RESUMEN
Secure multi-party computation of Chebyshev distance represents a crucial method for confidential distance measurement, holding significant theoretical and practical implications. Especially within electronic archival management systems, secure computation of Chebyshev distance is employed for similarity measurement, classification, and clustering of sensitive archival information, thereby enhancing the security of sensitive archival queries and sharing. This paper proposes a secure protocol for computing Chebyshev distance under a semi-honest model, leveraging the additive homomorphic properties of the NTRU cryptosystem and a vector encoding method. This protocol transforms the confidential computation of Chebyshev distance into the inner product of confidential computation vectors, as demonstrated through the model paradigm validating its security under the semi-honest model. Addressing potential malicious participant scenarios, a secure protocol for computing Chebyshev distance under a malicious model is introduced, utilizing cryptographic tools such as digital commitments and mutual decryption methods. The security of this protocol under the malicious model is affirmed using the real/ideal model paradigm. Theoretical analysis and experimental simulations demonstrate the efficiency and practical applicability of the proposed schemes.
