Twitter (X) use predicts substantial changes in well-being, polarization, sense of belonging, and outrage.

In public debate, Twitter (now X) is often said to cause detrimental effects on users and society. Here we address this research question by querying 252 participants from a representative sample of U.S. Twitter users 5 times per day over 7 days (6,218 observations). Results revealed that Twitter use is related to decreases in well-being, and increases in political polarization, outrage, and sense of belonging over the course of the following 30 minutes. Effect sizes were comparable to the effect of social interactions on well-being. These effects remained consistent even when accounting for demographic and personality traits. Different inferred uses of Twitter were linked to different outcomes: passive usage was associated with lower well-being, social usage with a higher sense of belonging, and information-seeking usage with increased outrage and most effects were driven by within-person changes.

Fast-forward to boredom: How switching behavior on digital media makes people more bored.

Boredom is unpleasant, with people going to great lengths to avoid it. One way to escape boredom and increase stimulation is to consume digital media, for example watching short videos on YouTube or TikTok. One common way that people watch these videos is to switch between videos and fast-forward through them, a form of viewing we call digital switching. Here, we hypothesize that people consume media this way to avoid boredom, but this behavior paradoxically intensifies boredom. Across seven experiments (total N = 1,223; six preregistered), we found a bidirectional, causal relationship between boredom and digital switching. When participants were bored, they switched (Study 1), and they believed that switching would help them avoid boredom (Study 2). Switching between videos (Study 3) and within video (Study 4), however, led not to less boredom but more boredom; it also reduced satisfaction, reduced attention, and lowered meaning. Even when participants had the freedom to watch videos of personal choice and interest on YouTube, digital switching still intensified boredom (Study 5). However, when examining digital switching with online articles and with nonuniversity samples, the findings were less conclusive (Study 6), potentially due to factors such as opportunity cost (Study 7). Overall, our findings suggest that attempts to avoid boredom through digital switching may sometimes inadvertently exacerbate it. When watching videos, enjoyment likely comes from immersing oneself in the videos rather than swiping through them. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The fable of state self-control.

Trait self-control is highly valued, often equated with moral righteousness and associated with numerous positive life outcomes. This paper challenges the conventional conflation of trait self-control and state self-control. We suggest that while trait self-control is consistently linked to success, state self-control is not the causal mechanism driving these benefits. Trait self-control, sometimes also referred to as conscientiousness, grit, and the ability to delay gratification, predicts better health, wealth, and academic achievement. Conventional wisdom has it that people high in trait self-control reap all these benefits because they engage in more state self-control, defined as the momentary act of resolving conflict between goals and fleeting desires. Despite its intuitive appeal, there are problems with extolling state self-control because of our love for trait self-control. First, empirical evidence suggests that individuals high in trait self-control do not engage in more state self-control but engage it less. Second, changes to state self-control do not reliably and sustainably improve people's outcomes, as least in the long-term. And third, despite the possibility of dramatic improvements in trait self-control, these improvements are often short lived, with people returning to their baseline trait level over longer time horizons. The roots of this problem are numerous: Imprecise and inaccurate naming of our constructs that lead to construct drift and contamination; ignoring the numerous other facets of conscientiousness like orderliness or industriousness; and not appreciating that traits are sometimes not reducible to states. We suggest that the celebrated benefits of trait self-control arise from mechanisms beyond state self-control and highlight the need for a broader conceptualization of self-control in psychological research and practical interventions.

An experimental manipulation of the value of effort.

People who take on challenges and persevere longer are more likely to succeed in life. But individuals often avoid exerting effort, and there is limited experimental research investigating whether we can learn to value effort. We developed a paradigm to test the hypothesis that people can learn to value effort and will seek effortful challenges if directly incentivized to do so. We also dissociate the effects of rewarding people for choosing effortful challenges and performing well. The results provide limited evidence that rewarding effort increased people's willingness to choose harder tasks when rewards were no longer offered (near transfer). There was also mixed evidence that rewarding effort increased willingness to choose harder tasks in another unrelated and unrewarded task (far transfer). These heterogeneous results highlight the need for further research to understand when this paradigm may be the most effective for increasing and generalizing the value of effort.

What do we manipulate when reminding people of (not) having control? In search of construct validity.

