RESUMEN
The death of a loved one is often an ordeal and a tragedy for those who witness it, as death is not merely the end of a life, but also the end of an existence, the loss of a unique individual who is special and irreplaceable. In some situations, end-of-life signs, such as agonal gasps, can be an almost unbearable "sight" because the physical manifestations are hard to watch and can lead to subjective interpretation and irrational fears. Ethical unease arises as the dying patient falls prey to death throes and to the manifestations of ebbing life and the physician can only stand by and watch. From this point on, medicine can put an end to suffering by the use of neuromuscular blockade, but in so doing life ceases at the same time. It is difficult, however, not to respond to the distress of loved ones and caregivers. The ethical problem then becomes the shift from the original ethical concern, i.e. the dying patient, to the patient's loved ones. Is such a rupture due to a difference in nature or a difference in degree, given that the dying patient remains a person and not a thing as long as the body continues to lead its own life, expressed through movement and sound? Because there cannot be any simple and unequivocal answer to this question, the SRLF Ethics Commission is offering ethical reflections on end-of-life signs and symptoms in the intensive care setting, and on the use of neuromuscular blockade in this context, with presentations on the subject by two philosophers and members of the SRLF Ethics Commission, Ms Lise Haddad and Prof Dominique Folscheid. The SRLF Ethics Commission hopes to provide food for thought for everyone on this topic, which undoubtedly calls for further contributions, the aim being not to provide ready-made solutions or policy, but rather to allow everyone to ponder this question in all conscience.
RESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Longstanding concerns regarding end of life in the ICU led in France to the publication of guidelines, updated in 2009, that take into account the insights provided by a recent law (Leonetti's law) regarding patients' rights. After the French President asked a specific expert to review end of life issues, the French Intensive Care Society (SRLF) surveyed their members (doctors and paramedics) about various aspects of end of life in the ICU. METHODS: SRLF members were invited to respond to a questionnaire, sent by Email, designed to assess their knowledge of Leonetti's law and to determine how many caregivers would agree with the authorization of lethal drug administration in selected end of life situations. RESULTS: Questionnaires returned by 616 (23%) of 2,700 members were analyzed. Most members (82.5%) reported that they had a good knowledge of Leonetti's law, which most (88%) said they have often applied. One third of respondents had received 'assisted death' requests from patients and more than 50% from patients' relatives. One quarter of respondents had experienced the wish to give lethal drugs to end of life patients. Assuming that palliative care in the ICU is well-managed, 25.7% of the respondents would approve a law authorizing euthanasia, while 26.5% would not. Answers were influenced by the fear of a possible risk of abuse. Doctors and nurses answered differently. CONCLUSION: ICU caregivers appear to be well acquainted with Leonetti's law. Nevertheless, in selected clinical situations with suitable palliative care, one quarter of respondents were in favor of a law authorizing administration of lethal drugs to patients.
RESUMEN
French law allows organ donation after death due to cardiocirculatory arrest. In the Maastricht classification, type III non-heart-beating donors are those who experience cardiocirculatory arrest after the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments. French authorities in charge of regulating organ donation (Agence de la Biomédecine, ABM) are considering organ collection from Maastricht type III donors. We describe a scenario for Maastricht type III organ donation that fully complies with the ethical norms governing care to dying patients. That organ donation may occur after death should have no impact on the care given to the patient and family. The dead-donor rule must be followed scrupulously: the organ retrieval procedure must neither cause nor hasten death. The decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatments, withdrawal modalities, and care provided to the patient and family must adhere strictly to the requirements set forth in patient-rights legislation (the 2005 Léonetti law in France) and should not be influenced in any way by the possibility of organ donation. A major ethical issue regarding the family is how best to transition from discussing treatment-withdrawal decisions to discussing possible organ retrieval for donation should the patient die rapidly after treatment withdrawal. Close cooperation between the healthcare team and the organ retrieval team is crucial to minimize the distress of family members during this transition. Modalities for implementing Maastricht type III organ donation are discussed here, including the best location for withdrawing life-sustaining treatments (operating room or intensive care unit).
