Competition, quality and integrated health care.

Integration of health care services has been promoted in several countries to improve the quality and coordination of care. We investigate the effects of such integration in a model where providers compete on quality to attract patients under regulated prices. We identify countervailing effects of integration on quality of care. While integration makes coordination of care more profitable for providers due to bundled payments, it also softens competition as patient choice is restricted. We also identify circumstances due to asymmetries across providers and/or services under which integration either increases or reduces the quality of services provided. In the absence of synergies, integration generally leads to increases in quality for some services and reductions for others. The corresponding effect on health benefits depends largely on whether integration leads to quality dispersion or convergence across services. If the softening of competition effect is weak, integration is likely to improve quality and patient outcomes.

Building on value-based health care: Towards a health system perspective.

A variety of methodologies have been developed to help health systems increase the 'value' created from their available resources. The urgency of creating value is heightened by population ageing, growth in people with complex morbidities, technology advancements, and increased citizen expectations. This study develops a policy framework that seeks to reconcile the various approaches towards value-based policies in health systems. The distinctive contribution is that we focus on the value created by the health system as a whole, including health promotion, thus moving from value-based health care towards a value-based health system perspective. We define health system value to be the contribution of the health system to societal wellbeing. We adopt a framework of five dimensions of value, embracing health improvement, health care responsiveness, financial protection, efficiency and equity, which we map onto a society's aggregate wellbeing. Actors within the health system make different contributions to value, and we argue that their perspectives can be aligned with a unifying concept of health system value. We provide examples of policy levers and highlight key actors and how they can promote certain aspects of health system value. We discuss advantages of value-based approach based on the notion of wellbeing and some practical obstacles to its implementation.

Pay-for-Performance incentives for specialised services in England: a mixed methods evaluation.

BACKGROUND: A Pay-for-Performance (P4P) programme, known as Prescribed Specialised Services Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (PSS CQUIN), was introduced for specialised services in the English NHS in 2013/2014. These services treat patients with rare and complex conditions. We evaluate the implementation of PSS CQUIN contracts between 2016/2017 and 2018/2019. METHODS: We used a mixed methods evaluative approach. In the quantitative analysis, we used a difference-in-differences design to evaluate the effectiveness of ten PSS CQUIN schemes across a range of targeted outcomes. Potential selection bias was addressed using propensity score matching. We also estimated impacts on costs by scheme and financial year. In the qualitative analysis, we conducted semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to gain insights into the complexities of contract design and programme implementation. Qualitative data analysis was based on the constant comparative method, inductively generating themes. RESULTS: The ten PSS CQUIN schemes had limited impact on the targeted outcomes. A statistically significant improvement was found for only one scheme: in the clinical area of trauma, the incentive scheme increased the probability of being discharged from Adult Critical Care within four hours of being clinically ready by 7%. The limited impact may be due to the size of the incentive payments, the complexity of the schemes' design, and issues around ownership, contracting and flexibility. CONCLUSION: The PSS CQUIN schemes had little or no impact on quality improvements in specialised services. Future P4P programmes in healthcare could benefit from lessons learnt from this study on incentive design and programme implementation.

The effect of hospital spending on waiting times.

Long waiting times have been a persistent policy issue in the United Kingdom that the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated. This study analyses the causal effect of hospital spending on waiting times in England using a first-differences panel approach and an instrumental variable strategy to deal with residual concerns for endogeneity. We use data from 2014 to 2019 on waiting times from general practitioner referral to treatment (RTT) measured at the level of local purchasers (known as Clinical Commissioning Groups). We find that increases in hospital spending by local purchasers of 1% reduce median RTT waiting time for patients whose pathway ends with a hospital admission (admitted pathway) by 0.6 days but the effect is not statistically significant at 5% level (only at the 10% level). We also find that higher hospital spending does not affect the RTT waiting time for patients whose pathway ends with a specialist consultation (non-admitted pathway). Nor does higher spending have a statistically significant effect on the volume of elective activity for either pathway. Our findings suggest that higher spending is no guarantee of higher volumes and lower waiting times, and that additional mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that increased spending benefits elective patients.

Socioeconomic inequalities in waiting times for planned and cancer surgery: Evidence from Spain.

