The best fitting of three contemporary observer models reveals how participants' strategy influences the window of subjective synchrony.

When experimenters vary the timing between two intersensory events, and participants judge their simultaneity, an inverse-U-shaped psychometric function is obtained. Typically, this simultaneity function is first fitted with a model for each participant separately, before best-fitting parameters are utilized (e.g., compared across conditions) in the second stage of a two-step inferential procedure. Often, simultaneity-function width is interpreted as representing sensitivity to asynchrony, and/or ascribed theoretical equivalence to a window of multisensory temporal binding. Here, we instead fit a single (principled) multilevel model to data from the entire group and across several conditions at once. By asking 20 participants to sometimes be more conservative in their judgments, we demonstrate how the width of the simultaneity function is prone to strategic change and thus questionable as a measure of either sensitivity to asynchrony or multisensory binding. By repeating our analysis with three different models (two implying a decision based directly on subjective asynchrony, and a third deriving this decision from the correlation between filtered responses to sensory inputs) we find that the first model, which hypothesizes, in particular, Gaussian latency noise and difficulty maintaining the stability of decision criteria across trials, is most plausible for these data. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Trial-by-trial predictions of subjective time from human brain activity.

Human experience of time exhibits systematic, context-dependent deviations from clock time; for example, time is experienced differently at work than on holiday. Here we test the proposal that differences from clock time in subjective experience of time arise because time estimates are constructed by accumulating the same quantity that guides perception: salient events. Healthy human participants watched naturalistic, silent videos of up to 24 seconds in duration and estimated their duration while fMRI was acquired. We were able to reconstruct trial-by-trial biases in participants' duration reports, which reflect subjective experience of duration, purely from salient events in their visual cortex BOLD activity. By contrast, salient events in neither of two control regions-auditory and somatosensory cortex-were predictive of duration biases. These results held despite being able to (trivially) predict clock time from all three brain areas. Our results reveal that the information arising during perceptual processing of a dynamic environment provides a sufficient basis for reconstructing human subjective time duration.

A Predictive Processing Model of Episodic Memory and Time Perception.

Human perception and experience of time are strongly influenced by ongoing stimulation, memory of past experiences, and required task context. When paying attention to time, time experience seems to expand; when distracted, it seems to contract. When considering time based on memory, the experience may be different than what is in the moment, exemplified by sayings like "time flies when you're having fun." Experience of time also depends on the content of perceptual experience-rapidly changing or complex perceptual scenes seem longer in duration than less dynamic ones. The complexity of interactions among attention, memory, and perceptual stimulation is a likely reason that an overarching theory of time perception has been difficult to achieve. Here, we introduce a model of perceptual processing and episodic memory that makes use of hierarchical predictive coding, short-term plasticity, spatiotemporal attention, and episodic memory formation and recall, and apply this model to the problem of human time perception. In an experiment with approximately 13,000 human participants, we investigated the effects of memory, cognitive load, and stimulus content on duration reports of dynamic natural scenes up to about 1 minute long. Using our model to generate duration estimates, we compared human and model performance. Model-based estimates replicated key qualitative biases, including differences by cognitive load (attention), scene type (stimulation), and whether the judgment was made based on current or remembered experience (memory). Our work provides a comprehensive model of human time perception and a foundation for exploring the computational basis of episodic memory within a hierarchical predictive coding framework.

The Neural Representation of Events Is Dominated by Elements that Are Most Reliably Present.

An episodic memory is specific to an event that occurred at a particular time and place. However, the elements that constitute the event-the location, the people present, and their actions and goals-might be shared with numerous other similar events. Does the brain preferentially represent certain elements of a remembered event? If so, which elements dominate its neural representation: those that are shared across similar events, or the novel elements that define a specific event? We addressed these questions by using a novel experimental paradigm combined with fMRI. Multiple events were created involving conversations between two individuals using the format of a television chat show. Chat show "hosts" occurred repeatedly across multiple events, whereas the "guests" were unique to only one event. Before learning the conversations, participants were scanned while viewing images or names of the (famous) individuals to be used in the study to obtain person-specific activity patterns. After learning all the conversations over a week, participants were scanned for a second time while they recalled each event multiple times. We found that during recall, person-specific activity patterns within the posterior midline network were reinstated for the hosts of the shows but not the guests, and that reinstatement of the hosts was significantly stronger than the reinstatement of the guests. These findings demonstrate that it is the more generic, familiar, and predictable elements of an event that dominate its neural representation compared with the more idiosyncratic, event-defining, elements.

