Using wastewater surveillance for mpox as a complement to traditional case-based reporting - Chicago, March-June 2023.

The Chicago Department of Public Health tested wastewater samples for the presence of Monkeypox Virus (MPXV) from March 13 through June 26, 2023. There were persistent detections prior to reported cases. This indicated the baseline levels of MPXV prevalence might warrant routine monitoring. Detections in areas without corresponding reported clinical cases might highlight areas where cases are being under-reported by traditional surveillance.

COVID-19 vaccination requirements, encouragement and hesitancy among non-health care, non-congregate workers in Chicago: results from the WEVax survey.

BACKGROUND: While frontline and essential workers were prioritized for COVID-19 vaccination in the United States, coverage rates and encouragement strategies among non-health care workers have not been well-described. The Chicago Department of Public Health surveyed non-health care businesses to fill these knowledge gaps and identify potential mechanisms for improving vaccine uptake. METHODS: The Workplace Encouragement for COVID-19 Vaccination in Chicago survey (WEVax Chicago) was administered using REDCap from July 11 to September 12, 2022, to businesses previously contacted for COVID-19 surveillance and vaccine-related outreach. Stratified random sampling by industry was used to select businesses for phone follow-up; zip codes with low COVID-19 vaccine coverage were oversampled. Business and workforce characteristics including employee vaccination rates were reported. Frequencies of requirement, verification, and eight other strategies to encourage employee vaccination were assessed, along with barriers to uptake. Fisher's exact test compared business characteristics, and Kruskal-Wallis test compared numbers of encouragement strategies reported among businesses with high (> 75%) vs. lower or missing vaccination rates. RESULTS: Forty-nine businesses completed the survey, with 86% having 500 or fewer employees and 35% in frontline essential industries. More than half (59%) reported high COVID-19 vaccination rates among full-time employees; most (75%) workplaces reporting lower coverage were manufacturing businesses with fewer than 100 employees. Verifying vaccination was more common than requiring vaccination (51% vs. 28%). The most frequently reported encouragement strategies aimed to improve convenience of vaccination (e.g., offering leave to be vaccinated (67%) or to recover from side effects (71%)), while most barriers to uptake were related to vaccine confidence (concerns of safety, side effects, and other skepticism). More high-coverage workplaces reported requiring (p = 0.03) or verifying vaccination (p = 0.07), though the mean and median numbers of strategies used were slightly greater among lower-coverage versus higher-coverage businesses. CONCLUSIONS: Many WEVax respondents reported high COVID-19 vaccine coverage among employees. Vaccine requirement, verification and addressing vaccine mistrust may have more potential to improve coverage among working-age Chicagoans than increasing convenience of vaccination. Vaccine promotion strategies among non-health care workers should target low-coverage businesses and assess motivators in addition to barriers among workers and businesses.

Mpox among Public Festival Attendees, Chicago, Illinois, USA, July-August 2022.

We investigated an mpox outbreak after a 2022 LGBTQ event in Chicago, Illinois, USA. Among case-patients, 38% had received 1 dose of mpox vaccine, none 2 doses; most reported sexual activity during the probable exposure period. Among other preventive measures, persons at risk should complete mpox vaccination 14 days before an event.

COVID-19 Clusters and Outbreaks Among Non-Health Care, Noncongregate Workers in Chicago, Illinois: Surveillance Through the First Omicron Wave.

OBJECTIVE: To describe COVID-19 investigations by a large urban health department among non-health care, noncongregate workplaces and the utility of surveillance methods over time. METHODS: Frequencies of workplace-associated clusters and outbreaks are described by workplace type, workforce size, and method of identification over time. RESULTS: From April 2020 through January 2022, 496 COVID-19 investigations identified 442 clusters (89%) and 54 outbreaks (11%). Frontline essential workplaces comprised 36% of investigations before versus 15% after vaccine eligibility. Pre-Omicron, most investigations (84%) were identified through case interviews. During Omicron predominance, case interviews decreased dramatically and identified 10% of investigations. Offices (41%) and bars and restaurants (36%) were overrepresented, and only one outbreak was identified, given decreases in confirmatory testing. CONCLUSIONS: Findings suggest that vaccine prioritization reduced COVID-19 burden among highest-risk workplaces, but surveillance methods likely became less representative over time.

COVID-19 Outbreaks Linked to Workplaces, 23 US Jurisdictions, August-October 2021.

