Why creatives don't find the oddball odd: Neural and psychological evidence for atypical salience processing.

Creativity has previously been linked with various attentional phenomena, including unfocused or broad attention. Although this has typically been interpreted through an executive functioning framework, such phenomena may also arise from atypical incentive salience processing. Across two studies, we examine this hypothesis both neurally and psychologically. First we examine the relationship between figural creativity and event-related potentials during an audio-visual oddball task, finding that rater creativity of drawings is associated with a diminished P300 response at midline electrodes, while abstractness and elaborateness of the drawings is associated with an altered distribution of the P300 over posterior electrodes. These findings support the notion that creativity may involve an atypical attribution of salience to prominent information. We further explore the incentive salience hypothesis by examining relationships between creativity and a psychological indicator of incentive salience captured by participants' ratings of enjoyment (liking) and their motivation to pursue (wanting) diverse real world rewards, as well as their positive spontaneous thoughts about those rewards. Here we find enhanced motivation to pursue activities as well as a reduced relationship between the overall tendency to enjoy rewards and the tendency to pursue them. Collectively, these findings indicate that creativity may be associated with atypical allocation of attentional and motivational resources to novel and rewarding information, potentially allowing more types of information access to attentional resources and motivating more diverse behaviors. We discuss the possibility that salience attribution in creatives may be less dependent on task-relevance or hedonic pleasure, and suggest that atypical salience attribution may represent a trait-like feature of creativity.

Standing out: an atypical salience account of creativity.

Creativity often entails gaining a novel perspective, yet it remains uncertain how this is accomplished. Atypical salience processing may foster creative thinking by prioritizing putatively irrelevant information, thereby broadening the material accessible for idea generation and inhibiting attentional fixedness; in essence, motivating creative individuals to incorporate information that others overlook.

Hierarchical consciousness: the Nested Observer Windows model.

Foremost in our experience is the intuition that we possess a unified conscious experience. However, many observations run counter to this intuition: we experience paralyzing indecision when faced with two appealing behavioral choices, we simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs, and the content of our thought is often characterized by an internal debate. Here, we propose the Nested Observer Windows (NOW) Model, a framework for hierarchical consciousness wherein information processed across many spatiotemporal scales of the brain feeds into subjective experience. The model likens the mind to a hierarchy of nested mosaic tiles-where an image is composed of mosaic tiles, and each of these tiles is itself an image composed of mosaic tiles. Unitary consciousness exists at the apex of this nested hierarchy where perceptual constructs become fully integrated and complex behaviors are initiated via abstract commands. We define an observer window as a spatially and temporally constrained system within which information is integrated, e.g. in functional brain regions and neurons. Three principles from the signal analysis of electrical activity describe the nested hierarchy and generate testable predictions. First, nested observer windows disseminate information across spatiotemporal scales with cross-frequency coupling. Second, observer windows are characterized by a high degree of internal synchrony (with zero phase lag). Third, observer windows at the same spatiotemporal level share information with each other through coherence (with non-zero phase lag). The theoretical framework of the NOW Model accounts for a wide range of subjective experiences and a novel approach for integrating prominent theories of consciousness.

High replicability of newly discovered social-behavioural findings is achievable.

Failures to replicate evidence of new discoveries have forced scientists to ask whether this unreliability is due to suboptimal implementation of methods or whether presumptively optimal methods are not, in fact, optimal. This paper reports an investigation by four coordinated laboratories of the prospective replicability of 16 novel experimental findings using rigour-enhancing practices: confirmatory tests, large sample sizes, preregistration and methodological transparency. In contrast to past systematic replication efforts that reported replication rates averaging 50%, replication attempts here produced the expected effects with significance testing (P < 0.05) in 86% of attempts, slightly exceeding the maximum expected replicability based on observed effect sizes and sample sizes. When one lab attempted to replicate an effect discovered by another lab, the effect size in the replications was 97% that in the original study. This high replication rate justifies confidence in rigour-enhancing methods to increase the replicability of new discoveries.

What I didn't grow up with is dangerous: personal experience with a new technology or societal change reduces the belief that it corrupts youth.

