Accuracy of US CDC COVID-19 forecasting models.

Accurate predictive modeling of pandemics is essential for optimally distributing biomedical resources and setting policy. Dozens of case prediction models have been proposed but their accuracy over time and by model type remains unclear. In this study, we systematically analyze all US CDC COVID-19 forecasting models, by first categorizing them and then calculating their mean absolute percent error, both wave-wise and on the complete timeline. We compare their estimates to government-reported case numbers, one another, as well as two baseline models wherein case counts remain static or follow a simple linear trend. The comparison reveals that around two-thirds of models fail to outperform a simple static case baseline and one-third fail to outperform a simple linear trend forecast. A wave-by-wave comparison of models revealed that no overall modeling approach was superior to others, including ensemble models and errors in modeling have increased over time during the pandemic. This study raises concerns about hosting these models on official public platforms of health organizations including the US CDC which risks giving them an official imprimatur and when utilized to formulate policy. By offering a universal evaluation method for pandemic forecasting models, we expect this study to serve as the starting point for the development of more accurate models.

What drives disagreement about moral hypocrisy? Perceived comparability and how people exploit it to criticize enemies and defend allies.

Charges of hypocrisy are usually thought to be to be damning. Yet when a hypocrisy charge is made, there often remains disagreement about whether or not its target really is a hypocrite. Why? Three pre-registered experiments (N = 2599) conceptualize and test the role of perceived comparability in evaluating hypocrisy. Calling someone a hypocrite typically entails invoking a comparison-one meant to highlight internal contradiction and cast moral character into question. Yet there is ambiguity about which sorts of comparisons are valid in the first place. We argue that disagreements about moral hypocrisy often boil down to disagreements about comparability. Although the comparability of two situations should not depend on whose behavior is being scrutinized, observers shift comparability judgments in line with social motives to criticize or defend. In short, we identify a cognitive factor that can help to explain why, for similar patterns of behavior, people see hypocrisy in their enemies but consistency in themselves and their allies.