OBJECTIVES: Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, several outbreaks were linked with facilities employing essential workers, such as long-term care facilities and meat and poultry processing facilities. However, timely national data on which workplace settings were experiencing COVID-19 outbreaks were unavailable through routine surveillance systems. We estimated the number of US workplace outbreaks of COVID-19 and identified the types of workplace settings in which they occurred during August-October 2021. METHODS: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention collected data from health departments on workplace COVID-19 outbreaks from August through October 2021: the number of workplace outbreaks, by workplace setting, and the total number of cases among workers linked to these outbreaks. Health departments also reported the number of workplaces they assisted for outbreak response, COVID-19 testing, vaccine distribution, or consultation on mitigation strategies. RESULTS: Twenty-three health departments reported a total of 12 660 workplace COVID-19 outbreaks. Among the 12 470 workplace types that were documented, 35.9% (n = 4474) of outbreaks occurred in health care settings, 33.4% (n = 4170) in educational settings, and 30.7% (n = 3826) in other work settings, including non-food manufacturing, correctional facilities, social services, retail trade, and food and beverage stores. Eleven health departments that reported 3859 workplace outbreaks provided information about workplace assistance: 3090 (80.1%) instances of assistance involved consultation on COVID-19 mitigation strategies, 1912 (49.5%) involved outbreak response, 436 (11.3%) involved COVID-19 testing, and 185 (4.8%) involved COVID-19 vaccine distribution. CONCLUSIONS: These findings underscore the continued impact of COVID-19 among workers, the potential for work-related transmission, and the need to apply layered prevention strategies recommended by public health officials.

Monkeypox Case Investigation - Cook County Jail, Chicago, Illinois, July-August 2022.

Knowledge about monkeypox transmission risk in congregate settings is limited. In July 2022, the Chicago Department of Public Health (CDPH) confirmed a case of monkeypox in a person detained in Cook County Jail (CCJ) in Chicago, Illinois. This case was the first identified in a correctional setting in the United States and reported to CDC during the 2022 multinational monkeypox outbreak. CDPH collaborated with CCJ, the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH), and CDC to evaluate transmission risk within the facility. Fifty-seven residents were classified as having intermediate-risk exposures to the patient with monkeypox during the 7-day interval between the patient's symptom onset and his isolation. (Intermediate-risk exposure was defined as potentially being within 6 ft of the patient with monkeypox for a total of ≥3 hours cumulatively, without wearing a surgical mask or respirator, or potentially having contact between their own intact skin or clothing and the skin lesions or body fluids from the patient or with materials that were in contact with the patient's skin lesions or body fluids.) No secondary cases were identified among a subset of 62% of these potentially exposed residents who received symptom monitoring, serologic testing, or both. Thirteen residents accepted postexposure prophylaxis (PEP), with higher acceptance among those who were offered counseling individually or in small groups than among those who were offered PEP together in a large group. Monkeypox virus (MPXV) DNA, but no viable virus, was detected on one surface in a dormitory where the patient had been housed with other residents before he was isolated. Although monkeypox transmission might be limited in similar congregate settings in the absence of higher-risk exposures, congregate facilities should maintain recommended infection control practices in response to monkeypox cases, including placing the person with monkeypox in medical isolation and promptly and thoroughly cleaning and disinfecting spaces where the person has spent time. In addition, officials should provide information to residents and staff members about monkeypox symptoms and transmission modes, facilitate confidential monkeypox risk and symptom disclosure and prompt medical evaluation for symptoms that are reported, and provide PEP counseling in a private setting.

Epidemiologic and Clinical Characteristics of Monkeypox Cases - United States, May 17-July 22, 2022.