Introduction: Throughout history, technological and societal changes consistently receive suspicion. Their influences appear damaging, corrupting, and potential precursors to societal downfall, with today's youth often portrayed as the primary victims. This study aims to explore an underlying reason for these perceptions and to investigate why society frequently perceives technological and societal transitions as detrimental to the younger generation. Methods: We conduct two studies across a total of 1,702 participants. In a pilot study, American adults generate a list of technological/societal innovations they believe to be especially problematic for youth in various ways. The second study maps beliefs that specific technological/societal shifts are corruptive, correlating with whether American adults experience them during their upbringing. Results: People view recent technologies as particularly corrupting of today's youth. A notable within-person correlation exists between an individual's exposure to specific technologies during their youth and their belief that these technologies corrupt today's youth. Specifically, people are more inclined to view technological/societal shifts as corruptive if they don't experience them during their formative years (b = -0.09, p < 0.001, 95%CI = [-0.11, -0.09]). When reminded of their own exposure to a particular innovation during their upbringing, however, this relationship reduces. Discussion: These findings suggest unfamiliarity currently stands as a pivotal factor in societal apprehensions regarding new technological and societal evolutions. As society welcomes new innovations, an enduring cycle emerges where those unacquainted changes seem corruptive to the newer generations. Recognizing this bias, primarily driven by mere unfamiliarity, may be crucial for more balanced evaluations of the inevitable technological and societal progress.

Insight and the selection of ideas.

Perhaps it is no accident that insight moments accompany some of humanity's most important discoveries in science, medicine, and art. Here we propose that feelings of insight play a central role in (heuristically) selecting an idea from the stream of consciousness by capturing attention and eliciting a sense of intuitive confidence permitting fast action under uncertainty. The mechanisms underlying this Eureka heuristic are explained within an active inference framework. First, implicit restructuring via Bayesian reduction leads to a higher-order prediction error (i.e., the content of insight). Second, dopaminergic precision-weighting of the prediction error accounts for the intuitive confidence, pleasure, and attentional capture (i.e., the feeling of insight). This insight as precision account is consistent with the phenomenology, accuracy, and neural unfolding of insight, as well as its effects on belief and decision-making. We conclude by reflecting on dangers of the Eureka Heuristic, including the arising and entrenchment of false beliefs and the vulnerability of insights under psychoactive substances and misinformation.

Do Obligations Follow the Mind or Body?

Do you persist as the same person over time because you keep the same mind or because you keep the same body? Philosophers have long investigated this question of personal identity with thought experiments. Cognitive scientists have joined this tradition by assessing lay intuitions about those cases. Much of this work has focused on judgments of identity continuity. But identity also has practical significance: obligations are tagged to one's identity over time. Understanding how someone persists as the same person over time could provide insight into how and why moral and legal obligations persist. In this paper, we investigate judgments of obligations in hypothetical cases where a person's mind and body diverge (e.g., brain transplant cases). We find a striking pattern of results: In assigning obligations in these identity test cases, people are divided among three groups: "body-followers," "mind-followers," and "splitters"-people who say that the obligation is split between the mind and the body. Across studies, responses are predicted by a variety of factors, including mind/body dualism, essentialism, education, and professional training. When we give this task to professional lawyers, accountants, and bankers, we find they are more inclined to rely on bodily continuity in tracking obligations. These findings reveal not only the heterogeneity of intuitions about identity but how these intuitions relate to the legal standing of an individual's obligations.

Manipulating Belief in Free Will and Its Downstream Consequences: A Meta-Analysis.

Ever since some scientists and popular media put forward the idea that free will is an illusion, the question has risen what would happen if people stopped believing in free will. Psychological research has investigated this question by testing the consequences of experimentally weakening people's free will beliefs. The results of these investigations have been mixed, with successful experiments and unsuccessful replications. This raises two fundamental questions: Can free will beliefs be manipulated, and do such manipulations have downstream consequences? In a meta-analysis including 145 experiments (95 unpublished), we show that exposing individuals to anti-free will manipulations decreases belief in free will and increases belief in determinism. However, we could not find evidence for downstream consequences. Our findings have important theoretical implications for research on free will beliefs and contribute to the discussion of whether reducing people's belief in free will has societal consequences.

Who Denigrates Today's Youth?: The Role of Age, Implicit Theories, and Sharing the Same Negative Trait.