Waiting times act as a non-price rationing mechanism to bring together the demand for and the supply of public healthcare services and ensure equal access independently of ability to pay. This study tests for the presence of socioeconomic inequalities in waiting times for ten publicly-funded planned and cancer surgeries in Catalonia (Spain) in 2015-2019. Socioeconomic status (SES), measured by four categories (very low, low, middle, high), is based on co-payment levels for medicines which depend on patient's income. Using administrative data, we estimate the association between SES and waiting times controlling for patient characteristics and hospital fixed effects. Compared to patients with low SES, patients with middle SES wait 2-6 fewer days for hip replacement, cataract surgery, and hysterectomy, and less than a day for breast cancer surgery. These inequalities arise within hospitals and are not explained by patient nor hospital characteristics. For some surgeries, the results also show that patients with higher SES are more likely to voluntarily exit the waiting list and have a lower probability of having a surgery canceled for medical reasons and dying while waiting.

The association between bed occupancy rates and hospital quality in the English National Health Service.

We study whether hospitals that exhibit systematically higher bed occupancy rates are associated with lower quality in England over 2010/11-2017/18. We develop an economic conceptual framework to guide our empirical analysis and run regressions to inform possible policy interventions. First, we run a pooled OLS regression to test if high bed occupancy is associated with, and therefore acts as a signal of, lower quality, which could trigger additional regulation. Second, we test whether this association is explained by exogenous demand-supply factors such as potential demand, and unavoidable costs. Third, we include determinants of bed occupancy (beds, length of stay, and volume) that might be associated with quality directly, rather than indirectly through bed occupancy. Last, we use a within-between random-effects specification to decompose these associations into those due to variations in characteristics between hospitals and variations within hospitals. We find that bed occupancy rates are positively associated with overall and surgical mortality, negatively associated with patient-reported health gains, but not associated with other indicators. These results are robust to controlling for demand-supply shifters, beds, and volume. The associations reduce by 12%-25% after controlling for length of stay in most cases and are explained by variations in bed occupancy between hospitals.

Understanding public procurement within the health sector: a priority in a post-COVID-19 world.

Every year, over 250,000 public authorities in the European Union (EU) spend about 14% of GDP on the purchase of services, works and supplies. Many are in the health sector, a sector in which public authorities are the main buyers in many countries. When these purchases exceed threshold values, EU public procurement rules apply. Public procurement is increasingly being promoted as a tool for improving efficiency and contributing to better health outcomes, and as a policy lever for achieving other government goals, such as innovation, the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, sustainable green growth and social objectives like public health and greater inclusiveness. In this paper, we describe the challenges that arise within health care systems with public procurement and identify potential solutions to them. We examined the tendering of pharmaceuticals, health technology, and e-health. In each case we identify a series of challenges relating to the complexity of the procurement process, imbalances in power on either side of transactions and the role of procurement in promoting broader public policy objectives. Finally, we recommend several actions that could stimulate better procurement, and suggest a few areas where further EU cooperation can be pursued.

Contracts for primary and secondary care physicians and equity-efficiency trade-offs.

We analyse how payment systems for general practitioners (GPs) and hospital specialists affect inequalities in healthcare treatments, referrals, and patient health. We present a model of contracting with two providers, a GP and a hospital specialist, with patients differing in severity and socioeconomic status, and the GP only receiving an informative signal on severity. We investigate four health system configurations depending on whether the GP refers and the specialist treats only high-severity patients or patients with any severity. We show that an increase in the GP fee, which induces GPs to refer only high-severity patients, increases utilitarian welfare but also increases inequities in access to specialist visits. A reduction in the DRG reimbursement to hospital specialists, which induces specialists to treat only high-severity patients, increases utilitarian welfare but also increases inequities in access to specialist visits when the GP refers only high-severity patients.

Consensus among clinicians on referrals' priority and use of digital decision-making support systems.

The growing demand for referrals is a main policy concern in health systems. One approach involves the development of demand management tools in the form of clinical prioritization to regulate patient referrals from primary care to specialist care. For clinical prioritization to be effective, it is critical that general practitioners (GPs) assess patient priority in the same way as specialists. The progressive development of IT tools in clinical practice, in the form of electronic referrals support systems (e-RSS), can facilitate clinical prioritization. In this study, we tested if higher use of e-RSS or higher use of high-priority categories was associated with the degree of agreement and therefore consensus on clinical priority between GPs and specialists. We found that higher use by GPs of the e-RSS tool was positively associated with greater degree of priority agreement with specialists, while higher use of the high-priority categories was associated with lower degree of priority agreement with specialists. Furthermore, female GPs, GPs in association with others, and GPs using a specific electronic medical record showed higher agreement with specialists. Our study therefore supports the use of electronic referrals systems to improve clinical prioritization and manage the demand of specialist visits and diagnostic tests. It also shows that there is scope for reducing excessive use by GPs of high-priority categories.