Monkeypox, a zoonotic infection caused by an orthopoxvirus, is endemic in parts of Africa. On August 4, 2022, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services declared the U.S. monkeypox outbreak, which began on May 17, to be a public health emergency (1,2). After detection of the first U.S. monkeypox case), CDC and health departments implemented enhanced monkeypox case detection and reporting. Among 2,891 cases reported in the United States through July 22 by 43 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia (DC), CDC received case report forms for 1,195 (41%) cases by July 27. Among these, 99% of cases were among men; among men with available information, 94% reported male-to-male sexual or close intimate contact during the 3 weeks before symptom onset. Among the 88% of cases with available data, 41% were among non-Hispanic White (White) persons, 28% among Hispanic or Latino (Hispanic) persons, and 26% among non-Hispanic Black or African American (Black) persons. Forty-two percent of persons with monkeypox with available data did not report the typical prodrome as their first symptom, and 46% reported one or more genital lesions during their illness; 41% had HIV infection. Data suggest that widespread community transmission of monkeypox has disproportionately affected gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men and racial and ethnic minority groups. Compared with historical reports of monkeypox in areas with endemic disease, currently reported outbreak-associated cases are less likely to have a prodrome and more likely to have genital involvement. CDC and other federal, state, and local agencies have implemented response efforts to expand testing, treatment, and vaccination. Public health efforts should prioritize gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men, who are currently disproportionately affected, for prevention and testing, while addressing equity, minimizing stigma, and maintaining vigilance for transmission in other populations. Clinicians should test patients with rash consistent with monkeypox,† regardless of whether the rash is disseminated or was preceded by prodrome. Likewise, although most cases to date have occurred among gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men, any patient with rash consistent with monkeypox should be considered for testing. CDC is continually evaluating new evidence and tailoring response strategies as information on changing case demographics, clinical characteristics, transmission, and vaccine effectiveness become available.§.

Multistate Outbreak of Infection with SARS-CoV-2 Omicron Variant after Event in Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2021.

Bars and restaurants are high-risk settings for SARS-CoV-2 transmission. A multistate outbreak after a bar gathering in Chicago, Illinois, USA, highlights Omicron variant transmissibility, the value of local genomic surveillance and interstate coordination, vaccination value, and the potential for rapid transmission of a novel variant across multiple states after 1 event.

Investigation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Associated With a Large Indoor Convention - New York City, November-December 2021.

During November 19-21, 2021, an indoor convention (event) in New York City (NYC), was attended by approximately 53,000 persons from 52 U.S. jurisdictions and 30 foreign countries. In-person registration for the event began on November 18, 2021. The venue was equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration, and attendees were required to wear a mask indoors and have documented receipt of at least 1 dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.* On December 2, 2021, the Minnesota Department of Health reported the first case of community-acquired COVID-19 in the United States caused by the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant in a person who had attended the event (1). CDC collaborated with state and local health departments to assess event-associated COVID-19 cases and potential exposures among U.S.-based attendees using data from COVID-19 surveillance systems and an anonymous online attendee survey. Among 34,541 attendees with available contact information, surveillance data identified test results for 4,560, including 119 (2.6%) persons from 16 jurisdictions with positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. Most (4,041 [95.2%]), survey respondents reported always wearing a mask while indoors at the event. Compared with test-negative respondents, test-positive respondents were more likely to report attending bars, karaoke, or nightclubs, and eating or drinking indoors near others for at least 15 minutes. Among 4,560 attendees who received testing, evidence of widespread transmission during the event was not identified. Genomic sequencing of 20 specimens identified the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant (AY.25 and AY.103 sublineages) in 15 (75%) cases, and the Omicron variant (BA.1 sublineage) in five (25%) cases. These findings reinforce the importance of implementing multiple, simultaneous prevention measures, such as ensuring up-to-date vaccination, mask use, physical distancing, and improved ventilation in limiting SARS-CoV-2 transmission, during large, indoor events.†.

Multiple Variants of SARS-CoV-2 in a University Outbreak After Spring Break - Chicago, Illinois, March-May 2021.

To prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, colleges and universities have implemented multiple strategies including testing, isolation, quarantine, contact tracing, masking, and vaccination. In April 2021, the Chicago Department of Public Health (CDPH) was notified of a large cluster of students with COVID-19 at an urban university after spring break. A total of 158 cases of COVID-19 were diagnosed among undergraduate students during March 15-May 3, 2021; the majority (114; 72.2%) lived in on-campus dormitories. CDPH evaluated the role of travel and social connections, as well as the potential impact of SARS-CoV-2 variants, on transmission. Among 140 infected students who were interviewed, 89 (63.6%) reported recent travel outside Chicago during spring break, and 57 (40.7%) reported indoor social exposures. At the time of the outbreak, undergraduate-aged persons were largely ineligible for vaccination in Chicago; only three of the students with COVID-19 (1.9%) were fully vaccinated. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) of 104 specimens revealed multiple distinct SARS-CoV-2 lineages, suggesting several nearly simultaneous introductions. Most specimens (66; 63.5%) were B.1.1.222, a lineage not widely detected in Chicago before or after this outbreak. These results demonstrate the potential for COVID-19 outbreaks on university campuses after widespread student travel during breaks, at the beginning of new school terms, and when students participate in indoor social gatherings. To prevent SARS-CoV-2 transmission, colleges and universities should encourage COVID-19 vaccination; discourage unvaccinated students from travel, including during university breaks; implement serial COVID-19 screening among unvaccinated persons after university breaks; encourage masking; and implement universal serial testing for students based on community transmission levels.