The construct of personal control is crucial for understanding a variety of human behaviors. Perceived lack of control affects performance and psychological well-being in diverse contexts - educational, organizational, clinical, and social. Thus, it is important to know to what extent we can rely on the established experimental manipulations of (lack of) control. In this article, we examine the construct validity of recall-based manipulations of control (or lack thereof). Using existing datasets (Study 1a and 1b: N = 627 and N = 454, respectively) we performed content-based analyses of control experiences induced by two different procedures (free recall and positive events recall). The results indicate low comparability between high and low control conditions in terms of the emotionality of a recalled event, the domain and sphere of control, amongst other differences. In an experimental study that included three types of recall-based control manipulations (Study 2: N = 506), we found that the conditions differed not only in emotionality but also in a generalized sense of control. This suggests that different aspects of personal control can be activated, and other constructs evoked, depending on the experimental procedure. We discuss potential sources of variability between control manipulation procedures and propose improvements in practices when using experimental manipulations of sense of control and other psychological constructs.

Characterizing the role of impulsivity in costly, reactive aggression using a novel paradigm.

A lack of self-control has long been theorized to predict an individual's likelihood to engage in antisocial behaviors. However, existing definitions of self-control encompass multiple psychological constructs and lab-based measures of aggression have not allowed for the examination of aggression upon provocation where self-control is needed most. We introduce two versions of a novel paradigm, the Retaliate or Carry-on: Reactive AGgression Experiment (RC-RAGE) to fill this methodological gap. Using large online samples of US adults (N = 354 and N = 366), we evaluate to what extent dispositional impulsivity, self-control, aggression, and state anger contribute to aggression upon provocation when there is a financial cost involved. Results showed that costly retaliation on this task was related to trait aggression and being in an angry emotional state, but not related to social desirability. Importantly, we show that the tendency to act impulsively is a better predictor of costly retaliation than other forms of self-control, such as the ability to delay gratification, resist temptation, or plan ahead. As a browser-based task, the RC-RAGE provides a tool for the future investigation of reactive aggression in a variety of experimental settings.

Modulating preferences during intertemporal choices through exogenous midfrontal transcranial alternating current stimulation: A registered report.

Decision conflicts may arise when the costs and benefits of choices are evaluated as a function of outcomes predicted along a temporal dimension. Electrophysiology studies suggest that during performance monitoring a typical oscillatory activity in the theta rhythm, named midfrontal theta, may index conflict processing and resolution. In the present within-subject, sham controlled, cross-over preregistered study, we delivered online midfrontal transcranial Alternating Current Stimulation (tACS) to modulate electrocortical activity during intertemporal decisions. Participants were invited to select choice preference between economic offers at three different intermixed levels of conflict (i.e., low, medium, high) while receiving either theta -, gamma-, or sham tACS in separate blocks and sessions. At the end of each stimulation block, a Letter-Flanker task was also administered to measure behavioural aftereffects. We hypothesized that theta-tACS would have acted on the performance monitoring system inducing behavioural changes (i.e., faster decisions and more impulsive choices) in high conflicting trials, rather than gamma- and sham-tACS. Results very partially confirmed our predictions. Unexpectedly, both theta- and gamma-driven neuromodulation speeded-up decisions compared to sham. However, exploratory analyses revealed that such an effect was stronger in the high-conflict decisions during theta-tACS. These findings were independent from the influence of the sensations induced by the electrical stimulation. Moreover, further analyses highlighted a significant association during theta-tACS between the selection of immediate offers in high-conflict trials and attentional impulsiveness, suggesting that individual factors may account for the tACS effects during intertemporal decisions. Finally, we did not capture long-lasting behavioural changes following tACS in the Flanker task. Our findings may inform scholars to improve experimental designs and boost the knowledge toward a more effective application of tACS.

In praise of empathic AI.

In this article we investigate the societal implications of empathic artificial intelligence (AI), asking how its seemingly empathic expressions make people feel. We highlight AI's unique ability to simulate empathy without the same biases that afflict humans. While acknowledging serious pitfalls, we propose that AI expressions of empathy could improve human welfare.

Do humans prefer cognitive effort over doing nothing?

Humans and other animals find mental (and physical) effort aversive and have the fundamental drive to avoid it. However, doing nothing is also aversive. Here, we ask whether people choose to avoid effort when the alternative is to do nothing at all. Across 12 studies, participants completed variants of the demand selection task, in which they repeatedly selected between a cognitively effortful task (e.g., simple addition, Stroop task, and symbol-counting task) and a task that required no effort (e.g., doing nothing, watching the computer complete the Stroop, and symbol-viewing). We then tabulated people's choices. Across our studies and an internal meta-analysis, we found little evidence that people choose to avoid effort (and hints that people sometimes prefer effort) when the alternative was doing nothing. Our findings suggest that doing nothing can be just as costly-if not more costly-than exerting effort. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Reliability of the empathy selection task, a novel behavioral measure of empathy avoidance.

