Pupillary response to cognitive control in depression-prone individuals.

Revealing the pupillary correlates of depression-prone individuals is conducive to the early intervention and treatment of depression. This study recruited 31 depression-prone and 31 healthy individuals. They completed an emotional task-switching task combined with a go/no-go task, and task-evoked pupillary responses (TEPR) were recorded. Behavioral results showed no significant differences in behavioral performance in terms of cognitive flexibility and inhibition between the depression-prone group and the healthy control group. The pupillary results revealed that (1) the depression-prone group showed slightly lower TEPRs to positive stimuli than the healthy controls during cue presentation; (2) during target presentation, the depression-prone group did not show an effect of emotional valence on the pupillary response in the task-repeat trials; and (3) compared to the healthy controls, the depression-prone group showed significantly smaller TEPRs to negative no-go stimuli and had a longer latency of the second peak of pupil dilation in no-go trials. These results imply that depression-prone individuals may have slower neural responses in cognitive control tasks and emotion-specific weakened cognitive control than healthy individuals.

Age Three: Milestone in the Development of Cognitive Flexibility.

Although the cognitive flexibility (CF) of preschool children has been extensively studied, the development of CF in children around three years old is unclear. This study aimed to investigate the CF of three-year-olds in a stepwise rule-induction task (sRIT) comprising nine steps in which children are encouraged to switch attention to a new rule and then implicitly inhibit the old one. A pair of boxes was displayed at each step, and children aged 2.5 to 3.5 years were asked to select the target. When children learned a rule (e.g., the shape rule), they were encouraged to switch rules through negative feedback. The results showed that most children (81.10%) passed at least one of the two sets of the sRIT, and children over the age of three years performed better than those under three years. Additionally, a positive correlation existed between rule switching and rule generalization, whereby the old rule was implicitly inhibited. These findings indicate that age three might be a milestone in the development of CF, and inhibitory control might play a vital role in rule switching.

Evaluation standards regulate the generation and selection of novel ideas in creative behaviors: insights from individual differences in event-related potentials.

Evaluation is generally considered to occur after the generation of novel ideas to select truly creative ideas; however, evaluation may occur concurrently with the generation and regulate its efficiency. To test this hypothesis, 120 participants who held strict, moderate, or loose evaluation standards were grouped, and neural responses related to novel idea generation were compared retrospectively. The results showed that lower N400 amplitudes and greater LSP amplitudes were simultaneously elicited by objectively defined novel and usable options than by novel but unusable options among participants with moderate standards but not among participants with strict or loose standards. Evaluation standards influence the efficiency of novel idea generation; neither strict nor loose evaluation standards are conducive to fully resolving cognitive conflicts and generating novel ideas. Moreover, lower N400 amplitudes and greater LSP amplitudes were simultaneously elicited by the subjectively rated novel and usable option than by the novel but unusable option among participants with strict and moderate standards but not among participants with loose standards. Evaluation standards influence the selection among the generated ideas; participants in the strict and moderate groups made a wise choice based on the degree of conflict resolution, whereas participants in the loose group did not.

A Combined Method of Seismic Monitoring and Transient Electromagnetic Detection for the Evaluation of Hydraulic Fracturing Effect in Coal Burst Prevention.

In order to mitigate the risk of roof-dominated coal burst in underground coal mining, horizontal long borehole staged hydraulic fracturing technology has been prevailingly employed to facilitate the weakening treatment of the hard roof in advance. Such weakening effect, however, can hardly be evaluated, which leads to a lack of a basis in which to design the schemes and parameters of hydraulic fracturing. In this study, a combined underground-ground integrated microseismic monitoring and transient electromagnetic detection method was utilized to carry out simultaneous evaluations of the seismic responses to each staged fracturing and the apparent resistivity changes before and after all finished fracturing. On this basis, the comparable and applicable fracturing effects on coal burst prevention were evaluated and validated by the distribution of microseismic events and their energy magnitude during the mining process. Results show that the observed mining-induced seismic events are consistent with the evaluation results obtained from the combined seismic-electromagnetic detection method. However, there is a limited reduction effect on resistivity near the fractured section that induces far-field seismic events. Mining-induced seismic events are concentrated primarily within specific areas, while microseismic events in the fractured area exhibit high frequency but low energy overall. This study validates the rationality of combined seismic-electromagnetic detection results and provides valuable insights for optimizing fracturing construction schemes as well as comprehensively evaluating outcomes associated with underground directional long borehole staged hydraulic fracturing.

