Episodic memory without autonoetic consciousness.

Ever since Tulving's influential 1985 article 'Memory and consciousness', it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Modeling confidence in causal judgments.

Counterfactual theories propose that people's capacity for causal judgment depends on their ability to consider alternative possibilities: The lightning strike caused the forest fire because had it not struck, the forest fire would not have ensued. To accommodate a variety of psychological effects on causal judgment, a range of recent accounts have proposed that people probabilistically sample counterfactual alternatives from which they compute a graded measure of causal strength. While such models successfully describe the influence of the statistical normality (i.e., the base rate) of the candidate and alternate causes on causal judgments, we show that they make further untested predictions about how normality influences people's confidence in their causal judgments. In a large (N = 3,020) sample of participants in a causal judgment task, we found that normality indeed influences people's confidence in their causal judgments and that these influences were predicted by a counterfactual sampling model in which people are more confident in a causal relationship when the effect of the cause is less variable among imagined counterfactual possibilities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

A network correspondence toolbox for quantitative evaluation of novel neuroimaging results.

Decades of neuroscience research has shown that macroscale brain dynamics can be reliably decomposed into a subset of large-scale functional networks, but the specific spatial topographies of these networks and the names used to describe them can vary across studies. Such discordance has hampered interpretation and convergence of research findings across the field. To address this problem, we have developed the Network Correspondence Toolbox (NCT) to permit researchers to examine and report spatial correspondence between their novel neuroimaging results and sixteen widely used functional brain atlases, consistent with recommended reporting standards developed by the Organization for Human Brain Mapping. The atlases included in the toolbox show some topographical convergence for specific networks, such as those labeled as default or visual. Network naming varies across atlases, particularly for networks spanning frontoparietal association cortices. For this reason, quantitative comparison with multiple atlases is recommended to benchmark novel neuroimaging findings. We provide several exemplar demonstrations using the Human Connectome Project task fMRI results and UK Biobank independent component analysis maps to illustrate how researchers can use the NCT to report their own findings through quantitative evaluation against multiple published atlases. The NCT provides a convenient means for computing Dice coefficients with spin test permutations to determine the magnitude and statistical significance of correspondence among user-defined maps and existing atlas labels. The NCT also includes functionality to incorporate additional atlases in the future. The adoption of the NCT will make it easier for network neuroscience researchers to report their findings in a standardized manner, thus aiding reproducibility and facilitating comparisons between studies to produce interdisciplinary insights.

Connectivity analyses for task-based fMRI.

Functional connectivity is conventionally defined by measuring the similarity between brain signals from two regions. The technique has become widely adopted in the analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, where it has provided cognitive neuroscientists with abundant information on how brain regions interact to support complex cognition. However, in the past decade the notion of "connectivity" has expanded in both the complexity and heterogeneity of its application to cognitive neuroscience, resulting in greater difficulty of interpretation, replication, and cross-study comparisons. In this paper, we begin with the canonical notions of functional connectivity and then introduce recent methodological developments that either estimate some alternative form of connectivity or extend the analytical framework, with the hope of bringing better clarity for cognitive neuroscience researchers.

Counterfactual thinking induces different neural patterns of memory modification in anxious individuals.

Episodic counterfactual thinking (eCFT) is the process of mentally simulating alternate versions of experiences, which confers new phenomenological properties to the original memory and may be a useful therapeutic target for trait anxiety. However, it remains unclear how the neural representations of a memory change during eCFT. We hypothesized that eCFT-induced memory modification is associated with changes to the neural pattern of a memory primarily within the default mode network, moderated by dispositional anxiety levels. We tested this proposal by examining the representational dynamics of eCFT for 39 participants varying in trait anxiety. During eCFT, lateral parietal regions showed progressively more distinct activity patterns, whereas medial frontal neural activity patterns became more similar to those of the original memory. Neural pattern similarity in many default mode network regions was moderated by trait anxiety, where highly anxious individuals exhibited more generalized representations for upward eCFT (better counterfactual outcomes), but more distinct representations for downward eCFT (worse counterfactual outcomes). Our findings illustrate the efficacy of examining eCFT-based memory modification via neural pattern similarity, as well as the intricate interplay between trait anxiety and eCFT generation.

