A standardized framework to test event-based experiments.

The replication crisis in experimental psychology and neuroscience has received much attention recently. This has led to wide acceptance of measures to improve scientific practices, such as preregistration and registered reports. Less effort has been devoted to performing and reporting the results of systematic tests of the functioning of the experimental setup itself. Yet, inaccuracies in the performance of the experimental setup may affect the results of a study, lead to replication failures, and importantly, impede the ability to integrate results across studies. Prompted by challenges we experienced when deploying studies across six laboratories collecting electroencephalography (EEG)/magnetoencephalography (MEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and intracranial EEG (iEEG), here we describe a framework for both testing and reporting the performance of the experimental setup. In addition, 100 researchers were surveyed to provide a snapshot of current common practices and community standards concerning testing in published experiments' setups. Most researchers reported testing their experimental setups. Almost none, however, published the tests performed or their results. Tests were diverse, targeting different aspects of the setup. Through simulations, we clearly demonstrate how even slight inaccuracies can impact the final results. We end with a standardized, open-source, step-by-step protocol for testing (visual) event-related experiments, shared via protocols.io. The protocol aims to provide researchers with a benchmark for future replications and insights into the research quality to help improve the reproducibility of results, accelerate multicenter studies, increase robustness, and enable integration across studies.

No evidence for unconscious initiation and following of arithmetic rules: A replication study.

The field of consciousness studies has yielded various-sometimes contradicting-accounts regarding the function of consciousness, ranging from denying it has such function to claiming that any high-level cognitive function requires consciousness. Empirical findings supporting both accounts were reported, yet some of them have been recently revisited based on failures to replicate. Here, we aimed at replicating a remarkable finding reported by Ric and Muller (2012); participants were able to follow an unseen instruction, integrate it with a subsequently presented pair of unseen digits, and accordingly either add the digits (resulting in a priming effect), or simply represent them. This finding thus demonstrates unconscious task-switching, temporal integration (involving mental chaining), and arithmetic operation. Finding such high-level processes in the absence of awareness is of pivotal importance to our understanding of consciousness, as it challenges prominent theories in the field (e.g., the global neuronal workspace). Accordingly, in light of the self-correction wave in psychological science in general and in the field of consciousness studies in particular, we report here a preregistered replication aimed at testing the reproducibility of this finding, while also better controlling for subjects' awareness of both the instruction and the digits. Across two highly powered experiments, our results failed to replicate the original effect. We, therefore, conclude that the current evidence does not support the claim that arithmetic operations (specifically, addition) can be flexibly initiated without awareness, in line with the current arguments for a more limited scope of unconscious processing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Towards an interdisciplinary "science of the mind": A call for enhanced collaboration between philosophy and neuroscience.

In recent decades, the neuroscientific community has moved from describing the neural underpinnings of mental phenomena-as characterized by experimental psychology and philosophy of mind-to attempting to redefine those mental phenomena based on neural findings. Nowadays, many are intrigued by the idea that neuroscience might provide the "missing piece" that would allow philosophers (and, to an extent, psychologists, too) to make important advances, generating new means that these disciplines lack to close knowledge gaps and answer questions like "What is Free Will?" and "Do humans have it?." In this paper, we argue that instead of striving for neuroscience to replace philosophy in the ongoing quest to understanding human thought and behavior, more synergetic relations should be established, where neuroscience does not only inspire philosophy but also draws from it. We claim that such a collaborative coevolution, with the two disciplines nourishing and influencing each other, is key to resolving long-lasting questions that have thus far proved impenetrable for either discipline on its own.

Taking consciousness for real: Increasing the ecological validity of the study of conscious vs. unconscious processes.

The study of consciousness has developed well-controlled, rigorous methods for manipulating and measuring consciousness. Yet, in the process, experimental paradigms grew farther away from everyday conscious and unconscious processes, which raises the concern of ecological validity. In this review, we suggest that the field can benefit from adopting a more ecological approach, akin to other fields of cognitive science. There, this approach challenged some existing hypotheses, yielded stronger effects, and enabled new research questions. We argue that such a move is critical for studying consciousness, where experimental paradigms tend to be artificial and small effect sizes are relatively prevalent. We identify three paths for doing so-changing the stimuli and experimental settings, changing the measures, and changing the research questions themselves-and review works that have already started implementing such approaches. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, we call for increasing ecological validity in consciousness studies.

Using virtual reality to induce multi-trial inattentional blindness despite trial-by-trial measures of awareness.

Unconscious processing has been widely examined using diverse and well-controlled methodologies. However, the extent to which these findings are relevant to real-life instances of information processing without awareness is limited. Here, we present a novel inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm in virtual reality (VR). In three experiments, we managed to repeatedly induce IB while participants foveally viewed salient stimuli for prolonged durations. The effectiveness of this paradigm demonstrates the close relationship between top-down attention and subjective experience. Thus, this method provides an ecologically valid setup to examine processing without awareness.

Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond.

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness ('C-tests') are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them.

Awareness is needed for contextual effects in ambiguous object recognition.

Despite its centrality to human experience, the functional role of conscious awareness is not yet known. One hypothesis suggests that consciousness is necessary for allowing high-level information to refine low-level processing in a "top-down" manner. To test this hypothesis, in this work we examined whether consciousness is needed for integrating contextual information with sensory information during visual object recognition, a case of top-down processing that is automatic and ubiquitous to our daily visual experience. In three experiments, 137 participants were asked to determine the identity of an ambiguous object presented to them. Crucially, a scene biasing the interpretation of the object towards one option over another (e.g., a picture of a tree when the object could equally be perceived as a fish or a leaf) was presented either before, after, or alongside the ambiguous object. In all three experiments, the scene biased perception of the ambiguous object when it was consciously perceived, but not when it was processed unconsciously. The results therefore suggest that conscious awareness may be needed for top-down contextual processes.

Progressing, not regressing: A possible solution to the problem of regression to the mean in unconscious processing studies.

How convincing is current evidence for unconscious processing? Recently, a major criticism suggested that some, if not much, of this evidence might be explained by a mere statistical phenomenon: regression to the mean (RttM). Excluding participants based on an awareness assessment is a common practice in studies of unconscious processing, and this post hoc data selection might lead to false effects that are driven by RttM for aware participants wrongfully classified as unaware. Here, we examined this criticism using both simulations and data from 12 studies probing unconscious processing (35 effects overall). In line with the original criticism, we confirmed that the reliability of awareness measures in the field is concerningly low. Yet, using simulations, we showed that reliability measures might be unsuitable for estimating error in awareness measures. Furthermore, we examined other solutions for assessing whether an effect is genuine or reflects RttM; all suffered from substantial limitations, such as a lack of specificity to unconscious processing, lack of power, or unjustified assumptions. Accordingly, we suggest a new nonparametric solution, which enjoys high specificity and relatively high power. Together, this work emphasizes the need to account for measurement error in awareness measures and evaluate its consequences for unconscious processing effects. It further suggests a way to meet the important challenge posed by RttM, in an attempt to establish a reliable and robust corpus of knowledge in studying unconscious processing.

Experiencing without knowing? Empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access.

Can one have a phenomenal experience to which one does not have access? That is, can you experience something without knowing? The dissociation between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness is widely debated. A major challenge to the supporters of this dissociation is the apparent inability to experimentally demonstrate that P-without-A consciousness exists; once participants report having a P-experience, they already have access to it. Thus, all previous empirical support for this dissociation is indirect. Here, using a novel paradigm, we create a situation where participants (Experiment 1, N = 40) lack online access to the stimulus yet are nevertheless able to retrospectively form judgements on its phenomenal, qualitative aspects. We further show that their performance cannot be fully explained by unconscious processing or by a response to stimulus offset (Experiment 2, N = 40). This suggests that P and A consciousness are not only conceptually distinct, but might also be teased apart empirically. STATEMENT OF RELEVANCE: A critical question in the scientific quest towards solving the problem of consciousness focuses on the ability to isolate conscious experiences at their purity, without any accompanying cognitive processes. This challenge has been augmented by a highly influential - yet controversial - dissociation suggested by the philosopher Ned Block between Phenomenal consciousness, or the "what it is like" to have an experience, and Access consciousness, indexing the ability to report that one has that experience. Critically, these two types of consciousness most typically go together, making it highly difficult - if not impossible - to isolate Phenomenal consciousness. Our work shows that the dissociation between phenomenal and access consciousness is not merely conceptual, but can also be empirically demonstrated. It further opens the gate to future studies pinpointing the neural correlates of the two types of consciousness.

What is the intention to move and when does it occur?

In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious intention" and attempts to measure its timing. Scalp electroencephalographic activity prior to movement, the Bereitschaftspotential, clearly begins prior to the reported onset of conscious intent. However, the interpretation of this finding remains controversial. Numerous studies show that the Libet method for determining intent, W time, is not accurate and may be misleading. We conclude that intention has many different aspects, and although we now understand much more about how the brain makes movements, identifying the time of conscious intention is still elusive.

An adversarial collaboration protocol for testing contrasting predictions of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory.