Adults perceive the youth of the present as being worse than from when they were young. This phenomenon has been shown to be a product of a memory bias, adults are unable to accurately recall what children were like in the past so they impose their current selves onto their memories. In two studies using American adults (N = 2,764), we seek to connect this finding to age, implicit theories of change, and extend the beliefs in the decline of the youth to new domains. Here we show as people age, they hold harsher beliefs about present children. Those who believe a trait does not change throughout the lifespan exhibit more forgiving attitudes toward the youth of today, believing they may not be in such decline on that trait. Finally, people who are low in a negative trait believe strongly that children are becoming more deficient in that particular trait (e.g., those who are not narcissistic believe the youth are becoming more narcissistic).

Mind-Wandering and Childhood ADHD: Experimental Manipulations across Laboratory and Naturalistic Settings.

The conceptual overlap between mind-wandering and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)-related impairments is considerable, yet little experimental research examining this overlap among children is available. The current study aims to experimentally manipulate mind-wandering among children with and without ADHD and examine effects on task performance. Participants were 59 children with ADHD and 55 age-matched controls. Participants completed a novel mind-wandering sustained attention to response task (SART) that included non-self-referential and self-referential stimuli to experimentally increase self-referential mind-wandering, reflected by increases in reaction time variability (RTV) following self-referential stimuli. The ADHD group participated in a classroom study with analogue conditions aimed at encouraging self-referential future-oriented thinking (free play/movie before and after class work) compared to a control condition (newscast) and a cross-over methylphenidate trial. The significant interaction between ADHD status and self-referential stimuli on SART performance indicated that self-referential stimuli led to greater RTV among children with ADHD (within-subject d = 1.29) but not among controls. Methylphenidate significantly reduced RTV among youth with ADHD across self-referential (d = 1.07) and non-self-referential conditions (d = 0.72). In the ADHD classroom study, the significant interaction between mind-wandering condition and methylphenidate indicated that methylphenidate led to higher work completion (ds > 5.00), and the free-play mind-wandering condition had more consistent detrimental effects on productivity (ds ≥ 1.25) than the movie mind-wandering condition. This study is the first to manipulate mind-wandering and assess effects among children with ADHD using a behavioral task. Results provide evidence that children with ADHD are uniquely susceptible to mind-wandering interference.

A relationship that makes life worth-living: levels of value orientation explain differences in meaning and life satisfaction.

When people talk about their values they refer to what is meaningful to them. Although meaning is associated with life satisfaction, previous studies report inconsistent results regarding the association of values and well-being. A cross-sectional study (N = 276) addresses the research question, do values influence experiences of meaning and subjective evaluations of life satisfaction? To assess whether providing a definition of "meaningful" is necessary when employing meaning measures, we assigned participants to condition where some provided their definition and others read a definition of "meaningful". All participants described a recent meaningful experience; they characterized it with sources of meaning; they read descriptions of 10 values and assessed the degree those were relevant to their experience; and they completed meaning and life satisfaction measures. Findings, which were unaffected by reading a definition of "meaningful", indicated that the most common source of meaning (Family) was associated positively with the value of Tradition and negatively with the value of Universalism. Latent Profile Analysis identified three profiles denoting participants' level of value orientation, which explained interindividual differences in average levels of meaning and life satisfaction variables. Participants who associated their meaningful experience with the 10 universal values at a high level scored higher in the meaning and life satisfaction measures than those who associated their experience to the 10 universal values at a low level. The present work advances knowledge regarding the relationship between meaning, values and life satisfaction and validates previous studies reporting on meaning as a marker of well-being.

Irrelevant insights make worldviews ring true.

Our basic beliefs about reality can be impossible to prove and yet we can feel a strong intuitive conviction about them, as exemplified by insights that imbue an idea with immediate certainty. Here we presented participants with worldview beliefs such as "people's core qualities are fixed" and simultaneously elicited an aha moment. In the first experiment (N = 3000, which included a direct replication), participants rated worldview beliefs as truer when they solved anagrams and also experienced aha moments. A second experiment (N = 1564) showed that the worldview statement and the aha moment must be perceived simultaneously for this 'insight misattribution' effect to occur. These results demonstrate that artificially induced aha moments can make worldview beliefs seem truer, possibly because humans partially rely on feelings of insight to appraise an idea's veracity. Feelings of insight are therefore not epiphenomenal and should be investigated for their effects on decisions, beliefs, and delusions.

