RESUMEN
This data article describes a dataset of US CEO turnover types created with manual data collection through searches of news stories related to CEO turnover. The data identify the fiscal year of turnover and its type for top managers in publicly-traded US firms. Researchers in economics, finance and accounting explore the role of CEO turnover in various settings, however data on the timing and type of CEO departures are not always reliably available. We identify turnover cases based on changes in the CEO of the firm as recorded in secondary data sources of Compustat and Execucomp, and then we classify turnover types based on the examination of full-text news. By including data on company and executive identifiers, this dataset may be merged with existing finance and accounting databases and used in future research on a variety of topics. The data includes 3,100 US publicly-traded firms and may be used in both cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses.
RESUMEN
This study explores whether the sensitivity of CEO compensation to changes in firm performance depends on the CEO's likelihood of leaving the position. In a sample of 3180 US publicly-traded firms, we find that the sensitivity of bonus pay to firm performance is enhanced for a CEO who has reached retirement age. Further, we find that the sensitivity of bonus pay to firm performance is greater when there is evidence of a planned CEO turnover within a two-year window. We show that these findings are consistent with a principal-agent model in which firms who anticipate a greater likelihood of CEO departure find it advantageous to enhance the link between bonus pay and concurrent performance measures to compensate for the lowering of incentives that rely on the manager being employed long-term. The results provide a rationale for including bonus pay in the overall executive compensation package.