Intentional binding as Bayesian cue combination: Testing predictions with trait individual differences.

We investigated differences in intentional binding in high and low hypnotizable groups to explore two questions relating to (a) trait differences in the availability of motor intentions to metacognitive processes and (b) a proposed cue combination model of binding. An experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding and may arise from strategically being unaware of one's intentions. Trait differences in the ability to respond to hypnotic suggestion may reflect differing levels of access to motor intentions. Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of the time between an action and its outcome, indicated by a forward shift in the judged time of an action toward its outcome (action binding) and the backward shift of an outcome toward a causal action (outcome binding). Intentional binding is sensitive to intentional action without requiring explicit reflection upon agency. One way of explaining the sensitivity of intentional binding is to see it as a simple case of multisensory cue combination in which awareness of intentions increases knowledge of the timing of actions. Here we present results consistent with such a mechanism. In a contingent presentation of action and outcome events, low hypnotizable had more precise timing judgments of actions and also showed weaker action binding than highs. These results support the theory that trait hypnotizability is related to access to information related to motor intentions, and that intentional binding reflects the Bayesian combination of cross-modal cues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Intentional Binding Without Intentional Action.

The experience of authorship over one's actions and their consequences-sense of agency-is a fundamental aspect of conscious experience. In recent years, it has become common to use intentional binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. However, it remains contentious whether reported intentional-binding effects indicate the role of intention-related information in perception or merely represent a strong case of multisensory causal binding. Here, we used a novel virtual-reality setup to demonstrate identical magnitude-binding effects in both the presence and complete absence of intentional action, when perceptual stimuli were matched for temporal and spatial information. Our results demonstrate that intentional-binding-like effects are most simply accounted for by multisensory causal binding without necessarily being related to intention or agency. Future studies that relate binding effects to agency must provide evidence for effects beyond that expected for multisensory causal binding by itself.

Thermal-Tactile Integration in Object Temperature Perception.

The brain consistently faces a challenge of whether and how to combine the available information sources to estimate the properties of an object explored by hand. While object perception is an inference process involving multisensory inputs, thermal referral (TR) is an illusion demonstrating how the interaction between thermal and tactile systems can lead to deviations from physical reality-when observers touch three stimulators simultaneously with the middle three fingers of one hand but only the outer two stimulators are heated (or cooled), thermal uniformity is perceived across three fingers. Here, we used TR of warmth to examine the thermal-tactile interaction in object temperature perception. We show that TR is consistent with precision-weighted averaging of thermal sensation across tactile locations. Furthermore, we show that prolonged contact with TR stimulation results in adaptation to the local variations of veridical temperatures instead of the thermal uniformity perceived across three fingers. Our results illuminate the flexibility of processing that underlies thermal-tactile interactions and serve as a basis for thermal display design.

Activity in perceptual classification networks as a basis for human subjective time perception.

Despite being a fundamental dimension of experience, how the human brain generates the perception of time remains unknown. Here, we provide a novel explanation for how human time perception might be accomplished, based on non-temporal perceptual classification processes. To demonstrate this proposal, we build an artificial neural system centred on a feed-forward image classification network, functionally similar to human visual processing. In this system, input videos of natural scenes drive changes in network activation, and accumulation of salient changes in activation are used to estimate duration. Estimates produced by this system match human reports made about the same videos, replicating key qualitative biases, including differentiating between scenes of walking around a busy city or sitting in a cafe or office. Our approach provides a working model of duration perception from stimulus to estimation and presents a new direction for examining the foundations of this central aspect of human experience.

