Preference for the Outcome That Follows a Relatively Aversive Event: Contrast or Delay Reduction?

Pigeons prefer a positive discriminative (S+) stimulus that follows a less preferred event (a large number of required responses, a longer delay, or the absence of food) over a different S+ with a similar history of reinforcement that follows a more preferred event (a single required response, no delay, or food). We proposed that this phenomenon results from contrast (referred to as within-trial contrast) between the less preferred initial event and the signal for reinforcement. Delay reduction theory (Fantino, 1969) can account for these results by proposing that the less preferred initial event lengthens the duration of the trial, thereby allowing the S+ stimulus to occur later in the trial and thus become a better predictor of reinforcement. In the present experiments, we further explored this effect. In Experiment 1, we controlled for trial duration by using a fixed ratio response (30 pecks) as one initial event and the absence of pecking for the same duration as the other initial event (0 pecks). The pigeons showed a reliable preference for the positive stimulus that followed the least preferred initial event. In Experiment 2, we controlled for trial duration by using 30 pecks as one initial event and 1 peck followed by a delay that matched the duration of the preceding 30-peck trial. (Group Time Same). For Group Time Different, there was no delay following the 1-peck initial event. For Group Time Same, preference for the initial event negatively predicted the pigeons' preference for the S+ stimulus that followed, supporting the contrast account. A somewhat greater preference for the discriminative stimulus that followed the least preferred initial event was found for Group Time Different suggesting that in addition to contrast, delay reduction also may play a small role. However, the greater initial-event preference found for Group Time Different suggests that contrast can account for the group difference as well.

Episodic-like memory: pigeons can report location pecked when unexpectedly asked.

Pigeons were tested for their ability to report the location they recently pecked, without prior experience having to do so. They were first pretrained to report the location that they had just pecked. They were then trained on a conditional discrimination to associate yellow and blue samples with vertical and horizontal comparisons, respectively, independent of comparison location. On probe trials in testing, when after choosing a vertical or horizontal line following the yellow or blue sample, the pigeons were 'asked' which location they had just pecked, they showed a significant tendency to choose correctly in spite of the fact that location of the correct comparison was incidental to the task. Performing on probe trials is analogous to asking the pigeons an unexpected question about their recent behavior and it is similar to the episodic memory question asked of humans, "What did you have for breakfast this morning?".

Required pecking and refraining from pecking alter judgments of time by pigeons.

There is evidence that humans' perception of time is affected by the activity in which they are engaged while they are timing. The more demanding the task, the faster time appears to pass. A similar effect has been found in pigeons. Pigeons trained to discriminate between a short-duration (2-sec) and a long-duration (10-sec) stimulus were required to peck when the stimulus was one color and to refrain from pecking when it was a different color. On probe trials of intermediate durations, the bisection point (50% choice of the stimulus associated with both long and short stimuli) for trials in which the pigeons were required to peck was almost 1 sec longer than on trials in which the pigeons were required to refrain from pecking (Zentall, Friedrich, & Clement, 2006). In the present research, we replicated this effect and determined the relation between this effect and the typical bisection point that occurs when pecking is permitted but not required. Results indicated that the typical procedure results in a bisection point that is between required pecking and refraining from pecking. Furthermore, the rate of pecking when pecking is allowed but not required also falls between the rate of pecking for the required-pecking and refrain-from-pecking conditions. This result suggests that, similar to humans, pigeons underestimate the passage of time when they are active or when attention to time-related cues has to be shared with attention to satisfying the response requirement.

Matching-to-sample by pigeons: the dissociation of comparison choice frequency from the probability of reinforcement.

It has been proposed that comparison choice in matching-to-sample should depend on two factors, the relative probability of reinforcement associated with each of the comparison stimuli and the conditional probability of each comparison stimulus being correct given presentation of one of the samples. DiGian and Zentall [DiGian, K.A., Zentall, T.R., 2007. Matching-to-sample in pigeons: in the absence of sample memory, sample frequency is a better predictor of comparison choice than the probability of reinforcement for comparison choice. Learn Behav. 35, 242-261] have shown that sample frequency together with the probability of choosing each of the comparison stimuli in training can influence comparison choice when delays are introduced, when the number of reinforcements associated with each of the comparison stimuli is equated. Furthermore, Zentall and Clement [Zentall, T.R., Clement, T.S., 2002. Memory mechanisms in pigeons: Evidence of base-rate neglect. J. Exp. Psych.: Anim. Behav. Proc. 28, 111-115] have found that sample frequency can affect comparison choice when delays are introduced independently of the number of choices of each of the comparison stimuli in training and the number of reinforcements associated with each of the comparison stimuli is equated. In the present experiment we found that the probability of choosing each of the comparison stimuli in training can affect comparison choice when delays are introduced, independently of sample frequency and when the number of reinforcements associated with each of the comparison stimuli is equated. Together, these experiments suggest that when the sample is not available, there is a partial dissociation between comparison choice and the probability of reinforcement associated with each of the comparison stimuli.

Pigeons learn to answer the question "where did you just peck?" and can report peck location when unexpectedly asked.

