Is Life Binary or Gradual?

The binary nature of life is deeply ingrained in daily experiences, evident in the stark distinctions between life and death and the living and the inert. While this binary perspective aligns with disciplines like medicine and much of biology, uncertainties emerge in fields such as microbiology, virology, synthetic biology, and systems chemistry, where intermediate entities challenge straightforward classification as living or non-living. This contribution explores the motivations behind both binary and non-binary conceptualizations of life. Despite the perceived necessity to unequivocally define life, especially in the context of origin of life research and astrobiology, mounting evidence indicates a gray area between what is intuitively clearly alive and what is distinctly not alive. This prompts consideration of a gradualist perspective, depicting life as a spectrum with varying degrees of "lifeness". Given the current state of science, the existence or not of a definite threshold remains open. Nevertheless, shifts in epistemic granularity and epistemic perspective influence the framing of the question, and scientific advancements narrow down possible answers: if a threshold exists, it can only be at a finer level than what is intuitively taken as living or non-living. This underscores the need for a more refined distinction between the inanimate and the living.

Is There Such a Thing as a Biosignature?

The concept of a biosignature is widely used in astrobiology to suggest a link between some observation and a biological cause, given some context. The term itself has been defined and used in several ways in different parts of the scientific community involved in the search for past or present life on Earth and beyond. With the ongoing acceleration in the search for life in distant time and/or deep space, there is a need for clarity and accuracy in the formulation and reporting of claims. Here, we critically review the biosignature concept(s) and the associated nomenclature in light of several problems and ambiguities emphasized by recent works. One worry is that these terms and concepts may imply greater certainty than is usually justified by a rational interpretation of the data. A related worry is that terms such as "biosignature" may be inherently misleading, for example, because the divide between life and non-life-and their observable effects-is fuzzy. Another worry is that different parts of the multidisciplinary community may use non-equivalent or conflicting definitions and conceptions, leading to avoidable confusion. This review leads us to identify a number of pitfalls and to suggest how they can be circumvented. In general, we conclude that astrobiologists should exercise particular caution in deciding whether and how to use the concept of biosignature when thinking and communicating about habitability or life. Concepts and terms should be selected carefully and defined explicitly where appropriate. This would improve clarity and accuracy in the formulation of claims and subsequent technical and public communication about some of the most profound and important questions in science and society. With this objective in mind, we provide a checklist of questions that scientists and other interested parties should ask when assessing any reported detection of a "biosignature" to better understand exactly what is being claimed.

The Emergence of Astrobiology: A Topic-Modeling Perspective.

Astrobiology is often defined as the study of the origin, evolution, distribution, and future of life on Earth and in the Universe. As a discipline that emerged in the past decades of the 20th century, its contours have not always been straightforward, resulting from the interweaving of several lines of research as early as the 1960s. By applying computational topic-modeling approaches to the complete full-text corpus of three flagship journals in the field, Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres (1968-2020), Astrobiology (2001-2020), and the International Journal of Astrobiology (2002-2020), we identify specific topics that characterize the early blossoming of the discipline. We also map their evolution through time, as emphasis changed between different readings of astrobiology, from an exobiology and origins-of-life perspective to a more space- and planetary-sciences view of the discipline.

Abiogenesis through gradual evolution of autocatalysis into template-based replication.

How life emerged from inanimate matter is one of the most intriguing questions posed to modern science. Central to this research are experimental attempts to build systems capable of Darwinian evolution. RNA catalysts (ribozymes) are a promising avenue, in line with the RNA world hypothesis whereby RNA pre-dated DNA and proteins. Since evolution in living organisms relies on template-based replication, the identification of a ribozyme capable of replicating itself (an RNA self-replicase) has been a major objective. However, no self-replicase has been identified to date. Alternatively, autocatalytic systems involving multiple RNA species capable of ligation and recombination may enable self-reproduction. However, it remains unclear how evolution could emerge in autocatalytic systems. In this review, we examine how experimentally feasible RNA reactions catalysed by ribozymes could implement the evolutionary properties of variation, heredity and reproduction, and ultimately allow for Darwinian evolution. We propose a gradual path for the emergence of evolution, initially supported by autocatalytic systems leading to the later appearance of RNA replicases.

The Origin of Life: What Is the Question?

The question of the origin of life is a tenacious question that challenges many branches of science but is also extremely multifaceted. While prebiotic chemistry and micropaleontology reformulate the question as that of explaining the appearance of life on Earth in the deep past, systems chemistry and synthetic biology typically understand the question as that of demonstrating the synthesis of novel living matter from nonliving matter independently of historical constraints. The objective of this contribution is to disentangle the different readings of the origin-of-life question found in science. We identify three main dimensions along which the question can be differently constrained depending on context: historical adequacy, natural spontaneity, and similarity to life-as-we-know-it. We argue that the epistemic status of what needs to be explained-the explanandum-varies from approximately true when the origin-of-life question is the most constrained to entirely speculative when the constraints are the most relaxed. This difference in epistemic status triggers a shift in the nature of the origin-of-life question from an explanation-seeking question in the most constrained case to a fact-establishing question in the lesser-constrained ones. We furthermore explore how answers to some interpretations of the origin-of-life questions matter for other interpretations.

Natural Selection beyond Life? A Workshop Report.

