euthanasia and organ donation and avoid conflict of interest by physicians, ODE does need strict procedural safeguards however. The most important safeguard is a strict separation between the 2 procedures. The paper discusses several ethical issues such as who should broach the subject of organ donation and who should perform the euthanasia, and how a conflict of interest can be avoided.

Brain death and postmortem organ donation: report of a questionnaire from the CENTER-TBI study.

BACKGROUND: We aimed to investigate the extent of the agreement on practices around brain death and postmortem organ donation. METHODS: Investigators from 67 Collaborative European NeuroTrauma Effectiveness Research in Traumatic Brain Injury (CENTER-TBI) study centers completed several questionnaires (response rate: 99%). RESULTS: Regarding practices around brain death, we found agreement on the clinical evaluation (prerequisites and neurological assessment) for brain death determination (BDD) in 100% of the centers. However, ancillary tests were required for BDD in 64% of the centers. BDD for nondonor patients was deemed mandatory in 18% of the centers before withdrawing life-sustaining measures (LSM). Also, practices around postmortem organ donation varied. Organ donation after circulatory arrest was forbidden in 45% of the centers. When withdrawal of LSM was contemplated, in 67% of centers the patients with a ventricular drain in situ had this removed, either sometimes or all of the time. CONCLUSIONS: This study showed both agreement and some regional differences regarding practices around brain death and postmortem organ donation. We hope our results help quantify and understand potential differences, and provide impetus for current dialogs toward further harmonization of practices around brain death and postmortem organ donation.

Forced caesareans: applying ordinary standards to an extraordinary case.

Is it morally justifiable to force non-consenting pregnant women to submit to caesarean surgery to save their fetus in distress? Even though proponents and opponents largely agree on the interests at stake, such as the health and life of the fetus and the respect for bodily integrity and autonomy of pregnant women, they disagree on which moral weight to attach to these interests. This is why disagreements about the justifiability of forced caesareans tend to be pervasive and intractable. To sidestep this deadlock, we will focus on conditions that give rise to the 'caesarean dilemma' in the first place, namely the conflict between inherent norms and values medical professionals are committed to by virtue of being a medical professional. Using the reflective equilibrium, we will test the opponents' and proponents' considered judgments about forced caesareans against the norms and values they-as medical professionals-are committed to and determine whether they are coherent. Subsequently we will identify the proponents' incoherencies between the considered judgments and norms and values they are committed to and conclude that as long as these incoherencies are in place, forced caesareans are morally impermissible.

Ethics of routine: a critical analysis of the concept of 'routinisation' in prenatal screening.

In the debate surrounding the introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in prenatal screening programmes, the concept of routinisation is often used to refer to concerns and potential negative consequences of the test. A literature analysis shows that routinisation has many different meanings, which can be distinguished in three major versions of the concept. Each of these versions comprises several inter-related fears and concerns regarding prenatal screening and particularly regarding NIPT in three areas: (1) informed choice, (2) freedom to choose and (3) consequences for people with a disability. Three of the strongest arguments raised under the flag of routinisation are assessed for their validity: the threat that NIPT poses to informed choice, the potential increase in uptake of first-trimester prenatal screening and its consequences for social pressure to participate in screening or terminate affected pregnancies, and the negative consequences for disabled people. These routinisation arguments lack empirical or normative ground. However, the results of this analysis do not imply that no attention should be paid to possible problems surrounding the introduction of NIPT. At least two problems remain and should be addressed: there should be an ongoing debate about the requirements of informed choice, particularly related to an expanded scope of prenatal screening. Also, reproductive autonomy can only be achieved when expecting parents' options are variegated, real and valuable, so that they can continue to choose whether or not to screen or to terminate a pregnancy.

Doing the Right Thing: A Qualitative Investigation of Retractions Due to Unintentional Error.

Retractions solicited by authors following the discovery of an unintentional error-what we henceforth call a "self-retraction"-are a new phenomenon of growing importance, about which very little is known. Here we present results of a small qualitative study aimed at gaining preliminary insights about circumstances, motivations and beliefs that accompanied the experience of a self-retraction. We identified retraction notes that unambiguously reported an honest error and that had been published between the years 2010 and 2015. We limited our sample to retractions with at least one co-author based in the Netherlands, Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany or a Scandinavian country, and we invited these authors to a semi-structured interview. Fourteen authors accepted our invitation. Contrary to our initial assumptions, most of our interviewees had not originally intended to retract their paper. They had contacted the journal to request a correction and the decision to retract had been made by journal editors. All interviewees reported that having to retract their own publication made them concerned for their scientific reputation and career, often causing considerable stress and anxiety. Interviewees also encountered difficulties in communicating with the journal and recalled other procedural issues that had unnecessarily slowed down the process of self-retraction. Intriguingly, however, all interviewees reported how, contrary to their own expectations, the self-retraction had brought no damage to their reputation and in some cases had actually improved it. We also examined the ethical motivations that interviewees ascribed, retrospectively, to their actions and found that such motivations included a combination of moral and prudential (i.e. pragmatic) considerations. These preliminary results suggest that scientists would welcome innovations to facilitate the process of self-retraction.

To stop or not to stop: dissent and undue burden as reasons to stop participation in paediatric research.