Divergent thinking benefits from functional antagonism of the left IFG and right TPJ: a transcranial direct current stimulation study.

Divergent thinking is assumed to benefit from releasing the constraint of existing knowledge (i.e. top-down control) and enriching free association (i.e. bottom-up processing). However, whether functional antagonism between top-down control-related and bottom-up processing-related brain structures is conducive to generating original ideas is largely unknown. This study was designed to investigate the effect of functional antagonism between the left inferior frontal gyrus and the right temporoparietal junction on divergent thinking performance. A within-subjects design was adopted for three experiments. A total of 114 participants performed divergent thinking tasks after receiving transcranial direct current stimulation over target regions. In particular, cathodal stimulation over the left inferior frontal gyrus and anodal stimulation over the right inferior frontal gyrus (Experiment 1), anodal stimulation over the right temporoparietal junction (Experiment 2), and both cathodal stimulation over the left inferior frontal gyrus and anodal stimulation over the right temporoparietal junction (Experiment 3) were manipulated. Compared with sham stimulation, the combination of hyperpolarization of the left inferior frontal gyrus and depolarization of the right temporoparietal junction comprehensively promoted the fluency, flexibility, and originality of divergent thinking without decreasing the rationality of generated ideas. Functional antagonism between the left inferior frontal gyrus (hyperpolarization) and right temporoparietal junction (depolarization) has a "1 + 1 > 2" superposition effect on divergent thinking.

Consequences of scarcity: the impact of perceived scarcity on executive functioning and its neural basis.

Introduction: Previous studies have found a causal relationship between scarcity and the adverse impact it has on executive functioning. However, few studies have directly examined perceived scarcity, and cognitive flexibility (the third component of executive functions) has rarely been included. Methods: Using a 2 (group: scarcity group vs. control group) × 2 (trial type: repeat trial vs. switch trial) mixed design, this study directly explored perceived scarcity's impact on cognitive flexibility and revealed its neural basis in the switching tasks. Seventy college students participated in this study through open recruitment in China. A priming task was used to induce perceived scarcity, thus exploring the impact of perceived scarcity on participants' performance in switching tasks and enabling the analysis of the neural activity of the brain, combined with electroencephalograph (EEG) technology. Results: In terms of behavioral outcomes, perceived scarcity led to poorer performance and a greater switching cost of reaction time in the switching tasks. Regarding neural activity, perceived scarcity led to an increase in the amplitude of P3 differential wave (repeat trials minus switch trials) in the parietal cortex during the target-locked epochs in the switching tasks. Discussion: Perceived scarcity can lead to changes in the neural activity of the brain regions related to executive functioning, resulting in a temporary decrease in cognitive flexibility. It may lead to individuals unable to adapt well to the changing environment, unable to quickly devote themselves to new tasks, and reduce work and learning efficiency in daily life.

Stronger spatial bias induced more by numbers in mind than numbers in eye: Evidence from event-related potentials.

