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BACKGROUND: The public order and safety (POS) sector remains susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreaks, as workplace attendance is typically compulsory and close physical contact is often needed. Here, we report on a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak with an attack rate of 39% (9/23), which occurred between 19 and 29 June 2021 among a cohort of new POS recruits participating in a mandatory 18-week training programme in England. METHODS: The COVID-OUT (COVID-19 Outbreak investigation to Understand Transmission) study team undertook a multidisciplinary outbreak investigation, including viral surface sampling, workplace environmental assessment, participant viral and antibody testing, and questionnaires, at the two associated training facilities between 5 July and 24 August 2021. RESULTS: Environmental factors, such as ventilation, were deemed inadequate in some areas of the workplace, with carbon dioxide (CO2) levels exceeding 1,500 ppm on multiple occasions within naturally ventilated classrooms. Activities during safety training required close contact, with some necessitating physical contact, physical exertion, and shouting. Furthermore, most participants reported having physical contact with colleagues (67%) and more than one close work contact daily (97%). CONCLUSIONS: Our investigation suggests that site- and activity-specific factors likely contributed to the transmission risks within the POS trainee cohort. Potential interventions for mitigating SARS-CoV-2 transmission in this POS training context could include implementing regular rapid lateral flow testing, optimizing natural ventilation, using portable air cleaning devices in classrooms, and expanding use of well-fitted FFP2/FFP3 respirators during activities where prolonged close physical contact is required.
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COVID-19 , Brotes de Enfermedades , SARS-CoV-2 , Lugar de Trabajo , Humanos , COVID-19/transmisión , COVID-19/epidemiología , Inglaterra/epidemiología , Brotes de Enfermedades/prevención & control , Masculino , Adulto , Femenino , Exposición Profesional/prevención & control , Ventilación/métodosRESUMEN
AIMS: To monitor severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) RNA contamination in vehicles operating in England during the pandemic, to better understand transmission risk of SARS-CoV-2 on public transport. METHODS AND RESULTS: We collected 1314 surface samples between December 2020 and April 2022 on trains and buses managed by five different transport operators. The presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA was investigated through reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). SARS-CoV-2 RNA was found on 197 (15%) of the 1314 surfaces sampled, including seat head rests, handholds, and air extract grilles, but the levels of RNA recovered on those samples (median value of 23.4, interquartile range: 14.3-35.4, N gene copies per extraction) made the presence of infectious virus at the time of sampling extremely unlikely. However, detection rates varied over time with peaks broadly coinciding with times of high community transmission, when it was more likely that people infected with SARS-CoV-2 were travelling on public transport. CONCLUSION: During the pandemic, and as in other public spaces, low levels of SARS-CoV-2 RNA were found on surfaces associated with public transport.
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COVID-19 , ARN Viral , SARS-CoV-2 , COVID-19/transmisión , COVID-19/virología , COVID-19/epidemiología , SARS-CoV-2/genética , SARS-CoV-2/aislamiento & purificación , Inglaterra/epidemiología , ARN Viral/genética , ARN Viral/análisis , ARN Viral/aislamiento & purificación , Humanos , Estudios Longitudinales , Vehículos a Motor , TransportesRESUMEN
Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) and accidental pathogen escape from laboratory settings (APELS) are major concerns for the community. A risk-based approach for pathogen research management within a standard biosafety management framework is recommended but is challenging due to reasons such as inconsistency in risk tolerance and perception. Here, we performed a scoping review using publicly available, peer-reviewed journal and media reports of LAIs and instances of APELS between 2000 and 2021. We identified LAIs in 309 individuals in 94 reports for 51 pathogens. Eight fatalities (2·6% of all LAIs) were caused by infection with Neisseria meningitidis (n=3, 37·5%), Yersinia pestis (n=2, 25%), Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium (S Typhimurium; n=1, 12·5%), or Ebola virus (n=1, 12·5%) or were due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (n=1, 12·5%). The top five LAI pathogens were S Typhimurium (n=154, 49·8%), Salmonella enteritidis (n=21, 6·8%), vaccinia virus (n=13, 4·2%), Brucella spp (n=12, 3·9%), and Brucella melitensis (n=11, 3·6%). 16 APELS were reported, including those for Bacillus anthracis, SARS-CoV, and poliovirus (n=3 each, 18·8%); Brucella spp and foot and mouth disease virus (n=2 each, 12·5%); and variola virus, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and influenza virus H5N1 (n=1 each, 6·3%). Continual improvement in LAI and APELS management via their root cause analysis and thorough investigation of such incidents is essential to prevent future occurrences. The results are biased due to the reliance on publicly available information, which emphasises the need for formalised global LAIs and APELS reporting to better understand the frequency of and circumstances surrounding these incidents.