The empathy selection task is a novel behavioral paradigm designed to assess an individual's willingness to engage in empathy. Work with this task has demonstrated that people prefer to avoid empathy when some other activity is available, though individual differences that might predict performance on this task have been largely unexamined. Here, we assess the suitability of the empathy selection task for use in individual difference and experimental research by examining its reliability within and across testing sessions. We compare the reliability of summary scores on the empathy selection task (i.e., proportion of empathy choices) as an individual difference metric to that of two commonly used experimental tasks, the Stroop error rate and go/no-go commission rate. Next, we assess systematic changes at the item/trial level using generalized multilevel modeling which considers participants' individual performance variation. Across two samples (N = 89), we find that the empathy selection task is stable between testing sessions and has good/substantial test-retest reliability (ICCs = .65 and .67), suggesting that it is comparable or superior to other commonly used experimental tasks with respect to its ability to consistently rank individuals.

Effort feels meaningful.

People often dislike effort and avoid it when they can, but effort can also imbue tasks with meaning. This is the case for real-life tasks, but also novel tasks devoid of true purpose. Why does effort feel meaningful, under what conditions, and for whom?

Cognitive effort for self, strangers, and charities.

Effort is aversive and often avoided, even when earning benefits for oneself. Yet, people sometimes work hard for others. How do people decide who is worth their effort? Prior work shows people avoid physical effort for strangers relative to themselves, but invest more physical effort for charity. Here, we find that people avoid cognitive effort for others relative to themselves, even when the cause is a personally meaningful charity. In two studies, participants repeatedly decided whether to invest cognitive effort to gain financial rewards for themselves and others. In Study 1, participants (N = 51; 150 choices) were less willing to invest cognitive effort for a charity than themselves. In Study 2, participants (N = 47; 225 choices) were more willing to work cognitively for a charity than an intragroup stranger, but again preferred cognitive exertion that benefited themselves. Computational modeling suggests that, unlike prior physical effort findings, cognitive effort discounted the subjective value of rewards linearly. Exploratory machine learning analyses suggest that people who represented others more similarly to themselves were more willing to invest effort on their behalf, opening up new avenues for future research.

Whither Inhibition?

Inhibition is considered a process essential to goal pursuit and as a result has become a central construct in many disciplines in psychology and adjacent fields. Despite a century's worth of debate, however, there is little consensus about what inhibition actually is. We suggest that it is time to abandon the concept of inhibition as it currently stands, given that its definition has been problematic. Instead, we propose an alternative framework in which inhibition is the target outcome, rather than a process to obtain a goal. We leverage existing process models to elucidate how people can achieve an inhibition goal by actively regulating impulses and desires. Although the field has been led astray by classifying inhibition as a process, our framework is intended to provide greater practical utility to the study of goal pursuit moving forward.

The Average Reward Rate Modulates Behavioral and Neural Indices of Effortful Control Allocation.

People tend to avoid exerting cognitive effort, and findings from recent behavioral studies suggest that effort allocation is in part determined by the opportunity cost of slothful responding-operationalized as the average reward rate per unit time. When the average rate of reward is high, individuals make more errors in cognitive control tasks, presumably owing to a withdrawal of costly cognitive processing. An open question remains whether the presumed modulations of cognitively effortful control processes are observable at the neural level. Here, we measured EEG while participants completed the Simon task, a well-known response conflict task, while the experienced average reward rate fluctuated across trials. We examined neural activity associated with the opportunity cost of time by applying generalized eigendecomposition, a hypothesis-driven source separation technique, to identify a midfrontal component associated with the average reward rate. Fluctuations in average reward rate modulated not only component amplitude but also, most importantly, component theta power (4-8 Hz). Higher average reward rate was associated with reduced theta power, suggesting that the opportunity of time modulates effort allocation. These neural results provide evidence for the idea that people strategically modulate the amount of cognitive effort they exert based on the opportunity cost of time.

Longitudinal evidence that Event Related Potential measures of self-regulation do not predict everyday goal pursuit.

Self-regulation has been studied across levels of analysis; however, little attention has been paid to the extent to which self-report, neural, and behavioral indices predict goal pursuit in real-life. We use a mixed-method approach (N = 201) to triangulate evidence among established measures of different aspects of self-regulation to predict both the process of goal pursuit using experience sampling, as well as longer-term goal progress at 1, 3, and 6-month follow-ups. While self-reported trait self-control predicts goal attainment months later, we observe a null relationship between longitudinal goal attainment and ERPs associated with performance-monitoring and reactivity to positive/rewarding stimuli. Despite evidence that these ERPs are reliable and trait-like, and despite theorizing that suggests otherwise, our findings suggest that these ERPs are not meaningfully associated with everyday goal attainment. These findings challenge the ecological validity of brain measures thought to assess aspects of self-regulation.

