Inactivation efficacy of H5N1 avian influenza virus by commonly used sample preparation reagents for safe laboratory practices.

The objective of this study was to determine the inactivation efficiency of common sample preparation reagents against highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) H5N1 virus. HPAI H5N1 virus has caused infections in humans with a mortality rate of over 50%. Due to the high mortality and the risk of aerosol transmission of that virus to humans and birds, infectious HPAI H5N1 viruses are contained in a biosafety level 3 laboratory. However, many procedures for further molecular analyses would be easier in lower biosafety conditions. To ensure the laboratory safety the successful inactivation procedures should be demonstrated before the samples are transferred to a lower containment facility. We tested the inactivation capacity of commonly used cell lysis buffer radio-immuno precipitation assay (RIPA) buffer for protein samples, cell fixatives methanol (MeOH) and paraformaldehyde (PFA) and guanidine isothiocyanate-containing lysis buffer for RNA isolation (RLT, Qiagen) in H5N1-infected cells. Based on our results RLT buffer, 90% MeOH (20 min, -20 °C) and 4% PFA (30 min, RT) all completely inactivated the HPAI H5N1 virus. However, RIPA buffer alone was not sufficient to inactivate the HPAI H5N1 virus in infected cell samples but, instead, combining RIPA lysis buffer and boiling for 10 min the samples in Laemmli buffer led to complete inactivation of the virus.

Phylogeography of Francisella tularensis subspecies holarctica in Finland, 1993-2011.

BACKGROUND: Finland repeatedly reports some of the highest incidences of tularaemia worldwide. To determine genetic diversity of the aetiologic agent of tularaemia, Francisella tularensis, a total of 76 samples from humans (n = 15) and animals (n = 61) were analysed. METHODS: We used CanSNPs and canINDEL hydrolysis or TaqMan MGB probes for the analyses, either directly from the clinical tissue samples (n = 21) or from bacterial isolates (n = 55). RESULTS: The genotypes of the strains were assigned to three previously described basal subspecies holarctica clades. The majority of strains (n = 67) were assigned to B.12, a clade reported to dominate in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. A single strain was assigned to clade B.4, previously reported from North America, Europe and China. The remaining strains (n = 8) were members of clade B.6. Importantly, new diversity was discovered in clade B.6. We describe two newly designed TaqMan MGB probe assays for this new B.6 subclade B.70, and its previously identified sister clade B.11, a clade dominantly found in Western Europe. CONCLUSIONS: The high genetic diversity of F. tularensis subspecies holarctica present in Finland is consistent with previous findings in Sweden. The results suggest a northern and southern division of the B.6 subclade B.10, where B.11 predominates in Western and Central Europe and B.70 is found in Fennoscandia. Further research is required to define whether the vast diversity of genotypes found is related to different habitats or reservoir species, their different postglacial immigration routes to Fennoscandia, or dynamics of the reservoir species.

Detection of Francisella tularensis in voles in Finland.

Francisella tularensis is a highly virulent intracellular bacterium causing the zoonotic disease tularemia. It recurrently causes human and animal outbreaks in northern Europe, including Finland. Although F. tularensis infects several mammal species, only rodents and lagomorphs seem to have importance in its ecology. Peak densities of rodent populations may trigger tularemia outbreaks in humans; however, it is still unclear to which extent rodents or other small mammals maintain F. tularensis in nature. The main objective of this study was to obtain information about the occurrence of F. tularensis in small mammals in Finland. We snap-trapped 547 wild small mammals representing 11 species at 14 locations around Finland during 6 years and screened them for the presence of F. tularensis DNA using PCR analysis. High copy number of F. tularensis-specific DNA was detected in tissue samples of five field voles (Microtus agrestis) originating from one location and 2 years. According to DNA sequences of the bacterial 23S ribosomal RNA gene amplified from F. tularensis-infected voles, the infecting agent belongs to the subspecies holarctica. To find out the optimal tissue for tularemia screening in voles, we compared the amounts of F. tularensis DNA in lungs, liver, spleen, and kidney of the infected animals. F. tularensis DNA was detectable in high levels in all four organs except for one animal, whose kidney was F. tularensis DNA-negative. Thus, at least liver, lung, and spleen seem suitable for F. tularensis screening in voles. Thus, liver, lung, and spleen all seem suitable for F. tularensis screening in voles. In conclusion, field voles can be heavily infected with F. tularensis subsp. holarctica and thus potentially serve as the source of infection in humans and other mammals.

[Safe from biothreats? Legislation protects you and society]. / Biouhilta turvassa?--Säädökset suojaavat työntekijää ja yhteiskuntaa.

The 9/11 terror attacks, followed by mailing of letters containing anthrax spores, changed our comprehension on threats towards modern society. Finland is committed by international treaties to develop biosafety and biosecurity legislation, and general awareness of the legislation. However, the rapidly developing field of biosciences cannot be extensively regulated by legislation. Awareness of the risks and challenges involved in handling of biological agents is an important tool in threat prevention. Despite active efforts to update the legislation by government authorities, currently the sustenance and development of biosecurity are primarily in the hands of individual researchers and the scientific community.

[New challenges in the biological weapons convention]. / Biologisten aseiden kieltosopimuksen uudet haasteet.

Microbes and their toxins are biological weapons that can cause disease in humans, animals or plants, and which can be used with hostile intent in warfare and terrorism. Biological agents can be used as weapons of mass destruction and therefore, immense human and social and major economical damage can be caused. Rapid development of life sciences and technologies during the recent decades has posed new challenges to the Biological Weapons Convention. The Convention states that the States Parties to the BWC strive to ensure that the Convention remains relevant and effective, despite changes in science, technology or politics.