The relationship between number and space is an important issue in numerical cognition. The spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect is a classic example of the association between numbers and spaces. It refers to the phenomenon whereby left-handed responses occur faster to small number and right-handed responses occur faster to large number. The current study explored the shared and distinct neural correlates of the SNARC effect considering numbers in eye and numbers in mind, by using event-related potentials (ERPs) technology. In each trial of the task, participants were asked to press freely one of two keys as a response to a number presented visually (numbers in eye) or via imagination (numbers in mind). The behavioral results indicated that the free-choice key presses were affected by the magnitudes of the numbers either in eye or in mind. Electrophysiological results observed that the SNARC effect appeared only in the 110-140 ms time window for numbers in eye. In contrast, for numbers in mind, the SNARC effect appeared during a longer time window (110-330 ms). These results suggest that both, numbers in eye and numbers in mind, can induce spatial bias at the early stimulus-representation stage, but the time duration of the spatial bias is longer for numbers in mind than numbers in eye. This may reflect a closer connection between numbers in mind and mental number line.

Do after "not to do": Deinhibition in cognitive control.

In daily life, we often need to inhibit a certain behavior or thought; however, sometimes we need to remove inhibition (deinhibition). Numerous studies have examined inhibition control, but it is unclear how deinhibition functions. In Experiment 1, we adopted a modified stop-signal task in which participants were instructed to immediately stop the prepared response to a stimulus appended by an accidental signal. The results showed that when the preceding trial was a stop-signal trial and participants successfully inhibited the action to the stimulus, the reaction time (RT) for the repeated stimuli in the current trial was significantly longer than that of the switched stimuli, reflecting the cost of deinhibition. Deinhibition ability is correlated with inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility. In Experiment 2, we manipulated stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between presentation of the stimuli and the stopping signals to exclude the interference of the signal preparation effect on the deinhibition cost. These findings suggest that an individual's deinhibition ability, as a previously ignored subcomponent of cognitive control, may play an important role in human adaptive behavior.

Cognitive control in creative discovery: The gap between ideal and reality.

Creative discovery involves discovering the additional values of existing things in the environment by identifying the novel associations between seemingly unrelated things; the judgment made in this process is expected to be accurate but not entirely correct. From the perspective of cognitive processing, what is the difference between the ideal and real states of creative discovery? This is largely unknown. In this study, a daily life scenario was presented, and a great number of seemingly unrelated tools were presented for participants to discover valuable tools. Electrophysiological activity was recorded when participants identified tools, and we then retrospectively analyzed the differences between responses. Compared with usual tools, unusual tools evoked greater N2, N400 and late sustained potential (LSP) amplitudes, which was likely associated with the monitoring and resolution of cognitive conflicts. Moreover, unusual tools evoked smaller N400 and greater LSP amplitudes when correctly identified as usable than when identified as unusable; this result suggested that creative discovery in the ideal state should depend on the cognitive control involved in resolving conflicts. However, in the comparison between subjectively rated usable and unusable tools, smaller N400 and greater LSP amplitudes were observed only when unusual tools could be identified by expanding the application scope but not by releasing functional fixedness; this outcome suggested that creative discovery in the real state was not always influenced by the cognitive control involved in resolving conflicts. The difference in cognitive control that should be exerted and that was actually exerted to identify novel associations was discussed.

Reconfiguration of response-set in task switching: Event-related potential evidence.

In task switching, an interaction between task and response is often observed, with response repetition (RR) benefits in task-repeat trials and RR costs in task-switch trials. The theoretical accounts of the RR effect remain controversial, and neuroscience evidence is scarce. The present study utilized the event-related potentials (ERPs) method to explore the neural mechanism underlying the RR effect by adopting a cued task-switching paradigm. The ERP results revealed the interaction between task and response in the P3b time window, with a response switch positivity under task-repetition conditions and an RR positivity under task-switching conditions. In addition, there were RR positivity in the N2 irrespective of task transition and in the late component (LC, 550-600 ms) that only under the task repetition condition. On the individual level, the RR benefit positively correlated with the RR positivity in the LC, while the RR costs negatively correlated with RR positivity in the N2/P3 component. These results suggest that both response reconfiguration and episodic-retrieval make contributions to the RR effects, which were also discussed in terms of predictive model for a domain-general inference and learning of perceptual categories.