Serial dependence in timing perception.

Recent sensory history affects subsequent experience. Behavioral results have demonstrated this effect in two forms: repeated exposure to the same sensory input produces negative aftereffects wherein sensory stimuli like those previously experienced are judged as less like the exposed stimulation, while singular exposures can produce positive aftereffects wherein judgments are more like previously experienced stimulation. For timing perception, there is controversy regarding the influence of recent exposure-both singular and repeated exposure produce apparently negative aftereffects-often referred to as temporal recalibration and rapid temporal recalibration, respectively. While negative aftereffects have been found following repeated exposure for all timing tasks, following a single exposure, they have only been demonstrated using synchrony judgments (SJs). Here, we examine the influence of a single presentation-serial dependence for timing-for standard timing tasks: SJ, temporal order judgments, and magnitude estimation judgments. We found that serial dependence produced apparently negative aftereffects in SJ, but positive aftereffects in temporal order judgment and magnitude estimation judgment. We propose that these findings, and those following repeated exposure, can be reconciled within a framework wherein negative aftereffects occur at sensory layers, consistent with classical depictions of sensory adaptation, and Bayesian-like positive aftereffects operate across different, higher, decision levels. These findings are consistent with the aftereffects known from other perceptual dimensions and provide a general framework for interpreting positive (serial dependence) and negative (sensory adaptation) aftereffects across different tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

The Illusion of Uniformity Does Not Depend on the Primary Visual Cortex: Evidence From Sensory Adaptation.

Visual experience appears richly detailed despite the poor resolution of the majority of the visual field, thanks to foveal-peripheral integration. The recently described uniformity illusion (UI), wherein peripheral elements of a pattern take on the appearance of foveal elements, may shed light on this integration. We examined the basis of UI by generating adaptation to a pattern of Gabors suitable for producing UI on orientation. After removing the pattern, participants reported the tilt of a single peripheral Gabor. The tilt aftereffect followed the physical adapting orientation rather than the global orientation perceived under UI, even when the illusion had been reported for a long time. Conversely, a control experiment replacing illusory uniformity with a physically uniform Gabor pattern for the same durations did produce an aftereffect to the global orientation. Results indicate that UI is not associated with changes in sensory encoding at V1 but likely depends on higher level processes.

Serial dependence in the perception of visual variance.

The recent history of perceptual experience has been shown to influence subsequent perception. Classically, this dependence on perceptual history has been examined in sensory-adaptation paradigms, wherein prolonged exposure to a particular stimulus (e.g., a vertically oriented grating) produces changes in perception of subsequently presented stimuli (e.g., the tilt aftereffect). More recently, several studies have investigated the influence of shorter perceptual exposure with effects, referred to as serial dependence, being described for a variety of low- and high-level perceptual dimensions. In this study, we examined serial dependence in the processing of dispersion statistics, namely variance-a key descriptor of the environment and indicative of the precision and reliability of ensemble representations. We found two opposite serial dependences operating at different timescales, and likely originating at different processing levels: A positive, Bayesian-like bias was driven by the most recent exposures, dependent on feature-specific decision making and appearing only when high confidence was placed in that decision; and a longer lasting negative bias-akin to an adaptation aftereffect-becoming manifest as the positive bias declined. Both effects were independent of spatial presentation location and the similarity of other close traits, such as mean direction of the visual variance stimulus. These findings suggest that visual variance processing occurs in high-level areas but is also subject to a combination of multilevel mechanisms balancing perceptual stability and sensitivity, as with many different perceptual dimensions.

A Deep-Dream Virtual Reality Platform for Studying Altered Perceptual Phenomenology.

