RESUMEN
Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) for rabies is widely administered and highly effective. Nevertheless, sporadic breakthrough infections (ie, rabies in people who have started PEP) have been reported. We conducted a systematic review of articles published between Jan 1, 1980 and June 1, 2022 to characterise breakthrough infections. After reviewing 3380 articles from across all continents, we identified 52 articles, which included a total of 122 breakthrough infections. We classified breakthrough infections on the basis of adherence to core practices (ie, wound cleaning and vaccine administration). Of 86 breakthrough infections with data, median time from exposure to symptom onset was 20 days (IQR 16-24). Most (89 [77%] of 115) participants received PEP within 2 days of an exposure. Severe wounds (defined as those involving multiple wound sites or bites to the head, face, or neck) were common (80 [69%] of 116 [with data]). Deviations from core practices were reported in 68 (56%) of 122 cases. Other possible causes for breakthrough infections included errors in the administration of rabies immunoglobulin, delays in seeking health care, and comorbidities or immunosuppression. Cold-chain integrity assessments and potency testing of PEP biologics were only rarely assessed (8 [7%] of 122 cases), neither of which were found to be a cause of breakthrough infections. Timely and appropriate administration of PEP is crucial to prevent rabies, and although people with high-risk exposures or immunosuppression can develop rabies despite adherence to core practices, this occurrence remains exceedingly rare.
Asunto(s)
Vacunas Antirrábicas , Rabia , Humanos , Rabia/prevención & control , Rabia/epidemiología , Infección Irruptiva , Vacunas Antirrábicas/uso terapéutico , Factores Inmunológicos , Inmunoglobulinas , Profilaxis PosexposiciónRESUMEN
OBJECTIVE: In March 2018, the US Department of Defense (DOD) added the smallpox vaccination, using ACAM2000, to its routine immunizations, increasing the number of persons receiving the vaccine. The following month, Fort Hood reported a cluster of 5 myopericarditis cases. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the DOD launched an investigation. METHODS: The investigation consisted of a review of medical records, establishment of case definitions, causality assessment, patient interviews, and active surveillance. A 2-sided exact rate ratio test was used to compare myopericarditis incidence rates. RESULTS: This investigation identified 4 cases of probable myopericarditis and 1 case of suspected myopericarditis. No alternative etiology was identified as a cause. No additional cases were identified. There was no statistically significant difference in incidence rates between the observed cluster (5.23 per 1000 vaccinated individuals, 95% CI: 1.7-12.2) and the ACAM2000 clinical trial outcomes for symptomatic persons, which was 2.29 per 1000 vaccinated individuals (95% CI: 0.3-8.3). CONCLUSIONS: Vaccination with ACAM2000 is the presumptive cause of this cluster. Caution should be exercised before considering vaccination campaigns for smallpox given the clinical morbidity and costs incurred by a case of myopericarditis. Risk of myopericarditis should be carefully weighed with risk of exposure to smallpox.
Asunto(s)
Personal Militar , Miocarditis , Vacuna contra Viruela , Viruela , Humanos , Viruela/epidemiología , Viruela/prevención & control , Viruela/complicaciones , Texas/epidemiología , Vacunación/efectos adversos , Programas de Inmunización , Miocarditis/epidemiología , Miocarditis/etiologíaRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: The largest West African monkeypox outbreak began September 2017, in Nigeria. Four individuals traveling from Nigeria to the United Kingdom (n = 2), Israel (n = 1), and Singapore (n = 1) became the first human monkeypox cases exported from Africa, and a related nosocomial transmission event in the United Kingdom became the first confirmed human-to-human monkeypox transmission event outside of Africa. METHODS: Epidemiological and molecular data for exported and Nigerian cases were analyzed jointly to better understand the exportations in the temporal and geographic context of the outbreak. RESULTS: Isolates from all travelers and a Bayelsa case shared a most recent common ancestor and traveled to Bayelsa, Delta, or Rivers states. Genetic variation for this cluster was lower than would be expected from a random sampling of genomes from this outbreak, but data did not support direct links between travelers. CONCLUSIONS: Monophyly of exportation cases and the Bayelsa sample, along with the intermediate levels of genetic variation, suggest a small pool of related isolates is the likely source for the exported infections. This may be the result of the level of genetic variation present in monkeypox isolates circulating within the contiguous region of Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers states, or another more restricted, yet unidentified source pool.
Asunto(s)
Monkeypox virus , Mpox , Brotes de Enfermedades , Humanos , Mpox/epidemiología , Monkeypox virus/genética , Nigeria/epidemiología , Reino UnidoRESUMEN
Although canine rabies virus variant (CRVV) was successfully eliminated from the United States after approximately 6 decades of vaccination campaigns, licensing requirements, and stray animal control, dogs remain the principal source of human rabies infections worldwide. A rabies vaccination certificate is required for dogs entering the United States from approximately 100 countries with endemic CRVV, including Egypt (1). On February 25, 2019, rabies was diagnosed in a dog imported from Egypt, representing the third canine rabies case imported from Egypt in 4 years (2,3). This dog and 25 others were imported by a pet rescue organization in the Kansas City metropolitan area on January 29. Upon entry into the United States, all 26 dogs had certificates of veterinary inspection, rabies vaccination certificates, and documentation of serologic conversion from a government-affiliated rabies laboratory in Egypt. CDC confirmed that the dog was infected with a CRVV that circulates in Egypt, underscoring the continued risk for CRVV reintroduction and concern regarding the legitimacy of vaccine documentation of dogs imported from countries considered at high risk for CRVV. Vaccination documentation of dogs imported from these countries should be critically evaluated before entry into the United States is permitted, and public health should be consulted upon suspicion of questionable documents.