When and why will creative discovery succeed or fail? The role of reactive control in resolving conflicts.

The process of creative discovery refers to discovering additional values of existing objects by identifying novel associations between seemingly unrelated things; however, this process is not always successful. To reveal the dynamic process of creative discovery, particularly when and why people made right or wrong judgments, the daily life scenario was described, and a possible tool was presented for judging whether it is usable to solve problems. Electrophysiological activity was recorded when people identified novel tools and then retrospectively analyzed the differences among three responses: correctly identified novel and usable (C-NU) options, falsely identified novel and usable (F-NU) options, and correctly identified novel but unusable (C-NUU) options. The results showed that, compared with ordinary tools, novel tools evoked greater N2, N400 and LSP amplitudes; the differences in these components were likely associated with the monitoring and resolution of cognitive conflicts in the process of discovering novel associations. Regarding novel tools, smaller N400 and greater LSP amplitudes were evoked by the C-NU option than by the F-NU option, and no differences in these components were found between the F-NU and C-NUU options. The findings revealed that the success or failure of discovering novel associations depended on reactive control in resolving conflicts. Only when sufficient cognitive effort is used to resolve a conflict to a great degree can the appropriately novel association be successfully discovered; otherwise, the novel and appropriate association is lost.

Electrophysiological correlates of the effect of set size on object switching in working memory.

Previous studies have revealed the effect of set size (the number of activated items) on object switching in working memory, but the underlying neural mechanism remains unclear. In this study, participants were asked to first remember two (small size) or three (large size) two-digit numbers and the corresponding geometrical figures as different references for numerical comparison and then compare a series of numbers (10-99) to the reference numbers cued by different geometrical figures. The cue repeated or switched across trials. Behavioral results revealed that the switch cost was greater in the large-size condition than in the small-size condition. Event-related potential results showed that in the N2 component, an interaction was observed between set size and transition, with a significant transition effect (switch minus repeat) in the large-size condition and a non-significant transition effect in the small-size condition. The same interaction was observed in the P3 component, with a larger amplitude difference (switch minus repeat) in the large-size condition than in the small-size condition. These results suggested that when set size is increased, the effort to inhibit the irrelevant items increases, resulting in large cost of object switching in working memory.

The role of cognitive control in the SNARC effect: A review.

The spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect, in which people respond to small numbers faster with the left hand and to large numbers faster with the right hand, is a popular topic in cognitive psychology. Some well-known theoretical accounts explaining this effect include the mental number line model, polarity correspondence principle, dual-route model, and working memory account. However, these fail to explain the finding that the size of the SNARC effect is modulated by cognitive control. Here, we propose a new account-a cognitive control-based view of the SNARC effect. This view argues that the SNARC effect is fundamentally determined by cognitive control in resolving conflicts during stimulus-response mapping. Several subcomponents of cognitive control, such as working memory, mental or task set shifting, inhibition control, and conflict adaptation, can easily modulate the SNARC effect. The cognitive control-based view can account for the flexible SNARC effect observed in diverse task situations while providing new insight into its mechanism.

Cognitive control is modulated by hierarchical complexity of task switching: An event-related potential study.

The study aimed to explore the effect of hierarchical complexity on task switching. The participants (n = 36) were asked to perform a magnitude or parity judgement on digits (1-9) in the hierarchical simple or complex block. In the simple block, participants made a numerical judgement on the presented digit (1-9) in each trial, whereas in the complex block, they had to first identify whether the digit in the current trial belonged to a predefined category (e.g., whether it was an even number), then perform a numerical judgement or not respond. The behavioural results revealed a significant interaction between hierarchical complexity and transition type (repeat vs. switch), with greater switch cost in the complex than in the simple block. Event-related potentials (ERPs) locked in the cue stage did not reveal this interaction, whereas the ERPs locked in the target stage revealed this interaction during the N2 and P3 time windows, with a larger switch negativity (switch minus repeat) in the complex than in the simple block. These findings demonstrate that an increase in hierarchical complexity triggers increased reactive control in the inhibition of the old task-set and reconfiguration of the new task-set during task switching.

