Application of the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to identify vulnerabilities and opportunities for improvement prior to implementing a computerized prescription order entry (CPOE) system in a university hospital oncology clinic.

INTRODUCTION: Prior to implementing a new computerized prescription order entry (CPOE) application, the potential risks associated with this system were assessed and compared to those of paper-based prescriptions. The goal of this study is to identify the vulnerabilities of the CPOE process in order to adapt its design and prevent these potential risks. METHODS AND MATERIALS: Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) was used as a prospective risk-management technique to evaluate the chemotherapy medication process in a university hospital oncology clinic. A multidisciplinary team assessed the process and compared the critical steps of a newly developed CPOE application versus paper-based prescriptions. The potential severity, occurrence and detectability were assessed prior to the implementation of the CPOE application in the clinical setting. RESULTS: The FMEA led to the identification of 24 process steps that could theoretically be vulnerable, therefore called failure modes. These failure modes were grouped into four categories of potential risk factors: prescription writing, patient scheduling, treatment dispensing and patient follow-up. Criticality scores were calculated and compared for both strategies. Three failure modes were prioritized and led to modification of the CPOE design. Overall, the CPOE pathway showed a potential risk reduction of 51% compared to paper-based prescriptions. CONCLUSION: FMEA was found to be a useful approach to identify potential risks in the chemotherapy medication process using either CPOE or paper-based prescriptions. The e-prescription mode was estimated to result in less risk than the traditional paper mode.

Systemic analysis of medication administration omission errors in a tertiary-care hospital in Quebec.

OBJECTIVE: Medication administration omission errors (MAOEs) occur frequently in hospitals and can significantly affect patient health. An interdisciplinary committee was formed in summer 2012 to analyse incident/accident reports (AH-223-1 forms) of MAOEs for the 2011-2012 fiscal year in order to identify contributing factors and to propose preventive solutions. Special attention was paid to events with consequences for patients. METHOD: An aggregate data analysis involving four major steps was conducted: sampling, categorisation, identification of contributing factors, and seeking preventive solutions. One hundred omissions were randomly selected from the 889 reported for this period. All omissions categorised as having had consequences for patients were then added, making a final total of 145 omissions. The omissions were categorised using an Ishikawa diagram developed from an exploratory literature review and process mapping. Subsequent to failure modes, effects and criticality analysis, cause-and-effect diagrams were constructed with the main prioritised categories to differentiate the proximal causes from the root causes. Brainstorming was used to develop solutions, which were then prioritised with an impact/effort matrix. RESULTS: This study identified 27 categories of MAOEs, of which the 7 most frequent and the most critical accounted for 79.3% of the reports. The event categories, in decreasing order of importance, were related to intravenous (IV) therapy (29.0%), failure in using the medication administration record (MAR; 23.4%), failure in creating/updating the MAR (10.3%), medications on the patient's bedside (7.6%), and three types of MAOEs related to transcribing prescriptions (9.0%). CONCLUSION: The interdisciplinary committee formulated 10 main recommendations related to these 7 categories, including 3 for IV therapy and 4 for failure in using or creating/updating the MAR.