Altered states of consciousness, such as psychotic or pharmacologically-induced hallucinations, provide a unique opportunity to examine the mechanisms underlying conscious perception. However, the phenomenological properties of these states are difficult to isolate experimentally from other, more general physiological and cognitive effects of psychoactive substances or psychopathological conditions. Thus, simulating phenomenological aspects of altered states in the absence of these other more general effects provides an important experimental tool for consciousness science and psychiatry. Here we describe such a tool, which we call the Hallucination Machine. It comprises a novel combination of two powerful technologies: deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) and panoramic videos of natural scenes, viewed immersively through a head-mounted display (panoramic VR). By doing this, we are able to simulate visual hallucinatory experiences in a biologically plausible and ecologically valid way. Two experiments illustrate potential applications of the Hallucination Machine. First, we show that the system induces visual phenomenology qualitatively similar to classical psychedelics. In a second experiment, we find that simulated hallucinations do not evoke the temporal distortion commonly associated with altered states. Overall, the Hallucination Machine offers a valuable new technique for simulating altered phenomenology without directly altering the underlying neurophysiology.

Grouping by feature of cross-modal flankers in temporal ventriloquism.

Signals in one sensory modality can influence perception of another, for example the bias of visual timing by audition: temporal ventriloquism. Strong accounts of temporal ventriloquism hold that the sensory representation of visual signal timing changes to that of the nearby sound. Alternatively, underlying sensory representations do not change. Rather, perceptual grouping processes based on spatial, temporal, and featural information produce best-estimates of global event properties. In support of this interpretation, when feature-based perceptual grouping conflicts with temporal information-based in scenarios that reveal temporal ventriloquism, the effect is abolished. However, previous demonstrations of this disruption used long-range visual apparent-motion stimuli. We investigated whether similar manipulations of feature grouping could also disrupt the classical temporal ventriloquism demonstration, which occurs over a short temporal range. We estimated the precision of participants' reports of which of two visual bars occurred first. The bars were accompanied by different cross-modal signals that onset synchronously or asynchronously with each bar. Participants' performance improved with asynchronous presentation relative to synchronous - temporal ventriloquism - however, unlike the long-range apparent motion paradigm, this was unaffected by different combinations of cross-modal feature, suggesting that featural similarity of cross-modal signals may not modulate cross-modal temporal influences in short time scales.

Sensory adaptation for timing perception.

Recent sensory experience modifies subjective timing perception. For example, when visual events repeatedly lead auditory events, such as when the sound and video tracks of a movie are out of sync, subsequent vision-leads-audio presentations are reported as more simultaneous. This phenomenon could provide insights into the fundamental problem of how timing is represented in the brain, but the underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. Here, we show that the effect of recent experience on timing perception is not just subjective; recent sensory experience also modifies relative timing discrimination. This result indicates that recent sensory history alters the encoding of relative timing in sensory areas, excluding explanations of the subjective phenomenon based only on decision-level changes. The pattern of changes in timing discrimination suggests the existence of two sensory components, similar to those previously reported for visual spatial attributes: a lateral shift in the nonlinear transducer that maps relative timing into perceptual relative timing and an increase in transducer slope around the exposed timing. The existence of these components would suggest that previous explanations of how recent experience may change the sensory encoding of timing, such as changes in sensory latencies or simple implementations of neural population codes, cannot account for the effect of sensory adaptation on timing perception.

The cross-modal double flash illusion depends on featural similarity between cross-modal inducers.

Despite extensive evidence of the possible interactions between multisensory signals, it remains unclear at what level of sensory processing these interactions take place. When two identical auditory beeps (inducers) are presented in quick succession accompanied by a single visual flash, observers often report seeing two visual flashes, rather than the physical one - the double flash illusion. This compelling illusion has often been considered to reflect direct interactions between neural activations in different primary sensory cortices. Against this simple account, here we show that by simply changing the inducer signals between featurally distinct signals (e.g. high- and low-pitch beeps) the illusory double flash is abolished. This result suggests that a critical component underlying the illusion is perceptual grouping of the inducer signals, consistent with the notion that multisensory combination is preceded by determination of whether the relevant signals share a common source of origin.

The sense of agency is action-effect causality perception based on cross-modal grouping.