LSD and creativity: Increased novelty and symbolic thinking, decreased utility and convergent thinking.

BACKGROUND: Controversy surrounds psychedelics and their potential to boost creativity. To date, psychedelic studies lack a uniform conceptualization of creativity and methodologically rigorous designs. AIMS: This study aimed at addressing previous issues by examining the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) on creativity using multimodal tasks and multidimensional approaches. METHODS: In a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover study, 24 healthy volunteers received 50 µg of LSD or inactive placebo. Near drug peak, a creativity task battery was applied, including pattern meaning task (PMT), alternate uses task (AUT), picture concept task (PCT), creative metaphors task (MET) and figural creativity task (FIG). Creativity was assessed by scoring creativity criteria (novelty, utility, surprise), calculating divergent thinking (fluency, originality, flexibility, elaboration) and convergent thinking, computing semantic distances (semantic spread, semantic steps) and searching for data-driven special features. RESULTS: LSD, compared to placebo, changed several creativity measurements pointing to three overall LSD-induced phenomena: (1) 'pattern break', reflected by increased novelty, surprise, originality and semantic distances; (2) decreased 'organization', reflected by decreased utility, convergent thinking and, marginally, elaboration; and (3) 'meaning', reflected by increased symbolic thinking and ambiguity in the data-driven results. CONCLUSION: LSD changed creativity across modalities and measurement approaches. Three phenomena of pattern break, disorganization and meaning seemed to fundamentally influence creative cognition and behaviour pointing to a shift of cognitive resources 'away from normal' and 'towards the new'. LSD-induced symbolic thinking might provide a tool to support treatment efficiency in psychedelic-assisted therapy.

Filthy Animals: Integrating the Behavioral Immune System and Disgust into a Model of Prophylactic Dehumanization.

The behavioral immune system (BIS) is an evolved psychological mechanism that motivates prophylactic avoidance of disease vectors by eliciting disgust. When felt toward social groups, disgust can dampen empathy and promote dehumanization. Therefore, we investigated whether the BIS facilitates the dehumanization of groups associated with disease by inspiring disgust toward them. An initial content analysis found that Nazi propaganda predominantly dehumanized Jews by portraying them as disease vectors or contaminants. This inspired three correlational studies supporting a Prophylactic Dehumanization Model in which the BIS predicted disgust toward disease-relevant outgroups, and this disgust in turn accounted for the dehumanization of these groups. In a final study, we found this process of prophylactic dehumanization had a downstream effect on increasing anti-immigrant attitudes during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, consistent with the evolutionary logic of a functionally flexible BIS, this effect only occurred when the threat of COVID-19 was salient. The implications of these results for the study of dehumanization and evolutionary theories of xenophobia are discussed. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s40806-021-00296-8.

Moral contamination: Perceptions of good (but not bad) deeds depend on the ethical history of the actor.

In the majority of moral decision-making research, we are asked to consider the action of someone we know little about-an anonymous actor. This is inconsistent with our everyday judgments of the actions of others. Here we test the novel prediction of whether actions are considered as comparably virtuous or malignant when performed by a good person, an immoral person, or the standard anonymous actor. Across four sets of experiments (nine studies in total), we show that the moral status of the actor contaminates peoples' evaluations of the virtue of their actions. Even without ulterior motives, people do not judge good acts consistently across actors. We also discover a dose-response relationship where the more immoral the actor has been in the past-the less credit they are given for a good action in the present. This process does not occur for good people performing bad acts, however. Bad acts are bad regardless of who commits them. These results give new insights into the way people evaluate the behaviors of others.

Thought dynamics under task demands: Evaluating the influence of task difficulty on unconstrained thought.

