Differences between sons and daughters in the intergenerational transmission of wealth.

Persistent interest lies in gender inequality, especially with regard to the favouring of sons over daughters. Economists are concerned with how privilege is transmitted across generations, and anthropologists have long studied sex-biased inheritance norms. There has, however, been no focused cross-cultural investigation of how parent-offspring correlations in wealth vary by offspring sex. We estimate these correlations for 38 wealth measures, including somatic and relational wealth, from 15 populations ranging from hunter-gatherers to small-scale farmers. Although small sample sizes limit our statistical power, we find no evidence of ubiquitous male bias, at least as inferred from comparing parent-son and parent-daughter correlations. Rather we find wide variation in signatures of sex bias, with evidence of both son and daughter-biased transmission. Further, we introduce a model that helps pinpoint the conditions under which simple mid-point parent-offspring wealth correlations can reveal information about sex-biased parental investment. Our findings are relevant to the study of female-biased kinship by revealing just how little normative descriptors of kinship systems, such as patrilineal inheritance, capture intergenerational correlations in wealth, and how variable parent-son and parent-daughter correlations can be. This article is part of the theme issue 'The evolution of female-biased kinship in humans and other mammals'.

Cultural group selection follows Darwin's classic syllogism for the operation of selection.

The main objective of our target article was to sketch the empirical case for the importance of selection at the level of groups on cultural variation. Such variation is massive in humans, but modest or absent in other species. Group selection processes acting on this variation is a framework for developing explanations of the unusual level of cooperation between non-relatives found in our species. Our case for cultural group selection (CGS) followed Darwin's classic syllogism regarding natural selection: If variation exists at the level of groups, if this variation is heritable, and if it plays a role in the success or failure of competing groups, then selection will operate at the level of groups. We outlined the relevant domains where such evidence can be sought and characterized the main conclusions of work in those domains. Most commentators agree that CGS plays some role in human evolution, although some were considerably more skeptical. Some contributed additional empirical cases. Some raised issues of the scope of CGS explanations versus competing ones.

Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the evidence.

Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufficient variation at the level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group selection? If the answer to one of these questions is "no," then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is "yes" and argue that we must take the cultural group selection hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation.

The importance of population growth and regulation in human life history evolution.

Explaining the evolution of human life history traits remains an important challenge for evolutionary anthropologists. Progress is hindered by a poor appreciation of how demographic factors affect the action of natural selection. I review life history theory showing that the quantity maximized by selection depends on whether and how population growth is regulated. I show that the common use of R, a strategy's expected lifetime number of offspring, as a fitness maximand is only appropriate under a strict set of conditions, which are apparently unappreciated by anthropologists. To concretely show how demography-free life history theory can lead to errors, I reanalyze an influential model of human life history evolution, which investigated the coevolution of a long lifespan and late age of maturity. I show that the model's conclusions do not hold under simple changes to the implicitly assumed mechanism of density dependence, even when stated assumptions remain unchanged. This analysis suggests that progress in human life history theory requires better understanding of the demography of our ancestors.

Two success-biased social learning strategies.

I compare the evolutionary dynamics of two success-biased social learning strategies, which, by definition, use the success of others to inform one's social learning decisions. The first, "Compare Means", causes a learner to adopt cultural variants with highest mean payoff in her sample. The second, "Imitate the Best", causes a learner to imitate the single most successful individual in her sample. I summarize conditions under which each strategy performs well or poorly, and investigate their evolution via a gene-culture coevolutionary model. Despite the adaptive appeal of these strategies, both encounter conditions under which they systematically perform worse than simply imitating at random. Compare Means performs worst when the optimal cultural variant is usually at high frequency, while Imitate the Best performs worst when suboptimal variants sometimes produce high payoffs. The extent to which it is optimal to use success-biased social learning depends strongly on the payoff distributions and environmental conditions that human social learners face.

Success-biased social learning: cultural and evolutionary dynamics.

Success bias is a social learning strategy whereby learners tend to acquire the cultural variants of successful individuals. I develop a general model of success-biased social learning for discrete cultural traits with stochastic payoffs, and investigate its dynamics when only two variants are present. I find that success bias inherently favors rare variants, and consequently performs worse than unbiased imitation (i.e. random copying) when success payoffs are at least mildly stochastic and the optimal variant is common. Because of this weakness, success bias fails to replace unbiased imitation in an evolutionary model when selection is fairly weak or when the environment is relatively stable, and sometimes fails to invade at all. I briefly discuss the optimal strength of success bias, the complicated nature of defining success in social learning contexts, and the value of variant frequency as an important source of information to social learners. I conclude with predictions regarding the prevalence of success bias in different behavioral domains.