Incidental retrieval of prior emotion mimicry.

When observing emotional expressions, similar sensorimotor states are activated in the observer, often resulting in physical mimicry. For example, when observing a smile, the zygomaticus muscles associated with smiling are activated in the observer, and when observing a frown, the corrugator brow muscles. We show that the consistency of an individual's facial emotion, whether they always frown or smile, can be encoded into memory. When the individuals are viewed at a later time expressing no emotion, muscle mimicry of the prior state can be detected, even when the emotion itself is task irrelevant. The results support simulation accounts of memory, where prior embodiments of other's states during encoding are reactivated when re-encountering a person.

The role of emotion in learning trustworthiness from eye-gaze: Evidence from facial electromyography.

Gaze direction can be used to rapidly and reflexively lead or mislead others' attention as to the location of important stimuli. When perception of gaze direction is congruent with the location of a target, responses are faster compared to when incongruent. Faces that consistently gaze congruently are also judged more trustworthy than faces that consistently gaze incongruently. However, it's unclear how gaze-cues elicit changes in trust. We measured facial electromyography (EMG) during an identity-contingent gaze-cueing task to examine whether embodied emotional reactions to gaze-cues mediate trust learning. Gaze-cueing effects were found to be equivalent regardless of whether participants showed learning of trust in the expected direction or did not. In contrast, we found distinctly different patterns of EMG activity in these two populations. In a further experiment we showed the learning effects were specific to viewing faces, as no changes in liking were detected when viewing arrows that evoked similar attentional orienting responses. These findings implicate embodied emotion in learning trust from identity-contingent gaze-cueing, possibly due to the social value of shared attention or deception rather than domain-general attentional orienting.

Facial Mimicry and Emotion Consistency: Influences of Memory and Context.

This study investigates whether mimicry of facial emotions is a stable response or can instead be modulated and influenced by memory of the context in which the emotion was initially observed, and therefore the meaning of the expression. The study manipulated emotion consistency implicitly, where a face expressing smiles or frowns was irrelevant and to be ignored while participants categorised target scenes. Some face identities always expressed emotions consistent with the scene (e.g., smiling with a positive scene), whilst others were always inconsistent (e.g., frowning with a positive scene). During this implicit learning of face identity and emotion consistency there was evidence for encoding of face-scene emotion consistency, with slower RTs, a reduction in trust, and inhibited facial EMG for faces expressing incompatible emotions. However, in a later task where the faces were subsequently viewed expressing emotions with no additional context, there was no evidence for retrieval of prior emotion consistency, as mimicry of emotion was similar for consistent and inconsistent individuals. We conclude that facial mimicry can be influenced by current emotion context, but there is little evidence of learning, as subsequent mimicry of emotionally consistent and inconsistent faces is similar.

Representational momentum reveals visual anticipation differences in the upper and lower visual fields.

Recent empirical research has revealed differences in functional capacity between the upper and lower visual fields (VFs), with the lower VF exhibiting superiority in visual perception skills. Similarly, functional differences between the left and right hemispheres elicit a predominance for visuospatial processing in the left visual field (left VF). Both anatomical as well as evolutionary arguments have been adopted in accounting for these variations in function. Preceding upper and lower VF research has typically investigated either static stimulus perception or the visual processing of upper limb action. The aim of the current research was to investigate whether the lower VF benefits associated with limb control transcend to visual anticipation (the perception of motion). Methods were based on Khan and Lawrence (Exp Brain Res 164:395-398, 2005), who investigated upper/lower VF differences in visuomotor control, but utilising a representational momentum paradigm to isolate perceptual processes. Thirty-two participants were randomised into either a left or right VF group and completed a perceptual computer-based task in the upper and lower VF, where they were required to judge the final position of a moving object before it disappeared. Two aspects of the distributions of same responses were then analysed; the central tendency (weighted means) and the variability. Results revealed that in the left VF, weighted means for the lower VF were significantly greater than for the upper VF [t(14) = 2.242, p = 0.042]. In both left and right VFs, variability was greater in the upper compared to lower VF. This provides new findings regarding visual processes in the different visual fields. While visual search and large scene perception has been found to be superior in the upper VF, here we find that visual anticipation, like target-directed visuomotor skill, is superior in the lower VF.