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Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A , Infección de Laboratorio , Yersinia pestis , Animales , Bovinos , Humanos , Salmonella enteritidis , Salmonella typhimuriumRESUMEN
Introduction: Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious infection of cloven-hoofed animals. The Biosafety Research Road Map reviewed scientific literature regarding the foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV). This project aims to identify gaps in the data required to conduct evidence-based biorisk assessments, as described by Blacksell et al., and strengthen control measures appropriate for local and national laboratories. Methods: A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections: the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: The available data regarding biosafety knowledge gaps and existing evidence have been collated. Some gaps include the need for more scientific data that identify the specific safety contribution of engineering controls, support requirements for showering out after in vitro laboratory work, and whether a 3- to 5-day quarantine period should be applied to individuals conducting in vitro versus in vivo work. Addressing these gaps will contribute to the remediation and improvement of biosafety and biosecurity systems when working with FMDV.
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Introduction: Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) virus and Lassa virus (LASV) are zoonotic agents regarded as high-consequence pathogens due to their high case fatality rates. CCHF virus is a vector-borne disease and is transmitted by tick bites. Lassa virus is spread via aerosolization of dried rat urine, ingesting infected rats, and direct contact with or consuming food and water contaminated with rat excreta. Methods: The scientific literature for biosafety practices has been reviewed for both these two agents to assess the evidence base and biosafety-related knowledge gaps. The review focused on five main areas, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: There is a lack of data on the safe collection and handling procedures for tick specimens and the infectious dose from an infective tick bite for CCHF investigations. In addition, there are gaps in knowledge about gastrointestinal and contact infectious doses for Lassa virus, sample handling and transport procedures outside of infectious disease areas, and the contribution of asymptomatic carriers in viral circulation. Conclusion: Due to the additional laboratory hazards posed by these two agents, the authors recommend developing protocols that work effectively and safely in highly specialized laboratories in non-endemic regions and a laboratory with limited resources in endemic areas.
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AIMS: To utilize environmental surface sampling to evaluate areas of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) contamination within workplaces to identify trends and improve local coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) control measures. METHODS AND RESULTS: Surface sampling was undertaken at 12 workplaces that experienced a cluster of COVID-19 cases in the workforce between March 2021 and March 2022. A total of 7.4% (61/829) samples collected were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA by the quantitative PCR (qPCR) with only 1.8% (15/829) of samples identified with crossing threshold (Ct) values <35.0. No sample returned whole-genome sequence inferring RNA detected was degraded. CONCLUSIONS: Few workplace surface samples were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA and positive samples typically contained low levels of nucleic acid. Although these data may infer a low probability of fomite transmission within the workplace, Ct values may have been lower at the time of contamination. Workplace environmental sampling identified lapses in COVID-19 control measures within individual sites and showed trends throughout the pandemic.
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COVID-19 , Humanos , COVID-19/epidemiología , SARS-CoV-2/genética , ARN Viral/genética , Lugar de Trabajo , Brotes de Enfermedades , Reino Unido/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
Introduction: The Biosafety Research Road Map reviewed the scientific literature on a viral respiratory pathogen, avian influenza virus, and a bacterial respiratory pathogen, Mycobacterium tuberculosis. This project aims at identifying gaps in the data required to conduct evidence-based biorisk assessments, as described in Blacksell et al. One significant gap is the need for definitive data on M. tuberculosis sample aerosolization to guide the selection of engineering controls for diagnostic procedures. Methods: The literature search focused on five areas: routes of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination methods. Results: The available data regarding biosafety knowledge gaps and existing evidence have been collated and presented in Tables 1 and 2. The guidance sources on the appropriate use of biosafety cabinets for specific procedures with M. tuberculosis require clarification. Detecting vulnerabilities in the biorisk assessment for respiratory pathogens is essential to improve and develop laboratory biosafety in local and national systems.