Risk Factors for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Infection in Homeless Shelters in Chicago, Illinois-March-May, 2020.

BACKGROUND: People experiencing homelessness are at increased risk of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), but little is known about specific risk factors for infection within homeless shelters. METHODS: We performed widespread severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) polymerase chain reaction testing and collected risk factor information at all homeless shelters in Chicago with at least 1 reported case of COVID-19 (n = 21). Multivariable, mixed-effects log-binomial models were built to estimate adjusted prevalence ratios (aPRs) for SARS-CoV-2 infection for both individual- and facility-level risk factors. RESULTS: During March 1 to May 1, 2020, 1717 shelter residents and staff were tested for SARS-CoV-2; 472 (27%) persons tested positive. Prevalence of infection was higher for residents (431 of 1435, 30%) than for staff (41 of 282, 15%) (prevalence ratio = 2.52; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.78-3.58). The majority of residents with SARS-CoV-2 infection (293 of 406 with available information about symptoms, 72%) reported no symptoms at the time of specimen collection or within the following 2 weeks. Among residents, sharing a room with a large number of people was associated with increased likelihood of infection (aPR for sharing with >20 people compared with single rooms = 1.76; 95% CI, 1.11-2.80), and current smoking was associated with reduced likelihood of infection (aPR = 0.71; 95% CI, 0.60-0.85). At the facility level, a higher proportion of residents leaving and returning each day was associated with increased prevalence (aPR = 1.08; 95% CI, 1.01-1.16), whereas an increase in the number of private bathrooms was associated with reduced prevalence (aPR for 1 additional private bathroom per 100 people = 0.92; 95% CI, 0.87-0.98). CONCLUSIONS: We identified a high prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infections in homeless shelters. Reducing the number of residents sharing dormitories might reduce the likelihood of SARS-CoV-2 infection. When community transmission is high, limiting movement of persons experiencing homelessness into and out of shelters might also be beneficial.

Community Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 at Two Family Gatherings - Chicago, Illinois, February-March 2020.

SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), has spread rapidly around the world since it was first recognized in late 2019. Most early reports of person-to-person SARS-CoV-2 transmission have been among household contacts, where the secondary attack rate has been estimated to exceed 10% (1), in health care facilities (2), and in congregate settings (3). However, widespread community transmission, as is currently being observed in the United States, requires more expansive transmission events between nonhousehold contacts. In February and March 2020, the Chicago Department of Public Health (CDPH) investigated a large, multifamily cluster of COVID-19. Patients with confirmed COVID-19 and their close contacts were interviewed to better understand nonhousehold, community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This report describes the cluster of 16 cases of confirmed or probable COVID-19, including three deaths, likely resulting from transmission of SARS-CoV-2 at two family gatherings (a funeral and a birthday party). These data support current CDC social distancing recommendations intended to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission. U.S residents should follow stay-at-home orders when required by state or local authorities.

Regional Emergence of Candida auris in Chicago and Lessons Learned From Intensive Follow-up at 1 Ventilator-Capable Skilled Nursing Facility.

BACKGROUND: Since the identification of the first 2 Candida auris cases in Chicago, Illinois, in 2016, ongoing spread has been documented in the Chicago area. We describe C. auris emergence in high-acuity, long-term healthcare facilities and present a case study of public health response to C. auris and carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPOs) at one ventilator-capable skilled nursing facility (vSNF-A). METHODS: We performed point prevalence surveys (PPSs) to identify patients colonized with C. auris and infection-control (IC) assessments and provided ongoing support for IC improvements in Illinois acute- and long-term care facilities during August 2016-December 2018. During 2018, we initiated a focused effort at vSNF-A and conducted 7 C. auris PPSs; during 4 PPSs, we also performed CPO screening and environmental sampling. RESULTS: During August 2016-December 2018 in Illinois, 490 individuals were found to be colonized or infected with C. auris. PPSs identified the highest prevalence of C. auris colonization in vSNF settings (prevalence, 23-71%). IC assessments in multiple vSNFs identified common challenges in core IC practices. Repeat PPSs at vSNF-A in 2018 identified increasing C. auris prevalence from 43% to 71%. Most residents screened during multiple PPSs remained persistently colonized with C. auris. Among 191 environmental samples collected, 39% were positive for C. auris, including samples from bedrails, windowsills, and shared patient-care items. CONCLUSIONS: High burden in vSNFs along with persistent colonization of residents and environmental contamination point to the need for prioritizing IC interventions to control the spread of C. auris and CPOs.