From Health in All Policies to Health for All Policies.

Worldwide responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have shown that it is possible for politicians to come together across departmental boundaries. To this end, in many countries, heads of government and their health ministers work closely with all other ministries, departments, and sectors, including social affairs, internal affairs, foreign affairs, research and education, transport, agriculture, business, and state aid. In this Viewpoint, we ask if and how the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can support intersectoral collaboration to promote health, since governments have already committed to achieving them. We contend that SDGs can do so, ultimately advancing health while offering co-benefits across society.

Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets.

We study the strategic relationship between hospital investment and provision of service quality. We use a spatial competition framework and allow investment and quality to be complements or substitutes in patient benefit and provider cost. We assume that each hospital commits to a certain investment before deciding on service quality, and that investment is observable and contractible while quality is observable but not contractible. We show that, under a fixed DRG-pricing system, providers' lack of ability to commit to quality leads to under- or overinvestment, relative to the first-best solution. Underinvestment arises when the price-cost margin is positive, and quality and investments are strategic complements, which has implications for optimal contracting. Differently from the simultaneous-move case, the regulator must complement the payment with one more instrument to address under/overinvestment. We also analyse the welfare effects of different policy options (separate payment for investment, higher per-treatment prices, or DRG-refinement policies).

The effect of co-payments on the take-up of prenatal tests.

Noninvasive prenatal screening tests help identify genetic disorders in a fetus, but their take-up remains low in several countries. Using a regression discontinuity design, we test the causal effect of a policy that eliminated co-payments for noninvasive screening tests in Italy. We identify the treatment effects by a discontinuity in women's eligibility for a free test based on their conception date. We find that the policy increases the probability of women's undergoing noninvasive screening tests by 5.5 percentage points, and the effect varies by socioeconomic status. We do not find evidence of substitution effects with more expensive and riskier invasive diagnostic tests. In addition, the increase in take-up does not affect pregnancy termination or newborn health. We find some evidence of positive effects on mothers' health behaviors during pregnancy as measured by reductions in mothers' weight gain and hospital admissions during pregnancy, but these are statistically significant only at the 10 percent level.

Hospital competition in a national health service: Evidence from a patient choice reform.

We study the impact of exposing hospitals in a National Health Service (NHS) to non-price competition by exploiting a patient choice reform in Norway in 2001. The reform facilitates a difference-in-difference approach due to plausibly exogenous (geographical) variation in pre-reform market structure. Employing rich, administrative data, covering the universe of hospital admissions from 1998 to 2005, we estimate models with hospital and treatment (DRG) fixed-effects and use only emergency admissions to limit patient selection issues. The results show that hospitals in more competitive areas have a sharper reduction in AMI mortality but no effect on stroke mortality. We also find that exposure to competition reduces all-cause mortality, shortens length of stay, but increases readmissions, though the effects are small in magnitude. In years with high (DRG) prices, the negative effect on readmissions almost vanishes. Finally, exposure to competition tends to reduce waiting times and increase admissions, but the effects must be interpreted with care as the outcomes include elective treatments.

Resilience Testing of Health Systems: How Can It Be Done?

The resilience of health systems has received considerable attention as of late, yet little is known about what a resilience test might look like. We develop a resilience test concept and methodology. We describe key components of a toolkit and a 5-phased approach to implementation of resilience testing that can be adapted to individual health systems. We develop a methodology for a test that is balanced in terms of standardization and system-specific characteristics/needs. We specify how to work with diverse stakeholders from the health ecosystem via participatory processes to assess and identify recommendations for health system strengthening. The proposed resilience test toolkit consists of "what if" adverse scenarios, a menu of health system performance elements and indicators based on an input-output-outcomes framework, a discussion guide for each adverse scenario, and a traffic light scorecard template. The five phases of implementation include Phase 0, a preparatory phase to adapt the toolkit materials; Phase 1: facilitated discussion groups with stakeholders regarding the adverse scenarios; Phase 2: supplemental data collection of relevant quantitative indicators; Phase 3: summarization of results; Phase 4: action planning and health system transformation. The toolkit and 5-phased approach can support countries to test resilience of health systems, and provides a concrete roadmap to its implementation.

Gaps in coverage and access in the European Union.