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Introduction: The virus formerly known as monkeypox virus, now called mpoxv, belongs to the Orthopoxvirus genus and can cause mpox disease through both animal-to-human and human-to-human transmission. The unexpected spread of mpoxv among humans has prompted the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). Methods: We conducted a literature search to identify the gaps in biosafety, focusing on five main areas: how the infection enters the body and spreads, how much of the virus is needed to cause infection, infections acquired in the lab, accidental release of the virus, and strategies for disinfecting and decontaminating the area. Discussion: The recent PHEIC has shown that there are gaps in our knowledge of biosafety when it comes to mpoxv. We need to better understand where this virus might be found, how much of it can spread from person-to-person, what are the effective control measures, and how to safely clean up contaminated areas. By gathering more biosafety evidence, we can make better decisions to protect people from this zoonotic agent, which has recently become more common in the human population.
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Introduction: Lack of evidence-based information regarding potential biological risks can result in inappropriate or excessive biosafety and biosecurity risk-reduction strategies. This can cause unnecessary damage and loss to the physical facilities, physical and psychological well-being of laboratory staff, and community trust. A technical working group from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), World Health Organization (WHO), and Chatham House collaborated on the Biosafety Research Roadmap (BRM) project. The goal of the BRM is the sustainable implementation of evidence-based biorisk management of laboratory activities, particularly in low-resource settings, and the identification of gaps in the current biosafety and biosecurity knowledge base. Methods: A literature search was conducted for the basis of laboratory design and practices for four selected high-priority subgroups of pathogenic agents. Potential gaps in biosafety were focused on five main sections, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Categories representing miscellaneous, respiratory, bioterrorism/zoonotic, and viral hemorrhagic fever pathogens were created within each group were selected for review. Results: Information sheets on the pathogens were developed. Critical gaps in the evidence base for safe sustainable biorisk management were identified. Conclusion: The gap analysis identified areas of applied biosafety research required to support the safety, and the sustainability, of global research programs. Improving the data available for biorisk management decisions for research with high-priority pathogens will contribute significantly to the improvement and development of appropriate and necessary biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity strategies for each agent.
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Introduction: Brucella melitensis and Bacillus anthracis are zoonoses transmitted from animals and animal products. Scientific information is provided in this article to support biosafety precautions necessary to protect laboratory workers and individuals who are potentially exposed to these pathogens in the workplace or other settings, and gaps in information are also reported. There is a lack of information on the appropriate effective concentration for many chemical disinfectants for this agent. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling of contaminated materials. B. melitensis is reported to have the highest number of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) to date in laboratory workers. Methods: A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, LAIs, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: Scientific literature currently lacks information on the effective concentration of many chemical disinfectants for this agent and in the variety of matrices where it may be found. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of PPE during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling contaminated materials. Discussion: Clarified vulnerabilities based on specific scientific evidence will contribute to the prevention of unwanted and unpredictable infections, improving the biosafety processes and procedures for laboratory staff and other professionals such as veterinarians, individuals associated with the agricultural industry, and those working with susceptible wildlife species.
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Introduction: Shigella bacteria cause shigellosis, a gastrointestinal infection most often acquired from contaminated food or water. Methods: In this review, the general characteristics of Shigella bacteria are described, cases of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) are discussed, and evidence gaps in current biosafety practices are identified. Results: LAIs are undoubtedly under-reported. Owing to the low infectious dose, rigorous biosafety level 2 practices are required to prevent LAIs resulting from sample manipulation or contact with infected surfaces. Conclusions: It is recommended that, before laboratory work with Shigella, an evidence-based risk assessment be conducted. Particular emphasis should be placed on personal protective equipment, handwashing, and containment practices for procedures that generate aerosols or droplets.