A Guide to Investigating Suspected Outbreaks of Mucormycosis in Healthcare.

This report serves as a guide for investigating mucormycosis infections in healthcare. We describe lessons learned from previous outbreaks and offer methods and tools that can aid in these investigations. We also offer suggestions for conducting environmental assessments, implementing infection control measures, and initiating surveillance to ensure that interventions were effective. While not all investigations of mucormycosis infections will identify a single source, all can potentially lead to improvements in infection control.

Multiple introductions and subsequent transmission of multidrug-resistant Candida auris in the USA: a molecular epidemiological survey.

BACKGROUND: Transmission of multidrug-resistant Candida auris infection has been reported in the USA. To better understand its emergence and transmission dynamics and to guide clinical and public health responses, we did a molecular epidemiological investigation of C auris cases in the USA. METHODS: In this molecular epidemiological survey, we used whole-genome sequencing to assess the genetic similarity between isolates collected from patients in ten US states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma) and those identified in several other countries (Colombia, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Venezuela). We worked with state health departments, who provided us with isolates for sequencing. These isolates of C auris were collected during the normal course of clinical care (clinical cases) or as part of contact investigations or point prevalence surveys (screening cases). We integrated data from standardised case report forms and contact investigations, including travel history and epidemiological links (ie, patients that had shared a room or ward with a patient with C auris). Genetic diversity of C auris within a patient, a facility, and a state were evaluated by pairwise differences in single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). FINDINGS: From May 11, 2013, to Aug 31, 2017, isolates that corresponded to 133 cases (73 clinical cases and 60 screening cases) were collected. Of 73 clinical cases, 66 (90%) cases involved isolates related to south Asian isolates, five (7%) cases were related to South American isolates, one (1%) case to African isolates, and one (1%) case to east Asian isolates. Most (60 [82%]) clinical cases were identified in New York and New Jersey; these isolates, although related to south Asian isolates, were genetically distinct. Genomic data corroborated five (7%) clinical cases in which patients probably acquired C auris through health-care exposures abroad. Among clinical and screening cases, the genetic diversity of C auris isolates within a person was similar to that within a facility during an outbreak (median SNP difference three SNPs, range 0-12). INTERPRETATION: Isolates of C auris in the USA were genetically related to those from four global regions, suggesting that C auris was introduced into the USA several times. The five travel-related cases are examples of how introductions can occur. Genetic diversity among isolates from the same patients, health-care facilities, and states indicates that there is local and ongoing transmission. FUNDING: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Outbreak of Seoul Virus Among Rats and Rat Owners - United States and Canada, 2017.

In December 2016, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (WDHS) notified CDC of a patient hospitalized with fever, leukopenia, elevated transaminases, and proteinuria. The patient owned and operated an in-home rattery, or rat-breeding facility, with approximately 100 Norway rats, primarily bred as pets. A family member developed similar symptoms 4 weeks later, but was not hospitalized. Because both patients were known to have rodent contact, they were tested for hantavirus infections. In January 2017, CDC confirmed recent, acute Seoul virus infection in both patients. An investigation was conducted to identify additional human and rat infections and prevent further transmission. Ultimately, the investigation identified 31 facilities in 11 states with human and/or rat Seoul virus infections; six facilities also reported exchanging rats with Canadian ratteries. Testing of serum samples from 183 persons in the United States and Canada identified 24 (13.1%) with Seoul virus antibodies; three (12.5%) were hospitalized and no deaths occurred. This investigation, including cases described in a previously published report from Tennessee (1), identified the first known transmission of Seoul virus from pet rats to humans in the United States and Canada. Pet rat owners should practice safe rodent handling to prevent Seoul virus infection (2).