Retracted papers originating from paper mills: cross sectional study.

OBJECTIVES: To describe retracted papers originating from paper mills, including their characteristics, visibility, and impact over time, and the journals in which they were published. DESIGN: Cross sectional study. SETTING: The Retraction Watch database was used for identification of retracted papers from paper mills, Web of Science was used for the total number of published papers, and data from Journal Citation Reports were collected to show characteristics of journals. PARTICIPANTS: All paper mill papers retracted from 1 January 2004 to 26 June 2022 were included in the study. Papers bearing an expression of concern were excluded. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Descriptive statistics were used to characterise the sample and analyse the trend of retracted paper mill papers over time, and to analyse their impact and visibility by reference to the number of citations received. RESULTS: 1182 retracted paper mill papers were identified. The publication of the first paper mill paper was in 2004 and the first retraction was in 2016; by 2021, paper mill retractions accounted for 772 (21.8%) of the 3544 total retractions. Overall, retracted paper mill papers were mostly published in journals of the second highest Journal Citation Reports quartile for impact factor (n=529 (44.8%)) and listed four to six authors (n=602 (50.9%)). Of the 1182 papers, almost all listed authors of 1143 (96.8%) paper mill retractions came from Chinese institutions and 909 (76.9%) listed a hospital as a primary affiliation. 15 journals accounted for 812 (68.7%) of 1182 paper mill retractions, with one journal accounting for 166 (14.0%). Nearly all (n=1083, 93.8%) paper mill retractions had received at least one citation since publication, with a median of 11 (interquartile range 5-22) citations received. CONCLUSIONS: Papers retracted originating from paper mills are increasing in frequency, posing a problem for the research community. Retracted paper mill papers most commonly originated from China and were published in a small number of journals. Nevertheless, detected paper mill papers might be substantially different from those that are not detected. New mechanisms are needed to identify and avoid this relatively new type of misconduct.

A Review of the Talc Industry's Influence on Federal Regulation and Scientific Standards for Asbestos in Talc.

The talc industry and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have asserted that talc has been asbestos-free since 1976 when the industry created a voluntary specification for the asbestos content of cosmetic talc. However, recent evidence reveals that cosmetic talc is not and never was asbestos-free. This narrative review examines the talc industry's role in delaying and ultimately blocking federal regulation of cosmetic talc from the 1970s to today. We review primary source material, including corporate documents released in recent litigation and FDA documents released in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. Our results indicate that the talc industry exerted considerable influence over three key areas: regulatory proceedings at the FDA; testing methods and the manipulation of test results (including undisclosed results); and press coverage and the medical literature. The talc companies' actions and FDA indifference have had a lasting effect on consumer health, including the regulation of talc by other government agencies.

Serous Ovarian Cancer Caused by Exposure to Asbestos and Fibrous Talc in Cosmetic Talc Powders-A Case Series.

OBJECTIVE: Asbestos is a known cause of ovarian cancer. We report 10 cases of serous ovarian cancer among users of Johnson & Johnson (J&J) asbestos-containing "cosmetic" talc products. METHODS: We conducted an asbestos exposure assessment during talc application and analyzed surgical tissues and talc containers for asbestos and talc. RESULTS: Talc was found in all cases and tremolite and/or anthophyllite asbestos was found in 8/10 cases. The asbestos fibers found in the "cosmetic" talc containers matched those found in tissues. We estimated inhaled asbestos dose ranged from 0.38 to 5.18 fiber years. CONCLUSION: We provide evidence that the inhaled dose of asbestos/fibrous talc from "cosmetic" talc use causes ovarian cancer. The unique combination of the types of asbestiform minerals detected in cancerous tissue and "cosmetic" talc is a fingerprint for exposure to asbestos-containing talc.

The marketing of OxyContin®: A cautionary tale.

This paper provides a review of Purdue Pharma, LP's development and marketing of the long-acting oral narcotic OxyContin®. Within five years of the drug's launch, OxyContin® became the number-one prescribed Schedule II narcotic in the United States. This commercial success was in part the result of a marketing campaign that promoted questionably "distinctive" benefits and minimised the very real dangers of OxyContin®, which include abuse, addiction, overdose, and death. The marketing was based on scientifically invalid or unproven claims of safety and efficacy, inappropriate, off-label marketing, and inadequate warnings. When the FDA belatedly asked for changes to some of the marketing language, Purdue exploited these changes to further marketing objectives and misled healthcare practitioners. This case highlights questions of industry and governmental/regulatory accountability and responsibility for the production, marketing and sale of pharmaceutical products that increase risk while driving enhanced profits.

Grave fraudulence in medical device research: a narrative review of the PIN seeding study for the Pinnacle hip system.