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BACKGROUND: A SARS-CoV-2 outbreak with an attack rate of 14.3% was reported at a plastics manufacturing plant in England. METHODS: Between 23rd March and 13th May 2021, the COVID-OUT team undertook a comprehensive outbreak investigation, including environmental assessment, surface sampling, molecular and serological testing, and detailed questionnaires, to identify potential SARS-CoV-2 transmission routes, and workplace- and worker-related risk factors. RESULTS: While ventilation, indicated using real-time CO2 proxy measures, was generally adequate on-site, the technical office with the highest localized attack rate (21.4%) frequently reached peaks in CO2 of 2100ppm. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was found in low levels (Ct ≥35) in surface samples collected across the site. High noise levels (79dB) were recorded in the main production area, and study participants reported having close work contacts (73.1%) and sharing tools (75.5%). Only 20.0% of participants reported using a surgical mask and/or FFP2/FFP3 respirator at least half the time and 71.0% expressed concerns regarding potential pay decreases and/or unemployment due to self-isolation or workplace closure. CONCLUSIONS: The findings reinforce the importance of enhanced infection control measures in manufacturing sectors, including improved ventilation with possible consideration of CO2 monitoring, utilising air cleaning interventions in enclosed environments, and provision of good-quality face masks (i.e., surgical masks or FFP2/FFP3 respirators) especially when social distancing cannot be maintained. Further research on the impacts of job security-related concerns is warranted.
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COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Humanos , COVID-19/prevención & control , Plásticos , ARN Viral , Dióxido de Carbono , Brotes de Enfermedades , Instalaciones Industriales y de FabricaciónAsunto(s)
Máscaras , Mpox , Humanos , Muestreo , Sistema Respiratorio , Nasofaringe , Pruebas Respiratorias , EspiraciónRESUMEN
Surfaces contaminated with infectious SARS-CoV-2 particles have the potential to cause human infection and any increase in surface survivability of a SARS-CoV-2 variant may increase its prevalence over other variants. This study investigated whether there were differences in surface persistence between Delta and Omicron variants leading to Omicron's dominance globally. Stainless steel coupons were inoculated with suspensions of either Delta or Omicron variant and exposed to typical environmental conditions within a containment level 3 laboratory. Coupons were recovered at different timepoints and enumerated using plaque assay. Both variants were recoverable for >48 h on the coupons. Omicron showed a greater reduction of viability after 48 h compared to Delta with a 20-fold decrease versus 15-fold respectively, but this difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.424). These results indicate that Omicron's surface persistence is unlikely to contribute to it becoming the dominant variant over Delta.
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COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Humanos , SARS-CoV-2/genética , Temperatura , BioensayoRESUMEN
The virucidal activity of the Zoono Z71 Microbe Shield surface sanitizer and protectant, a quaternary ammonium compound (QAC)-based antimicrobial coating that was used by the United Kingdom rail industry during the COVID-19 pandemic, was evaluated, using the bacteriophage ɸ6 as a surrogate for SARS-CoV-2. Immediately after application and in the absence of interfering substances, the product effectively reduced (>3 log10) the viability of ɸ6 on some materials that are typically used in rail carriages (stainless steel, high-pressure laminate, plastic). If, after the application of the product, these surfaces remained undisturbed, the antimicrobial coating retained its efficacy for at least 28 days. However, efficacy depended on the material being coated. The product provided inconsistent results when applied to glass surfaces and was ineffective (i.e., achieved <3 log10 reduction) when applied to a train arm rest that was made of Terluran 22. Regardless of the material that was coated or the time since application, the presence of organic debris (fetal bovine serum) significantly reduced the viricidal activity of the coating. Wiping the surface with a wetted cloth after the deposition of organic debris was not sufficient to restore efficacy. We conclude that the product is likely to be of limited effectiveness in a busy, multiuser environment, such as public transport. IMPORTANCE This study evaluated the performance of a commercially available antimicrobial coating that was used by the transport industry in the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the product was effective against ɸ6, the efficacy of the coating depended upon the material to which it was applied. Similarly, and regardless of the surface material, the presence of organic debris severely impaired viricidal activity, and efficacy could not be recovered through wiping (cleaning) the surface. This highlights the importance of including relevant materials and conditions when evaluating antimicrobial coatings in the laboratory. Further efforts are required to identify suitable infection prevention and control practices for the transport industry.
