Research on Aviation Safety Prediction Based on Variable Selection and LSTM.

Accurate prediction of aviation safety levels is significant for the efficient early warning and prevention of incidents. However, the causal mechanism and temporal character of aviation accidents are complex and not fully understood, which increases the operation cost of accurate aviation safety prediction. This paper adopts an innovative statistical method involving a least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) and long short-term memory (LSTM). We compiled and calculated 138 monthly aviation insecure events collected from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and took minor accidents as the predictor. Firstly, this paper introduced the group variables and the weight matrix into LASSO to realize the adaptive variable selection. Furthermore, it took the selected variable into multistep stacked LSTM (MSSLSTM) to predict the monthly accidents in 2020. Finally, the proposed method was compared with multiple existing variable selection and prediction methods. The results demonstrate that the RMSE (root mean square error) of the MSSLSTM is reduced by 41.98%, compared with the original model; on the other hand, the key variable selected by the adaptive spare group lasso (ADSGL) can reduce the elapsed time by 42.67% (13 s). This shows that aviation safety prediction based on ADSGL and MSSLSTM can improve the prediction efficiency of the model while keeping excellent generalization ability and robustness.

Predicting and mitigating failures on the flight deck: an aircraft engine bird strike scenario.

Engine damage as a consequence of foreign object debris (FOD) during flight is frequently caused by birds. One approach to minimising disruption caused by this damage is to provide flight crew with accurate information relating to the continuing operational status of the aircraft's engines. Before designing such avionic systems however, understanding of current procedures is needed. Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) and Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) were used to identify potential failures that flight crew may make when managing an engine bird strike. Workshops with commercial pilots generated insights into current practice and a commercial pilot SME reviewed outputs for accuracy. Over 200 potential failures were identified, most commonly related to communication. Remedial measures, considering future avionic systems, are proposed to mitigate identified failures. This analysis provides a starting point for future design concepts for assisting flight crew in dealing with engine malfunction due to FOD strikes. Practitioner summary: Hierarchical Task Analysis was conducted to show all tasks involved in dealing with an in-flight aircraft engine bird strike. Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach analysis was performed and over 200 possible failures were identified when managing this event. Remedial measures are proposed to help mitigate possible failures.

Human Factors Contributions to the Development of Standards for Displays of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Support of Detect-and-Avoid.

OBJECTIVE: The aim is to provide a high-level synthesis of human factors research that contributed to the development of detect-and-avoid display requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). BACKGROUND: The integration of UAS into the U.S. National Airspace System is a priority under the Federal Aviation Administration's Modernization and Reform Act. For UAS to have routine access to the National Airspace System, UAS must have detect-and-avoid capabilities. One human factors challenge is to determine how to display information effectively to remote pilots for performing detect-and-avoid tasks. METHOD: A high-level review of research informing the display requirements for UAS detect-and-avoid is provided. In addition, description of the contributions of human factors researchers in the writing of the requirements is highlighted. RESULTS: Findings from human-in-the-loop simulations are used to illustrate how evidence-based guidelines and requirements were established for the display of information to assist pilots in performing detect-and-avoid. Implications for human factors are discussed. CONCLUSION: Human factors researchers and engineers made many contributions to generate the data used to justify the detect-and-avoid display requirements. Human factors researchers must continue to be involved in the development of standards to ensure that requirements are evidence-based and take into account human operator performance and human factors principles and guidelines. APPLICATION: The research presented in this paper is relevant to the design of UAS, the writing of standards and requirements, and the work in human-systems integration.

Eye tracking as a debriefing tool in upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) for general aviation pilots.

Upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) is intended to improve the ability of pilots to recognize and avoid situations that can lead to airplane upsets and to improve their ability to recover control of an airplane that has exceeded the normal flight envelope. To this end, a set of different training contents - from theoretical knowledge of aerodynamics and human factors to practice-based flight training - is necessary. In order to support the debriefing with an objective feedback, and because visual scanning is a core competence, two studies on subjective evaluation of aviation pilots - one conducted in a flight simulator and the other one in-flight - focussed on the practical application of eye tracking as a debriefing tool in UPRT. From a practitioner's perspective, eye tracking appeared to be a useful method in terms of visualising instrument scanning techniques, supporting the instructor with objective debriefing material and fostering self-awareness in human processes. The discussion recommends adjusted UPRT instructor training and further improvements to eye tracking hardware and software. Practitioner Summary: The article focuses on pilot evaluations of eye tracking as a debriefing tool in UPRT and the identification of critical elements in its use. Eye tracking is a promising debriefing tool for UPRT. The discussion points to desirable improvements of eye tracking hardware and software as well as adjustments to instructor training that are pertinent.