Sense of agency, the experience of controlling external events through one's actions, stems from contiguity between action- and effect-related signals. Here we show that human observers link their action- and effect-related signals using a computational principle common to cross-modal sensory grouping. We first report that the detection of a delay between tactile and visual stimuli is enhanced when both stimuli are synchronized with separate auditory stimuli (experiment 1). This occurs because the synchronized auditory stimuli hinder the potential grouping between tactile and visual stimuli. We subsequently demonstrate an analogous effect on observers' key press as an action and a sensory event. This change is associated with a modulation in sense of agency; namely, sense of agency, as evaluated by apparent compressions of action-effect intervals (intentional binding) or subjective causality ratings, is impaired when both participant's action and its putative visual effect events are synchronized with auditory tones (experiments 2 and 3). Moreover, a similar role of action-effect grouping in determining sense of agency is demonstrated when the additional signal is presented in the modality identical to an effect event (experiment 4). These results are consistent with the view that sense of agency is the result of general processes of causal perception and that cross-modal grouping plays a central role in these processes.

Audio-Visual Temporal Recalibration Can be Constrained by Content Cues Regardless of Spatial Overlap.

It has now been well established that the point of subjective synchrony for audio and visual events can be shifted following exposure to asynchronous audio-visual presentations, an effect often referred to as temporal recalibration. Recently it was further demonstrated that it is possible to concurrently maintain two such recalibrated estimates of audio-visual temporal synchrony. However, it remains unclear precisely what defines a given audio-visual pair such that it is possible to maintain a temporal relationship distinct from other pairs. It has been suggested that spatial separation of the different audio-visual pairs is necessary to achieve multiple distinct audio-visual synchrony estimates. Here we investigated if this is necessarily true. Specifically, we examined whether it is possible to obtain two distinct temporal recalibrations for stimuli that differed only in featural content. Using both complex (audio visual speech; see Experiment 1) and simple stimuli (high and low pitch audio matched with either vertically or horizontally oriented Gabors; see Experiment 2) we found concurrent, and opposite, recalibrations despite there being no spatial difference in presentation location at any point throughout the experiment. This result supports the notion that the content of an audio-visual pair alone can be used to constrain distinct audio-visual synchrony estimates regardless of spatial overlap.

Sensorimotor temporal recalibration within and across limbs.

Deciding precisely when we have acted is challenging, as actions involve a train of neural events spread across both space and time. Repeated delays between actions and consequent events can result in a shift, such that immediate feedback can seem to precede the causative act. Here we examined which neurocognitive representations are affected during such sensorimotor temporal recalibration, by testing if the effect generalizes across limbs and whether it might reflect altered decision criteria for temporal judgments. Hand or foot adaptation phases were interspersed with simultaneity judgments about actions involving the same or opposite limb. Shifts in the distribution of participants' simultaneity responses were quantified using a detection-theoretic model, where a shift of both boundaries together gives a stronger indication that the effect is not simply a result of decision bias. By demonstrating that temporal recalibration occurs in the foot as well as the hand, we confirmed that it is a robust motor phenomenon: Both low and high boundaries shifted reliably in the same-limb conditions. However, in cross-limb conditions only the high boundary shifted reliably. These two patterns are interpreted to reflect a genuine change in how the time of action is represented, and a timing criterion shift, respectively.

Attentional tuning resets after failures of perceptual awareness.

Key to successfully negotiating our environment is our ability to adapt to current settings based on recent experiences and behaviour. Response conflict paradigms (e.g., the Stroop task) have provided evidence for increases in executive control after errors, leading to slowed responses that are more likely to be correct, and less susceptible to response congruency effects. Here we investigate whether failures of perceptual awareness, rather than failures at decisional or response stages of information processing, lead to similar adjustments in visual attention. We employed an attentional blink task in which subjects often fail to consciously register the second of two targets embedded in a rapid serial visual presentation stream of distractors, and examined how target errors influence performance on subsequent trials. Performance was inferior after Target 2 errors and these inter-trial effects were independent of the temporal lag between the targets and were not due to more global changes in attention across runs of trials. These results shed light on the nature of attentional calibration in response to failures of perceptual consciousness.