This study identifies gaps in universal health coverage in the European Union, using a questionnaire sent to the Health Systems and Policy Monitor network of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. The questionnaire was based on a conceptual framework with four access dimensions: population coverage, service coverage, cost coverage, and service access. With respect to population coverage, groups often excluded from statutory coverage include asylum seekers and irregular residents. Some countries exclude certain social-professional groups (e.g. civil servants) from statutory coverage but cover these groups under alternative schemes. In terms of service coverage, excluded or restricted services include optical treatments, dental care, physiotherapy, reproductive health services, and psychotherapy. Early access to new and expensive pharmaceuticals is a concern, especially for rare diseases and cancers. As to cost coverage, some countries introduced protective measures for vulnerable patients in the form of exemptions or ceilings from user chargers, especially for deprived groups or patients with accumulation of out-of-pocket spending. For service access, common issues are low perceived quality and long waiting times, which are exacerbated for rural residents who also face barriers from physical distance. Some groups may lack physical or mental ability to properly formulate their request for care. Currently, available indicators fail to capture the underlying causes of gaps in coverage and access.

Do small hospitals have lower quality? Evidence from the English NHS.

We investigate the extent to which small hospitals are associated with lower quality. We first take a patient perspective, and test if, controlling for casemix, patients admitted to small hospitals receive lower quality than those admitted to larger hospitals. We then investigate if differences in quality between large and small hospitals can be explained by hospital characteristics such as hospital type and staffing. We use a range of quality measures including hospital mortality rates (overall and for specific conditions), hospital acquired infection rates, waiting times for emergency patients, and patient perceptions of the care they receive. We find that small hospitals, with fewer than 400 beds, are generally not associated with lower quality before or after controlling for hospital characteristics. The only exception is heart attack mortality, which is generally higher in small hospitals.

The best person (or machine) for the job: Rethinking task shifting in healthcare.

Globally, health systems are faced with the difficult challenge of how to get the best results with the often limited number of health workers available to them. Exacerbating this challenge is the task of meeting ever-changing needs of service users and managing unprecedented technological advances. The process of matching skills to changing needs and opportunities is termed task shifting. It involves questioning health service goals, what health workers do, asking if it can be done in a better way, and implementing change. Task shifting in healthcare is often conceptualised as a process of transferring responsibility for 'simple' tasks from high-skilled but scarce health workers to those with less expertise and lower pay, and predominantly viewed as a means to reduce costs and promote efficiency. Here we present a position paper based on the work and expertise of the European Commission Expert Panel on Effective ways of Investing in Health. It contends that this is over simplistic, and aims to provide a new task shifting framework, informed by relevant evidence, and a series of recommendations. While far from comprehensive, there is a growing body of evidence that certain tasks traditionally undertaken by one type of health worker can be undertaken by others (or machines), in some cases to a higher standard, thus challenging the persistence of rigid professional boundaries. Task shifting has the potential to contribute to health systems strengthening when accompanied by adequate planning, resources, education, training and transparency.

What explains differences in waiting times for health care across socioeconomic status?

In publicly funded health systems, waiting times act as a rationing mechanism that should be based on need rather than socioeconomic status. However, several studies suggest that individuals with higher socioeconomic status wait less. Using individual-level data from administrative registers, we estimate and explain socioeconomic inequalities in access to publicly funded care for seven planned hospital procedures in Denmark. For each procedure, we first estimate the association between patients' waiting time for health care and their socioeconomic status as measured by income and education, controlling for patient severity. Then, we investigate how much of the association remains after controlling for (i) other individual characteristics (patients' family status, labor market status, and country of origin) that may be correlated with income and education, (ii) possible selection due to patients' use of a waiting time guarantee, and (iii) hospital factors which allow us to disentangle whether inequalities in waiting times arise across hospitals or within the hospital. Only for a few procedures, we find inequalities in waiting times related to income and education. These inequalities can be explained mostly by geographical and institutional factors across hospitals. But we also find inequalities for some procedures in relation to non-Western immigrants within hospitals.

Socioeconomic inequalities in waiting times for primary care across ten OECD countries.

Waiting times for health care are a major policy concern across OECD countries. Waiting times are generally tolerated in publicly-funded health systems and perceived as equitable if access to care is not based on socioeconomic status. Although a growing literature has documented that socioeconomic status is negatively associated with waiting times for secondary care in several countries, less is known about waiting time inequalities in primary care, which is the focus of this study. We exploit the Commonwealth Fund's International Health Policy Survey of Adults in 2010, 2013 and 2016 and include ten OECD countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Waiting time for primary care is measured by the time reported to get an appointment to see a doctor or a nurse. We employ interval regression models to investigate for each country whether socioeconomic status (household income and education) are associated with the waiting time for a primary care appointment. We control for age, gender, chronic conditions, and whether the individual holds private health insurance. We find a negative association between household income and waiting times in Canada, Germany, Norway and Sweden.