The relationship between conscious experience and brain activity has intrigued scientists and philosophers for centuries. In the last decades, several theories have suggested different accounts for these relationships. These theories have developed in parallel, with little to no cross-talk among them. To advance research on consciousness, we established an adversarial collaboration between proponents of two of the major theories in the field, Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory. Together, we devised and preregistered two experiments that test contrasting predictions of these theories concerning the location and timing of correlates of visual consciousness, which have been endorsed by the theories' proponents. Predicted outcomes should either support, refute, or challenge these theories. Six theory-impartial laboratories will follow the study protocol specified here, using three complementary methods: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Magneto-Electroencephalography (M-EEG), and intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG). The study protocol will include built-in replications, both between labs and within datasets. Through this ambitious undertaking, we hope to provide decisive evidence in favor or against the two theories and clarify the footprints of conscious visual perception in the human brain, while also providing an innovative model of large-scale, collaborative, and open science practice.

Prestimulus oscillatory brain activity interacts with evoked recurrent processing to facilitate conscious visual perception.

We investigated whether prestimulus alpha-band oscillatory activity and stimulus-elicited recurrent processing interact to facilitate conscious visual perception. Participants tried to perceive a visual stimulus that was perceptually masked through object substitution masking (OSM). We showed that attenuated prestimulus alpha power was associated with greater negative-polarity stimulus-evoked ERP activity that resembled the visual awareness negativity (VAN), previously argued to reflect recurrent processing related to conscious perception. This effect, however, was not associated with better perception. Instead, when prestimulus alpha power was elevated, a preferred prestimulus alpha phase was associated with a greater VAN-like negativity, which was then associated with better cue perception. Cue perception was worse when prestimulus alpha power was elevated but the stimulus occurred at a nonoptimal prestimulus alpha phase and the VAN-like negativity was low. Our findings suggest that prestimulus alpha activity at a specific phase enables temporally selective recurrent processing that facilitates conscious perception in OSM.

Neuroscientific Evidence for Processing Without Awareness.

The extent to which we are affected by perceptual input of which we are unaware is widely debated. By measuring neural responses to sensory stimulation, neuroscientific data could complement behavioral results with valuable evidence. Here we review neuroscientific findings of processing of high-level information, as well as interactions with attention and memory. Although the results are mixed, we find initial support for processing object categories and words, possibly to the semantic level, as well as emotional expressions. Robust neural evidence for face individuation and integration of sentences or scenes is lacking. Attention affects the processing of stimuli that are not consciously perceived, and such stimuli may exogenously but not endogenously capture attention when relevant, and be maintained in memory over time. Sources of inconsistency in the literature include variability in control for awareness as well as individual differences, calling for future studies that adopt stricter measures of awareness and probe multiple processes within subjects.

Free will without consciousness?

Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion about how science can inform the free will debate. These discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that decisions might be influenced or biased by various unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do they render subjects' decisions less free or even unfree? Here, we argue that, while unconscious influences on decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will in general, they provide important information about limitations on freedom in specific circumstances. We demonstrate that aspects of this long-lasting controversy are empirically testable and provide insight into their bearing on degrees of freedom, laying the groundwork for future scientific-philosophical approaches.

The ConTraSt database for analysing and comparing empirical studies of consciousness theories.

Understanding how consciousness arises from neural activity remains one of the biggest challenges for neuroscience. Numerous theories have been proposed in recent years, each gaining independent empirical support. Currently, there is no comprehensive, quantitative and theory-neutral overview of the field that enables an evaluation of how theoretical frameworks interact with empirical research. We provide a bird's eye view of studies that interpreted their findings in light of at least one of four leading neuroscientific theories of consciousness (N = 412 experiments), asking how methodological choices of the researchers might affect the final conclusions. We found that supporting a specific theory can be predicted solely from methodological choices, irrespective of findings. Furthermore, most studies interpret their findings post hoc, rather than a priori testing critical predictions of the theories. Our results highlight challenges for the field and provide researchers with an open-access website ( https://ContrastDB.tau.ac.il ) to further analyse trends in the neuroscience of consciousness.

Same action, different meaning: neural substrates of action semantic meaning.

Voluntary actions are shaped by desired goals and internal intentions. Multiple factors, including the planning of subsequent actions and the expectation of sensory outcome, were shown to modulate kinetics and neural activity patterns associated with similar goal-directed actions. Notably, in many real-world tasks, actions can also vary across the semantic meaning they convey, although little is known about how semantic meaning modulates associated neurobehavioral measures. Here, we examined how behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging measures are modulated when subjects execute similar actions (button presses) for two different semantic meanings-to answer "yes" or "no" to a binary question. Our findings reveal that, when subjects answer using their right hand, the two semantic meanings are differentiated based on voxel patterns in the frontoparietal cortex and lateral-occipital complex bilaterally. When using their left hand, similar regions were found, albeit only with a more liberal threshold. Although subjects were faster to answer "yes" versus "no" when using their right hand, the neural differences cannot be explained by these kinetic differences. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first evidence showing that semantic meaning is embedded in the neural representation of actions, independent of alternative modulating factors such as kinetic and sensory features.