Children participating in clinical research may show signs of discomfort, discontent, dissent and so on, that cannot be solved by comforting the child. When, and on what ground, should such signs lead to the decision to withdraw the child from the trial? In order to adequately protect children participating in clinical research, it is important to know how to determine during the course of a trial whether participation is still justified. Yet to date, legislation, ethical guidelines and medical ethical literature do not provide sufficient guidance. Therefore, in this paper we aim to provide the required clarity. We identify two types of reasons for taking signs of discomfort, discontent, dissent and so on, very seriously: (1) the principle of respect for the growing autonomy of the child, in those cases where a child expresses a clear, explicit and persistent wish to be withdrawn from the study; and (2) the principle of non-maleficence, in those cases where for an individual child, the research burden appears to be higher than acceptable. We recommend to closely monitor each child during the course of the study, thereby being vigilant to whether the child still wants to continue and to whether the actual burden the child experiences is still acceptable in relation to the permitted levels of burden.

Nudge me, help my baby: on other-regarding nudges.

There is an increasing interest in the possibility of using nudges to promote people's health. Following the advances in developmental biology and epigenetics, it is clear that one's health is not always the result of one's own choices. In the period surrounding pregnancy, maternal choice behaviour has a significant influence on perinatal morbidity and mortality as well as the development of chronic diseases later in life. One's health is thus a matter of one's own as well as one's maternal choices. Therefore, self-regarding and other-regarding nudges should be considered as viable strategies to promote health. In this article, we introduce the concept of other-regarding nudges. We use the harm principle and the principle of beneficence to justify these other-regarding nudges. We conclude by stressing the importance of a fair assessment of expectations towards the nudgee, when determining whether a nudge is aimed at preventing harm or promoting a good.

Ethical framework for the detection, management and communication of incidental findings in imaging studies, building on an interview study of researchers' practices and perspectives.

BACKGROUND: As thousands of healthy research participants are being included in small and large imaging studies, it is essential that dilemmas raised by the detection of incidental findings are adequately handled. Current ethical guidance indicates that pathways for dealing with incidental findings should be in place, but does not specify what such pathways should look like. Building on an interview study of researchers' practices and perspectives, we identified key considerations for the set-up of pathways for the detection, management and communication of incidental findings in imaging research. METHODS: We conducted an interview study with a purposive sample of researchers (n = 20) at research facilities across the Netherlands. Based on a qualitative analysis of these interviews and on existing guidelines found in the literature, we developed a prototype ethical framework, which was critically assessed and fine-tuned during a two-day international expert meeting with bioethicists and representatives from large population-based imaging studies from the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden and Belgium (n = 14). RESULTS: Practices and policies for the handling of incidental findings vary strongly across the Netherlands, ranging from no review of research scans and limited feedback to research participants, to routine review of scans and the arrangement of clinical follow-up. Respondents felt that researchers do not have a duty to actively look for incidental findings, but they do have a duty to act on findings, when detected. The principle of reciprocity featured prominently in our interviews and expert meeting. CONCLUSION: We present an ethical framework that may guide researchers and research ethics committees in the design and/or evaluation of appropriate pathways for the handling of incidental findings in imaging studies. The framework consists of seven steps: anticipation of findings, information provision and informed consent, scan acquisition, review of scans, consultation on detected abnormalities, communication of the finding, and further clinical management and follow-up of the research participant. Each of these steps represents a key decision to be made by researchers, which should be justified not only with reference to costs and/or logistical considerations, but also with reference to researchers' moral obligations and the principle of reciprocity.

Cui bono? Good for whom? Some apologies, confessions, musings, unsubstantiated views, not empirically founded statements, lists, a few commandments, reading suggestions, and rather practical tips for aspiring and experienced bioethicists.

Probably almost every day (good working day) in 35 years of 'doing' medical ethics I have asked myself: for whom is good medical ethics good? Who benefits from our critical ethical analysis? In my view the ultimate justification of bioethics lies in contributing to the debate on problems people experience in real life and to changing practices. I discuss some pitfalls and problems present-day bioethicists encounter in an interdisciplinary climate, facing scepticism, competition and scarcity of resources, such as disdain from philosophers, take-over by other disciplines, dilution of ethical argument, the empirical seduction, and paragraph ethics.

Improving the Helsinki Declaration's guidance on research in incompetent subjects.

Research involving children or other incompetent subjects who are deemed unable to provide informed consent is complex, particularly in the case of research that does not directly benefit the research subjects themselves. The Helsinki Declaration, the World Medical Association's landmark document for research ethics, therefore states that incompetent research subjects must not be included in such research unless it entails only minimal risk and minimal burden. In this paper, we argue that now that research in these groups is expected to expand, this undifferentiated minimal risk and burden requirement does not suffice any more. In the upcoming revision of the Declaration, the paragraph at stake should be refined in such a way that it is not unnecessarily restrictive or more permissive than can be ethically justified. Our first recommendation is to stimulate research ethics committees to identify more accurately those risks and burdens that the research subjects must undergo solely for research purposes by distinguishing between two types of study procedures instead of between two types of studies. Our second recommendation is to allow for exceptions to the minimal risk and burden requirement in cases of exceptionally valuable studies that involve subjects who can give their assent to participate in the study and that involve at most a minor increase over minimal risk and/or burden.

The price of autonomy: should we offer individuals a choice of colorectal cancer screening strategies?

A difference between colorectal cancer screening and screening for most other types of cancer is that various screening methods are available. A choice between screening methods is common in the USA. Most European programmes currently offer a single screening method, since it is recommended that only screening strategies with sufficient evidence for a reduction in colorectal cancer mortality are introduced. Faecal occult blood testing is widely accepted in Europe, and evidence on the effectiveness of flexible sigmoidoscopy is increasing. The availability of multiple effective screening options warrants deliberation on whether individuals should be given a choice between strategies. In this Personal View, we present arguments in favour and against offering a choice of screening strategies, together with the evidence substantiating these views. We also focus on screening invitees' autonomy, which is a crucial parameter in the debate.