The influence of response grouping on free-choice decision making in a response selection task.

Previous research has demonstrated an advantage for the preparation of fingers on one hand over the preparation of fingers on two hands, and for the preparation of homologous fingers over that of non-homologous fingers. In the present study, we extended the precuing effects observed with finger responses to response selection under free-choice conditions. Participants were required to choose from a range of possible responses following the presentation of a precue that indicated which response to prepare (go-to precue) or prevent (no-go-to precue). In Experiment 1 the choice was between homologous and non-homologous finger responses on the hand opposite to the precue while in Experiment 2 the choice was between finger responses on the same or different hand to the precue. In the go-to precue condition, the frequency of homologous finger choices was more frequent than non-homologous finger responses. Similarly, participants chose finger responses on the same hand as the precue regardless of whether they were instructed to prepare or prevent the precued response. The hand effect bias was stronger than the finger effect bias. These findings are consistent with the Grouping Model (Adam, Hommel, & Umilta, 2003).

Self produced and observed actions influence emotion: the roles of action fluency and eye gaze.

Affective responses to objects can be influenced by cognitive processes such as perceptual fluency. Here we investigated whether the quality of motor interaction with an object influences affective response to the object. Participants grasped and moved objects using either a fluent action or a non-fluent action (avoiding an obstacle). Liking ratings were higher for objects in the fluent condition. Two further studies investigated whether the fluency of another person's actions influences affective response. Observers watched movie clips of the motor actions described above, in conditions where the observed actor could be seen to be looking towards the grasped object, or where the actor's head and gaze were not visible. Two results were observed: First, when the actor's gaze cannot be seen, liking ratings of the objects are reduced. Second, action fluency of observed actions does influence liking ratings, but only when the actor's gaze towards the object is visible. These findings provide supporting evidence for the important role of observed eye gaze in action simulation, and demonstrate that non-emotive actions can evoke empathic states in observers.

Vision-for-action: the effects of object property discrimination and action state on affordance compatibility effects.

When a person views an object, the action the object evokes appears to be activated independently of the person's intention to act. We demonstrate two further properties of this vision-to-action process. First, it is not completely automatic, but is determined by the stimulus properties of the object that are attended. Thus, when a person discriminates the shape of an object, action affordance effects are observed; but when a person discriminates an object's color, no affordance effects are observed. The former, shape property is associated with action, such as how an object might be grasped; the latter, color property is irrelevant to action. Second, we also show that the action state of an object influences evoked action. Thus, active objects, with which current action is implied, produce larger affordance effects than passive objects, with which no action is implied. We suggest that the active object activates action simulation processes similar to those proposed in mirror systems.

Lack of inhibition in Parkinson's disease: evidence from a lexical decision task.

Persons affected by Parkinson's disease (PD) often show an increased semantic priming effect from target words in lexical decision tasks (hyper-priming) as compared to age-matched controls. In this study, a lexical decision task was used to investigate both semantic priming (Experiment 1) and repetition priming (Experiment 2) from distractor words in PD patients and age-matched controls. With this negative priming procedure, target words in successive trials are never related, and therefore participants always have to switch between unrelated target words. Instead, it is the distractor prime word that is either related or unrelated to the subsequent target, giving the measure of priming. Results showed that PD patients demonstrated a robust effect of positive semantic priming from distractor words. Participants from the control group did not show any semantic priming effect (positive or negative) from distractors. Similarly, PD patients showed positive repetition priming from distractor words, but the control group showed significant repetition negative priming. These results support the view that the hyper-priming effect typically shown by persons with Parkinson's disease is the result of impaired inhibitory processes required to control word activation during reading.