Safety in the nonoperating room anesthesia suite is not an accident: lessons from the National Transportation Safety Board.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: To review the findings of National Transportation Safety Board-related aviation near misses and catastrophes and apply these principles to the nonoperating room anesthesia (NORA) suite. RECENT FINDINGS: NORA is a specialty that has seen tremendous growth. In 2019, NORA contributes to a larger proportion of anesthesia practice than ever before. With this growth, the NORA anesthesiologist and team are challenged to provide safe, high-quality care for more patients, often with complex comorbidities, and are forced to utilize deeper levels of sedation and anesthesia than ever before. These added pressures create new avenues for human error and adverse outcomes. SUMMARY: Safety in modern anesthesia practice often draws comparison to the aviation industry. From distinct preoperational checklists, defined courses of action, safety monitoring and the process of guiding individuals through a journey, there are many similarities between the practice of anesthesia and flying an airplane. Consistent human performance is paramount to creating safe outcomes. Although human errors are inevitable in any complex process, the goal for both the pilot and physician is to ensure the safety of their passengers and patients, respectively. As the aviation industry has had proven success at managing human error with a dramatic improvement in safety, a deeper look at several key examples will allow for comparisons of how to implement these strategies to improve NORA safety.

Airline Safety Improvement Through Experience with Near-Misses: A Cautionary Tale.

In recent years, the U.S. commercial airline industry has achieved unprecedented levels of safety, with the statistical risk associated with U.S. commercial aviation falling to 0.003 fatalities per 100 million passengers. But decades of research on organizational learning show that success often breeds complacency and failure inspires improvement. With accidents as rare events, can the airline industry continue safety advancements? This question is complicated by the complex system in which the industry operates where chance combinations of multiple factors contribute to what are largely probabilistic (rather than deterministic) outcomes. Thus, some apparent successes are realized because of good fortune rather than good processes, and this research intends to bring attention to these events, the near-misses. The processes that create these near-misses could pose a threat if multiple contributing factors combine in adverse ways without the intervention of good fortune. Yet, near-misses (if recognized as such) can, theoretically, offer a mechanism for continuing safety improvements, above and beyond learning gleaned from observable failure. We test whether or not this learning is apparent in the airline industry. Using data from 1990 to 2007, fixed effects Poisson regressions show that airlines learn from accidents (their own and others), and from one category of near-misses-those where the possible dangers are salient. Unfortunately, airlines do not improve following near-miss incidents when the focal event has no clear warnings of significant danger. Therefore, while airlines need to and can learn from certain near-misses, we conclude with recommendations for improving airline learning from all near-misses.

Hot Air Balloon: An Unusual Cause of Multicasualty Trauma Incident.

Hot air balloon incidents are few and far between compared with the total number of flights. Nevertheless, hot air balloon incidents may produce severe trauma involving several patients and are linked to significant mortality. The prehospital management of injured patients starts after having secured potential surrounding dangers, such as fire or explosion. In the context of a rescue by helicopter, close attention must be paid to potential obstacles, like trees or electrical wires, and the risk of aspiration of the balloon envelope into the rotor. Patients involved in such incidents are often split up in a closed perimeter around the crash point. The severity of the trauma depends essentially on the height of the fall. The most frequent traumatic lesions involve fractures of the lower limbs, the spine, and the pelvis as well as severe burns caused by the balloon fire. Because of the number of patients present, an initial triage is usually required at the site. The use of rescue helicopters can be helpful. They can perform aerial reconnaissance, provide on-site high-level resources, enable access to the patients even in hostile environments, and quickly transport them to trauma center hospitals.

[Shuttle Challenger disaster: what lessons can be learned for management of patients in the operating room?]. / Catastrophe de la navette Challenger: quels enseignements pour la prise en charge des patients au bloc opératoire?

For many years hospitals have been implementing crew resource management (CRM) programs, inspired by the aviation industry, in order to improve patient safety. However, while contributing to improved patient care, CRM programs are controversial because of their limited impact, a decrease in effectiveness over time, and the underinvestment by some caregivers. By analyzing the space shuttle Challenger accident, the objective of this article is to show the potential impact of the professional culture in decision-making processes. In addition, to present an approach by cultural factors which are an essential complement to current CRM programs in order to enhance the safety of care.

Endovascular treatment of bilateral carotid artery pseudoaneurysms after blunt carotid injury.