Natural selection is commonly seen not just as an explanation for adaptive evolution, but as the inevitable consequence of "heritable variation in fitness among individuals". Although it remains embedded in biological concepts, such a formalisation makes it tempting to explore whether this precondition may be met not only in life as we know it, but also in other physical systems. This would imply that these systems are subject to natural selection and may perhaps be investigated in a biological framework, where properties are typically examined in light of their putative functions. Here we relate the major questions that were debated during a three-day workshop devoted to discussing whether natural selection may take place in non-living physical systems. We start this report with a brief overview of research fields dealing with "life-like" or "proto-biotic" systems, where mimicking evolution by natural selection in test tubes stands as a major objective. We contend the challenge may be as much conceptual as technical. Taking the problem from a physical angle, we then discuss the framework of dissipative structures. Although life is viewed in this context as a particular case within a larger ensemble of physical phenomena, this approach does not provide general principles from which natural selection can be derived. Turning back to evolutionary biology, we ask to what extent the most general formulations of the necessary conditions or signatures of natural selection may be applicable beyond biology. In our view, such a cross-disciplinary jump is impeded by reliance on individuality as a central yet implicit and loosely defined concept. Overall, these discussions thus lead us to conjecture that understanding, in physico-chemical terms, how individuality emerges and how it can be recognised, will be essential in the search for instances of evolution by natural selection outside of living systems.

Thresholds in Origin of Life Scenarios.

Thresholds are widespread in origin of life scenarios, from the emergence of chirality, to the appearance of vesicles, of autocatalysis, all the way up to Darwinian evolution. Here, we analyze the "error threshold," which poses a condition for sustaining polymer replication, and generalize the threshold approach to other properties of prebiotic systems. Thresholds provide theoretical predictions, prescribe experimental tests, and integrate interdisciplinary knowledge. The coupling between systems and their environment determines how thresholds can be crossed, leading to different categories of prebiotic transitions. Articulating multiple thresholds reveals evolutionary properties in prebiotic scenarios. Overall, thresholds indicate how to assess, revise, and compare origin of life scenarios.

The recipes of Philosophy of Science: Characterizing the semantic structure of corpora by means of topic associative rules.

Scientific articles have semantic contents that are usually quite specific to their disciplinary origins. To characterize such semantic contents, topic-modeling algorithms make it possible to identify topics that run throughout corpora. However, they remain limited when it comes to investigating the extent to which topics are jointly used together in specific documents and form particular associative patterns. Here, we propose to characterize such patterns through the identification of "topic associative rules" that describe how topics are associated within given sets of documents. As a case study, we use a corpus from a subfield of the humanities-the philosophy of science-consisting of the complete full-text content of one of its main journals: Philosophy of Science. On the basis of a pre-existing topic modeling, we develop a methodology with which we infer a set of 96 topic associative rules that characterize specific types of articles depending on how these articles combine topics in peculiar patterns. Such rules offer a finer-grained window onto the semantic content of the corpus and can be interpreted as "topical recipes" for distinct types of philosophy of science articles. Examining rule networks and rule predictive success for different article types, we find a positive correlation between topological features of rule networks (connectivity) and the reliability of rule predictions (as summarized by the F-measure). Topic associative rules thereby not only contribute to characterizing the semantic contents of corpora at a finer granularity than topic modeling, but may also help to classify documents or identify document types, for instance to improve natural language generation processes.

Best behaviour: A proposal for a non-binary conceptualization of behaviour in biology.

Behaviour is a widespread object of research in biology, yet it is often left undefined, and the variety of existing definitions have not led to a consensus. We argue that the fundamental problem in defining behaviour has been the assumption that the concept must be categorical: either a phenomenon is a behaviour or it is not. We propose instead that 'behaviour' is best understood as a spectrum concept. We have identified three major characteristics of phenomena which, we argue, fuel the intuitions of biologists regarding the classification of cases as behaviour. All are related to the mechanistic explanations put forth to account for the phenomena, and are (i) the complexity of the mechanism, (ii) the stability of the constitutive entities, and (iii) the quantity and significance of the inputs to the underlying mechanism. We illustrate this new conceptualisation through a three-dimensional behaviour-space which highlights the apparently different conceptualizations of behaviour attributed to humans, animals and plants, showing that they, in fact, all partake of a unified, malleable understanding of a single concept.

Making sense of downward causation in manipulationism: illustrations from cancer research.

Many researchers consider cancer to have molecular causes, namely mutated genes that result in abnormal cell proliferation (e.g. Weinberg 1998). For others, the causes of cancer are to be found not at the molecular level but at the tissue level where carcinogenesis consists of disrupted tissue organization with downward causation effects on cells and cellular components (e.g. Sonnenschein and Soto 2008). In this contribution, I ponder how to make sense of such downward causation claims. Adopting a manipulationist account of causation (Woodward 2003), I propose a formal definition of downward causation and discuss further requirements (in light of Baumgartner 2009). I then show that such an account cannot be mobilized in support of non-reductive physicalism (contrary to Raatikainen 2010). However, I also argue that such downward causation claims might point at particularly interesting dynamic properties of causal relationships that might prove salient in characterizing causal relationships (following Woodward 2010).

On what it is to fly can tell us something about what it is to live.

The plurality of definitions of life is often perceived as an unsatisfying situation stemming from still incomplete knowledge about 'what it is to live' as well as from the existence of a variety of methods for reaching a definition. For many, such plurality is to be remedied and the search for a unique and fully satisfactory definition of life pursued. In this contribution on the contrary, it is argued that the existence of such a variety of definitions of life undermines the very feasibility of ever reaching a unique unambiguous definition. It is argued that focusing on the definitions of specific types of 'living systems'-somehow in the same way that one can define specific types of 'flying systems'-could be more fruitful from a heuristic point of view than looking for 'the' right definition of life, and probably more accurate in terms of carving Nature at its joints.