If pigeons are trained on matching-to-sample with differential responding required to the two samples, there is evidence that the differential responding can control comparison choice. We asked whether similar responding required at two different locations could also serve as the basis for comparison choice. Pigeons were pretrained to report the location that they had pecked. To reduce the likelihood that they could use the presence of differential proprioceptive cues at the time of their report, a common response was required between the location response and the comparison choice. They were then given experience with a conditional discrimination in which location of the comparison response varied randomly and was incidental to the choice of comparison. On test trials, after the pigeons had made their comparison choice, they showed a significant tendency to choose the appropriate test comparison when they were unexpectedly asked to report the location of their previous pecking response. These results have implications for the demonstration of episodic-like memory in pigeons because they suggest that pigeons have the capacity to recall, unexpectedly, specific details about their past experiences.

Within-trial contrast: pigeons prefer conditioned reinforcers that follow a relatively more rather than a less aversive event.

When behavior suggests that the value of a reinforcer depends inversely on the value of the events that precede or follow it, the behavior has been described as a contrast effect. Three major forms of contrast have been studied: incentive contrast, in which a downward (or upward) shift in the magnitude of reinforcement produces a relatively stronger downward (or upward) shift in the vigor of a response; anticipatory contrast, in which a forthcoming improvement in reinforcement results in a relative reduction in consummatory response; and behavioral contrast, in which a decrease in the probability of reinforcement in one component of a multiple schedule results in an increase in responding in an unchanged component of the schedule. Here we discuss a possible fourth kind of contrast that we call within-trial contrast because within a discrete trial, the relative value of an event has an inverse effect on the relative value of the reinforcer that follows. We show that greater effort, longer delay to reinforcement, or the absence of food all result in an increase in the preference for positive discriminative stimuli that follow (relative to less effort, shorter delay, or the presence of food). We further distinguish this within-trial contrast effect from the effects of delay reduction. A general model of this form of contrast is proposed in which the value of a primary or conditioned reinforcer depends on the change in value from the value of the event that precedes it.

Within-trial contrast: when is a failure to replicate not a type I error?

Vasconcelos, Urcuioli, and Lionello-DeNolf (2007) report the results of five experiments that fail to replicate the results of our within-trial contrast study (Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, & Zentall, 2000) and suggest that our results may represent a Type I Error. We believe that this conclusion is not warranted because (a) there is considerable evidence in support of the effect and (b) the amount of training that they gave to their pigeons prior to test may not have been sufficient to observe the effect reliably. We suggest that when sufficient training is provided, reliable contrast can be found.

Preference for a stimulus that follows a relatively aversive event: contrast or delay reduction?

Several types of contrast effects have been identified including incentive contrast, anticipatory contrast, and behavioral contrast. Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, and Zentall (2000) proposed a type of contrast that appears to be different from these others and called it within-trial contrast. In this form of contrast the relative value of a reinforcer depends on the events that occur immediately prior to the reinforcer. Reinforcers that follow relatively aversive events are preferred over those that follow less aversive events. In many cases the delay reduction hypothesis proposed by Fantino (1969) also can account for such effects. The current experiments provide a direct test of the delay reduction and contrast hypotheses by manipulating the schedule of reinforcement while holding trial duration constant. In Experiment 1, preference for fixed-interval (FI) versus differential-reinforcement-of-other-behavior (DRO) schedules of reinforcement was assessed. Some pigeons preferred one schedule over the other while others demonstrated a position (side) preference. Thus, no systematic preference was found. In Experiment 2, a simultaneous color discrimination followed the FI or DRO schedule, and following training, preference was assessed by presenting the two positive stimuli simultaneously. Consistent with the contrast hypothesis, pigeons showed a significant preference for the positive stimulus that in training had followed their less preferred schedule.

Use of a single-code/default strategy by pigeons to acquire duration sample discriminations.

Past evidence that pigeons may adopt a single-code/default strategy to solve duration sample discriminations may be attributable to the similarity between the intertrial interval (ITI) and the retention interval. The present experiments tested whether pigeons would adopt a single-code/default strategy when possible ITI-retention-interval ambiguity was eliminated and sample salience was increased. Previous studies of duration sample discriminations that have purported to show evidence for the use of a single-code/default coding strategy have used durations of 0, 2, and 10 sec (Zentall, Klein, and Singer, 2004). However, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that the use of a 0-sec sample may produce an artifact resulting in inadvertent present/absent sample matching. In Experiment 2, when pigeons were trained with three nonzero duration samples (2, 8, and 32 sec), clear evidence for the use of a single-code/default strategy was found.

Evidence for detection of one duration sample and default responding to other duration samples by pigeons may result from an artifact of retention-test ambiguity.

S. C. Gaitan and J. T. Wixted (2000) proposed that when pigeons are trained on a conditional discrimination to associate 1 duration sample with 1 comparison and 2 other duration samples with a 2nd comparison, they detect only the single duration, and on trials involving either of the 2 other duration samples, they respond to the other comparison by default. In 2 experiments, the authors show instead that pigeons lend to treat the retention intervals (such as those used by Gaitan and Wixted) as intertrial intervals, and thus, they tend to treat all trials with a delay as 0-s sample trials. The authors tested this hypothesis by showing that divergent retention functions do not appear when the retention interval is discriminably different from the intertrial interval.