Looking at Mental Images: Eye-Tracking Mental Simulation During Retrospective Causal Judgment.

How do people evaluate causal relationships? Do they just consider what actually happened, or do they also consider what could have counterfactually happened? Using eye tracking and Gaussian process modeling, we investigated how people mentally simulated past events to judge what caused the outcomes to occur. Participants played a virtual ball-shooting game and then-while looking at a blank screen-mentally simulated (a) what actually happened, (b) what counterfactually could have happened, or (c) what caused the outcome to happen. Our findings showed that participants moved their eyes in patterns consistent with the actual or counterfactual events that they mentally simulated. When simulating what caused the outcome to occur, participants moved their eyes consistent with simulations of counterfactual possibilities. These results favor counterfactual theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how eye movements can reflect simulation during this reasoning and provide a novel approach for investigating retrospective causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking.

The emotional impact of baseless discrediting of knowledge: An empirical investigation of epistemic injustice.

According to theoretical work on epistemic injustice, baseless discrediting of the knowledge of people with marginalized social identities is a central driver of prejudice and discrimination. Discrediting of knowledge may sometimes be subtle, but it is pernicious, inducing chronic stress and coping strategies such as emotional avoidance. In this research, we sought to deepen the understanding of epistemic injustice's impact by examining emotional responses to being discredited and assessing if marginalized social group membership predicts these responses. We conducted a novel series of three experiments (Total N = 1690) in which participants (1) shared their factual knowledge about how a game worked or their personal feelings about the game; (2) received discrediting feedback (invalidating remarks), validating feedback (affirming remarks), or insulting feedback (general negative social evaluation); and then (3) reported their affect. In all three studies, on average, affective responses to discrediting feedback were less negative than to insulting feedback, and more negative than to validating feedback. Participants who shared their knowledge reported more negative affect after discrediting feedback than participants who shared their feelings. There were consistent individual differences, including a twice-replicated finding of reduced negative affect after receiving discrediting and insulting feedback for Black men compared to White men and women and Black women. Black men's race-based traumatic symptom scores predicted their affective responses to discrediting and insulting feedback, suggesting that experience with discrimination contributed to the emotional processing of a key aspect of epistemic injustice: remarks conveying baseless discrediting of knowledge.

Perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity in episodic counterfactual thinking.

Episodic counterfactual thinking (ECT) consists of imagining alternative outcomes to past personal events. Previous research has shown that ECT shares common neural substrates with episodic future thinking (EFT): our ability to imagine possible future events. Both ECT and EFT have been shown to critically depend on the hippocampus, and past research has explored hippocampal engagement as a function of the perceived plausibility of an imagined future event. However, the extent to which the hippocampus is modulated by perceived plausibility during ECT is unknown. In this study, we combine two functional magnetic resonance imaging datasets to investigate whether perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity during ECT. Our results indicate that plausibility parametrically modulates hippocampal activity during ECT, and that such modulation is confined to the left anterior portion of the hippocampus. Moreover, our results indicate that this modulation is positive, such that increased activity in the left anterior hippocampus is associated with higher ratings of ECT plausibility. We suggest that neither effort nor difficulty alone can account for these results, and instead suggest possible alternatives to explain the role of the hippocampus during the construction of plausible and implausible ECT.

A computational modeling approach to investigating mind wandering-related adjustments to gaze behavior during scene viewing.

Research on gaze control has long shown that increased visual-cognitive processing demands in scene viewing are associated with longer fixation durations. More recently, though, longer durations have also been linked to mind wandering, a perceptually decoupled state of attention marked by decreased visual-cognitive processing. Toward better understanding the relationship between fixation durations and visual-cognitive processing, we ran simulations using an established random-walk model for saccade timing and programming and assessed which model parameters best predicted modulations in fixation durations associated with mind wandering compared to attentive viewing. Mind wandering-related fixation durations were best described as an increase in the variability of the fixation-generating process, leading to more variable-sometimes very long-durations. In contrast, past research showed that increased processing demands increased the mean duration of the fixation-generating process. The findings thus illustrate that mind wandering and processing demands modulate fixation durations through different mechanisms in scene viewing. This suggests that processing demands cannot be inferred from changes in fixation durations without understanding the underlying mechanism by which these changes were generated.