Investigating adult age differences in real-life empathy, prosociality, and well-being using experience sampling.

While the importance of social affect and cognition is indisputable throughout the adult lifespan, findings of how empathy and prosociality develop and interact across adulthood are mixed and real-life data are scarce. Research using ecological momentary assessment recently demonstrated that adults commonly experience empathy in daily life. Furthermore, experiencing empathy was linked to higher prosocial behavior and subjective well-being. However, to date, it is not clear whether there are adult age differences in daily empathy and daily prosociality and whether age moderates the relationship between empathy and prosociality across adulthood. Here we analyzed experience-sampling data collected from participants across the adult lifespan to study age effects on empathy, prosocial behavior, and well-being under real-life circumstances. Linear and quadratic age effects were found for the experience of empathy, with increased empathy across the three younger age groups (18 to 45 years) and a slight decrease in the oldest group (55 years and older). Neither prosocial behavior nor well-being showed significant age-related differences. We discuss these findings with respect to (partially discrepant) results derived from lab-based and traditional survey studies. We conclude that studies linking in-lab experiments with real-life experience-sampling may be a promising venue for future lifespan studies.

Caring is costly: People avoid the cognitive work of compassion.

Compassion-the warm, caregiving emotion that emerges from witnessing the suffering of others-has long been considered an important moral emotion for motivating and sustaining prosocial behavior. Some suggest that compassion draws from empathic feelings to motivate prosocial behavior, whereas others try to disentangle these processes to examine their different functions for human prosociality. Many suggest that empathy, which involves sharing in others' experiences, can be biased and exhausting, whereas warm compassionate concern is more rewarding and sustainable. If compassion is indeed a warm and positive experience, then people should be motivated to seek it out when given the opportunity. Here, we ask whether people spontaneously choose to feel compassion, and whether such choices are associated with perceiving compassion as cognitively costly. Across all studies, we found that people opted to avoid compassion when given the opportunity, reported compassion to be more cognitively taxing than empathy and objective detachment, and opted to feel compassion less often to the degree they viewed compassion as cognitively costly. We also revealed two important boundary conditions: first, people were less likely to avoid compassion for close (vs. distant) others, and this choice difference was associated with viewing compassion for close others as less cognitively costly. Second, in the final study we found that with more contextually enriched and immersive pleas for help, participants preferred to escape feeling compassion, although their preference did not differ from also escaping remaining objectively detached. These results temper strong arguments that compassion is an easier route to prosocial motivation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

More Effort, Less Fatigue: The Role of Interest in Increasing Effort and Reducing Mental Fatigue.

People generally prefer easier over more difficult mental tasks. Using two different adaptations of a demand selection task, we show that interest can influence this effect, such that participants choose options with a higher cognitive workload. Interest was also associated with lower feelings of fatigue. In two studies, participants (N = 63 and N = 158) repeatedly made a choice between completing a difficult or easy math problem. Results show that liking math predicts choosing more difficult (vs. easy) math problems (even after controlling for perceived math skill). Two additional studies used the Academic Diligence Task (Galla et al., 2014), where high school students (N = 447 and N = 884) could toggle between a math task and playing a video game/watching videos. In these studies, we again find that math interest relates to greater proportion of time spent on the math problems. Three of these four studies also examined perceived fatigue, finding that interest relates to lower fatigue. An internal meta-analysis of the four studies finds a small but robust effect of interest on both the willingness to exert greater effort and the experience of less fatigue (despite engaging in more effort).

The Experience of Empathy in Everyday Life.

We used experience sampling to examine perceptions of empathy in the everyday lives of a group of 246 U.S. adults who were quota sampled to represent the population on key demographics. Participants reported an average of about nine opportunities to empathize per day; these experiences were positively associated with prosocial behavior, a relationship not found with trait measures. Although much of the literature focuses on the distress of strangers, in everyday life, people mostly empathize with very close others, and they empathize with positive emotions 3 times as frequently as with negative emotions. Although trait empathy was negatively associated only with well-being, empathy in daily life was generally associated with increased well-being. Theoretically distinct components of empathy-emotion sharing, perspective taking, and compassion-typically co-occur in everyday empathy experiences. Finally, empathy in everyday life was higher for women and the religious but not significantly lower for conservatives and the wealthy.