Do Adverse Childhood Experiences Make Us More Utilitarian in Moral Dilemmas?

Purpose: Adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) have been associated with various aspects of morality, but their precise impact on moral decision-making remains unclear. This study aims to explore how ACEs influence moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas. Methods: Study 1 employed traditional dilemma analysis to quantify utilitarian responses and compare them among groups with no, low, and high ACEs. Study 2 utilized the CNI model to quantify three determinants of moral decision-making: sensitivity to consequences (C parameter), sensitivity to norms (N parameter), and general action tendencies (I parameter). Differences in these parameters among groups with no, low, and high ACEs were investigated. Results: Both Study 1 and Study 2 revealed that the high-ACE and low-ACE groups showed significantly higher utilitarian responses compared to the no-ACE group. However, no notable differences emerged between the high-ACE and low-ACE groups. Study 2 found that the N parameter was significantly lower in the high-ACE group compared to the low and no-ACE groups. Similarly, the low-ACE group exhibited significantly lower scores in the N parameter compared to the no-ACE group. Additionally, no significant differences were observed in the C and I parameters among groups with no, low, and high ACEs. Conclusion: These findings suggest that individuals with a high number of ACEs tend to exhibit more utilitarian responses, attributed to decreased affective response to the violation of moral rules, rather than increased deliberative cost-benefit reasoning or a general preference for action. Such insights deepen our understanding of the precise aspects of moral decision-making influenced by ACEs.

Effects of Alexithymia on Moral Decision-Making in Sacrificial Dilemmas: High Alexithymia is Associated with Weaker Sensitivity to Moral Norms.

Purpose: Although several studies have investigated the association between alexithymia and moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas, the evidence remains mixed. The current work investigated this association and how alexithymia affects moral choice in such dilemmas. Methods: The current research used a multinomial model (ie, CNI model) to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms in responses to moral dilemmas. Results: Higher levels of alexithymia were associated with a greater preference for utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (Study 1). Furthermore, individuals with high alexithymia showed significantly weaker sensitivity to moral norms than did those with low alexithymia, whereas there were no significant differences in sensitivity to consequences or a general preference for inaction versus action (Study 2). Conclusion: The findings suggest that alexithymia affects moral choice in sacrificial dilemmas by blunting emotional reactions to causing harm, rather than through increased deliberative cost-benefit reasoning or general preference for inaction.

Effects of Primary and Secondary Psychopathy on Deontological and Utilitarian Response Tendencies: The Mediator Role of Alexithymia.

(1) Background: The purpose of this study is to provide more nuanced insights into the effects of sub-dimensional levels of psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. To this end, this study examined the effects of primary and secondary psychopathy on utilitarian and deontological response tendencies. Moreover, this study also explored the mediating role of alexithymia as well as the moderating role of gender in these effects. (2) Methods: A total of 1227 participants were recruited through the online questionnaire service wjx.cn. After deleting unfinished questionnaires, the remaining 1170 participants were included in the final data analysis. Each participant completed a demographic information questionnaire, the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale, the Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20, and six pairs of moral dilemmas. Descriptive and correlational analyses of study variables were conducted in SPSS 22.0. Mediation and gender difference analyses were conducted in AMOS 23.0. (3) Results: Primary psychopathy was negatively correlated with deontological response tendencies and uncorrelated with utilitarian response tendencies. By contrast, secondary psychopathy also correlated negatively with deontological response tendencies, but it correlated positively with utilitarian response tendencies. Mediation analysis revealed that alexithymia only mediated the relationship between secondary psychopathy and deontological response tendencies. Multi-group analysis revealed that there was no difference between females and males in the indirect effect model. (4) Conclusions: People with high primary psychopathy are less likely to reject harm in moral dilemmas. By contrast, people with high secondary psychopathy have high alexithymia, which causes them to be less concerned about avoiding harm, and they are more likely to maximize outcomes in moral dilemmas. These findings shed new light on the moral dilemma judgments of individuals with primary and secondary psychopathy.

Why People With High Alexithymia Make More Utilitarian Judgments.

Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.

Gain-loss situation modulates neural responses to self-other decision making under risk.

Although self-other behavioral differences in decision making under risk have been observed in some contexts, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying such differences. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the cups task, in which participants choose between risky and sure options for themselves and others in gain and loss situations, we found that people were more risk-taking when making decisions for themselves than for others in loss situations but were equally risk-averse in gain situations. Significantly stronger activations were observed in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and anterior insula (AI) when making decisions for the self than for others in loss situations but not in gain situations. Furthermore, the activation in the dmPFC was stronger when people made sure choices for others than for themselves in gain situations but not when they made risky choices, and was both stronger when people made sure and risky choices for themselves than for others in loss situations. These findings suggest that gain-loss situation modulates self-other differences in decision making under risk, and people are highly likely to differentiate the self from others when making decisions in loss situations.

Belief Bias Effect in Older Adults: Roles of Working Memory and Need for Cognition.

Belief bias is the tendency in syllogistic reasoning to rely on prior beliefs rather than to fully obey logical principles. Few studies have investigated the age effect on belief bias. Although several studies have recently begun to explore this topic, little is known about the psychological mechanisms underlying such an effect. Accordingly, we investigated belief bias in older and young adults and explored the roles of working memory (WM) and need for cognition (NFC) in the relationship between age and reasoning performance. We found that older adults showed a lower accuracy rate compared with young adults when conclusion believability and logical validity were incongruent. However, older adults showed a higher accuracy rate compared with young adults when conclusion believability and logical validity were congruent. The results indicated that in comparison with young adults, prior beliefs hampered logical reasoning more significantly in older adults under incongruent conditions and boosted logical reasoning more significantly under congruent conditions. Moreover, the logic index in older adults was significantly lower than in young adults, and the interaction index of believability and validity in older adults was significantly below zero. Furthermore, NFC mediated the age effect on reasoning performance under the two conditions. By contrast, WM mediated the age effect on reasoning performance only under incongruent conditions and did not act as a mediator under congruent conditions.

Decisions for Others Are Less Risk-Averse in the Gain Frame and Less Risk-Seeking in the Loss Frame Than Decisions for the Self.

Despite the fact that people make decisions for others as often as they make decisions for themselves, little is known about how decisions for others are different from those made for the self. In two experiments, we investigated the effect of social distance (i.e., making decisions for oneself, a friend, or a stranger) on risk preferences in both gain and loss situations. We found that people were more risk averse in gain situations when they made decisions for themselves than for a stranger (Studies 1 and 2), but were equally risk averse for themselves and their friends (Study 2). However, people were more risk seeking in loss situations when they made decisions for themselves than for their friends as well as for a stranger, and were more risk seeking for their friends than for a stranger (Study 2). Furthermore, the effect of social distance on risk preferences was stronger in loss than in gain situations. Mediation analysis indicated that outcome-induced loss aversion was responsible for effects of social distance on risk preferences. These findings demonstrate that social distance influences risk preferences via perceived loss aversion, which sheds new light on self-other differences in decision making.