Cognitive control of invalid predominant ideas in insight-like problem solving.

Predominant ordinary ideas are insufficient for solving insight-like problems; they interfere with subordinate original ideas and can produce a mental impasse. However, how people monitor and control invalid predominant ideas remains largely unknown. In the current study, participants were asked to solve a sequence of several similar practice problems that had the same solution to strengthen a predominant idea; the participants were then presented with an insight-like test problem that could not be solved by the predominant idea. The results showed that if the test problem was similar to the practice problems in which the predominant idea could typically be applied, it elicited greater late sustained potential (LSP) over the whole brain but no conflict-related N2 or N400 components, which suggests that the participants did not experience cognitive conflict and continued to verify the predominant but currently invalid idea. When the test problem differed from the practice problems, the items that participants reported trying to solve elicited greater N2-N400 and LSP over the whole brain, which suggests that the participants experienced cognitive conflict and exerted more reactive control over the invalid predominant idea; in contrast, the items that participants reported thinking about how to solve did not evoke greater conflict-related N2-N400 components and evoked even lower LSP, which likely indicates an ineffective state. These findings demonstrate three kinds of cognitive control toward invalid predominant ideas in situations where they are typically and not typically applied and provide empirical evidence of a mental impasse in insight-like problem-solving behaviors.

Cognitive Neural Mechanism of Backward Inhibition and Deinhibition: A Review.

Task switching is one of the typical paradigms to study cognitive control. When switching back to a recently inhibited task (e.g., "A" in an ABA sequence), the performance is often worse compared to a task without N-2 task repetitions (e.g., CBA). This difference is called the backward inhibitory effect (BI effect), which reflects the process of overcoming residual inhibition from a recently performed task (i.e., deinhibition). The neural mechanism of backward inhibition and deinhibition has received a lot of attention in the past decade. Multiple brain regions, including the frontal lobe, parietal, basal ganglia, and cerebellum, are activated during deinhibition. The event-related potentials (ERP) studies have shown that deinhibition process is reflected in the P1/N1 and P3 components, which might be related to early attention control, context updating, and response selection, respectively. Future research can use a variety of new paradigms to separate the neural mechanisms of BI and deinhibition.

Proactive and reactive control differ between task switching and response rule switching: Event-related potential evidence.

The distinction between task-switching (T-switch) and response-rule switching (RR-switch) has been reported in previous studies. However, it is unclear whether the neural correlates of proactive and reactive control differ between T-switch and RR-switch. In this study, a modified cue-target task was adopted. When the cue in the current trial differed from that in the preceding trial in shape (or color), the participants had to perform a T-switch (or RR-switch). Otherwise, they performed the same task following the same response rule. The behavioral results showed that the switch cost was greater for the RR-switch than for the T-switch. The event-related potential results indicated that (1) for cues, the switch-positivity in the late positive component (LPC) (500-800 ms) was more enhanced for the RR-switch than for the T-switch over the central to parietal regions, reflecting increased proactive control for the RR-switch compared with the T-switch; (2) for targets, the P3 amplitude was more attenuated in the RR-switch than the T-switch over the central and parietal regions, reflecting increased reactive control for the RR-switch; and (3) under the T-switch, the switch-positivity in the cue-LPC was negatively correlated with accuracy cost, while under the RR-switch, the switch negativity in the target-P3 was positively correlated with the reaction time cost. These findings suggest that similar proactive and reactive control are recruited in the T-switch and RR-switch, whereas cognitive control efforts clearly differ between them, perhaps due to different sub-processes.

Expectations Attenuate the Negative Influence of Neural Adaptation on the Processing of Novel Stimuli: ERP Evidence.