The detection of blunt carotid artery injures has improved because of more aggressive screening protocols. Initial treatment depends on multiple factors; however, controversy exists with regard to the treatment of pseudoaneurysmal degeneration, especially in this age of endovascular treatment options. Current options include anticoagulation, open surgical repair, and endovascular repair. We report a rare case of bilateral carotid artery pseudoaneurysm degeneration after bilateral carotid artery dissection caused by blunt trauma.

Timing of surgery in thoracolumbar trauma: is early intervention safe?

The understanding of the optimal surgical timing for stabilization in thoracolumbar fractures is severely limited. Thoracolumbar spine fractures can be devastating injuries and are often associated with significant morbidity and mortality. The role of early surgical stabilization (within 48-72 hours of injury) as a vehicle to improve outcomes in these patients has generated significant interest. Goals of early stabilization include improved neurological recovery, faster pulmonary recovery, improved pain control, and decreased health care costs. Opponents cite the potential for increased bleeding, hypotension, and the risk of further cord injury as a few factors that weigh against early stabilization. The concept of spinal cord injury and its relationship to surgical timing remains in question. However, when neurological outcomes are eliminated from the equation, certain measures have shown positive influences from prompt surgical fixation. Early fixation of thoracolumbar spine fractures can significantly decrease the duration of hospital stay and the number of days in the intensive care unit. Additionally, prompt stabilization can reduce rates of pulmonary complications. This includes decreased rates of pneumonia and fewer days on ventilator support. Cost analysis revealed as much as $80,000 in savings per patient with early stabilization. All of these benefits come without an increase in morbidity or evidence of increased mortality. In addition, there is no evidence that early stabilization has any ill effect on the injured or uninjured spinal cord. Based on the existing data, early fixation of thoracolumbar fractures has been linked with positive outcomes without clear evidence of negative impacts on the patient's neurological status, associated morbidities, or mortality. These procedures can be viewed as "damage control" and may consist of simple posterior instrumentation or open reductions with internal fixation as indicated. Based on the current literature it is advisable to proceed with early surgical stabilization of thoracolumbar fractures in a well-resuscitated patient, unless extenuating medical conditions would prevent it.

The U.S. commercial air tour industry: a review of aviation safety concerns.

The U.S. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations defines commercial air tours as "flight[s] conducted for compensation or hire in an airplane or helicopter where a purpose of the flight is sightseeing." The incidence of air tour crashes in the United States is disproportionately high relative to similar commercial aviation operations, and air tours operating under Part 91 governance crash significantly more than those governed by Part 135. This paper reviews the government and industry response to four specific areas of air tour safety concern: surveillance of flight operations, pilot factors, regulatory standardization, and maintenance quality assurance. It concludes that the government and industry have successfully addressed many of these tenet issues, most notably by: advancing the operations surveillance infrastructure through implementation of en route, ground-based, and technological surveillance methods; developing Aeronautical Decision Making and cue-based training programs for air tour pilots; consolidating federal air tour regulations under Part 136; and developing public-private partnerships for raising maintenance operating standards and improving quality assurance programs. However, opportunities remain to improve air tour safety by: increasing the number and efficiency of flight surveillance programs; addressing pilot fatigue with more restrictive flight hour limitations for air tour pilots; ensuring widespread uptake of maintenance quality assurance programs, especially among high-risk operators not currently affiliated with private air tour safety programs; and eliminating the 25-mile exception allowing Part 91 operators to conduct commercial air tours without the safety oversight required of Part 135 operators.

Effects of distance flown on pilot decision making in continued flight into deteriorating weather conditions.

INTRODUCTION: Continuing flight into adverse weather remains a significant problem in general aviation (GA) safety. A variety of experiential, cognitive, and motivational factors have been suggested as explanations. Previous research has shown that adverse weather accidents occur further into planned flights than other types of accident, suggesting that previous investment of time and effort might be a contributing factor. The aim of this study was to experimentally determine the effect of prior commitment on general aviation pilots' decision-making and risk-taking in simulated VFR flights. METHOD: Thirty-six licensed pilots 'flew' two simulated flights designed to simulate an encounter with deteriorating coastal weather and a developing extensive cloud base underneath the aircraft as it crossed a mountain range. After making a decision to continue or discontinue the flight, pilots completed a range of risk perception, risk taking, and situational awareness measures. RESULTS: Visual flight rules were violated in 42% of the flights. Prior commitment, in terms of distance already flown, led to an increased tendency to continue the flight into adverse weather in the coastal 'scud running' scenario. Continuing pilots perceived the risks differently and showed greater risk tolerance than others. These 'bolder' pilots also tended to be more active and better qualified than the others. CONCLUSIONS: There are undoubtedly multiple factors underlying any individual decision to continue or discontinue a flight. The willingness to tolerate a higher level of risk seems to be one such factor. This willingness can increase with time invested in the flight and also seems to be related to individual flight qualifications and experience. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS: All pilots might benefit from carefully structured simulator sessions designed to safely teach practical risk management strategies with clear and immediate feedback.