On the frequency and nature of the cues that elicit déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories.

Barzykowski and Moulin suggest that déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories recruit similar retrieval processes. Here, we invite the authors to clarify three issues: (1) What mechanism prevents déjà vu to happen more frequently? (2) What is the role of semantic cues in involuntary autobiographical retrieval? and (3) How déjà vu relates to non-believed memories?

Controversies and progress on standardization of large-scale brain network nomenclature.

Progress in scientific disciplines is accompanied by standardization of terminology. Network neuroscience, at the level of macroscale organization of the brain, is beginning to confront the challenges associated with developing a taxonomy of its fundamental explanatory constructs. The Workgroup for HArmonized Taxonomy of NETworks (WHATNET) was formed in 2020 as an Organization for Human Brain Mapping (OHBM)-endorsed best practices committee to provide recommendations on points of consensus, identify open questions, and highlight areas of ongoing debate in the service of moving the field toward standardized reporting of network neuroscience results. The committee conducted a survey to catalog current practices in large-scale brain network nomenclature. A few well-known network names (e.g., default mode network) dominated responses to the survey, and a number of illuminating points of disagreement emerged. We summarize survey results and provide initial considerations and recommendations from the workgroup. This perspective piece includes a selective review of challenges to this enterprise, including (1) network scale, resolution, and hierarchies; (2) interindividual variability of networks; (3) dynamics and nonstationarity of networks; (4) consideration of network affiliations of subcortical structures; and (5) consideration of multimodal information. We close with minimal reporting guidelines for the cognitive and network neuroscience communities to adopt.

"Repressed Memory" Makes No Sense.

The expression "repressed memory" was introduced over 100 years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked-yet the term "repressed memory" seems to remain. In this paper, I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this theoretical term as well as an argument to question its scientific status by comparing it to other cases of theoretical terms that have either survived scientific change-such as "atom" or "gene"-or that have perished, such as "black bile." Ultimately, I argue that "repressed memory" is more like "black bile" than "atom" or "gene" and, thus, recommend its demotion from our scientific vocabulary.

Moralization and self-control strategy selection.

To manage conflicts between temptation and commitment, people use self-control. The process model of self-control outlines different strategies for managing the onset and experience of temptation. However, little is known about the decision-making factors underlying strategy selection. Across three experiments (N = 317), we tested whether the moral valence of a commitment predicts how people advise attentional self-control strategies. In Experiments 1 and 2, people rated attentional focus strategies as significantly more effective for people tempted to break moral relative to immoral commitments, even when controlling for perceived temptation and trait self-control. Experiment 3 showed that as people perceived commitments to have more positive moral valence, they judged attentional focus strategies to be significantly more effective relative to attentional distraction strategies. Moreover, this effect was partly mediated by perceived differences in motivation. These results indicate that moralization informs decision-making processes related to self-control strategy selection.

Not Every Thing Must Go.

In The Entangled Brain, Pessoa criticizes standard approaches in cognitive neuroscience in which the brain is seen as a functionally decomposable, modular system with causal operations built up hierarchically. Instead, he advocates for an emergentist perspective whereby dynamic brain networks are associated, not with traditional psychological categories, but with behavioral functions characterized in evolutionary terms. Here, we raise a number of concerns with such a radical approach. We ultimately believe that although much revision to cognitive neuroscience is welcome and needed, Pessoa's more radical proposals may be counterproductive.

Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent wrongdoing.

Third-personal judgments of blame are typically sensitive to what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based on perceived mental control, or the degree to which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over time. To acquire information about others' mental control, people self-project their own perceived mental control to anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four experiments (N = 841), we tested whether perceptions of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with which people can counterfactually imagine an individual being non-negligent mediated the relationship between judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated that perceived mental control has a strong effect on judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent wrongdoers less harshly compared with a control group for whom past episodes of negligence were not salient. Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of responsibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Prestimulus oscillatory brain activity interacts with evoked recurrent processing to facilitate conscious visual perception.