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Antiinfecciosos , COVID-19 , Humanos , COVID-19/prevención & control , SARS-CoV-2 , Compuestos de Amonio Cuaternario/farmacología , Pandemias/prevención & control , Antiinfecciosos/farmacología , Antiinfecciosos/uso terapéuticoRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: An outbreak of monkeypox virus infections in non-endemic countries was recognised on May 12, 2022. As of September 29, more than 67â000 infections have been reported globally, with more than 3400 confirmed cases in the UK by September 26. Monkeypox virus is believed to be predominantly transmitted through direct contact with lesions or infected body fluids, with possible involvement of fomites and large respiratory droplets. A case of monkeypox in a health-care worker in the UK in 2018 was suspected to be due to virus exposure while changing bedding. We aimed to measure the extent of environmental contamination in the isolation rooms of patients with symptomatic monkeypox. METHODS: We investigated environmental contamination with monkeypox virus from infected patients admitted to isolation rooms at the Royal Free Hospital (London, UK) between May 24 and June 17, 2022. Surface swabs of high-touch areas in five isolation rooms, of the personal protective equipment (PPE) of health-care workers in doffing areas in three rooms, and from air samples collected before and during bedding changes in five rooms were analysed using quantitative PCR to assess monkeypox virus contamination levels. Virus isolation was performed to confirm presence of infectious virus in selected positive samples. FINDINGS: We identified widespread surface contamination (56 [93%] of 60 samples were positive) in occupied patient rooms (monkeypox DNA cycle threshold [Ct] values 24·7-37·4), on health-care worker PPE after use (Ct 26·1-35·6), and in PPE doffing areas (Ct 26·3-36·8). Of 20 air samples taken, five (25%) were positive. Three (75%) of four air samples collected before and during a bedding change in one patient's room were positive (Ct 32·7-36·2). Replication-competent virus was identified in two (50%) of four samples selected for viral isolation, including from air samples collected during bedding change. INTERPRETATION: These data show contamination in isolation facilities and potential for suspension of monkeypox virus into the air during specific activities. PPE contamination was observed after clinical contact and changing of bedding. Contamination of hard surfaces in doffing areas supports the importance of cleaning protocols, PPE use, and doffing procedures. FUNDING: None.
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Transmisión de Enfermedad Infecciosa de Paciente a Profesional , Mpox , Humanos , Monkeypox virus/genética , Mpox/epidemiología , Hospitales , Reino Unido/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
Background: Modern microbiology laboratories are designed to protect workers and the environment from microbial aerosols produced during microbiological procedures and accidents. However, there is only limited data available on the aerosols generated from common microbiology procedures. Methods: A series of common microbiological procedures were undertaken with high concentration spore suspensions while air samplers were operated to sample the aerosols generated. Surface contamination from droplets was visualized using sodium fluorescein within the suspension. A total of 36 procedures were studied using different sample volumes (0.1-10 mL) and two spore suspension titers (107 and 109 colony forming units [cfu]/mL). Results: The aerosol concentrations generated varied from 0 to 13,000 cfu/m3. There was evidence to suggest that titer, volume, and poor use of equipment were significant factors in increased aerosol generation from some of the procedures. A risk assessment undertaken using the data showed that any aerosol generated from these processes would be contained within a correctly operating biological safety cabinet. Therefore, with these procedures, the operator and the environment would not require any additional protective measures such as respiratory protective equipment or a negative pressure laboratory to prevent aerosol exposure or release. Conclusions: Aerosol generation from common laboratory processes can be minimized by reducing sample volumes and concentrations if possible. Training laboratory staff in good microbiological techniques would further mitigate aerosols generated from common laboratory processes.