In 2001, DePuy, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson (J&J/DePuy), initiated a seeding study called the "Multi-center, Prospective, Clinical Evaluation of Pinnacle Acetabular Implants in Total Hip Arthroplasty" (PIN Study). J&J/DePuy designed this study to develop new business opportunities during the launch of their Pinnacle Hip System (PHS) and generate survivorship data for marketing. This article, the first review of a seeding trial for a medical device, examines internal company documents relating to the PIN Study; the analysis herein focuses on the integrity of J&J/DePuy's research practices in conception, implementation, and analysis. J&J/DePuy violated the study protocol and manipulated data; consented participants in violation of standards protecting human subjects; and did not secure Institutional Review Board approval for all study sites. J&J/DePuy used PIN Study results as the "fundamental selling point" for the PHS. Medical device seeding trials are distinct from previously-documented pharmaceutical seeding trials because companies can profit directly from device sales and because these studies may be the first clinical evaluation of the device (as was the case for the PIN Study). Seeding trials are malleable marketing projects, not rigorous scientific studies. Regulatory bodies, physicians, and others should be vigilant for persuasive marketing accounts disguised as science.

Ethics, morality, and conflicting interests: how questionable professional integrity in some scientists supports global corporate influence in public health.

Clinical and public health research, education, and medical practice are vulnerable to influence by corporate interests driven by the for-profit motive. Developments over the last 10 years have shown that transparency and self-reporting of corporate ties do not always mitigate bias. In this article, we provide examples of how sound scientific reasoning and evidence-gathering are undermined through compromised scientific enquiry resulting in misleading science, decision-making, and policy intervention. Various medical disciplines provide reference literature essential for informing public, environmental, and occupational health policy. Published literature impacts clinical and laboratory methods, the validity of respective clinical guidelines, and the development and implementation of public health regulations. Said literature is also used in expert testimony related to resolving tort actions on work-related illnesses and environmental risks. We call for increased sensitivity, full transparency, and the implementation of effective ethical and professional praxis rules at all relevant regulatory levels to rout out inappropriate corporate influence in science. This is needed because influencing the integrity of scientists who engage in such activities cannot be depended upon.

MetLife and its corporate allies: dust diseases and the manipulation of science.

BACKGROUND: The dust diseases silicosis and asbestosis were the first occupational diseases to have widespread impact on workers. Knowledge that asbestos and silica were hazardous to health became public long after the industry knew of the health concerns. This delay was largely influenced by the interests of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife). OBJECTIVES: To understand how MetLife influenced the science and politics of asbestos and silica exposure in the first half of the twentieth century. METHODS: We examined previously secret corporate documents produced in litigation, deposition, and trial testimony, as well as published scholarship. RESULTS: MetLife established itself as an authority in public and industrial health in the early part of the twentieth century, gaining the trust of the public and government. They were able to use this trust and authority to avoid financial loss, including the firing of sick workers, and avoid legal liability by organizing a network of experts to testify on their behalf in silica- and asbestos-related damage suits. They further manipulated the results of scientific findings from major research institutions, delaying important knowledge about the asbestos-cancer relationship. They also influenced law and public policy through writing and implementing worker compensation laws in numerous states and concocting an arbitrary "protective" standard to monitor asbestos exposure. This standard was known by MetLife to not protect against disease. CONCLUSIONS: The actions of MetLife and its allies had real human and scientific consequences and an effect on the industry lasting until now.

Bronchiolitis obliterans and consumer exposure to butter-flavored microwave popcorn: a case series.

Respiratory exposure to diacetyl and diacetyl-containing flavorings used in butter-flavored microwave popcorn (BFMP) causes lung disease, including bronchiolitis obliterans (BO), in flavorings and popcorn manufacturing workers. However, there are no published reports of lung disease among BFMP consumers. We present a case series of three BFMP consumers with biopsy-confirmed BO. We review data relating to consumer exposures, estimate case exposures, and compare them to diacetyl-containing flavoring-exposed manufacturing workers with lung disease. These consumer cases' exposure levels are comparable to those that caused disease in workers. We were unable to identify any other exposures or diseases known or suspected to cause BO in these cases. BFMP poses a significant respiratory risk to consumers. Some manufacturers have substituted diacetyl with other alpha-diketones that are likely to pose a similar risk. Simple consumer practices such as cooling the popcorn bag would eliminate the risk of severe lung disease.

Study of neurontin: titrate to effect, profile of safety (STEPS) trial: a narrative account of a gabapentin seeding trial.

BACKGROUND: Seeding trials, clinical studies conducted by pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes, have rarely been described in detail. METHODS: We examined all documents relating to the clinical trial Study of Neurontin: Titrate to Effect, Profile of Safety (STEPS) produced during the Neurontin marketing, sales practices, and product liability litigation, including company internal and external correspondence, reports, and presentations, as well as depositions elicited in legal proceedings of Harden Manufacturing vs Pfizer and Franklin vs Warner-Lambert, most which were created between 1990 and 2009. Using a systematic search strategy, we identified and reviewed all documents related to the STEPS trial in order to identify key themes related to the trial's conduct and determine the extent of marketing involvement in its planning and implementation. RESULTS: Documents demonstrated that STEPS was a seeding trial posing as a legitimate scientific study. Documents consistently described the trial itself, not trial results, to be a marketing tactic in the company's marketing plans. Documents demonstrated that at least 2 external sources questioned the validity of the study before execution, and that data quality during the study was often compromised. Furthermore, documents described company analyses examining the impact of participating as a STEPS investigator on rates and dosages of gabapentin prescribing, finding a positive association. None of these findings were reported in 2 published articles. CONCLUSION: The STEPS trial was a seeding trial, used to promote gabapentin and increase prescribing among investigators, and marketing was extensively involved in its planning and implementation.

