The impact of prices and pricing units on residual and organic waste: Evidence from Wallonia, Belgium.

Waste pricing is important to encourage households to reduce their waste and to increase sorting and recycling. Pricing instruments include differentiated prices for the waste fractions collected and the choice of an appropriate pricing unit (volume, weight, levy). In this paper, we test the effectiveness of those different instruments using an original and complete dataset from Wallonia (the southern region of Belgium), covering 10 years and all the 262 municipalities of the region. Our approach is to estimate the sensitivity of households' production of residual and organic waste to prices i.e., the price elasticities, using sophisticated econometric techniques to control for the endogeneity of prices. For residual waste, we show a significant own-price elasticity, which is higher when organic waste is not collected at the curbside. For organic waste, we found an important and significant cross-price elasticity, but a limited own-price elasticity. Hence, the privileged instrument to encourage waste reduction and sorting should be the price of residual waste. Finally, we show that the weight-based pricing system contributes substantially to the reduction of residual waste.

Prioritization vs zero-rating: Discrimination on the internet.

This paper analyzes two business practices on the mobile internet market, paid prioritization and zero-rating. These practices allow the internet service provider to discriminate different content types. With prioritization, the ISP delivers content at different speeds; with zero-rating, the ISP charges different prices. In recent years these practices have attracted considerable media attention and regulatory interest. When the asymmetry between content providers is limited, in particular with regard to their ability to attract traffic or to monetize it, we first show that the ISP can extract more surplus from consumers by privileging the relatively weaker content and restoring symmetry between content providers. Next, we show that the ISP chooses prioritization when traffic is highly valuable for content providers and congestion is severe, and zero-rating in all other cases. Finally, we find that a policy banning prioritization can lead to zero-rating and a reduction in consumer surplus.