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Introduction: The operator protection factor (OPF) of four biological safety cabinets (BSCs) has been measured under standard and suboptimal conditions. Methods: The OPF for one BSC1, two BSC2, and an acid-fast bacilli staining station (AFBSS) was measured using the potassium iodide method for in situ testing of BSCs (CEN12469) over a range of inflow velocities under standard conditions and with common interfering factors (fans, opening doors, and walk pasts). Results: The BSC1 and the AFBSS gave a high level of protection under standard test conditions at all airflows (down to 0.3 and 0.38 m/s, respectively). During interfering processes, the BSC1 and AFBSS gave a high level of protection (OPF >105) at the specified inward airflow. At lower airflows, there was a predictable deterioration in performance. There was a significant difference in performance between the two BSC2s tested, with one model passing all tests under all interfering conditions at all airflows. The second BSC2 failed the standard test at the lowest airflow and provided poor levels of protection (OPF <105) in all tests carried out with interfering processes. Conclusion: Although BSC2s are capable of giving a high level of performance, this is design dependent and the BSC1 and AFBSS give a more predictable level of performance due to their simpler design. In environments where BSC certification is not possible, they may provide more robust and sustainable primary containment.
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An imported case of monkeypox was diagnosed in December 2019 in a traveller returning from Nigeria to the UK. Subsequently, environmental sampling was performed at two adjoining single-room residences occupied by the patient and their sibling. Monkeypox virus DNA was identified in multiple locations throughout both properties, and monkeypox virus was isolated from several samples 3 days after the patient was last in these locations. Positive samples were identified following the use of both vacuum and surface sampling techniques; these methodologies allowed for environmental analysis of potentially contaminated porous and non-porous surfaces via real-time quantitative reverse transcriptase PCR analysis in addition to viral isolation to confirm the presence of infection-competent virus. This report confirms the potential for infection-competent monkeypox virus to be recovered in environmental settings associated with known positive cases and the necessity for rapid environmental assessment to reduce potential exposure to close contacts and the general public. The methods adopted in this investigation may be used for future confirmed cases of monkeypox in order to establish levels of contamination, confirm the presence of infection-competent material and to identify locations requiring additional cleaning.
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Monkeypox virus , Mpox , ADN Viral , Brotes de Enfermedades , Humanos , Mpox/diagnóstico , Mpox/epidemiología , Monkeypox virus/genética , Reino UnidoRESUMEN
Most studies on surface persistence of SARS-CoV-2 have been conducted at temperatures between 20°C and 30°C. There is limited data on the survival of SARS-CoV-2 at low temperatures. In this study, the stability of SARS-CoV-2 Alpha and Delta variants on stainless steel was investigated at two temperatures (4°C and 24°C). The results show that both variants decayed more rapidly at 24°C compared with 4°C. At 24°C, Alpha and Delta variants showed reductions of 0.33 log10 and 1.02 log10, respectively, within the first 2.5 h. However, at 4°C, Alpha variant showed a reduction of 0.16 log10 within the first 2.5 h while no reduction was observed with Delta variant. After remaining in situ for 24 h at 24°C, log10 reductions of 2.66 (Alpha) and 3.11 (Delta) were observed. No viable Alpha and Delta variant was recovered after 48 h and 72 h, respectively. After 24 h in a refrigerated environment (4°C) log10 reductions of 1.16 (Alpha) and 0.95 (Delta) were observed. Under these experimental conditions, both viruses survived on stainless steel for at least 1 week. No viable Alpha and Delta variant was recovered after 10 days. These findings support the potential for increased fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during winter months in colder regions worldwide and in some industrial sectors. IMPORTANCE Human transmission is believed to occur primarily through direct transfer of infectious droplets or aerosols. However, fomite transmission through contact with contaminated surfaces may also play an important role. This study provides novel evidence comparing the stability of Alpha and Delta variants on stainless steel surfaces at 4°C and 24°C. At 4°C both variants were found to be still detectable for up to 7 days. At 24°C Delta variant could be recovered over 2 days compared with Alpha variant which could not be recovered after 2 days. This has implications for fomite transmission interventions for people living and working in cold environments.