Critical Capability Needs for Reduction of Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 Indoors.

Coordination of efforts to assess the challenges and pain points felt by industries from around the globe working to reduce COVID-19 transmission in the indoor environment as well as innovative solutions applied to meet these challenges is mandatory. Indoor infectious viral disease transmission (such as coronavirus, norovirus, influenza) is a complex problem that needs better integration of our current knowledge and intervention strategies. Critical to providing a reduction in transmission is to map the four core technical areas of environmental microbiology, transmission science, building science, and social science. To that end a three-stage science and innovation Summit was held to gather information on current standards, policies and procedures applied to reduce transmission in built spaces, as well as the technical challenges, science needs, and research priorities. The Summit elucidated steps than can be taken to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2 indoors and calls for significant investments in research to enhance our knowledge of viral pathogen persistence and transport in the built environment, risk assessment and mitigation strategy such as processes and procedures to reduce the risk of exposure and infection through building systems operations, biosurveillance capacity, communication form leadership, and stakeholder engagement for optimal response. These findings reflect the effective application of existing knowledge and standards, emerging science, and lessons-learned from current efforts to confront SARS-CoV-2.

Lessons learned in managing risk: Tools and strategies for confident operations from the CLEAN 2020 Summit.

Risk mitigation of COVID-19 in the indoor environment requires an articulated strategy for creating a bridge between science and the business community that focuses on knitting together four core capabilities-environmental microbiology, transmission science, building science, and social science-advancing scientific knowledge. The purpose of this article is to share insights from the CLEAN 2020 Summit, which assembled leaders from business, policy, standards development, science, and engineering working to mitigate risk of transmission in the built environment. The Summit worked to assess current challenges and pain points felt by industries from around the globe as well as innovative solutions applied to meet these challenges. Although SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 diseases are unique, the foundation of knowledge to assess and mitigate the risk of viral transmission in the built environment is robust. There are opportunities to improve science and engineering technology solutions, processes, and procedures to better meet the dynamic needs of the evolving pandemic.

Refinement of the Nanoparticle Emission Assessment Technique into the Nanomaterial Exposure Assessment Technique (NEAT 2.0).

Engineered nanomaterial emission and exposure characterization studies have been completed at more than 60 different facilities by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). These experiences have provided NIOSH the opportunity to refine an earlier published technique, the Nanoparticle Emission Assessment Technique (NEAT 1.0), into a more comprehensive technique for assessing worker and workplace exposures to engineered nanomaterials. This change is reflected in the new name Nanomaterial Exposure Assessment Technique (NEAT 2.0) which distinguishes it from NEAT 1.0. NEAT 2.0 places a stronger emphasis on time-integrated, filter-based sampling (i.e., elemental mass analysis and particle morphology) in the worker's breathing zone (full shift and task specific) and area samples to develop job exposure matrices. NEAT 2.0 includes a comprehensive assessment of emissions at processes and job tasks, using direct-reading instruments (i.e., particle counters) in data-logging mode to better understand peak emission periods. Evaluation of worker practices, ventilation efficacy, and other engineering exposure control systems and risk management strategies serve to allow for a comprehensive exposure assessment.

Anthrax letters in an open office environment: effects of selected CDC response guidelines on personal exposure and building contamination.

In 2001, letters filled with a powder containing anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) spores were delivered by mail to a number of governmental and media locations within the United States. In response, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provided guidelines for office personnel who might encounter a letter containing suspicious powder. These guidelines were developed during the crisis and in the absence of experimental data from laboratory or field investigations. An obvious need thus exists for quantitative and scientific verification for validation of these guidelines. This study attempts to address this need, adapting earlier work that used a multiple small office test site to create a model system in an open office test site in a vacated office building in which Bacillus atrophaeus spores (as a simulant for B. anthracis spores) were released by opening a letter. Using SF(6) as a tracer gas, smoke tubes (containing stannic chloride) to visualize airflow, culturable aerosol sampling, and aerosol spectrometry we were able to characterize airflow and unmitigated spore aerosol dissemination within the office test site. Subsequently, two scripted test scenarios were used to reproduce selected portions of the existing CDC response guidelines and a modified version where the contaminated letter opener warned co-workers to evacuate then waited 5 min before doing so himself. By not leaving together with other co-workers, the risk of the letter opener cross-contaminating others was eliminated. The total potential spore aerosol exposure of the letter opener was not affected by remaining still and waiting 5 min to allow co-workers to escape first before leaving the office. Closing office doors and quickly deactivating the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system significantly reduced spore aerosol concentrations outside the main open office in which they had been released.

Responding to detection of aerosolized Bacillus anthracis by autonomous detection systems in the workplace.

Autonomous detection systems (ADSs) are under development to detect agents of biologic and chemical terror in the environment. These systems will eventually be able to detect biologic and chemical hazards reliably and provide approximate real-time alerts that an agent is present. One type of ADS that tests specifically for Bacillus anthracis is being deployed in hundreds of postal distribution centers across the United States. Identification of aerosolized B. anthracis spores in an air sample can facilitate prompt on-site decontamination of workers and subsequent administration of postexposure prophylaxis to prevent inhalational anthrax. Every employer who deploys an ADS should develop detailed plans for responding to a positive signal. Responding to ADS detection of B. anthracis involves coordinating responses with community partners and should include drills and exercises with these partners. This report provides guidelines in the following six areas: 1) response and consequence management planning, including the minimum components of a facility response plan; 2) immediate response and evacuation; 3) decontamination of potentially exposed workers to remove spores from clothing and skin and prevent introduction of B. anthracis into the worker's home and conveyances; 4) laboratory confirmation of an ADS signal; 5) steps for evaluating potentially contaminated environments; and 6) postexposure prophylaxis and follow-up.

Rapid detection and determination of the aerodynamic size range of airborne mycobacteria associated with whirlpools.

Novel environmental air and water mycobacteria sampling and analytical methods are needed to circumvent difficulties associated with the use of culture-based methodologies. To implement this objective, a commercial, clinical, genus DNA amplification method utilizing the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was interfaced with novel air sampling strategies in the laboratory. Two types of air samplers, a three-piece plastic, disposable filter cassette and an eight-stage micro-orifice uniform deposit impactor (MOUDI), were used in these studies. In both samplers, 37-mm polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) filters were used. Use of the MOUDI sampler permitted the capture of airborne mycobacteria in discrete size ranges, an important parameter for relating the airborne mycobacteria cells to potential respirable particles (aerodynamic diameter <10 microm) capable of causing health effects. Analysis of the samples was rapid, requiring only 1-1.5 days, as no microbial culturing or DNA purification was required. This approach was then used to detect suspected mycobacteria contamination associated with pools at a large public facility. PCR was also used to analyze various water samples from these pools. Again, no culturing or sample purification was required. Water samples taken from all ultraviolet light/hydrogen peroxide-treated whirlpools tested positive for the presence of mycobacteria. No mycobacteria were detected in the chlorine-treated pools and the water main supply facility. All air samples collected in the proximity of the indoor whirlpools and the associated changing rooms were strongly positive for airborne mycobacteria. The airborne mycobacteria particles were predominantly collected on MOUDI stages 1-6 representing an aerodynamic size range of 0.5 to 9.9 microm. In conclusion, using this approach permits the rapid detection of mycobacteria contamination as well as the routine monitoring of suspected pools. The approach circumvents problems associated with culture-based methods such as fungal overgrowth on agar plates, and the presence of nonculturable or difficult to culture mycobacteria strains.