The Untapped Potential of Narrative as a Tool in Aviation Mental Health and Certification.

INTRODUCTION: Work-related stress is common in pilots, with broad implications, including the potential development of mental health symptoms and sometimes even psychiatric disease. This commentary argues for the use of narrative as a tool to promote preventive health behaviors in pilots and combat misinformation about aeromedical certification related to mental health.Hoffman WR, McNeil M, Tvaryanas A. The untapped potential of narrative as a tool in aviation mental health and certification. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2024; 95(3):165-166.

Lessons for surgeons in the final moments of Air France Flight 447.

BACKGROUND: All surgeons make mistakes, and learning from critical incidents may help improve performance. The present study aimed to highlight lessons for surgeons from analysis of the final moments of Air France Flight 447. All of the authors work in teams and situations where safety, technical performance, and non-technical skills are critical. This review was born out of discussions regarding the events of Flight 447; specifically, whether the airline disaster was relevant to their work, and whether they could learn anything from it. METHODS: The study is based on review of the crash reports of Flight 447, which lost flight speed indication after formation of ice prevented air from entering flight speed indicators during a storm. Following a subsequent stall, the aircraft fell at a rate of >10,000 feet/min until it crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing 228 passengers and crew. RESULTS: There were errors in decision making, reasoning, communication, and teamwork. Such non-technical skills failures have been recognized previously and can be addressed by existing non-technical skills training. A reliance on autopilot meant that the pilots were unfamiliar with high-altitude flying when the autopilot is disengaged. They were unprepared for and affected by such a sudden and serious problem; an event called "surprise and startle" by the accident investigation. The absence of the senior pilot (who was on a scheduled break) in the critical final minutes slowed error recognition and recovery. CONCLUSIONS: Unintended consequences of modern safety strategies may be under-recognized and can lead to adverse events. Both simulation-based and non-simulation-based training should include "surprise and startle" events beyond the scenarios trainees might expect. Likewise, in the face of increasing reliance on modern technology, surgeons should ensure that they would be able to perform procedures in the absence of such technologies. Specific training may improve surgeons' non-technical skills, and recognition of such skills could also be used to help select future surgeons.

Identifying training deficiencies in military pilots by applying the human factors analysis and classification system.

Without accurate analysis, it is difficult to identify training needs and develop the content of training programs required for preventing aviation accidents. The human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS) is based on Reason's system-wide model of human error. In this study, 523 accidents from the Republic of China Air Force were analyzed in which 1762 human errors were categorized. The results of the analysis showed that errors of judgment and poor decision-making were commonly reported amongst pilots. As a result, it was concluded that there was a need for military pilots to be trained specifically in making decisions in tactical environments. However, application of HFACS also allowed the identification of systemic training deficiencies within the organization further contributing to the accidents observed.

Analysis on coupling dynamic effect of human errors in aviation safety.

Human factors have increasingly been the leading cause of aircraft accidents. In most cases, human factors are not working alone, instead they are coupled with complex environment, mechanical factors, physiological and psychological factors of pilots, and organizational management, all of which form a complex aviation safety system. It is vital to investigate the coupling impact of human errors to avoid the occurrence of aviation accidents. In view that the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) provides a hierarchical classification principle of human errors in aviation accidents, and the System Dynamics (SD) approach is helpful to describe the risk evolution process, this paper establishes a hybrid HFACS-SD model by employing the HFACS and the SD approach to reveal the aviation human factors risk evolution mechanism, in which the HFACS is first used to capture the causal factors of human errors risk, and a coupling SD model is then built to describe the evolution of aviation human factors risk supported by historical data. The eigenvalue elasticity analysis is taken to identify critical loops and parameters that have a substantial impact on the system structural behavior, and the influence of parameters and loops is assessed. Simulation results show that the evolution trend of the accident rate can be replicated by the proposed HFACS-SD model, and the structural dominance analysis can efficiently identify critical loops and parameters. Simulation results further show that, with the recommended safety enhancement measures, the stability of the aviation system is increased, and thus lowering the overall accident rate.