We investigated whether prestimulus alpha-band oscillatory activity and stimulus-elicited recurrent processing interact to facilitate conscious visual perception. Participants tried to perceive a visual stimulus that was perceptually masked through object substitution masking (OSM). We showed that attenuated prestimulus alpha power was associated with greater negative-polarity stimulus-evoked ERP activity that resembled the visual awareness negativity (VAN), previously argued to reflect recurrent processing related to conscious perception. This effect, however, was not associated with better perception. Instead, when prestimulus alpha power was elevated, a preferred prestimulus alpha phase was associated with a greater VAN-like negativity, which was then associated with better cue perception. Cue perception was worse when prestimulus alpha power was elevated but the stimulus occurred at a nonoptimal prestimulus alpha phase and the VAN-like negativity was low. Our findings suggest that prestimulus alpha activity at a specific phase enables temporally selective recurrent processing that facilitates conscious perception in OSM.

A functional neuroimaging investigation of Moral Foundations Theory.

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that the human mind contains modules (or "foundations") that are functionally specialized to moralize unique dimensions of the social world: Authority, Loyalty, Purity, Harm, Fairness, and Liberty. Despite this strong claim about cognitive architecture, it is unclear whether neural activity during moral reasoning exhibits this modular structure. Here, we use spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation (PLSC) analyses of fMRI data collected during judgments of foundation-specific violations to investigate whether MFT's cognitive modularity claim extends to the neural level. A mean-centered PLSC analysis returned two latent variables that differentiated between social norm and moral foundation violations, functionally segregated Purity, Loyalty, Physical Harm, and Fairness from the other foundations, and suggested that Authority has a different neural basis than other binding foundations. Non-rotated PLSC analyses confirmed that neural activity distinguished social norm from moral foundation violations, and distinguished individualizing and binding moral foundations if Authority is dropped from the binding foundations. Purity violations were persistently associated with amygdala activity, whereas moral foundation violations more broadly tended to engage the default network. Our results constitute partial evidence for neural modularity and motivate further research on the novel groupings identified by the PLSC analyses.

Neural differences between internal and external episodic counterfactual thoughts.

Episodic counterfactual thoughts (eCFT) consist of imagining alternative outcomes to past experiences. A common sub-class of eCFT-upward eCFT-involves imagining how past negative experiences could have been better, either because one could have done something differently (internal) or because something about the circumstances could have been different (external). Although previous neuroimaging research has shown that the brain's default mode network (DMN) supports upward eCFT, it is unclear how it is differentially recruited during internal versus external upward eCFT. We collected functional magnetic resonance imaging data while participants remembered negative autobiographical memories, generated either internal or external upward eCFT for the memory, and then rated the plausibility, perceived control and difficulty of eCFT generation. Both internal and external eCFT engaged midline regions of cingulate cortex, a central node of the DMN. Most activity differentiating eCFT, however, occurred outside the DMN. External eCFT engaged cuneus, angular gyrus and precuneus, whereas internal eCFT engaged posterior cingulate and precentral gyrus. Angular gyrus and precuneus were additionally sensitive to perceived plausibility of external eCFT, while postcentral gyrus and insula activity scaled with perceived plausibility of internal eCFT. These results highlight the key brain regions that might be involved in cases of maladaptive mental simulations. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

The moderating effects of nostalgia on mood and optimism during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The initial waves of the coronavirus pandemic amplified feelings of depression, psychological fatigue and pessimism for the future. Past research suggests that nostalgia helps to repair negative moods by boosting current and future-oriented positive affect, thereby strengthening psychological resilience. Accordingly, the present study investigated whether nostalgia moderated the relationship between pandemic experience and individual differences in mood and optimism. Across two studies we assessed psychosocial self-report data from a total of 293 online participants (22-72 years old; mean age 38; 109 females, 184 males) during the first two waves of the pandemic. Participants completed comprehensive questionnaires that probed state and trait characteristics related to mood and memory, such as the Profile of Mood States, Nostalgia Inventory and State Optimism Measure. Our findings indicate that during the initial wave of coronavirus cases, higher levels of nostalgia buffered against deteriorating mood states associated with concern over the pandemic. Nostalgia also boosted optimism for participants experiencing negative mood, and optimism predicted subjective mood improvement one week later. This shielding effect of nostalgia on optimism was replicated during the second wave of coronavirus cases. The present findings support the role of nostalgia in promoting emotional homeostasis and resilience during periods of psychological distress.