A proposal for a safe exposure level for diacetyl.

Diacetyl is a naturally occurring compound that has been used in concentrated form as a food additive, particularly in butter flavorings. Inhalation of diacetyl and butter flavoring fumes has caused a variety of respiratory diseases in workers and consumers including bronchiolitis obliterans (BO), a relatively rare, severe, and irreversible lung disease. A safe level of exposure to diacetyl has not been established. We review the literature on diacetyl and flavoring toxicity and critique a recent proposal for an occupational exposure limit (OEL) of 0.2 ppm for diacetyl. We present unpublished data and novel analyses in support of our proposal for a safe level of exposure. Our findings indicate that a safe level of exposure exists around or below a time-weighted average of 1 ppb for an eight-hour workday. The levels of exposure we found to be unsafe include ranges that popcorn consumers may potentially be exposed to, indicating a risk of severe lung disease (including BO) for some consumers.

Pooled analysis of rofecoxib placebo-controlled clinical trial data: lessons for postmarket pharmaceutical safety surveillance.

BACKGROUND: In September 2004, rofecoxib was voluntarily withdrawn from the worldwide market. Our objective was to determine whether and when analysis of published and unpublished placebo-controlled trials could have revealed cardiovascular risk associated with rofecoxib before its withdrawal as an example to inform future postmarket pharmaceutical safety surveillance efforts. METHODS: We conducted a cumulative subject-level pooled analysis of data from all randomized, placebo-controlled trials of rofecoxib conducted by the manufacturer before September 2004. Our main outcome measurement was incidence of any investigator-reported death from any cause or cardiovascular thromboembolic (CVT) adverse event. RESULTS: We identified 30 randomized, placebo-controlled trials of rofecoxib that enrolled a combined 20 152 subjects. Trial duration ranged from 4 weeks to 4 years; enrollment ranged from 17 to 2586 subjects prescribed either rofecoxib or placebo; and rofecoxib dose ranged from 12.5 mg to 50 mg. As of December 2000, 21 of these trials had been completed (70%), and the risk of a CVT adverse event or death was greater among subjects assigned to the rofecoxib group (rate ratio [RR], 2.18; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.93-5.81) (P = .07), raising concerns from a safety standpoint. Subsequently collected data through June 2001 showed that rofecoxib was associated with a 35% increased risk of a CVT adverse event or death (RR, 1.35; 95% CI, 1.00-1.96) (P = .05). Analyzing data available as of April 2002, we found a 39% increased risk (RR, 1.39; 95% CI, 1.07-1.80) (P = .02), and using data available as of September 2004, we found a 43% increased risk (RR,1.43; 95% CI, 1.16-1.76) (P < .001). CONCLUSION: Cumulative pooled analysis of all randomized, placebo-controlled trials demonstrates a trend toward increased cardiovascular risk associated with rofecoxib compared with placebo as early as December 2000, the comparison reaching a P value of .05 by June 2001, nearly 3(1/2) years before the manufacturer's voluntary market withdrawal.

The ADVANTAGE seeding trial: a review of internal documents.

BACKGROUND: Seeding trials, clinical studies conducted by pharmaceutical companies that are designed to seem as if they answer a scientific question but primarily fulfill marketing objectives, have not been described in detail. PURPOSE: To describe a known seeding trial, ADVANTAGE (Assessment of Differences between Vioxx and Naproxen To Ascertain Gastrointestinal Tolerability and Effectiveness), through documents of the trial sponsor, Merck & Co. (Whitehouse Station, New Jersey). DATA SOURCES: Merck internal and external correspondence, reports, and presentations elicited to inform legal proceedings of Cona v Merck and Co., Inc., and McDarby v Merck and Co., Inc. The documents were created between 1998 and 2006. DATA EXTRACTION: An iterative case-study process of review, discussion, and re-review of documents to identify themes relevant to the design and conduct of ADVANTAGE. To supplement the case-study review, the authors did a systematic review of the literature to identify published manuscripts focused on seeding trials and their conduct. DATA SYNTHESIS: Review of the documents revealed 3 key themes: The trial was designed by Merck's marketing division to fulfill a marketing objective; Merck's marketing division handled both the scientific and the marketing data, including collection, analysis, and dissemination; and Merck hid the marketing nature of the trial from participants, physician investigators, and institutional review board members. Although the systematic review of the literature identified 6 articles that focused on the practice of seeding trials, none provided documentary evidence of their existence or conduct. LIMITATIONS: The legal documents in these cases provide useful, but limited, information about the practices of the pharmaceutical industry. This description of 1 company's actions is incomplete and may have limited generalizability. CONCLUSION: Documentary evidence shows that ADVANTAGE is an example of marketing framed as science. The documents indicate that ADVANTAGE was a seeding trial developed by Merck's marketing division to promote prescription of Vioxx (rofecoxib) when it became available on the market in 1999.