As research on mind wandering has accelerated, the construct's defining features have expanded and researchers have begun to examine different dimensions of mind wandering. Recently, Christoff and colleagues have argued for the importance of investigating a hitherto neglected variety of mind wandering: "unconstrained thought," or, thought that is relatively unguided by executive-control processes. To date, with only a few studies investigating unconstrained thought, little is known about this intriguing type of mind wandering. Across 2 experiments, we examined, for the first time, whether changes in task demand influence rates of constrained versus unconstrained thoughts. In both experiments, participants completed either an easy (0-back) or hard (2-back) task and responded to intermittently presented thought probes that gauged thought constraint throughout the task. In Experiment 1, we found that participants completing the easy task engaged in unconstrained thoughts more frequently than those completing the difficult task. In Experiment 2, we replicated this result and further demonstrated manipulations of unconstrained thought while also measuring task-relatedness (a common dimension of mind wandering). Finally, exploratory analyses showed associations between constrained thought and age, verbal intelligence, and an assessment of flow ('deep effortless concentration'), thereby adding further evidence to indicate a dissociation between task-relatedness and constraint. We discuss the methodological and theoretical applications of our findings to the burgeoning field of research on unconstrained thought. All data, analysis, article, and experiment code can be found at https://osf.io/wr2vk/ (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Getting a grip on insight: real-time and embodied Aha experiences predict correct solutions.

Insight experiences are sudden, persuasive, and can accompany valuable new ideas in science and art. In this preregistered experiment, we aim to validate a novel visceral and continuous measure of insight problem solving and to test whether real-time and embodied feelings of insight can predict correct solutions. We report several findings. Consistent with recent work, we find a strong positive relationship between Aha moments and accuracy for problems that demand implicit processing. We also found that the intensity of the insight experience further predicted the accuracy of solutions and participants naturally embodied the intensity of their insight experiences by squeezing the dynamometer more tightly. Intriguingly, this unintentional embodiment further predicted the accuracy of solutions. We suggest that the dynamometer complements previous measures by (1) simultaneously capturing both process and feeling in real-time, (2) highlights the value of measuring Aha moments on a continuum of intensity, and (3) firmly establishes that the impulsive feeling of Aha can carry information about the veracity of an idea. We discuss the findings in light of a recent theoretical account of how feelings of insight may act as a heuristic to select ideas from the stream of consciousness.

The neural correlates of ongoing conscious thought.

A core goal in cognitive neuroscience is identifying the physical substrates of the patterns of thought that occupy our daily lives. Contemporary views suggest that the landscape of ongoing experience is heterogeneous and can be influenced by features of both the person and the context. This perspective piece considers recent work that explicitly accounts for both the heterogeneity of the experience and context dependence of patterns of ongoing thought. These studies reveal that systems linked to attention and control are important for organizing experience in response to changing environmental demands. These studies also establish a role of the default mode network beyond task-negative or purely episodic content, for example, implicating it in the level of vivid detail in experience in both task contexts and in spontaneous self-generated experiential states. Together, this work demonstrates that the landscape of ongoing thought is reflected in the activity of multiple neural systems, and it is important to distinguish between processes contributing to how the experience unfolds from those linked to how these experiences are regulated.

Attention need not always apply: Mind wandering impedes explicit but not implicit sequence learning.

According to the attentional resources account, mind wandering (or "task-unrelated thought") is thought to compete with a focal task for attentional resources. Here, we tested two key predictions of this account: First, that mind wandering should not interfere with performance on a task that does not require attentional resources; second, that as task requirements become automatized, performance should improve and depth of mind wandering should increase. Here, we used a serial reaction time task with implicit- and explicit-learning groups to test these predictions. Providing novel evidence for the attentional resource account's first prediction, results indicated that depth of mind wandering was negatively associated with learning in the explicit, but not the implicit, group, indicating that mind wandering is associated with impaired explicit, but not implicit, learning. Corroborating the attention resource account's second prediction, we also found that, overall, performance improved while at the same time depth of mind wandering increased. From an implicit-learning perspective, these results are consistent with the claim that explicit learning is impaired under attentional load, but implicit learning is not. Data, analysis code, manuscript preparation code, and pre-print available at osf.io/qzry7/.

Taking charge: Characterizing the rapid development of self-regulation through intensive training.

Self-regulation is widely considered as a relatively stable trait, and the extent to which it can be improved through training is unknown. This randomized controlled investigation found dramatic and enduring increases in self-regulation among college students, as measured by experience sampling, nightly journaling, and questionnaires. Participants encountered stable levels of temptations throughout the intervention but became better at resisting them over time. Increases in self-regulation were accompanied by improvements across a diversity of additional outcomes like mood, stress, focus, mindfulness, emotional regulation, and life satisfaction. Collectively, this points to higher levels of plasticity in self-regulation and wellbeing than is widely assumed.