When processing repeated stimuli, the neural response is attenuated (i.e., neural adaptation) and performance seems to be facilitated; however, this neural adaptation negatively influences the subsequent processing of novel stimuli. The present study was designed to test whether and how temporal expectations reduce neural adaptation and attenuate the negative influence of neural adaptation on subsequent novel problem solving. Temporal expectations were experimentally manipulated by asking participants to solve a novel problem following three to five repeated problems, generating the expectation of repeated events in the first three serial positions as well as that of novel events in the fourth to sixth serial positions. Compared to the first occurrence, repeated problems evoked more negative deflections, including greater N1, lower P2 and greater LNC amplitudes, regardless of whether participants expected a repeated or novel event; however, the mean amplitudes of the P2 and LNC were smaller in the latter condition. These results show neural adaptation during processing of repeated stimuli and demonstrate that neural adaptation is reduced when a novel event is expected. Regarding the novel events, the conflict monitoring- and resolution-related N400, P600 and LNC amplitudes decreased with decreased neural adaptation. These results indicate that the expectation of novel events attenuate the negative influence of neural adaptation on the subsequent processing of novel events. This study provides new insight into alleviating the constraints imposed by frequently used knowledge on the processing of novel stimuli.

Reactive control in evaluating appropriately or inappropriately novel ideas: Evidence from electrophysiological measures.

Novelty and appropriateness have been considered two necessary criteria to distinguish creative ideas, but little is known about what kind of reactive control people will make when they evaluate appropriately or inappropriately novel ideas. To study this issue, high-density technology was used to record electroencephalography (EEG) signals when participants were evaluating ideas in novel & appropriate, novel & inappropriate, ordinary & appropriate, and ordinary & inappropriate conditions. An analysis of event-related potentials (ERPs) revealed that greater conflict detection-related N2 and N400-like components over the anterior scalp appeared in novel conditions than in ordinary conditions, suggesting that people are able to rapidly monitor novel ideas. Afterward, the mean amplitudes of the LPC over the left anterior scalp were greater in novel & appropriate condition than ordinary & appropriate condition, but no difference was found between novel & appropriate and novel & inappropriate conditions, which likely displayed much more reactive control was recruited to handle novel ideas and no additional control was recruited when the novel ideas were inappropriate. In addition, the mean amplitudes of the LPC/LNC over the posterior scalp were greater in novel than ordinary conditions and were also greater in inappropriate than appropriate conditions, which likely reflected the processing difficulties of conceptual understanding. These findings revealed the early rise monitoring, conceptual understanding, and reactive control mechanism underlying the evaluation of novel ideas.

Reconfiguration of response rule is more difficult than that of task goal: Behavior and electrophysiological evidence.

Previous studies have investigated the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive control by using the task-switching paradigm, but differentiation from response rule switching (RR-switch) remains poorly explored. In this study, a partial voluntary task-switching (VTS) paradigm was used to explore the electrophysiological differences between task switching (T-switch) and RR-switching. Participants were sequentially presented with Arabic numerals colored red or green. If the color in the current trial was the same as that in the previous trial, the participants had to perform the same task following the same response rule. Otherwise, they had to voluntarily switch tasks (e.g., from parity task to magnitude task) or switch response rules (e.g., from "pressing F for odd and J for even number" to "pressing J for odd and F for even number"). The behavioral results indicated that RR-switch was infrequently selected, and the performance was less efficient than that of the T-switch. Event-related potential results showed that both T- and RR-switches elicited a larger switch-positivity in the P2 and P3 time windows than that in the repeat condition. Switch-positivity was larger for RR-switch than for T-switch over the frontal sites, suggesting that more attention and cognitive resources were required to update information for the RR-switch than for the T-switch. These findings suggest that in the VTS, the hierarchical relationship between task goals and response rules is relatively loose, resulting in the neural disassociation of task reconfiguration and response change.